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Transcript for Bassem Youssef: Israel-Palestine, Gaza, Hamas, Middle East, Satire & Fame | Lex Fridman Podcast #424

This is a transcript of Lex Fridman Podcast #424 with Bassem Youssef.
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Introduction

Bassem Youssef
(00:00:00)
If I hate you, that’s great, but if I have a story to support that hate, that’s even better.
Lex Fridman
(00:00:04)
One of your favorite words, “Jihad.”
Bassem Youssef
(00:00:09)
That’s my favorite hobbies. It doesn’t matter now, who do you vote into power; they will not listen to you, they would listen to the people who paid them to be there. When the military came in, people were walking to me, pointing their fingers like, “Don’t speak about [inaudible 00:00:24], don’t speak about the army. We love you now, but don’t you…” They would, like that. So I called John Stewart, I was like, “I don’t know what to do.” And he said the most interesting thing ever. And say, “If you’re afraid of something, make fun about the fact that you’re afraid of it.”
Lex Fridman
(00:00:43)
The following is a conversation with Bassem Youssef, a legendary Egyptian-American comedian, the so-called John Stewart of the Middle East, who fearlessly satirized those in power even when his job and life were on the line. Bassem is a beautiful human being. It was truly a pleasure for me to get to know him and to have this fun, fascinating, and challenging conversation. This is the Lex Fridman podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, dear friends, here’s Bassem Youssef.

Oct 7


(00:01:21)
Your wife is half Palestinian, and I’ve heard you say that you’ve been trying to kill her, but she keeps using the kids as human shields. So have you considered negotiating a ceasefire?
Bassem Youssef
(00:01:31)
Well, the thing is, every day, every minute of the day in a married life is a negotiation. Everything can blow up into a full-scale war. Starting from a simple sentence like, “Good morning, what should we do with the kids today? What should we do with that piece of furniture?” Any sentence can lead you to heaven or to hell in the same time.
Lex Fridman
(00:01:54)
So, you do negotiate with terrorists.
Bassem Youssef
(00:01:56)
Oh yeah. Yeah, 100%. You must. Yeah. And for her, I’m her terrorist too. So it’s equal.
Lex Fridman
(00:02:01)
Terrorists on both sides. On a more serious note, when you found out about the attacks of October 7th, what went through your mind?
Bassem Youssef
(00:02:08)
If I’m allowed to use a curse word, I was like-
Lex Fridman
(00:02:11)
As many as possible.
Bassem Youssef
(00:02:12)
I was like, “Oh shit.” Part of my stand-up comedy is I describe a situation where I was in a restaurant with producers and there was a bombing two blocks away in Chelsea, New York in 2016. And of course, this is the like, “Damn, what’s going to happen to us now?” And there’s two different reactions, the white reaction, which is like, “Oh my God, I hope nobody is hurt. This is terrible. I hope everybody’s okay.” And there’s the Arab reaction. “What’s his name? What’s his name? What is the name?” Because you know what’s going to come. I was scared what’s going to really happened in that area, and I said like, “Oh my God, it’s going to be horrible.” And the way that it was reported, I didn’t know how to handle this. So I went into hiding for a few days, three or four days, and I talked about Piers Morgan team talking to me two times, three times. I was like, “No, I can’t. How can you defend that? How can you defend the rape, the decapitated babies and whatever?”

(00:03:12)
And then I started kind of looking in the news a little bit, and then I started seeing people coming on the shows and saying things that I know as an Arab, as a Muslim, as someone from that region, that it’s not true. But I didn’t know what to say, how to say it. So by the third time when they asked me, I said, “Fine, put me on.” And I went there, it was [inaudible 00:03:36], figuratively speaking, a suicide mission because it’s a lose-lose situation. I can lose stuff in Hollywood. I remember my managers like, “Bessem, be careful. I mean, are you sure you want to do it?” My managers was like, “Please don’t do it. Please don’t do it.” And on the other side, if I don’t perform well, whatever, “Well” means, I’m going to be rejected by my own people. So it was a lose-lose situation because whatever I say, it’ll never be enough, and whatever I say will not be good enough. And I was going into there, and I felt that I was going into a trance for the 33 minutes that I was on that interview for the first time.
Lex Fridman
(00:04:20)
You blacked out?
Bassem Youssef
(00:04:21)
I blacked out. I blacked out. And a lot of people ask me, “Was that a bit when the earpiece kept falling?” It’s like, “No, it was really falling off and it disconnected and I had to save it because I cannot see them, I can just hear them and I could expecting at any time, “Okay, Bessem, thank you.”” I was fighting for every second, to say words, to put stuff in there.
Lex Fridman
(00:04:45)
For people who don’t know, this is your conversation, interview with Piers Morgan and you couldn’t see.
Bassem Youssef
(00:04:51)
I couldn’t see. I was just like, the lens of the camera and-
Lex Fridman
(00:04:54)
It was like a surreal dream or nightmare.
Bassem Youssef
(00:04:56)
Yeah. “Hello, Bessem.” It was like, “Hello, Bessem,” I was like, “Hi.”
Lex Fridman
(00:04:59)
And it could end at any moment, your career and everything.
Bassem Youssef
(00:05:02)
Everything. Yeah. Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:05:04)
So what was the drive that got you to actually do it, to overcome that fear?
Bassem Youssef
(00:05:10)
Multiple things. First of all, I don’t want to say it’s just my wife’s family because my wife’s family has always been there, but this time was different. The bombing, the attack, they’re usually one of those people that they’re aware of everything. When whatever happened in Gaza, they are always in safe places. But this time, it seems that there was no place safe. And already we heard about two, three of the cousins, and the uncles already lost their home. So this was too much. So I wanted to say something for those people, because I know that… One of the jokes that I made about like, “Oh, it’s Hasan, her cousin, he’s a loser, he’s a doctor. He’s a doctor.” And every time a hospital was bombed, we were worried about him. So I wanted to say that because I felt that this is a family that I have never seen in my life. She actually hardly saw an uncle or two, because they cannot leave. But I said, “I need to speak, at least I do something for those extended family that I have never known.”

(00:06:17)
But also because when Piers Morgan team called me a couple of times and said, “Okay, let’s see what’s going on in the show,” and I just watched the stuff, and the lies, and the one-sided reporting that made my blood boil. And then I thought, “What am I afraid of? I’m afraid of if I say something, I can lose my career. Wait a minute, but that was the reason why I left Egypt.” I said, “Wait, I left Egypt, I came to United States, I came to the Land of the Free where I can say anything I want. And yet I have limitation of what to say. I mean, I thought we left that shit behind. I mean, what’s happening?”

(00:06:57)
And I understand the connection of how sensitive it is when you speak about Israel and all of the ready-made accusations. But as an Arab, as a Muslim, I don’t react the same when you talk about Saudi Arabia, or Iran, or Egypt or any of them, it’s like, “Hey, you want to dis some of these countries, I’ll do that with you because I have strong opinions about what happened and I already been expressing them.” But that’s why, and there’s a lot of Jewish people who come to my show and they understand that. They understand the separation, but that kind of a grouping of blackmailing people and saying, and not saying what they have in their mind, it is that one of the things that kind of pushed me to go on the show.
Lex Fridman
(00:07:40)
The thing that was bothering you, was that what was being said or how it was being said?
Bassem Youssef
(00:07:46)
Both. Because there are lies, which is usually in the media, but there was the total disregard of humanity. You talk a lot on your show about human suffering, and I felt that here the human suffering was not equal. I felt that’s why I came up with this like, “What’s the exchange rate today? What’s the exchange rate today?” Of course, it’s terrible to see anybody die, but I feel that like, isn’t our life not worth anything?
Lex Fridman
(00:08:20)
Yeah. You had a chart akin to crypto, you analyzed it from an investing perspective, of course, in a dark human economy-
Bassem Youssef
(00:08:27)
The ROI on-
Lex Fridman
(00:08:30)
The ROI. And you were saying that a certain year was a good year.
Bassem Youssef
(00:08:34)
Yeah, 2014.
Lex Fridman
(00:08:34)
2014 was a good year for investment purposes and also to refer to family member that you called a loser, you were saying that you called him, had a conversation with him, and he keeps saying that he’s not using anybody for human shields, and you called him a loser. What do you do? He can’t even keep a job.
Bassem Youssef
(00:08:51)
Liar. He lied to us because I have to believe. It’s also one of the things, like how it was said, it was stuff that I’ve been hearing. I don’t know what turned on in my head, but it’s stuff that I’ve been hearing all my life from the media, “Israel warns civilians before bombing them, and that’s okay,” but that’s not okay. Israel is trying to minimize the civilians, but killing them anyway. And that’s okay, but that’s not okay. So it is kind of like the indoctrination that we’ve been hearing, as if it is okay, and then suddenly it’s not.
Lex Fridman
(00:09:27)
Yeah, there’s a kind of several layers of bullshit, almost sometimes hiding the obvious horror of the situation with kind of politeness and all this kind of stuff. Just the basic value of human life. That said, it’s a difficult situation.
Bassem Youssef
(00:09:44)
It is.
Lex Fridman
(00:09:45)
What would you do if you were Israel? Bibi called you, awesome, big fan, big fan of your comedy. First of all, would you hang up right away? Would you hear him out?
Bassem Youssef
(00:09:54)
Oh, I’ll definitely hear him out. That was like, “Wait a minute. That’s material. That’s material, man.” It was like, “So Netanyahu called me. I was sitting with my family. Just like, I’m on my phone, and it was like, “Oh, Netanyahu.”
Lex Fridman
(00:10:05)
Yeah, it just shows up that way. I mean, what would you do? What would you do in this situation?
Bassem Youssef
(00:10:13)
To answer this question, we need to understand how Israel thinks. There is an incredible speech given by Gideon Levy, the famous Israeli reporter [inaudible 00:10:23]. He describes a situation where he was in the West Bank and there was a checkpoint. And in that checkpoint there was an ambulance with a Palestinian patient and it was there, sitting for an hour and a half, not moving. And then he went to talk to the soldiers, like, “Guys, why are you not letting them go?” It’s like, “Ah, let them go.” And then he told them, “Imagine if he was your father.” And the soldiers stood up, it was like, “What? These are pigs. These are not humans.”

(00:10:58)
So when you tell me what would you do if Israel would do, we need to ask how does Israel look at the Palestinian and view the Palestinians? Because they do look at them less than human. And there is an incredible talk by [inaudible 00:11:12] Meyer. He was a Holocaust survivor, and he said, “I learned in Auschwitz when I was there in the Concentration Camp that in order for a dominant group of people to dehumanize another group, they need first, to dehumanize themselves. And Israel looks at Palestinians as lesser people, as lesser beings, as some people who are dispensable. And the way that they treat them is that, they don’t really care about… That’s why that the exchange rate thing.

(00:11:42)
So for me, if I am Israel, it’ll be like, “What would you do if you’re the United States in the time of the Native Americans? They were killing people with the millions.” When you dehumanize a group of people, you really don’t care. So if I was Israel, I would do exactly what Israel is doing right now, because there’s no one is holding me accountable. There is no one stopping me, and I can get whatever I want, throughout my history, through violence.
Lex Fridman
(00:12:08)
I think a lot of the things you just said are a tiny bit slightly exaggerated. So let me try.
Bassem Youssef
(00:12:14)
Please, please.
Lex Fridman
(00:12:14)
Let’s try. So not everybody in Israel.
Bassem Youssef
(00:12:17)
Of course.
Lex Fridman
(00:12:17)
So let’s look at several groups. So people in government, IDF soldiers and citizens that are neither of those. And not everybody of any of those sees Palestinians as less than human, just some percentage. So what percentage is that in your sense?
Bassem Youssef
(00:12:39)
It’s the people who have the power.
Lex Fridman
(00:12:41)
So it’s mostly the focus of your commentary, when you say, “People in Israel,” you really mean the people in power.
Bassem Youssef
(00:12:47)
The people who have the power, but as much as, of course, I mean the people in power, because even when I speak about America, I speak about people in power. When I speak about Egypt, I speak the people about power, because you can’t really talk about the 100 million people in Egypt, or the 11 million people in Israel. Of course not. There are people who go in, and they demonstrate against Netanyahu and they want him out of the government. But we have to admit that the Israeli society at a whole have moved quite bit to the right and has been many extreme. And you know what happens when you go to the right or you go to the most extreme, the other person go to the most extreme, and extremism breeds extremism. So thank you for the clarification, but I really meant, with the people of power. When people criticize the United States for going in Iraq, of course I’m not criticizing citizens.
Lex Fridman
(00:13:32)
But you made another point, which is an interesting point and it’s very difficult to see in the heart of people. But I wonder if you look at the average Palestinian and the average Israeli, and when they look at the other, do they have some hate in their heart? Well, everybody probably has some. What is that amount? When you look at a person that looks different than you, how much hate is there?
Bassem Youssef
(00:13:57)
It depends on what is the living situation of each person. So in the Berlin Film Festival, just like a few couple of weeks ago, there was an Israeli and a Palestinian receiving an award together. And the Israeli director said, “We are going to go back to Israel. He’s going to go to the West Bank, he will have no rights, and I’ll have full living rights.” These people managed to work together and be friends, and they have empathy to each other. Now, the average Palestinian, it’s a very difficult question because is it the Palestinian in the diaspora or the Palestinian in Gaza? Or the diaspora in the West Bank or the one as a citizen of Israel, who still have less right than a normal citizen of Israel, a Jew?” And it really depends. There are Arabs in Israel who are having a great life, and there are people, Arabs, who are having a miserable life, but definitely people that living in Gaza or in the West Bank is kind of like on the lower tier of the living conditions. Now, let’s talk about the hate. What does that Palestinian see from an Israeli? The Palestinian see oppression, limitation of movement, limitation of freedom. And then when there’s something happens, you see the full force coming in, destroying their home, taking away members of his family. There would be absolutely no reason for him to love the other. The Israeli, because he doesn’t have the power, but he lives under his government, all he sees is the rockets or whatever, but he sees the reaction and he doesn’t see what happened to those humans. And as humans, we are selfish. We see what really affects us as humans. And I cannot even imagine what it would be like to live as a Palestinian, and I’m not even talk about Gaza because everybody talks about Gaza. But let me give you an example, and I’m not going to talk about the 12,000 kids killed in Gaza, let’s talk about just the four weeks in the West Bank.

(00:15:57)
March 4th, Amir al-Najjar, age 10, sitting next to his father, shot in while he’s sitting in the car next to his father by the IDF soldiers. Mohammed Ziyad, 13 years old, March 3rd, shot in front of a UN school while sitting with his friends. Mohammed Ghanem, age 15, March 2nd, he shot while standing in front of a storefront during a night raid. February 23rd, Saeed Jardal, he was killed by a drone fire. February 22nd, Fadi Suleiman killed while standing in front of a top of a red cross building. Nihil Ziyad, February 14th, Valentine’s Day, killed and shot in the head while leaving school. February 11th, Mohammed Khattour, US citizens killed while being in a parked car. And [inaudible 00:16:54], February 9th, killed right in front of his home because a military car came reversing back to him, and then somebody opened the door, shot him and leave. This is a daily life of people in the West Bank.
Lex Fridman
(00:17:07)
What is the justification the IDF provides?
Bassem Youssef
(00:17:11)
Terrorism.
Lex Fridman
(00:17:13)
Terrorism?
Bassem Youssef
(00:17:14)
Or I don’t know. I mean you cannot really say, “Human shields,” but they would say they were throwing rocks. There was a guy who went on Chris Rock and he said his son, a US citizen was killed, and they were throwing rocks, so we killed him. Even when they were throwing rocks, you killed him? But the thing is, you see, this is how easy for them to get rid of Palestinians. I mean, I had to say, I prepared a little bit for the podcast because you are in tech and I am ignorant in tech. There is a movie called The Lab. It is directed by an Israeli director called Yotam Feldman. And he talks about how the military industry in Israel is very advanced. And what is really mind-boggling is in that movie, he shows how the military tests its weapons in the field, in urban areas, on Palestinians.

(00:18:08)
It is heartbreaking, as a doctor, there’s five stages of trials. There is discovery, pre-clinical, clinical, and then market, and then post-market evaluation by the FDA, the FDA approve, and then the FDA post-market. Five just to take a pill. And you go in and he interviews people as like, “Where did you test this?” They tested in the field.

(00:18:35)
So when human life is so cheap, and it is so indispensable, it gave me a visceral reaction because this has been actually the state of humanity. Humanity lived, and survived and thrive by actually killing each other. But there was kind of a, we were remotely, we are removed from it. People in Greece didn’t know what the Alexander the Great was doing. He was killing and pillaging. We call him, “The Great,” but he was killing. He was conquering, he was invading. Julius Caesar, all of the greats, he would do it, but killing was difficult. Killing had to have some sort of… You have to be with your enemy. Then you go back, catapults, then cannons, then a little bit back, and then you are kind of starting remotely. Now you’re killing people behind the screen with a push of a button. A lot of people say, “Terrorism, they killed you with a knife, killed one person with a knife, shot you. That’s terrorism.” But if you fly a $64 million F-16 and you drop up in an A-84 bomb that costs $16,000, that’s not terrorism because it’s remote. You’re behind the screen.

(00:19:49)
So what happened, what Israel is doing, it is removing itself, like America too, drones [inaudible 00:19:55]. And then when you push someone to be, they always brag about bombing them to the Stone Ages. What happens when the screens, and all of the obstacles that you have been put between you and those people, that you have treated them this way, when this is a breach and you come face to face, you will come face to face with what you have created.
Lex Fridman
(00:20:17)
Yeah, there’s a lot of interesting things you just said. So one is the methodology of killing. If you want to look at some horrific, hard-scaled killing, people often talk about the Holocaust, but that’s visceral. You can look at Holodomor by Stalin, where the murders through starvation.
Bassem Youssef
(00:20:37)
By Churchill in India.
Lex Fridman
(00:20:39)
Churchill, in India, and the Great Leap Forward by Mao. So starvation is a thing we don’t often think of it as murder because it’s quiet, it’s slow. And the interesting thing about starvation is that the people don’t complain as they’re dying because they’re exhausted. That’s one. And the other is the value of human life, it does seem that every culture has an unequal valuation of human life. So those two things combined create a complicated military landscape of the world.
Bassem Youssef
(00:21:22)
Yes, but the thing is that how we would look at technology as the savior, as if we talk about how, “AI will disrupt, will disrupt, will disrupt.” And now if you talk about going to the West Bank, the people in the West Bank walk, and they don’t see humans, they see people shouting them from towers or behind the screens and they have biometrics that is developed by Basel System, that’s done by HP or Google and Amazon who are part of Project Nimbus. And you see indivision developing all of this metric, and surveillance and all of that stuff. And then, you have something like the gospel that people have actually said that the gospel can actually create a target list using AI and give you a green, yellow, or a red to go ahead. And now AI is not just disrupting the market, it’s disrupting our humanity. And we became so comfortable killing people from afar, killing people with a push of the button. And now it is like dating apps when you swipe left and right, it’s like, “Oh, right,” it becomes so cheap. It’s not meeting someone. It’s like, “Oh, [inaudible 00:22:36],” it’s like a lot of fish in the sea. Same with AI. Boom, 500 people killed. Boom, get killed. It’s so easy, it’s so easy, it’s so easy. And then it’s so far removed from you.

(00:22:46)
So when you put these people in this condition, you have literally put them in a different universe than yours. You are behind in your air conditioned screens, pushing them, blowing up a university. It’s amazing. But then you meet what you have done, you meet the Frankenstein that you have created, and then people are like, “Oh, look what they did to us.”
Lex Fridman
(00:23:07)
You just gave me this image of a dating app from hell. Where leaders are just sitting there and swiping left, right.
Bassem Youssef
(00:23:15)
Like, “Invade,” “Destroy.” “Puppet government.”
Lex Fridman
(00:23:21)
Yeah. And then, turn off the phone and go to sleep. So I traveled to the West Bank and I mentioned to you offline that I really loved the people there. I’ve met a bunch of people like that in Eastern Europe where I grew up. Yeah, like the flamboyant, the big personalities, all of that. I also met a person who’s in charge of a refugee camp who was shot by an IDF soldier. And I’m not sure the words he said are important as the consequences of the thing that you mentioned, which is the deep hate in his eyes. That didn’t feel repairable at all. It was pain, it was like a foundation of pain, and on top of that, a hatred. And I was like, “Wow, you kill one person. This is what you create.”
Bassem Youssef
(00:24:19)
Mm-hmm. Because we have kind of like a front row seat to what’s happening. We think we are in it, but we can’t really grasp it. I mean people’s like, ” Oh, we’re just going to go in, get Hamas out and we are going to get them back in.” And what about the people get back in? How do you think they would look at you? What have you created? What have you done?

(00:24:44)
My show in Egypt was all about propaganda. It’s all about the use of words. Words are very important. The decapitated babies were not chosen randomly. Because you see, it plants a certain image in your brain. Imagine if you’re going in what a baby can do; it can smile, cry and poop, that’s it. It is absolutely no threat. So when you tell people, “40 decapitated babies, they’re so animalistic, they didn’t see the babies. Women raped. Of course, he’s an animal to do that.” And they would go through that and what was very frustrating about the conversation is the Gish galloping. The gish galloping. You see the distractions? You see what happens? ” What’s the proportionate response?” “Can Israel defend itself?” “Do you condemn Hamas?” “Does Israel have the right to exist?” “Decapitated babies.” “Raped women.” “Why don’t the Arab countries take them?” “Muslims kill Muslims.” “Look what happened in Yemen, in Syria, in Iraq.” See how they kind of distract you? They throw little things at you so you don’t know what to do. Or the honor war, “The UNN,” “Anti-Semitic.” “October 7th,” “October 7th,” “October 7th,” and then suddenly you are distracted and pulled into discussing all of these little things and you’re not discussing what’s happening right now. It is basically stalling, giving them time to do what they do.
Lex Fridman
(00:26:06)
So there’s some degree to the propaganda though. So the beheaded babies and all this kind of stuff that is so over the top that it shuts down actual conversation about actual wrongs, war crimes on both sides. So it’s overstating it to where everyone on social media and everywhere in the press and everywhere is arguing, almost become desensitized to actual horrors of death, which are more mundane. They’re not so dramatic as beheaded babies.
Bassem Youssef
(00:26:35)
Yeah, because may be shot, but decapitated babies, there’s like a knife blade that goes into the skin, the trachea, the flesh, the spine. Decapitated. You can just, like, “He’s dead.” No, you go in. This is the hate. So much hate. And that’s why you-
Lex Fridman
(00:26:51)
You have made me laugh at the darkest shit. You’re such a beautiful person. Your dark humor is just wonderful.
Bassem Youssef
(00:27:01)
But you see this happened to Jews before. Remember blood libel? Where did the blood libel come from? It come from these rumors that Jews suck baby’s blood. This is what they did to them.
Lex Fridman
(00:27:11)
Yeah, it’s in the cup.
Bassem Youssef
(00:27:12)
Exactly. That’s a very delicious baby cup.
Lex Fridman
(00:27:15)
Delicious baby blood.
Bassem Youssef
(00:27:16)
But this is what you do. You tell people something. And it happened with the Native Americans when they were here, when they went in and they wipe a whole tribe. And Jewish people, one of the minorities that were persecuted and had this used against them for a very long time, and it is terrible, and it’s terrifying that’ it’s been used again.
Lex Fridman
(00:27:35)
So I just did a very lengthy debate on Israel and Palestine and the really painful thing from that, those two historians, and it was deep, it was thorough, it was fascinating. But in constantly asking about sources of hope or solutions, there was none. There was a really dark sense of, it’s hopeless, from both sides. It’s hopeless. So I look to you for a source hope. For a source of hope. Is there any hope here? Solutions? Short term, long term?
Bassem Youssef
(00:28:22)
Obama have kind of summarized this beautifully in his book. He said, the reason why the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is so chronic is one side have so much power and the other side have absolutely no power. And that’s what Obama said, he said, you have Israel, that basically don’t listen to us because they’re supported by people who are bigger than the president, bigger than administration. They know that they can. I mean, Netanyahu was quoted on tape many times saying like, he’s basically belittling Americans like, “We control 80% of the population. We don’t care.” This has nonchalant, kind of like, “We have them.” And there’s nothing really that compels Israel to give up anything because at the end of the day, what is compromise? Compromise is like, “I give something, you give something.” Israel’s giving anything, and they project that on you.

(00:29:15)
So for example, how many times have we heard, “Oh, Palestinians were giving four, five, six, seven, 15 chances and they said no to them.” And yet when you read the history, that’s not the case at all. For example, in the whole idea about Arafat walked away from Oslo, that didn’t happen. And there is an incredible video by, what’s his name? Joe Scarborough with Misha. And they were hosting her father Brzezinski. He was the national security advisor. And Joe Scarborough was like, “Well, Arafat left the Oslo Accord and the Palestinians left.” And then Brzezinski said, “This is like embarrassingly shallow.” It’s like, “Listen, what happened was there was a lot of catches on the Oslo Accord. It was very unfair to the Palestinians. So Arafat said, “I agree, but I need to take it to the Arab capitals.”” And they went to Sharm el-Sheikh, they came to Egypt, and he and Ehud Barak went to there. And then Ehud Barak left because there was election and he lost the Ariel Sharon game and it was destroyed. This is one of the reason why people… It’s kind of like facts don’t matter as much as what is the narrative that has been controlled.
Lex Fridman
(00:30:32)
But what were the biggest barriers to peace there? Do you think it’s, fundamentally leaders don’t want a two-state solution? Or was there nuanced small differences that, if solved, could lead to a two-state solution?
Bassem Youssef
(00:30:46)
I mean, maybe there was a certain point when the Israeli leaders were more open to compromise. But I can’t say that because each time Israel gives back land, it has to be after some use of force. The 1973 war, the first and second, the casualties in Gaza, they never give up land willingly and because of peace. Because if I have that much military, I can do whatever I want, why would I give up anything? I have that much power. Why would America or China give everything if they’re so powerful? And especially if they have this kind of open check from the United States. So it is really about what can push Israel to give up something? Because you are so much stronger than me, what could compel you to give up something? And this is why the whole thing about trying to equalize Palestinians and the Israeli state and government, it doesn’t make any sense.

Two-state solution

Lex Fridman
(00:31:49)
So what is the source of hope? John Stewart, who will talk about it from many angles, somebody you admire, a friend, he proposed a two-state solution.
Bassem Youssef
(00:32:03)
Of course.
Lex Fridman
(00:32:07)
Look to the comedians for hope.
Bassem Youssef
(00:32:09)
Yes. Well, everybody’s talking about the two-state solution, but Israel has said many times, or Netanyahu and [inaudible 00:32:15], “There’s going to be no state solutions.” In the past, it’s like even Naftali Bennett, he came in on [inaudible 00:32:23] like, “Yeah, maybe in the past we wanted two-state solutions, but look, every time we give them land, they kill us. So no state solutions.” And they are openly saying it.
Lex Fridman
(00:32:29)
But that’s, perhaps rhetoric?
Bassem Youssef
(00:32:31)
The rhetoric that is supported by action. Because look at what they’re doing in the West Bank, as you said. They are cutting it, illegal settlement, piecemealing it. So if you have an intention at all to give them anything, why do you keep doing this?
Lex Fridman
(00:32:48)
And you’ve called it, “A bunch of little Gazas.”
Bassem Youssef
(00:32:51)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:32:51)
It’s a nice little picture of what’s happening.
Bassem Youssef
(00:32:56)
Piecemealing it. Because what happened in the past four months, the Palestinians have been micro-dosing on it for a very long time.
Bassem Youssef
(00:33:00)
The Palestinians have been micro-dosing on it for a very long time. Little by little, little by little. And we would shout every time when it gets too much and then we’ll shut down, and then little by little. But this time it was hard. It was hard to see the blatant oppression. And the world said, “Maybe the Hamas Ministry of Health are giving us the bad numbers. Maybe these are human shields.” And I laughed. There’s 13,000 babies killed. Does that mean that there are 13,000 military target hiding in their diapers? Because it doesn’t make any sense to kill that many babies it’s just like, “Oops, it’s out of our hands.”
Lex Fridman
(00:33:45)
It’s hard to know what to do with those numbers. Just one baby is enough.
Bassem Youssef
(00:33:51)
But you know what happens when you hear so many numbers? Numbers become numbers and you become so desensitized. And this is why there’s a difference between saying, “13,000 Palestinian kids dead.” It’s like, “Mila Cohen an Israeli baby, 10 month old, she was killed in her crib.” And this is what we hear from CNN. We never hear a story about the Palestinian kid. That’s why thank you for giving me the space for saying the names of the Palestinian children that were killed just in four weeks. Because humans needs context. They need depth. They need a 3D look at what they can look at. But if you just tell numbers, “Oh.” They don’t mean anything.
Lex Fridman
(00:34:34)
Is there some degree to where both leaderships, Hamas, PA, Palestinian Authority, Israel, all want war, like perpetual war to remain in power?
Bassem Youssef
(00:34:49)
That’s an interesting question. But let’s admit something. The Arab regimes in the area have actually used the problem of Palestine in order to stay in power, in order to take, get excuses, have this enemy. And Israel, the Israeli government has used that too. And maybe the Palestinians. But my problem with when going into discussion this is that the two sides are not equal. They’re not equal in power, they’re not equal in influence, and they’re not equal in international support, especially with the United States. People who have made changes in history were the people with power, the people who would have the ability to change things and the Palestinians cannot really change it. What can they change?
Lex Fridman
(00:35:39)
Well, is that true though, with how much support the Palestinian people have? So just like you said, there’s a lot of Arab states that will voice their pro-Palestinian position in order to distract from their own corruption and abuses of power in their own countries. But I don’t think, if you look globally, there’s a complete asymmetry of power and public opinion here, maybe in the press in the West. But if you look globally…
Bassem Youssef
(00:36:12)
But do they have the same kind of weapons that the Israeli have?
Lex Fridman
(00:36:14)
Literally power? No, there’s a major asymmetry of literal power.
Bassem Youssef
(00:36:20)
Some money to their leaders. Does that make any difference? And also when you say Palestinian Authority, which authority are you talking about? Hamas or the Palestinian Authority who has been kind of a domesticated, kind of like a puppy for the Palestinians who basically have been an informant on their own people. And this is the thing also that kind of really pissed me off when I was hearing the thing about these things like, “Hamas, Hamas, Hamas, Hamas.” We have Netanyahu on tape confessing that he supported Hamas giving money in order to cause factions between the Palestinians. So it’s just like it doesn’t make… You just told me this. You just told me this, you just told me they didn’t have any support Hamas, but Hamas is like “What?”
Lex Fridman
(00:37:01)
To which degree does Netanyahu represent the Israeli people? Is a real question.
Bassem Youssef
(00:37:08)
To which point does Trump or Biden represent the American people?
Lex Fridman
(00:37:12)
And to which degree does Hamas represent the Palestinian people?
Bassem Youssef
(00:37:16)
None of these represent it, but who have the power in order to make the decisions? It really comes down to that.
Lex Fridman
(00:37:23)
Well, who does have the power? You’re giving a lot of power to Israel.
Bassem Youssef
(00:37:28)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:37:28)
But the Arab League-
Bassem Youssef
(00:37:31)
What should Hamas do? What do you think? What should Hamas do?
Lex Fridman
(00:37:33)
Continue doing what the charter says which is trying to destroy Israel. And the role of the Palestinian people is to overthrow Hamas and get a more moderate leadership probably. And the role of the Israeli people is to vote out this right-wing government and elect a more moderate leader so that there’s a chance at peace with two moderate leaders.
Bassem Youssef
(00:37:56)
So before Hamas even got to control 2006 Gaza there was a real sure one in 2000, and we all know what happened, and I really sure one kind of had make the came up with this amazing policy of breaking kids’ bones in the into father. So even Barrack he was also, I mean which one is moderate I think is Hamas is a product of what happened. I mean, if there was no apartheid in South Africa, there will be no NFC. There will be no Nelson Mandela though if there was no Nazis in Paris will be no French resistance. And I’m not saying, and again, I don’t want to be put in a position to defend Hamas or anybody because you know what that entails. But those are Hamas, again, not defending them.

(00:38:50)
They went into October 7th. Why did they did that release our hostages, the people in prison? Because if you’re talk about people who are kidnapped, Israel kidnaps people every single day and when they had the first exchange in November 4th, Israel leaves 400 people. Three quarters of them were women and children. Why are those people in prison? There’s one in four kids that are in prison that stay in solitary confinement, which is by international law, a form of torture and you’re putting kids through that.
Lex Fridman
(00:39:22)
Is it possible, so first of all, ceasefire and longer term, is it possible for Arab states and the United States to get together and with power through diplomacy enforce a solution?
Bassem Youssef
(00:39:41)
It’s a very, very ideal solution, but you know and I know that Arab states don’t really have the power. All of the powers are in the hands of America.
Lex Fridman
(00:39:51)
I think they have the power. See, I think they have the power.
Bassem Youssef
(00:39:54)
Maybe they Don’t want to use it. Maybe they don’t want to.
Lex Fridman
(00:39:58)
Because there is a benefit. The dark sense I have is that a lot of people win from the suffering that Palestinians are going through because they can point to that and distract from
Bassem Youssef
(00:40:14)
Definitely
Lex Fridman
(00:40:15)
Corruption in their own states. And then obviously Iran can benefit also from the same kind of dynamic distracting from the authoritarian nature of their regime.
Bassem Youssef
(00:40:27)
Definitely. But what is the core of the problem here? Is it the Arab states using the suffering or actually the suffering itself and the suffering comes from people being displaced. Their homes were taken away. There are 7 million Palestinians in diaspora, seven millions, 7 million went out there and now they’re living in Canada and America and Europe. They had homes there. They cannot go back to 1.7 million people. Of the people in Gaza don’t belong in Gaza. They were pushed from other places. The piecemeal thing of people are being in Germany, I’m going to shift gear a little bit. It’s going to be a little bit of fun. There is a book that I bought the rights to and I want to turn it into a movie, and I optioned the right for two years in March of last year, before October 7th, after October 7th, I bought the permanent, right,

(00:41:26)
That book, it’s called the Muslim and the Jew, and it is written by an author called Ronen Steinke. I read an article about this book in 2016 and I chased that book for rights for seven years. I didn’t have that much money, but I wanted that book and that book was translated into English called Anna and Dr. Hanmi, and that book tells the incredible story under Nazi Germany where Arabs went in droves to Berlin in 1920s after the first World War in the Weimar Republic, and they became doctors and engineers and journalists for two reasons. Number one, they’re cheap, very cheap because of the inflation. And two, a lot of the Arab nationalists didn’t want to send their kids to England or France because they were the occupiers and Dr. Hanmi was the hero of that. He’s an Egyptian doctor and that’s why I personally connected with him and he went to medical school, didn’t find a place to live, so he lived in the Jewish ghetto.

(00:42:34)
Like many Arabs, he didn’t find a school to work at, a hospital to work in, so he worked in a Jewish hospital. So there was a lot of Arabs who lived with the ghetto and actually the first director of the Berlin mosque with a Jewish convert who converted to Islam, and he was a gay activist. I’m telling you, this is a crazy story, and this is not a fiction story. This is actually like a nonfiction. It’s written actually based on the statement, the documents of the Nazis and Gustavo, Dr. Hemi, he was in this hospital and the Nazis came in and they killed and tortured and beat up the Jewish doctor and they made him the head of his department. Then now he’s surrounded by Nazi doctor. They didn’t touch him because he was an Arab. There was kind of like a thing between Germany and the Arabs because they wanted to appease to them in order to have kind of a grassroots base in the Arab world where he want to go next.

(00:43:38)
And this is why 19 34, 19 35, the racial laws of Nuremberg, they had a name change. First they were called anti-Semitic. Then they changed into anti-Jewish because also Arabs were Semitic, so they wanted to appease the Arabs. Now what happened to Dr. Hanmi when that happened to him, he would go back to the ghetto and he would see the apartments next to him. The Jewish apartments become more and more and more flooded with people because they were moving Jews and pushing them and putting them together, pushing them to the side and each flat, each apartment instead of one family, it would have 3, 4, 6, 7 families. And he was there when at home and he looked, he was there.

(00:44:29)
This is where the people he grew up with, he lived with, and now he’s seeing that kind of discrimination just because he was an Arab. And then he started to kind of atone for, because he felt responsible because he wasn’t treated the same way. And he started to go and treat Jewish people in their homes because they couldn’t go to hospitals. And then one family gave them his daughter. It’s like, this is Anna. Save her. He took her pretended that she’s his niece, put a hijab around her, taught her Arabic, called her Nadia, my daughter’s name by the way.

(00:45:05)
And he hid her in plain sight for seven years in front of the Nazis as his nurse. It’s an incredible story. And then not just that, he went to prison and then he went out and he formed with the Arab people that was imprisoned with him, a network that saves 300 Jews. You see that kind of story. This is the Jews that were living in the airport. I’m not saying that the Jews living in the airport was living like an incredible life. Of course, as LA kind of minority, they did not have the full power of their full advantages of the rule. That’s normal. But we had this kind of a relationship

(00:45:42)
Before Israel was erected in 1948. And then of course, everybody looked at Jews at time as fifth column. And of course the nationalistic regimes used that. And this is why what Biden said was very dangerous when he said, if there’s no Israel, no Israel, you are the leader of the free world. You are the President of the United States. Do you mean that you are telling me that Jews in your country, in the United States of America are not safe? That is wrong on two levels. Number one, America historically and right now is more safe to Jews in the world than anybody. They’re safer than the Jews in Israel.

(00:46:23)
They never had pogroms or the Holocaust like Europe. They live here a good life, not perfect life, but they’re better. Second of all, if you are the president and you’re telling that a group of people will not feel safe unless there is a different one, you are already feeding into their fifth column. They’re like, you’re Russian. You come from there. And there is a group of laws in the Russian constitution that says that Russia will protect its citizens everywhere in the world. What happens if the president says like, oh, you’re Russians. You’re protected by your own country. Don’t belong here. This
Lex Fridman
(00:46:51)
Is terrible. Yeah, you’re right. That’s actually an indirect threat. Even saying Muslims cannot feel safe in America or something like this. That means that’s a threat.
Bassem Youssef
(00:47:03)
But what would a Jewish person in Beverly Hills or in Brooklyn feel if he hears that you are already telling people you need to be loyal to Israel? I mean, Israel is a foreign country. I am sorry, but Israel is a foreign country. Israel is a client country that we sponsor, and it should actually be responsible and held accountable for what they do.

Holocaust

Lex Fridman
(00:47:28)
You mentioned 1948, the Nakba, but before that, 41, 39, 41 to 45, the Holocaust. What do you do? What do do with the Holocaust? How do you incorporate into the calculus of what’s,
Bassem Youssef
(00:47:46)
Oh, it’s terrible
Lex Fridman
(00:47:46)
Of morality. That leads up to the displacement of 700,000 Palestinians from the land. How do you work that
Bassem Youssef
(00:47:56)
Out? It is terrible, but I mean the systemic annihilation of Jewish people under the Nazi, that is a carefully engineered thoughtful plan. It was terrible. It was kind of like the human ingenuity put into something that is very evil, but also it is not just that happened. We need to remember that Otto Frank, the father of Anna, Frank has his visa, refugee visa rejected by the United States. There’s a lot of people that were rejected by the United States, rejected by other European countries, and then they were pushed into Palestine.

(00:48:31)
So you have to put yourself between and the Arabs, okay, we’re sitting here, okay, come and then, all right, you don’t have a home or a country anymore that kills you. I mean, you see, if I’m not an Arab and you give me that kind of piece of terrible human tragedy, like oh my God, that is terrible. But then I’m an Arab like, yes, I’m so sorry, but what do I have to do with that? Why is that my fault? The persecution of the Jewish people have started since then the eighth and ninth century because they were like they first anti-Christians, they were with criminal immigrants. They were conspirators. This is the anti people as if Europe kind of throw anti-Semitism on us. You understand that like Henry Ford, Henry Ford is one of the biggest anti, he was the inspiration for Adolf Hitler.

(00:49:28)
This is how anti-Semitic Henry Ford was. And you kind of gloss over that and then suddenly we as Arabs have to pay the price. Why?
Lex Fridman
(00:49:44)
Several questions I want to ask there, but one just zooming out, why do you think hatred of Jews has been such a viral kind of idea throughout human history? Oh,
Bassem Youssef
(00:49:56)
It’s very easy. It all started from Christ. They killed Christ. They kill Christ. They killed Christ. They’re the killer of Christ. That’s a very sexy story. And that stayed for years. That stayed for centuries. I’m sorry, centuries. They’re the killer of Christ. And then the Catholic Church did not allow usury, but they would work in usury, so they become rich. Now, the people that we hate, that we accuse them of feeling Christ are becoming rich. So that’s envy now and that’s hatred. I mean, when you talk about ghettos, ghettos were not just as secluded parts in cities. Sometimes those ghettos or outside the cities, Jews were not even allowed to work a lot of professions.

(00:50:42)
They were not allowed to get into the syndicates of certain professions. So they had to work usually and they got rich, so the people hated them more. The first crusade didn’t kill a single Muslim. All the killed were Jews. And when they finally arrived to Jerusalem, all the killed were Jews. They almost annihilated the Jews. So it was all this, and of course you have the dark ages. Who do you need as an enemy? The Jews. They’re the killer of Christ. There’s nothing bigger than this.

(00:51:15)
And then you fast-forward. I mean, one of the things that I found out that was very, very, very, very crazy when Henry Ford imported the protocols of the elders of Zion, by the way, in the Arab world, protocols of the elders of Zion is so popular and for the obvious years and for the people who don’t know it’s kind of a bunch of stories. And basically it’s like the Jews saying, we got to control the war and we’re going to do this and we’re going to do that and whatever. What people don’t know that that is a work of plagiarism. It was plagiarized from a satirical play called Conversation in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, and it is kind of based on one chapter or one scene or something. It’s crazy, but it’s crazy
Lex Fridman
(00:52:12)
How sticky it is. Yes, that’s weird
Bassem Youssef
(00:52:15)
Because if I hate you, that’s great, but if I have a story to support that hate, that’s even better.
Lex Fridman
(00:52:20)
But it’s one of the best stories, one of the stickiest stories about hate. Of course, it’s probably the most effective. A lot of peoples hate other groups of peoples, but that’s just the sexiest story of them
Bassem Youssef
(00:52:36)
All. Because humans need to concentrate their hate, their insecurities and their shortcomings into one thing that they can practice that hate on. If it’s a person, great, if it’s a group, even better.
Lex Fridman
(00:52:55)
How do you into this calculus incorporate That group is pretty small. There’s 16 million Jews worldwide, and you mentioned how is that the responsibility of the Arab peoples? Everybody should be to blame for not taking in Jews after the Holocaust, but the reality of the situation, if we look at the religious slice of this, there’s 16, let’s say million Jews, and there’s, I don’t know how many Muslims, but 1.8 billion. That difference, that a hundred x difference. Do you incorporate that into the sense that Jews in Israel might feel for the existential dread that this small group might be destroyed? Jews
Bassem Youssef
(00:53:48)
In Israel have every right to feel afraid because of everything that they see and everything they’ve been told everything. But I would say that the calculus or the numbers doesn’t, of course being small,
Lex Fridman
(00:54:02)
It
Bassem Youssef
(00:54:03)
Is of course a factor, but it is never an excuse in order to take something that’s not yours. It’s saying like, Hey, you have 300 million Americans and we have 52, 52 give one state for, there’s too many of them, too many of you just give them something. It’s like the fact that I have something and you don’t, and I have, there’s too many of me, and there is little of you. And then you come in and it’s not really Israel against the Arab word or the Muslim or because we have to say we up big time.

(00:54:34)
But it is the Palestinians that are in and they are being subjected to that. So it’s not really like the 1.8 billion and the 16 million Jews and the 1.8 billion. If you look at them, some of them don’t care. Some of them live into regimes that being oppressed and those regimes are supported by the United States in order. It’s easier for me as an empire to take what I want from this country if I control the dictator. And I tell them that his power is linked to my desire to keep him in power. So that’s why you have a total disconnect between people in power in the Arab and the Muslim countries and the people themselves.

1948

Lex Fridman
(00:55:15)
Can you speak to the 1948, because you mentioned taking land that’s not yours, maybe parallels with Native Americans. There was a war, the Jewish minority fought that war against several Arab states and won that war. How do we incorporate that into the catalyst?
Bassem Youssef
(00:55:41)
Yeah, well, that’s also a misconception, like a misinterpretation of the event because it seems that it was the small, it’s kind of like a David and Goliath kind of story. And I was always like, how did we not do that? But in reality with numbers, I can’t pull it up right now, but if you look at the numbers, the number of tanks, the planes, the trained officer, because many of those Jewish fighters came from World War Two, they were seasoned fighters and they actually had more planes, more tanks, more artillery, more pieces of weapon, more of all of other combined, because the people that really was Egypt and 1948, many of those Arab countries didn’t even have their independence. So they would kind of send a cavalry or a people in horses. But in fact, the whole idea was like we won against seven nations. The numbers totally in Israel’s favor. They were better equipped, they were better trained. They had more tanks and artillery and airplanes, and they planned better. So yes, they deserved the win because they planned and we did it. So
Lex Fridman
(00:57:00)
To you, there was an asymmetry of military power even then. But what do you do with the fact that the war was won? So if you look at the history of the world, there is wars fought over land.
Bassem Youssef
(00:57:15)
I agree with you. This has been the history of humanity. Humanity was not living peacefully. It’s all about people taking people and equaling people taking their land. But there’s two difference here, mostly usually the conquering power. For example, England, they had England and they conquered you in India and after the occupation finished, they go back to England,

(00:57:39)
France, Greece, Persia, Egypt. They will go in, expand and shrink, expand and shrink. It’s always been there. What is different here is exactly what happened in Australia and the United States. A group of people came in not just to conquer and take the land, but to completely change, to replace them and get them out or kill them. It was very easy with the Indians because they had smallpox. There was no social media. They did it over 400 years. They had time. The problem is what is happening right now, I agree with you. It might not be that new, but we are there and we are watching it happen.
Lex Fridman
(00:58:16)
And so now we have to confront the realities of war and empire and conquering,
Bassem Youssef
(00:58:22)
Because what’s the problem? We told ourselves we can be better. After 1948, there was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It means that we are going to be better humans. We are not going to kill and take land. We’re not going to displace people. We’re not going to take people for what they’re, there’s now laws, there’s international laws, there’s International Court of Justice, and now Israel is giving the middle finger to all of them.
Lex Fridman
(00:58:45)
So isn’t in some fundamental way. This whole thing that we’re talking about is us as a civilization on social media in articles and books, in newspapers. We’re just trying to figure out who are we as a
Bassem Youssef
(00:59:01)
People. I think that the shock came from the fact that we thought that we as humanity have evolved and now we are. What have actually changed is that we became more advanced in effectively eradicating a group of people because of the technology that we have and the fact that we can do that under the eyes and ears of all the world. And we are watching it under our phone. We have a window. We have a window to the war. 1945, people didn’t know what was happening in Japan. Well, we heard about it on the radio like, oh, today our forces came in and they launched. We don’t know. We heard it. Maybe we saw pictures after that and it’s quite edited. But now we see it, we’re into it, and it’s so much for our psyche and we can get it. The Arabs say like, guys, you told us we came to the West because we were told that we were equal.

(00:59:55)
The university declaration of right, one of the co-authors, his name is Stephane Hessel. He’s a Jew. He’s a survivor of the Holocaust. And what happened to him, he died, by the way a couple of years ago, but before he died, he was canceled by so many people and he was called anti-Semitic because he joined the BDS movement and he spoke about truth Palestine, that is the author of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that we value so much. And we think that that would define our humanity. But then we go in and we are shocked. It’s like maybe we were sold something. Maybe that was false advertisement.
Lex Fridman
(01:00:40)
You shared a tweet by an account called Awesome Jew. It reads Islamo-Nazi comedian Bassem Youssef comedian in quotes, by the way.
Bassem Youssef
(01:00:53)
Yeah, yeah, of course, because I’m not funny.
Lex Fridman
(01:00:55)
So Islamo-Nazi comedian, Bassem Youssef is now denying the October. I love that you retweeted this twice, I guess suppose because it’s advertising some upcoming dates. He’s now denying October 7th massacre. The Muslim Radical Bassem Youssef is notorious for his radical radical set twice for his radical hatred of Jews in Israel. In a recent clip, he claims that the atrocities committed on October 7th, they’re fabricated or looking for all information regarding any of his upcoming shows, as well as the venues which host the scumbag. Would Jews feel safe around this Nazi Nazi?
Bassem Youssef
(01:01:34)
Yeah,
Lex Fridman
(01:01:36)
This is my first time interviewing a Nazi
Bassem Youssef
(01:01:39)
Honor. It’s my first time I actually get called a Nazi.
Lex Fridman
(01:01:42)
First time. First time.
Bassem Youssef
(01:01:43)
I have been called so many things in Egypt. So in Egypt, I was called a CIA operative, a Mossad spy, a secret Muslim brotherhood, a secret Jew. And there was also an article that was published about me in the state-Run Media saying in details how Bassem has been recruited by CIA agents using John Stewart in order to use satire to bring down the country. I was a Freemason, an infidel, a member of the Knights of the Temple, something like that. And there’s actually people, the Muslim Brotherhood on their show, they would say like, he’s action Israeli, and they have forged and Egyptian Id for him to come here. So it’s kind of like when I said I left all of that behind and I come here, it’s like, boom, anti-Semitic, Nazi. I mean, I really covered everything. I don’t know what else. I mean, think it’s kind of like I’m collecting PhDs. I’m just getting all of these credits.
Lex Fridman
(01:02:51)
How do you deal with that? How do you deal with the attacks? I mean, this goes back to the decision to do the interview with Piers Morgan. How do you psychologically do all of it?
Bassem Youssef
(01:03:03)
These kinds of attacks? At the beginning its fun, but when they evolve into something else, so for example, I was laughing of all of the stuff about calling me this, calling me that, but then when people would come and thread the theater, because it’s not the people who are making those accusations that would come to you. It’s the people that will hear and see those accusations and act on it. And there’s always the fear of, I mean, we have in the air board a lot of things that somebody would hear something about someone else and go kill him and whatever, anybody else. So there’s this, but somehow I want to make fun of it. And it is to be called an Islamo-Nazi. It must been the funniest thing ever
Speaker 1
(01:03:49)
Does Islam Nazi. Wow. How did you An radical Muslim me. A lot of Islamist’s hate me. They don’t call me a secular infidel. So it’s kind of like, who am I? Maybe I have an identity
Bassem Youssef
(01:04:04)
Crisis and I need the people to tell me who I’m,

Egypt

Lex Fridman
(01:04:08)
Let’s go to the beginning. Let’s go to your childhood. You grew up in Egypt, Cairo, Egypt,
Bassem Youssef
(01:04:13)
Childhood.
Lex Fridman
(01:04:15)
Well, let’s figure out how you came to be who you are.
Bassem Youssef
(01:04:18)
How did you become an Islamo-Nazi.
Lex Fridman
(01:04:20)
Yeah, exactly. It’s a long journey. I do like the swastika tattoo on your, which I didn’t.
Speaker 1
(01:04:28)
How did you see my?
Lex Fridman
(01:04:28)
You know what you did. I know I did. It was very inappropriate. You’re also obviously a sexual harasser of me.
Speaker 1
(01:04:36)
This is
Bassem Youssef
(01:04:36)
Like a me too.
Lex Fridman
(01:04:37)
Yes.
Bassem Youssef
(01:04:39)
This is like 2020. Someone will come up. It’s like, okay,
Lex Fridman
(01:04:41)
We clip it. This is your me too moment. All right, Cairo, what’s, what’s a defining memory, positive or negative from your childhood?
Bassem Youssef
(01:04:54)
My memory in general was cool. It was cool. I went to a Catholic school for primary school, elementary, and by the time I’d done, there was kind of a start of a decline into the public education. And my parents, they’re middle-class working officials. My dad was a judge, my mom was a business professor and they were one of the people who’s like, they didn’t have that much luxury. My dad drove a regular car, a Fiat, which is the equivalent for the Lada in Russia.
Lex Fridman
(01:05:30)
Thank you for speaking to the audience.
Bassem Youssef
(01:05:35)
Lada.
Lex Fridman
(01:05:35)
So would that be a good car
Bassem Youssef
(01:05:38)
Or bad car? No, it’s kind of like the minimum. And my dad was not a command of showing off whatever money they would do. They would put it for us. Education, give everything to their kids. This is kind of a very, very typical mentality, and I’m sure it’s in many cultures, but we grew up with this. Everything that we have is like for kids, so they will put us into education. So.
Bassem Youssef
(01:06:00)
… everything that we have is left for kids, so they will put us into education. So middle school, that was… 1986 was the beginning of the explosion of international schools, private schools. And these schools were relatively expensive. Of course now with today’s currency, it’s ridiculous, but at that time it’s very expensive. So I went to that school, and from… There was this moment, it was like you feel less right away. I mean, of course there’s the regular bullying and stuff, but it’s not that. It’s kind like you always feel less. You don’t have that much of purchasing power that can allow you to go to the same outings or travel with them. And even how you dress, it will be modest compared to them.

(01:06:43)
So I was always an outsider, and I compensated with that by two things, being good at school and being good at sports. So I was not like the typical nerd. It was just like, I was playing football, basketball, track and field, and I was one of the… People would like to have me on their team. So I wasn’t kind of like, “Ah, he’s a nerd, get him away.” But I never had a girlfriend. I never had any kind of… I was not boyfriend material. So that kind of leaves remnants in you, that you’re not good enough.
Lex Fridman
(01:07:15)
But psychologically you were always… Like when you were by yourself, you felt like an outsider.
Bassem Youssef
(01:07:19)
Yes, all the time. And that’s why I’m more of a loner. I don’t have a lot of what you call friends. I have acquaintances, people that I do stuff with, but I don’t have the people that I tell them everything. When I went to medical school, now medical school is a different animal. Medical school is where all of the people from the public schools go. Public schools are very… They don’t have English language as a strong part, but they are brilliant people, because they would mostly study in Arabic. But they are brilliant and they are very, very, very smart, very sharp. But then I’ll go there. Now I am the sissy boy from the private school that comes into medical school. Now I’m an outsider again, and I go into residency and I pick up salsa. So now I’m a salsa teacher while being a cardiothoracic surgery resident. And I’m an outsider for the third time because in salsa, I’m kind of like the respectful doctor. And in resident, I’m the guy who is just dancing. And everything, of course, as a medical resident, you will mess up a lot.

(01:08:25)
So they would always like, “Oh, because you’re a dancer. Oh, because you don’t care about medicine. You just want to go there and dance with women,” which is true. So all of my life, I felt that I’m an outsider. I’m not part of the team. I’m not part of the core group. And I have a story that you would love. Right before my residency, I was so much into salsa, so I had all of the money, and then you saved that. And I was working summers and I was doing extra jobs, and I took that money and I went to Miami in order to learn Rueda de Casino, which is the Cuban kind of circle salsa kind of thing. And I went there in the summer of 2001. My return ticket was 9/12/2001.
Lex Fridman
(01:09:22)
The universe has a sense of humor. I got to tell you that.
Bassem Youssef
(01:09:26)
9/12, I was supposed to be on a plane coming back to Egypt. What happens? Thank God I ran out of money 10 days before that. It was like, “All right,” I changed my ticket and I came back. 9/11. I’m kind of like, ah, sleeping… My mom, “Wake up, wake up!” “What? What?” And I see the two tower falling, Mom was like, “Oh, you’re here, you’re here, you’re here, thank God you’re here.” And I was like, “I could have been in Guantanamo right now.”
Lex Fridman
(01:09:54)
Yeah, flying on 9/12.
Bassem Youssef
(01:09:58)
But by the way, I was in Miami when they went to the flying school, in Miami. So I mean, I had like 9/11 written all over my face.
Lex Fridman
(01:10:08)
You’d be all over the news.
Bassem Youssef
(01:10:09)
All over… And my mom was like, “What? He went there to dance salsa. I didn’t know that salsa is like a name for terrorists.”
Lex Fridman
(01:10:17)
Why salsa? Why did that attract you? Can you explain what salsa is? So I mentioned to you offline that I’ve been doing a little bit of tango, trying to learn it.
Bassem Youssef
(01:10:25)
Yeah. Samba, salsa, bachata, merengue. It’s kind of like Latin dances and it’s like… I don’t know how you describe salsa. Couple dance and Latin beat. And I did it because I once… And I talk about that in my Arabic stand-up comedy, not the English. I talk about how I didn’t have really a great social life. And my friends went there one day, and I go into a place which it was called El Gato Negro. No, no, it was called Big Fat Black Pussycat. And then I think they thought it will be racist or something though, so to change it to El Gato Negro. Anyway, so-
Lex Fridman
(01:11:14)
Great, great, great decision.
Bassem Youssef
(01:11:18)
I know. So I went there. I was like, “Damn! Music and women and I’m a doctor, a doctor dancing salsa. That is a chick magnet.”
Lex Fridman
(01:11:26)
Yeah, 100%.
Bassem Youssef
(01:11:28)
We do everything for that.
Lex Fridman
(01:11:31)
All of human [inaudible 01:11:32]
Bassem Youssef
(01:11:32)
Even power, even money.
Lex Fridman
(01:11:33)
All the wars we’ve been talking about.
Bassem Youssef
(01:11:35)
Women.
Lex Fridman
(01:11:37)
At the end of the day-
Bassem Youssef
(01:11:37)
The approval from the other sex. We are babies. We are terrible people. So of course that was great. But then, as a nerd, I went in so hard and now I became a salsa teacher. And I earned more money from salsa, more than I did as a doctor’s resident.
Lex Fridman
(01:11:58)
I didn’t know this part of you. That’s hilarious.
Bassem Youssef
(01:12:02)
I know. I was making a killing amount of money, huge amount of money. And I would go finish my shift and I’d go to the salsa class, and sometimes I would have like 70 people in my salsa class.
Lex Fridman
(01:12:16)
Oh wow.
Bassem Youssef
(01:12:16)
I had the biggest salsa class in Egypt, at the beginning of the 2000. And it was fantastic. And it was an outlet because you go there and there’s the shifts and people dying. Damn. And then you go salsa.
Lex Fridman
(01:12:28)
An escape. You must’ve been good.
Bassem Youssef
(01:12:31)
I was okay. I was cool. I was fun. There were people better than me, but I have a thing about teaching. I like teaching people.
Lex Fridman
(01:12:39)
So you mentioned heart surgery. So what motivated you to become a doctor?
Bassem Youssef
(01:12:43)
It was a choice of exclusion. I mean, there’s nothing else you can do with these high grades other than doctor and engineering. I hate math, so go be a doctor. This is the Middle East. What do you expect? It’s either… In my joke in my show, I said you can be one of three things in the Middle East, a doctor, an engineer, or a disappointment. That is the choices that you have. So years after, I’m a disappointment.
Lex Fridman
(01:13:14)
You’re damn good at it though. That’s a hard path, though. And it’s a fascinating one for-
Bassem Youssef
(01:13:22)
Can I tell you something?
Lex Fridman
(01:13:22)
Yes.
Bassem Youssef
(01:13:23)
That actually I was thinking about why did I actually go into medicine and why did I always choose the hardest thing, although I didn’t love it? And I have to tell you, I had an epiphany only two weeks ago, and I don’t know if that’s actually related or not. Remember when I told you I went to this school, and I didn’t have that much money and I didn’t have the luxury of time or money to be with those people and do what they do? So by the time I finished school and everybody was going to university, everybody in my school went to the AUC, the American University in Cairo. Of course, private American education, party time.

(01:14:03)
I mean, of course they’re brilliant and everything, but they have a different social life. And part of me now, I realize that just very, very recently, maybe I went to the hardest school ever so I don’t have space to use other than studying. Because if I have that much space, what I’m going to do with it? I don’t have that much freedom. I don’t have that much money. I can’t compete with those people going out, so maybe I need a solid excuse that I’m in a place where I don’t have that much of a spare time.
Lex Fridman
(01:14:41)
Is it also possible… I like how this is a therapy session where we’re psychoanalyzing you. Is it also possible that you always just pick the hardest thing you could possibly do?
Bassem Youssef
(01:14:50)
Maybe, but-
Lex Fridman
(01:14:52)
Maybe that’s the Piers Morgan thing too.
Bassem Youssef
(01:14:55)
Maybe. But when I left Egypt and I came here, I still had the choice to go back to medicine. But I hated it. Medicine traumatized me. The amount of… You give up… My brother in Egypt, he had a daughter. She’s a brilliant basketball player. She’s in the national team. Amazing. I used to play basketball also in the Egyptian League, but I never was… Kind of my favorite position in the court was the bench, and I was not as good as her. And then it was time for her to go into college, and he didn’t talk to me for six weeks. I said, “Tamer, what’s happening to Farida? Which college?” Like, “I didn’t want to tell you. She went into medicine.” I said, “What? Medicine? Why did he do?” Because he knows how I hated it. I was traumatized. And I said, “Dude, she’s a basketball player. Make her go to an easy school.” Said, “Nah…” So that’s kind of why-
Lex Fridman
(01:15:49)
You still did it. You still did it.
Bassem Youssef
(01:15:53)
I still did it, but I don’t know, is it because of the difficulty or because of what I told you? Maybe I needed something. Maybe because I was not very confident in my social life, so I needed a distraction not to have that much of a social life.
Lex Fridman
(01:16:07)
Oh wow, okay.
Bassem Youssef
(01:16:09)
You understand?
Lex Fridman
(01:16:09)
I see. Yeah.
Bassem Youssef
(01:16:11)
It’s kind of… Because I will always have an excuse. I’m studying, I have something, I have exams. And I don’t know, I kind of self-sabotaged my own thing because I couldn’t compete with those people on the outing and the money and whatever, so I need an excuse to be… Like, “Oh, he’s a doctor. He’s studying.”
Lex Fridman
(01:16:26)
At least in your own mind, you couldn’t compete.
Bassem Youssef
(01:16:28)
Yeah, I always felt as less because, I mean, I didn’t have any girlfriends in school. I had very late in life, everything to me came to life, so I always felt… Even stand-up comedy, it came very late to me in life, so I always feel that I’m not good enough. I feel that I didn’t spend the time to fill the foundation that other comedians do, so I always feel that I am too lucky. I always feel that this is a fleeting thing. And when I had the height and the fall, the fall of… In Egypt, when I would like the top of everything, I was so famous, and then everything was taken away from me. That’s like, “Ah. You see? I told you. That happens when you don’t build foundation, you fall.” So I always feel that I am not good enough, or if I am in a position where people think I am, deep inside I’m not. You know that I have a speech impediment, that I was not meant to be a TV presenter? In Arabic, it’s very obvious. I cannot roll my Rs.

(01:17:32)
I cannot say “rrr.” I cannot roll it. So in Arabic, like Spanish, it’s very obvious. So when I did my first video on the internet, that made me famous. And then I got my television deal back there in Egypt. My partner at the time, he took the video and he went to a producer, and said like, “Are you giving me a guy with a lisp?” That’s why when I came on television, I was the first ever guy with a lisp. I had two things going for me, the lisp and the big nose. And I was always bullied for these two all the time, so I always felt less.
Lex Fridman
(01:18:03)
See, but that’s a foundation of creating a great person.
Bassem Youssef
(01:18:07)
Yeah. Because if you’re pretty, you don’t need to do much.
Lex Fridman
(01:18:14)
I probably wouldn’t recommend it, but it is true that-
Bassem Youssef
(01:18:18)
So if you are pretty, do some disfigurement that you’re-

Jon Stewart

Lex Fridman
(01:18:23)
Find the flaws and be extremely self-critical about them. So you saw Jon Stewart on TV for the first time in 2003, I believe. How did that change your life?
Bassem Youssef
(01:18:37)
I was in a gym and I was running on the treadmill. And at that time, CNN was coming up on cable. And I was watching, and there is this studio, I don’t know what it is. So I put the earphones on and I started watching. And I was so taken by this that I stopped the treadmill and I just stood for the 20 minutes like this on the treadmill, just like standing there. I didn’t know what he was saying, I didn’t understand what is Democrats, what is Republicans? Those names that he’s saying… What is Fox News? I don’t understand. But I was fascinated. There was something… You know when you don’t understand the music, but you get the rhythm? It was that.
Lex Fridman
(01:19:23)
I wonder what that is that you saw. It’s like the timing of the humor. I mean, Jon Stewart is one of a kind. His biting criticism of power, I would say. And also ability to highlight the absurdity of it all.
Bassem Youssef
(01:19:39)
But you understand, I didn’t understand any of that. I didn’t understand any of the references. But it is the rhythm. You know sometimes when you even see a comedy that’s the language you don’t understand, but there’s a rhythm? Da da da, da da da, boom boom. There’s something, there’s something in the music. So there’s something with the videos and the pictures and he and the face and people reacting. What is this? What is this? What is this? And we had the global edition. So I went to the YouTube and I just started to kind of watch every single episode that I can. I said, “Do you think we can have this in Egypt?” I said, “Ah, never.” And then 2011, I had a friend of mine who was also a YouTube partner, it was something new at the time, he said, “Let’s do something on internet. Let’s do something…” I said, “I want to do Jon Stewart.” It’s like, “Nah, do Ray William Johnson, Jon Stewart will not work.” It’s like, “Nah! I want to do Jon Stewart.”
Lex Fridman
(01:20:35)
So that was in there.
Bassem Youssef
(01:20:36)
Yeah, it was in there. And I did it. And it worked.

Going viral during the Arab Spring

Lex Fridman
(01:20:42)
Can you talk about 2011? I mean, the Arab Spring, what is it? People here in America-
Bassem Youssef
(01:20:49)
It depends on which side-
Lex Fridman
(01:20:52)
Did something happen or what?
Bassem Youssef
(01:20:55)
Depends which side of the equation you are. Because for a lot of people it’s a conspiracy. It’s American made. It is the Muslim Brotherhood, it’s the Islamists, it is Israel, it’s everything else other than people. But it’s a pure revolution. It’s a pure… I think we put too much weight on conspiracies. I think it is normal human behavior that then get maybe used or abused or taken advantage of by other powers, and then the conspiracy starts.

(01:21:26)
But at the time, the Arab Spring didn’t start in Egypt. It started in Tunisia. Bouazizi, a fruit vendor, burned himself up like the American soldiers who did that a few days ago. And that kind of sparked protests in Tunisia. And Ben Ali was a dictator in Tunisia for about 20 years, and they removed him. So suddenly it was kind of like a domino effect. And then Egypt started and it just took 18 days. And people, hindsight is 20/20. Same said just Mubarak became a burden on the military because the military are the real rulers of the country. You might have a president that kind of have certain powers, but at the end of the day, when the military sees that a certain president is too much of a burden, too much of a… So they cut him off.
Lex Fridman
(01:22:17)
And Mubarak is the leader of Egypt at the time.
Bassem Youssef
(01:22:18)
At that time. He was there for 30 years.
Lex Fridman
(01:22:20)
30 years. By the way, speaking of which, because it was a joke in your Mark Twain speech. I got teary-eyed just watching that. That was just great. You’re fucking great, what you did with Mark Twain Awards for Jon Stewart. It’s great. I mean, your comedy is great in general, and I wanted to go to your show. I definitely will. But that’s like a little stroll and a complete tangent of just a masterful introduction and celebration of Jon Stewart. Anyway, Mubarak. 30 years.
Bassem Youssef
(01:22:48)
And it’s a joke that I say also, Mubarak was a president for 30 years. Like, “Oh my God, you had a president for 30 years?” It’s the Middle East. It’s a very short first term. It’s like we’re still warming up, baby.
Lex Fridman
(01:22:58)
Just warming up.
Bassem Youssef
(01:22:58)
And I told them, we need to plan ahead. We need to plan our vacations, our careers, our jail time. It’s just like we need to-
Lex Fridman
(01:23:05)
That’s great. It’s true.
Bassem Youssef
(01:23:10)
So we had kind of the shortest, nicest revolution, 18 days. And we thought, “Oh, 18 days, we can change the country in 18 days.” But of course we were naive and we had this kind of hope. So Mubarak was removed. There was an interim period by the military, took it for one year, then they did elections. Muslim Brotherhood came to power. They stayed for one year, and then the military removed them. And in these three years, my show started, it started by kind of a YouTube video.
Lex Fridman
(01:23:41)
It became famous overnight.
Bassem Youssef
(01:23:43)
Overnight, five to six videos, boom, went out. And at that time I was waiting to get my clearance to go to Cleveland. I was accepted in a fellowship as a pediatric heart surgery in a hospital in Cleveland. And I said, ” All right, I’m just going to do a couple of videos. Maybe I’m going to put it in internet, and maybe after a year or two, after I come back from the fellowship, somebody will come, ‘Hey, why don’t you write a show that looks like John Stewart?'” That was my mind. It took five weeks. I had my first contract of television, and overnight, the exposure. And over the next two, three years, I had 30 to 40 million people watch. 30 to 40 million people watching every episode. A lot of this like, “Wow, that’s too much.” That is terrifying because it means that there are 30 million people who have an opinion about you.
Lex Fridman
(01:24:32)
You said there’s a lot of aspects of that sudden fame that were just horrible.
Bassem Youssef
(01:24:38)
It’s toxic. It’s unnatural. When people started to recognize me in the street and take pictures, I was awkward. It’s like, “Why do you want to have a picture of me? Why? Is it…” Because I didn’t feel that I’m worthy enough to be a reward for someone to have a picture. And I didn’t understand it. I was kind of an ass sometimes because… People thought it was arrogance. No, it was confusion. And I remember my director and my producers and people, they always saw me in a very bad mood. It’s like, “Why are you not enjoying this?” It’s like, “Because this is not natural. This is not natural, this adoration, this love, and this have to end somehow.” And it did. Because at a certain point you are a human, and people, kind of the adoration and the fun and the love comes because they see you saying stuff… because you do your job, basically.

(01:25:31)
Political satire is basically us making fun of politicians in the media. And a lot of people have really strong opinions about politicians in the media. So we came that, we articulate that, and we give it to them and we make them laugh. So for them, we made a great job. So why don’t you do more? But you are limited. And at a certain time, you can’t. And at a certain time you’re afraid because we’re humans, because you’re afraid about if I continue speaking up… not something will happen to me. I’m kind of like maybe have some protection because people see me, but what the people around you? And I’ve seen that. So that’s why at a certain point, that’s it.
Lex Fridman
(01:26:13)
I mean, there’s a lot of things to say there, but one of the difficult things of fame in your situation is you’re not just having fun. You’re criticizing power.
Bassem Youssef
(01:26:22)
Yeah. And it is loved by the people, but it comes with a price. Because at a certain… If the power is too strong and you are not into a situation or a system that allows that, that gives you that kind of safety-
Lex Fridman
(01:26:37)
So what happened?
Bassem Youssef
(01:26:39)
What happened? So the height of my fame was when the Muslim Brotherhood was in power. And at that time they had their media, and I had one show. I had one hour per week, and they had five channels, 24/7. And they were like… Jon Stewart said it beautifully once. It’s like, “We say shit and you say shit, and we just say shit better than you.” This is exactly what Jon Stewart was like. “We’re just better at saying shit back at you.” So basically I had one hour and they had the five thing that they were like… They’re calling me all kinds of names, not just me, all their enemies. And then I just had one hour and I would kind of annihilate them in one hour a week. So at a certain point they would even kind of side with the army against the liberal seculars, whatever you call it. And at a certain point, the army kind of flipped everybody.
Lex Fridman
(01:27:38)
What do you mean flipped?
Bassem Youssef
(01:27:42)
Yeah, they removed the Muslim Brotherhood. They came to power. And I have to say, I admit it, I supported that in the beginning because I had daily threats. I was actually interrogated and arrested under the Muslim Brotherhood. I was in an interrogation for six hours, and they were asking me all my jokes. And I used that in my standup comedy describing exactly what happened in the six hours. And it is so funny.
Lex Fridman
(01:28:04)
Okay, well, it’s hilarious. But what… Slow down. You were interrogated by the Muslim Brotherhood?
Bassem Youssef
(01:28:13)
The general prosecutor. The general prosecutor. And it was basically because of complaints by the officials in the government. Because in order the general prosecutor to do it, it has to have a high up mandate to bring that person to questioning.
Lex Fridman
(01:28:25)
So they went through kind of official channels.
Bassem Youssef
(01:28:27)
Oh yeah, yeah, absolutely.
Lex Fridman
(01:28:28)
So it’s all-
Bassem Youssef
(01:28:29)
Yeah, it was official. It was legal.
Lex Fridman
(01:28:30)
Yeah. Very legal.
Bassem Youssef
(01:28:32)
So I went there, and I asked… And it’s kind of like a bunch of insulting Islam, insulting president, spreading false rumors. And I went there, and it was funny because I go into the building where there’s police officers and there’s judges, and all of them are big fans of the show. And some of them were taking pictures of me. And then I’m sitting there, and it was the most ridiculous interview ever because he was asking me about my jokes. It’s like, “What did you mean by this joke?” And it’s like, “Nothing.” And it was there for six hours.
Lex Fridman
(01:29:03)
He’s just reading your jokes back to you.
Bassem Youssef
(01:29:05)
He was reading my joke, and he’s reading the jokes and the junior judge is sitting there cracking up. It’s like, “I remember that.” It’s like, “Guys, guys.”
Lex Fridman
(01:29:15)
That’s dark.
Bassem Youssef
(01:29:17)
It’s kind of like… And I’m laughing, but in the same time it’s like the whole situation is ridiculous. But then at the end, I was released on bail. So I went back to my show, and I make fun of that. And you have to be honest, the Muslim Brotherhood were in power, but Egypt was right out of the revolution, for there was kind of an equal spread of power between the people. There was not someone who would come in and just… The Muslim Brotherhood didn’t have that power yet, but people saw that they were moving towards that. And then the tension rose, and then there was a kind of a confrontation between them and the army. And then a lot of people were killed in the street. It was terrible massacre. And then suddenly, I am blamed for all of that. It’s like, “You made fun of us, so now it made it easier for people to kill us.” Like, “Dude, come on. You’re doing that to me too. I just did it better than you. And the fact that you sided with the same people that flipped against you, that’s not my fault.”
Lex Fridman
(01:30:11)
Did you criticize the army at all?
Bassem Youssef
(01:30:13)
Yeah. So after that show, I did one episode against the army and I was canceled the next day. And then I went to another channel, did 16 episodes in a different season, and I was walking on eggshells. And then that was canceled again. And then the production company that was doing my show, that we severed ties, because we didn’t have the show, they had their offices raided, they have people having death threats. So I woke up one day, 11th of November 2014, and my lawyer said, “Leave the country right now. There is this legal case that they… They’re coming for you.” But they said, “You cannot…” It was an arbitration case, and I lost against the channel that basically canceled me. And I told them, “But there’s no jail time in arbitration.” It’s like, “Yeah, tell that to the judge. Just leave.” So I jumped on a plane. The verdict was 12:00 noon, 11 November. 5:00 afternoon I was on a plane, left Egypt, and I never came back since then.
Lex Fridman
(01:31:11)
Was there a worry of non-legal things like assassination?
Bassem Youssef
(01:31:19)
I can tell you something, I was so stressed because of the show and because of everything, sometimes I would wake up in the morning and I hope that a bullet will come and finish everything because I was so stressed. It’s like, “I would love…” Because I’m too much of a chicken to kill myself, so I would rather have someone else do it for me. So I was under so much pressure. And I remember the day that my show was canceled indefinitely, the second time, under the army. And I was like, “Ah. I don’t have to worry about what kind of script I have to write next week.” Because remember when you asked me about that tweet? About all those… Those accusation doesn’t bother me. Infidel, spy, secret Jew, Zionist, Islamonazi. That’s bullshit. What really leaves a mark is the criticism to your craft and your work. So, “You’re not funny,” goes deeper.
Lex Fridman
(01:32:19)
Yeah, certain things get to you better than others, especially if you have a secret suspicion that you are maybe not funny.
Bassem Youssef
(01:32:29)
Maybe I’m not, because I was put into that, it’s like, because that touched your insecurities. Like, “I know, but you shouldn’t say it out loud.”
Lex Fridman
(01:32:37)
You shouldn’t say the truth out loud.
Bassem Youssef
(01:32:38)
You shouldn’t say it out loud [inaudible 01:32:42]
Lex Fridman
(01:32:42)
But what about the weight of the responsibility of speaking truth to power, walking on eggshells, what did that feel like?
Bassem Youssef
(01:32:51)
Well, after the Muslim Brotherhood were removed… You have to understand, when the military coup happened, it was a very popular coup. People loved the army. In Egypt, the army is more sacred than the religion. People love the army. Popular army can go no wrong. So me going against the army was… I mean, the Muslim Brotherhood was not very popular. They were popular for their own basis, but people accepted the fact that we make fun of them. But Sisi, at that time, he was a God. And I used to go to this high class club called Gezira Club, and this is basically kind of the upper middle class, upper class kind of people. And during that year of the Muslim Brotherhood, I was the most popular ever. People come, “Yay!” When the military came in, people were walking to me, pointing their fingers like, “Don’t speak about Sisi, don’t speak about the army. We love you now, but don’t you…”

(01:33:47)
They were like that. So I called Jon Stewart, I was like, “I don’t know what to do. I don’t know what to do.” And at that time, all of the channels were closed down, all of… I was the only one left because it was difficult for them to get rid of me very quickly because I was too popular. It was kind of like piecemealing kind of like… And I remember I told him, “I don’t know what to do.” He said, “You don’t have to do anything, just, your safety comes first.” And said, “But I can’t. I mean, I’ve been doing that for two years and I cannot just say, ‘Bye-bye guys.’ I have a responsibility. I have a team, I have people working for me. And also, I cannot just disappear.” And he said the most interesting thing ever. And say, “If you’re afraid of something, make fun about the fact that you’re afraid of it, instead of talking about that something.”
Lex Fridman
(01:34:42)
Brilliant.
Bassem Youssef
(01:34:44)
So there was a whole episode that we did not even mention Sisi. We did not even mention it, but the videos did all the thing. And the whole episode was me trying to avoid talking about him. And that’s how the comedy was created, the fact that I don’t want to be here. And so he said, “You’ll be surprised how people can relate to that,” because there was a lot of kind of like, “Oh, we love him, but we feel we cannot speak.” So just by doing the simple thing about mirroring the society, that goes a long way.

(01:35:19)
And I kind of try to do what I can under the military. I mean, they came up with a machine that treats AIDS and Hepatitis C virus and basically every single… And I went to town with that because people… It doesn’t really have to go in to go to the bigger post like, “You’re an asshole.” No, you talk about their propaganda. You talk about what they want people to perceive them at, and it’s a failure. And for that, that kind of hit them even more. Because what do authoritarian figures do? They work on two things, fear and propaganda. And from that, it gets the respect. So when you go into their propaganda and expose them, they have nothing else.
Lex Fridman
(01:36:11)
That’s brilliant. So you are walking on eggshells, but you’re doing it masterfully, that you’re revealing sort of the flaws in the propaganda, the absurdity of the propaganda and in so doing are criticizing them.
Bassem Youssef
(01:36:21)
And this is why comedy is very specific, because people say, “You were not as hard on him as you were on the Muslim…” I was like, “Yeah, because on the Muslim Brotherhood we were just saying shit for each other,” but now the ceiling was like here. So it’s kind of like, how can you do something from here?
Lex Fridman
(01:36:37)
Yeah, exactly. That’s the art form. Yeah. In the Soviet Union under Stalin, a lot of the criticism came from children stories and children’s cartoons.
Bassem Youssef
(01:36:51)
Double meaning, double innuendos, stuff that means other stuff. That is-
Lex Fridman
(01:36:51)
Real creative.
Bassem Youssef
(01:36:55)
That’s the brilliance.
Lex Fridman
(01:36:57)
But everyone knows.
Bassem Youssef
(01:36:59)
Everyone knows.
Lex Fridman
(01:37:00)
Because you are putting a mirror, you’re mirroring the society. It’s fascinating, actually.
Bassem Youssef
(01:37:04)
And that’s why I was canceled twice.
Lex Fridman
(01:37:07)
And that is a scary one, the army. You see that in Ukraine, everybody supports the army. That’s why Zelensky getting rid of the head of the army was a big, big deal. It’s a really dangerous thing. And everyone was afraid to say anything negative about the army, especially during war, in that case. And in this case, maybe there’s civil war, that kind of thing.
Bassem Youssef
(01:37:30)
But think about it. Actually, an army during peace is much more dangerous. Because think about it. I don’t really have an enemy to fight, but I have all of this power, all of this tank. Why does this actor have more money than me? I’m protecting him. Why does this businessman think that he can get onto his private plane and go to Paris? And why I’m here sitting, not having all of these things? And there’s a lot of time on your hand because your job is to go fight. When you don’t go fight, and when you have the lack of… That’s one of the things I love the United States about, is the fact that the army cannot really get power, but the power is actually in the military-industrial complex, which is a different issue. It’s kind a different kind of issue. But if you have all of that power, why am I sitting around just playing guard for you guys?
Lex Fridman
(01:38:22)
That’s why Iran is terrifying because you have this military that just becomes a police force that turns against its own people. So you’re a famous guy talking shit in the middle of all that.
Bassem Youssef
(01:38:36)
Yeah. And when I left, I went through a very dark side, dark, dark, dark. Because all of the insecurities, all of the stuff that had been working on my head now came to life. And now I’m in America and I’m a nobody. I’m a nobody. And now it’s like I have to do something. I have to earn some money. So I started to do stand-up comedy five years ago, and I sucked because it was my second language and it was new. And now I would go to these comedy clubs-
Bassem Youssef
(01:39:00)
It was my second language and it was new. And now I would go to these comedy clubs with kids and 21, 22 people. And then I’m there with a family to support that. I’m going there to do it for $15, $20. And I was bad. I was bad.
Lex Fridman
(01:39:14)
You’re bombing.
Bassem Youssef
(01:39:14)
Bombing big time.
Lex Fridman
(01:39:15)
Eating shit.
Bassem Youssef
(01:39:15)
Eating shit big time, dying up there big time. And I would go back home and I would cry. And then what made it worse is sometimes like a fan, not a fan, a bunch of fans from Egypt. It’s like, “Bassem Youssef…” They come and it’s like….
Lex Fridman
(01:39:16)
Yeah, just-
Bassem Youssef
(01:39:35)
Their disappointment. That kind of face of adoration that goes into… And I could see it in their face. “I think he’s going to drive an Uber in a couple of weeks.”
Lex Fridman
(01:39:50)
Oh, that’s so incredible.
Bassem Youssef
(01:39:51)
That kind of pressure. And I would go and I would cry and I… And then the fans were like, “Oh, you left. You gave up. You were a sellout. You’re a coward. Why don’t you speak from abroad? You’re safe now.” It’s like, I already spoke. I don’t want to be an activist. I was doing that for comedy when it was good for everybody, but now they want me to go into YouTube and just like throw rocks from outside. I was like, “You don’t understand. I have family there.”

(01:40:20)
And it was this kind of thing, like I’m being attacked for not doing what I should do in their face and attacked for not being funny and not doing good… And now I feel like, maybe it was wrong and… It was so traumatic that I don’t know actually how I went through these years. And I blocked so many details from my brain, because I have been using this technique for a while now that I have been erasing a lot of my… There is a lot of memory gaps in my brain, and I’m trying to suppress it because it was very, very, very traumatic. And a lot of people told me, “You have to go to therapy.” But I’m worried to open the floodgates. And I’m thinking, if I’m functional and I’m not killing anybody, I’m okay.
Lex Fridman
(01:41:16)
I think Elon tweeted, “‘Never went to therapy,’ is going to be on my headstone.”
Bassem Youssef
(01:41:21)
Yeah…
Lex Fridman
(01:41:25)
You’re best buds. Okay. I mean that is terrifyingly difficult to… After being a surgeon, after being a superstar, super famous, going to eat shit at local tiny clubs in the United States. I mean eating shit period. Like bombing is really, really, really difficult. Really difficult, for twenty-year-olds.
Bassem Youssef
(01:41:52)
Imagine when you’re 45, 46. And then people’s like, “Is this his midlife crisis? What is this?” I went through a lot of pain and a lot of the doubts and it was terrible.
Lex Fridman
(01:42:08)
How did you survive? I know you [inaudible 01:42:11] most of it, but what gave you strength through all that?
Bassem Youssef
(01:42:14)
Because I didn’t have any other choice, because I started that and the only reason that I could… is continue. I don’t know what else to do. I don’t want to go back to medicine. I don’t want to do that. And I don’t know. And bit by bit, bit by bit, I started to kind of be better, be better, be better. And I was at a certain time, a year ago, a year ago, this is where I started to kind of hone the craft and kind of sell more tickets and sometimes even sell out some shows and sometimes sell a theater. So it was going and the money was flowing and it was good. And then I was like, I wanted faster, I wanted more. I want it now. I want Netflix deal and whatever. And then the Piers Morgan thing happened and then I blew up and then suddenly I’m selling out everywhere.

(01:43:03)
And it’s like, “Ah, if the war happened two years ago, I will not be ready.” So now they come to the show, and by the way, my show had nothing to do with October 7th. My show is my thing that I’ve been crafting and working on. You know how difficult it’s to do the first hour, the hour that I’ve been working on for five years? And it’s all my personal story, all about what happened to me in Egypt, me as an immigrant, coming here to the United States, finding Trump as a president, finding myself in the middle of a guns rally, finding myself in the middle of a bombing, kind of talking about how I got my citizenship. It’s funny stories about my origin story.

(01:43:41)
So they come in and they expect October 7th and all of a sudden my personal story, but it’s good and it kills and they love it. It’s like if that kind of blew up in America happened to me two, three years ago, I would not have… People would come and be disappointed.
Lex Fridman
(01:43:54)
I got to say the timing of October 7th is very suspicious.
Bassem Youssef
(01:43:57)
Oh my God. Please don’t say that.
Lex Fridman
(01:43:58)
I don’t know. I’m just asking questions. I don’t know.
Bassem Youssef
(01:44:01)
I’m telling you, one of the funniest thing, a guy… I was in Dubai and a TV anchor came to me. “Bassem Youssef, he flourishes during revolutions and wars.” Like, whoa, whoa. Wait, what? Dude. You’re making me sound like a bad omen. A very bad omen.
Lex Fridman
(01:44:19)
Yeah. You, Hamas and Bibi together orchestrated all of this.
Bassem Youssef
(01:44:23)
Oh my god. That’s the trilogy.
Lex Fridman
(01:44:27)
You guys should go on the road together. I’m telling you that phone call is coming,
Bassem Youssef
(01:44:31)
Yeah, but Hamas has to open.
Lex Fridman
(01:44:34)
And that would really bomb, right? That
Bassem Youssef
(01:44:34)
They would really bomb.

Arabic vs English

Lex Fridman
(01:44:41)
I love dark humor. You do a show, like you were saying, in English and in Arabic, and the story is very different.
Bassem Youssef
(01:44:50)
Totally different. Two different stories.
Lex Fridman
(01:44:52)
I would love to… just the language difference, because the music of the language is also different. So how can you convert it into words, but what’s the difference in the music of the languages?
Bassem Youssef
(01:45:03)
I’ll tell you, because I thought about that thought.
Lex Fridman
(01:45:08)
[inaudible 01:45:08]. All right, all right.
Bassem Youssef
(01:45:10)
Okay, so when I was doing the English first, I actually had good jokes, but I was missing the delivery because the cadence and the music and the rhythm is different. The way that an English-speaking American member of audience will receive it’ll be different than how I receive it. The energy, everything’s different. So when I kind of got it, I didn’t know how to switch back to Arabic.
Lex Fridman
(01:45:40)
Oh wow. Yeah. Fascinating.
Bassem Youssef
(01:45:43)
Because here’s the thing. With English stand-up comedy you have a huge library, you have a legacy. You have years and years and years and years of people doing comedy. But in Arabic it’s very new to us. And most of the Arabic stand-up comedy, especially in Egypt, is very tamed. This is kind of like, imagine the stand-up comedy scene in American 1960s before Lenny Bruce.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:05)
So no swearing, conservative, careful.
Bassem Youssef
(01:46:07)
No swearing, nothing, conservative, everything.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:08)
No [inaudible 01:46:09].
Bassem Youssef
(01:46:09)
It’s kind of very… So I didn’t know what to do with Arabic, so I broke the barriers. I became Lenny Bruce, I became George Carlin. So I went in and I went and I changed the whole thing.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:21)
The seven words you’re not allowed to say.
Bassem Youssef
(01:46:23)
Ah, for me, 15 words.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:26)
There’s a lot.
Bassem Youssef
(01:46:28)
Arabic is a very rich language. So here’s the difference between the Arabic and the English show. The English show, surprise, surprise is a unifying language, even for a group of Arabs.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:28)
Interesting.
Bassem Youssef
(01:46:43)
So if I give the same exact show to the same 1000 audience members in the same theater, and they’re the same people, same makeup of like Lebanese, Egyptian, Syrian, Saudis, English will be a unifying language. Arabic is a dividing language.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:43)
Why is that?
Bassem Youssef
(01:47:01)
Because you have 22 dialects, and the dialects are vastly different. And maybe Egyptians understand a little bit of Lebanese, but not that much. But the references, Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian, totally different animal. That’s like a totally different language. Saudi, Emirati, Kuwaiti, totally different. People understand the Egyptian dialect because it’s the dialect of most of the artwork and the movies. But the reference in the everyday street talk might not be understood by them. So now I have to go in and talk to all of these dialects together.

(01:47:32)
So a big part of my show is like, “What are you guys expecting of this?” When I do profanity and you’re going to like it. This is the problem with the show as a dialect, and I construct all of these sentences formed of so different words. For example, an iron in any Arabic dialect is an iron. In Saudi Arabia, it means ass. That’s one example. That’s one example. So imagine if you can actually construct sentences having all of these things in one… So I would construct a whole section of my show about that.
Lex Fridman
(01:48:13)
So it’s really very much about, like self-reflective on language and the limits of language that’s allowed.
Bassem Youssef
(01:48:19)
And the limits of language. And I tell them part of the show is I know what’s the problem with me doing Arabic. It’s like if this was an English show and I was telling you fuck and shit and bitch, you’ll be, “Ha, ha, ha, ha…” But if I do one swear word, all of you will cringe. It’s like, why?
Lex Fridman
(01:48:31)
That’s fascinating.
Bassem Youssef
(01:48:32)
Is it because we are ashamed of our own… So it’s not just about swearing, it’s about… There’s a lot of philosophical pathways in this. Yeah, there’s profanity and people have fun, whatever. But it is about how do we treat our language? And I tell them, “We speak Arabic as Arabs, but it’s not the same Arabic.” It’s crazy, right?
Lex Fridman
(01:48:54)
And you’re doing the show in America also, which is another level of [inaudible 01:48:58].
Bassem Youssef
(01:48:57)
Oh yeah. Actually the Arab diaspora in America is some of the best audiences I have. They are wonderful. And I did it also in the Middle East, and maybe I’ll do like an Arab tour in the Middle East in the fall.
Lex Fridman
(01:49:12)
Which countries would you go to or not?
Bassem Youssef
(01:49:14)
I already did Jordan, Lebanon. I’m doing UAE, I’m doing Kuwait.
Lex Fridman
(01:49:20)
Egypt?
Bassem Youssef
(01:49:20)
Bahrain. Egypt, I don’t think so. I don’t think so.
Lex Fridman
(01:49:23)
Is it personal? Is it worry about your safety?
Bassem Youssef
(01:49:29)
Well, I have the American citizenship right now, so I am relatively safe. There’s a block, honestly. There’s a block. There’s so much that happened. And I’ll never bad mouth Egypt. It is my country. It has all of my marriage. 40 years of my life I lived there. But when you get hurt so much, instead of trying to kind of… I don’t want to take revenge, I don’t want to like battle. I just want to avoid because Egypt gave me so much fame and so much love and so much hate and so much rejection. It was a very tumultuous relationship. Very, very difficult.

(01:50:12)
And a lot of people tell me, “Well, don’t you miss Egypt?” And I tell them every time, “The Egypt that I miss is not there anymore. It’s not bad or good. It’s not worse or better. It’s just I’m different.” And the places are different and the people are different and their circumstances are different. Whatever image you had you have of what you love is not there anymore. That’s why a lot of immigrants, especially Arab immigrants, they live here, but they’re there. And then when they go back for a vacation, they get disappointed because they didn’t find what they want. And then they come back here and they’re disappointed because they want to come back, but it’s not there anymore.
Lex Fridman
(01:50:46)
Yeah. Their view of that place is from a different time. I have that… My parents, but everybody that left the Soviet Union, I mean it’s such a complicated relationship with that. It’s sometimes borders on hate, disappointment. In the case of the Soviet Union, perhaps similar to Egypt is the promise is sold when you were younger and the promise is broken by the possibility of what it was supposed to be. With the Soviet Union, I’m sure with Egypt it’s the same. Iran is the same. So they have a very complicated relationship with that.
Bassem Youssef
(01:51:26)
Yeah. That’s why, for example, people from Iran, I remember quite well the World Cup that was done in the United States, and the Iranian team will play in America. And there were people in the audience all wearing Iranian shirts. They hate the regime, but they have this kind of connection with the country. And this is the whole thing. You can actually love the country and you not have to agree with the regime.
Lex Fridman
(01:51:54)
Would you ever perform in the West Bank?
Bassem Youssef
(01:51:56)
No.
Lex Fridman
(01:51:56)
Gaza?
Bassem Youssef
(01:51:57)
Because if I go there, I have to go through the Israeli checkpoints and I don’t want to go through the… I don’t want to have an Israeli soldier telling me what to do.
Lex Fridman
(01:52:04)
Yeah, there’s a demeaning aspect to that whole-
Bassem Youssef
(01:52:06)
Very.
Lex Fridman
(01:52:07)
Even in subtle ways, yeah.
Bassem Youssef
(01:52:09)
Yeah, yeah. I mean I have so many Palestinian friends with an American passport, US passports, living here, they’re born here. And they talk about the humiliation and the intimidation and the harassment that they go in. It’s like, do you want me to try?
Lex Fridman
(01:52:24)
Yeah, that little bit of a humiliation…
Bassem Youssef
(01:52:29)
A little bit.
Lex Fridman
(01:52:32)
Oh, sometimes it’s major, but-
Bassem Youssef
(01:52:32)
I know, I know.
Lex Fridman
(01:52:34)
… I noticed that even the little bit, after a lifetime of that, it can turn to hate towards the other.
Bassem Youssef
(01:52:44)
Yeah, and resentment.
Lex Fridman
(01:52:45)
Resentment. And then how do you do anything with that resentment?
Bassem Youssef
(01:52:48)
I have a friend of mine, he is from Palestine from the West Bank. He’s American. He was born here. And we have of course all of this discussion of what happened. And he tells me on October 11th in the West Bank, and there was a village called Qusra. And on that village, the settlers went in around the village and they send a message on Facebook. It was like, “You rats, get out of your sewers and we’re going to be waiting for you.” Intimidation through technology. Qusra have another settlement next to it called Esh Kodesh. Esh Kodesh, they have people there who were training something called [inaudible 01:53:32], which is basically the guardians of [inaudible 01:53:36]. And it’s like a paramilitary group that trains other settlers on military compact, give them weapons and do military drills.

(01:53:45)
And they went there militarized and went there, and it was actually co-founded a Jew from Brooklyn. Not even… and like an Israeli. And he’s like one of the disciples of Meir Kahane. I’m sure that you know who Meir Kahane is, who was the Jewish defense leader, the people who assassinated Alex Odeh here in the United States, and they were there with their weapons outside intimidating people. Now this story carries everything that is wrong with the situation. You have people from Brooklyn, from outside, just because they’re Jewish, they can’t come and they can claim the land from the people there. Anybody from… just because he’s Jewish, you can come and take the land from other people.

(01:54:25)
They’re using technology to intimidate Palestinians. They have unchecked military power. These are not IDF soldiers, these are settlers and they have free reign in order to intimidate and to kill the people. And you understand, this is the daily life of Palestinians, not in Gaza. In the West Bank.
Lex Fridman
(01:54:45)
What do we do, what do people do to nudge this towards peace, towards flourishing?
Bassem Youssef
(01:54:55)
Here’s the thing, I want to talk to the people of Israel. What is Israel doing right now is not just unfair to the Palestinians, it’s unfair to the Jewish people in Israel. No, it is unfair to the Jewish people around the world, because the way that Israel links itself to Judaism, at a certain point… Remember ISIS and Al-Qaeda, and when everybody hated Muslims? Humans are simple. They cannot have the nuances to separate. So anybody with a Muslim name, with a Muslim face with a beard who looks Muslim, he would do it because of that actions of those atrocities, you have the power as a person to separate yourself from an abusive power, a horrible power, and be yourself.

(01:55:43)
I am really worried because the rise of antisemitism and the rise of hate against Jews is not because of the Jews. It’s because of the actions of a government. Jews do not have to be on the side of apartheid. Ronnie Kasrils, he’s a Jewish South African, and he fought shoulder-to-shoulder next to Nelson Mandela. He was part of the African National Conference, ANC. And he had an article said like, “I know what apartheid is and I saw Israel and this is what they have.” And the thing is, Israel, the Israeli government should listen to other people. You cannot call anybody who criticizes you either an antisemite, or if they’re already Jewish, you call them like self-hating Jew. You cannot do that. You cannot continue doing that, because we did that.

(01:56:28)
When I would go in and criticize the Islamists, it’s like, “Oh, you’re self-hating Muslim. You’re not really Muslim, you’re an infidel, you’re a secret, you’re secular,” whatever. We have the power in order to reform the course by holding people in power accountable. And the thing is, it is very stupid to actually call this antisemitism. My idol is Jon Stewart. I voted for Bernie Sanders. Sarah Taxler, the one who did this amazing documentary about me, Tickling Giants, she’s a Jew. She is married to an Israeli Jew. We have a good ratio because we know what the right is. They don’t have to associate themselves with the action of the Israeli government.

Sam Harris and Jihad

Lex Fridman
(01:57:09)
One of your favorite words, Jihad.
Bassem Youssef
(01:57:13)
That’s my favorite hobbies.
Lex Fridman
(01:57:15)
Favorite hobby.
Bassem Youssef
(01:57:15)
It’s in my shows. What’s your guys’ favorite… I talk about how when a white shooter does something, he talks about all of his family. And I was like, “What if we took this for Arab terrorists. What are his hobbies? Jihad.” You see? You could be a comedian.
Lex Fridman
(01:57:34)
Yeah. Wow. You’re making me feel good. Okay. Sam Harris has done several episodes on Jihad and people should go listen to it, even if you disagree with it. But the basic idea that he’s proposing is that this idea of Jihad in the negative connotation of it, of martyrdom, is counterproductive, is destructive to the possible future flourishing of Palestinian people. What do you think of that? There’s just the idea of martyrdom-
Bassem Youssef
(01:58:11)
Yeah, I totally agree. But people don’t wake up in the morning and say like, “I want to declare Jihad.” Think about it. Why would anybody choose to end his life by taking other people with him, and end that life? His life must be miserable. He must be pushed into that. Nobody chooses death over life willingly. One of the first suicide bombers in the Palestinian resistance were Christians. We don’t talk about that.
Lex Fridman
(01:58:40)
I think he would say that the presence of a story that you can tell yourself when you’re in a really shitty place, that you can go to a much better place by sacrificing your own life… just the fact the presence of that story is there is harmful.
Bassem Youssef
(01:58:57)
Of course. But here’s my problem with Sam Harris, and usually people, they have free range talking about the Islamic faith and nitpicking the stuff that makes it put in a bad light. I can go and nitpick every single religion. They are Jews there like Ben-Gvir who openly say spitting on Christians is not a hate speech. I mean, you can bring me all kinds of videos of Islamic Jihadists saying horrible things on YouTube, and I can bring you Jews who live there, they say like, “we are going to have the whole world enslaved for us. And everybody would love to be slaves for the Jews.” I can use the Talmudic argument that if you tie a man to a tree and he dies of thirst and hunger, you didn’t kill that man. And this is kind of the same arguments like, “Ah, we are not killing Palestinians. They’re dying by themselves.”

(01:59:52)
So the nitpicking of a certain narrative, religious narrative that is separate from the political context and what’s happening right now, it’s very unfair, because I can read… If you want to have a deep dive into religious texts, nobody will be happy. And I can bring stuff from the Talmud and the Torah and stuff that is horrible. But this is a way, again, of distraction.
Lex Fridman
(02:00:20)
I dare you to talk about Buddhism and Jainism though. Try.
Bassem Youssef
(02:00:24)
Well, the people who killed the Muslims in Myanmar, weren’t they Buddhist?
Lex Fridman
(02:00:29)
Yeah. Well, hey, let’s go Jainism. Okay, I’ll find the religion. I’ll get back to you. I’ll have to find one.
Bassem Youssef
(02:00:35)
The Church of the Flying Monster-
Lex Fridman
(02:00:36)
The spaghetti thing?
Bassem Youssef
(02:00:39)
Spaghetti.
Lex Fridman
(02:00:42)
As a person who tries not to eat carbs, I’m deeply offended by that.
Bassem Youssef
(02:00:45)
I mean, there’s Scientologists, all they do is actually buy real estate.
Lex Fridman
(02:00:51)
I think there’s a few books written about the fact that they do other stuff as well. So even there…
Bassem Youssef
(02:00:57)
I know, I know.
Lex Fridman
(02:00:58)
Mormons sometimes… They’re some of the nicest people I’ve ever met, but I’m sure there’s also darkness there too. Oh boy, religion.
Bassem Youssef
(02:01:08)
There’s soaking in Mormons.
Lex Fridman
(02:01:11)
There’s what?
Bassem Youssef
(02:01:12)
Soaking.
Lex Fridman
(02:01:12)
What’s soaking?
Bassem Youssef
(02:01:13)
Okay. Soaking, basically if you get into the woman and you don’t move, that’s not adultery. That’s not like-
Lex Fridman
(02:01:25)
Oh, interesting. So there’s a loophole.
Bassem Youssef
(02:01:25)
Yeah, you go in and you just stay…
Lex Fridman
(02:01:29)
There’s a loophole.
Bassem Youssef
(02:01:31)
A loophole. That’s the thing. Religion has loopholes.
Lex Fridman
(02:01:31)
Religion has a loophole.
Bassem Youssef
(02:01:32)
Yes. And Muslims, we do that the whole time. We pick and choose our sins, the stuff that we enjoy. It’s just we’re humans.
Lex Fridman
(02:01:39)
There’s 72 virgins waiting for all of us.
Bassem Youssef
(02:01:41)
Maybe if I converted you as a Jew, I’ll get you 80. I don’t know. We can negotiate.
Lex Fridman
(02:01:46)
But I also have questions about whether-
Bassem Youssef
(02:01:48)
I’ll give you a very good deal. And maybe I’ll throw there a Camry.
Lex Fridman
(02:01:51)
I have to be honest. A Camry? It’s pretty good. What year? I don’t know.
Bassem Youssef
(02:01:57)
1998. Best year ever.
Lex Fridman
(02:01:59)
Well, they last a long time, so I’m not sure I want 72. I-
Bassem Youssef
(02:02:04)
Well, I’ll throw five in the mix and see how we feel.
Lex Fridman
(02:02:08)
Yeah, can we-
Bassem Youssef
(02:02:08)
If you want to upgrade…
Lex Fridman
(02:02:09)
Yeah. Can we do a trial period? But in general, if you just zoom out, do you think religion is… In what way is it good for the world? In what way is it harmful?

Religion

Bassem Youssef
(02:02:22)
If there was no religion, humans would have invented religion, because think about it. Think of the early humanity. You’re a caveman or whatever, and then you see your family members killed and then you say, “What? I’m going to be the sheep or the gazelle that just ends and perish? I am more important.” I think with the development of consciousness, humans thought that they are much more precious and important than the other animals because they have now intelligence. So my life will not end like that. My death will be even more important. There’s consequences for that. There’s consequences for what I do.

(02:03:01)
And then the early man was there in the desert and all of these natural phenomena. They didn’t know what to do. They were afraid. So they need to have refuge. They need to have something to take care of. They need to have a reason for everything, because if there’s no reason, it’s chaos. It’s chaos.
Lex Fridman
(02:03:19)
It’s terrifying.
Bassem Youssef
(02:03:20)
It’s terrifying. There’s nothing. There has to be a reason. There has to be a reason, there has to be a purpose. There has to be a cause, something. I’m not just going to be die like a cockroach being stepped on. And that’s kind of part of it is ego.
Lex Fridman
(02:03:36)
The whole world rotates around you in a way.
Bassem Youssef
(02:03:38)
It’s the ego. So religion actually got a lot of it from humanity itself. Like me, like us being humans. And many religion is a collection of stories, and those stories based on things that humans did themselves and they attributed it to gods.
Lex Fridman
(02:03:57)
And there’s an aspect of religion where you humble yourself before a thing that is much greater than you. So that has, I would say, a very positive effect of humbling.
Bassem Youssef
(02:04:08)
It will be great if it stop there. But here’s the thing, if you humble, in order that your ego kicks in and feel that you are better than someone else who’s not humbled in front of the same God-
Lex Fridman
(02:04:08)
You always go there.
Bassem Youssef
(02:04:19)
… that means that I will have all of that [inaudible 02:04:22] that I can use that because now… What does mean, being humble? I’m divine. But I’m not-
Lex Fridman
(02:04:28)
Yeah. Also, I’m way more humble than you.
Bassem Youssef
(02:04:29)
Ah, but you’re not. So you see how they kind of like the oxymoron. I’m humble and I’m surrendering, but in the same time I am better than you and I’m more entitled. Isn’t it crazy?
Lex Fridman
(02:04:38)
Yeah, it’s beautiful. It’s crazy. It’s absurd. It’s-
Bassem Youssef
(02:04:41)
I mean, look at the Muslim, Christians and Jews and everyone. Say, “All right, Muslims, we surrendered.” I’m talking about the extreme ones. I mean people… I surrender to God. Good. Keep it that way. If you go there. I surrender to God, that means that I am closer to God than you, then you should die. Okay, Christians. Christ is love and he loves me and we are going to be together. But you don’t get into his kingdom and you die. You see, it’s the same thing. If you-
Lex Fridman
(02:04:41)
Just stop it and-
Bassem Youssef
(02:05:11)
Like stop there. Stop where you are humble and you feel that you’re a piece of shit and you are a worthless human being and you are there. Stop there. But once you says like, “Oh, that makes me a better person than you, and it makes me more with God than you, so that would give me the entitlement to kick your ass.”
Lex Fridman
(02:05:30)
Yeah, we always ruin a good thing,
Bassem Youssef
(02:05:32)
Don’t we?
Lex Fridman
(02:05:34)
That ego. You’ve been outspoken, with Piers Morgan, but just on this topic, and you talked about the Superman story, which I would love it if you were in a Superman movie. But have you lost job opportunities because of this, because of speaking out?
Bassem Youssef
(02:05:56)
There was a couple of things that were going on, but they stopped again. I don’t know if it’s October 7th.
Lex Fridman
(02:06:03)
Can you tell the Superman story just so-
Bassem Youssef
(02:06:03)
Yeah, yeah. So-
Lex Fridman
(02:06:04)
What role were you?
Bassem Youssef
(02:06:06)
Oh, okay-
Lex Fridman
(02:06:06)
What did you audition for?
Bassem Youssef
(02:06:08)
Yes. Okay, okay. So in June I was traveling to Dubai and an hour before I get into the car and go there, my manager is like, “Bass, I’m going to send you a script, read it. It’s for Superman.” It’s like, oh, Superman. I am not really good in auditions. I’m not a seasoned actor. So I was like, “Okay, I’m just going to do it, send the tape.” I do the tape, I send it. I go to the airport, and I read… and I think I can talk about it now because they said they changed the script. So basically what I found it interesting in that new script is that there is a dictator in a country that invades another country, and Superman interferes politically. That’s the first time we ever see Superman interferes politically. So basically it was Russia and Ukraine, but because of me, it was like it couldn’t be Russia and Ukraine. So it had to be something kind of with a flavor.

(02:06:59)
So I read the role as if a mixture of Trump and Mubarak. I did this mix, like, “You know…” Kind of the Middle East, but also kind of the essence of Trump into it. I went to the airport. It’s like an hour. It’s like James Gunn saw it, he loves it. It’s like, what? I never had an audition that fast. I mean, I had a few roles, but not that fast, not like that. And then I said, “Well, the strike starts tomorrow and we need to be on the phone… After the strike, we cannot talk.” The SAG after strike, like the writers and the actors strike. So like, “well, I’m going to be on a plane right now.” It’s like, “Okay, once you land, you can have a Zoom call with James Gunn.”

(02:07:41)
I have a call with James Gunn. I’m a huge fan of him. The guy took something like Guardians of the Galaxy, nobody knew about it, made amazing trilogy. And he is like a really cool guy. I like what he did. And it was really nice. And he started to talk to me about the movie. And I talked to people before we were casting them. So I know that everybody on set have a good chemistry. It was amazing. So in your mind, if you’re an actor, what does that mean? You got the part. And he told me, “You got the part.” Month goes by, strike goes by. October 7th happens. I do Piers Morgan one and two. And then I go to my Australian tour. My manager called me. “Bassem…” The strike was over. It’s like, “You don’t have the part anymore.”

(02:08:27)
I was sad, very sad, but for three days. And I said, “[inaudible 02:08:30].” I’m actually doing very well. [inaudible 02:08:34]. And then when I went to Chris Cuomo after I finished the show, he told me, “Did you lose any opportunities?” And that was off record, after the show was concluded. And I talked about Superman, and I found myself when I was talking, I was angry, I was bitter. And I went home. I was like, ” Why was I angry? Why was I bitter? It wasn’t meant to be. And I’m living a good life now. I don’t need to…”

(02:09:08)
So when I was asked again the next day in two different interviews, the BBC and another one also with my friend, [inaudible 02:09:15], I said the story in a different way. I said, “I don’t have any anger. As a matter of fact, maybe if I was Warner Brothers…” I didn’t talk about James Gunn. I thought it was the studio. If I was Warner Brothers and I’m a Muslim, I wouldn’t have a Zionist or a pro-Israeli in my movie. But I want to tell them that when I criticize Israel, I am not a threat to you as a Jew. And we can actually have more in common. That was more of a kind of empathic.

(02:09:41)
So when I said, that the internet went crazy, and James Gunn have haters because the Snyder-verse and all of this. It’s a world that I don’t understand. And James Gunn had all of these attacks on him, and I was pissed with how it was handled. I wasn’t angry at James Gunn, but I thought it was handled… So my publicist and manager is like, “Bassem, stay calm, don’t speak. It’s better to not talk about it.” I said, “Okay.”

(02:10:13)
So there’s nothing wrong about me, but I see the heat is rising against James Gunn. And that is a guy that I had a personal connection with, even through Zoom. And I didn’t like what was happening. And then he called me and he explained to me and said, “Bassem, I actually have camera tests before people, before finally…” I didn’t know that. “And then we changed the script and it was the strike. So I didn’t call.” And also I thought to myself, I’m small. I’m a small actor. I’m not that important for him to call me to say, “We’re going to change the script.”

(02:10:42)
So I still think that the timing sucks and everything. But then I went and I did a video explaining exactly what I’m telling you, because I didn’t want to be famous for the wrong reasons, because that would be unfair. Because already people were… and I was having interviews. “Can you come about to Superman?” I was like, ” Guys, that’s it. I’m not going to talk about it, because this is a non-issue.” And when I talked to James on the phone, I felt how sincere he was. So I didn’t want someone, because of me will, have that kind of attack, because I know what it means to be on the other side of that kind of attack. It’s terrible. And it ruins your life and it ruins your day. And nobody deserves to be doing that. And I don’t want to be the reason for someone else to go through that pain.
Lex Fridman
(02:11:25)
And you also said that you don’t want to be a victim.
Bassem Youssef
(02:11:29)
Yeah, I don’t want to be. I’m doing great. I’m selling out everywhere. I’m having a wonderful, loyal audiences coming to me. Why I would be angry about the role of its Superman? Yes, it’s great to be in the superhero movies, but so what?
Lex Fridman
(02:11:43)
There’s a wisdom in that. Even if you weren’t doing great, that’s a choice a lot of people can come to, which is like, do I play victim here or not?
Bassem Youssef
(02:11:53)
It’s greed. It’s greed. They want more attention. They want to be more into the thing. They want more and more. And there’s so much to go around to be enough for all of us. But it is-
Bassem Youssef
(02:12:00)
There is so much to go around to be enough for all of us, but it’s great. It is ego, ego, ego, ego. I need to be in the center, I need to be victimized, I need to make people feel sorry for me and love me. It is not the right way. It is not because it is fake, it’s fake, it’s made up. I did not victimize myself when I left for Egypt. I speak about it now, but in that dark times, I was detained in airports. I didn’t have my American passport yet, I was still traveling with my Egyptian passport, and I was detained in an Arab airport and I was going to be delivered to the Egyptians.

(02:12:38)
I had shows, when I was still starting, I had hecklers being sent to me by the Egyptian embassy and Egyptian Consulate in New York and in London to curse me and to take videos of that and then send it to state-run media in Egypt. I didn’t speak about that because I felt that if I speak about that, I feel about what was going on to me, I would be victimizing myself. It’s like if I’m going to be good, I’m going to be good because of what I do, not because of what people’s perception of what I’m going through.
Lex Fridman
(02:13:07)
That becomes a slippery slope, and somehow victimizing yourself=
Bassem Youssef
(02:13:10)
Goes to more victimizing, and then you cannot leave that habit. You can only exist and thrive if people feel sorry for you.
Lex Fridman
(02:13:18)
Yeah, Israel and Palestine currently both have that temptation.
Bassem Youssef
(02:13:25)
I would always push back when you do the comparison, because one of them is not really the same kind of power.
Lex Fridman
(02:13:33)
For sure, for you that’s a big problem.
Bassem Youssef
(02:13:35)
It’s very easy to say why Palestinians would victimize themselves, but Israel, with all of that military white man, it’s too much. What Israel is doing is that they’re victimizing the Jewish experience, and I don’t think it’s fair for a lot of Jews. I don’t think that they should use the Holocaust and the persecution that happened to Jewish people all through history in order to push an equally oppressive agenda. That is not fair and it’s not good for the Jewish people living, and it is basically a disrespect to the memory of the Holocaust. I told you I want to make a movie about the Holocaust. I do, because what happened, that kind of engineered torture, should never happen again, and it should not be happening now.
Lex Fridman
(02:14:20)
To you, what Israel is doing is leading to more anti-Semitism in the world?
Bassem Youssef
(02:14:23)
A hundred percent. Can I be a conspiracy theorist for a second?
Lex Fridman
(02:14:27)
Please. There earth is flat, we all know this.
Bassem Youssef
(02:14:30)
A part of me thinking maybe they’re doing that intentionally, because if there’s a rise of anti-Semitism in Jews, there will always point like, “See, they hate us, so we can do whatever we want. If we let go of our might in our strength, we are going to go back to the concentration camps because you see how the word hates you.”
Lex Fridman
(02:14:53)
Again, when you say “they”, are people in power.
Bassem Youssef
(02:14:56)
Yeah, absolutely. Listen, it’s always the people in power. I believe that humans are easily corruptible and easily repairable, but the corruptive part is much easier. People could change, but power, people in power are very dangerous. Very, very dangerous. Especially if you have religion – which is power by itself -military might, political support, and money. Dude, that’s a very, very, very dangerous recipe.
Lex Fridman
(02:15:29)
All that said, I do believe in the power of the little guy. The individual just overthrow the government. I don’t know if you heard, but the Arab Spring… It happens.
Bassem Youssef
(02:15:41)
We are here-
Lex Fridman
(02:15:42)
Just among friends.
Bassem Youssef
(02:15:43)
We are Americans, right?
Lex Fridman
(02:15:44)
Yes.
Bassem Youssef
(02:15:44)
We’re Americans
Lex Fridman
(02:15:45)
Allegedly.
Bassem Youssef
(02:15:47)
We’re Americans.
Lex Fridman
(02:15:50)
How funny is that? Just given our two backgrounds. We’re American.
Bassem Youssef
(02:15:54)
We’re Americans. It’s like we’re Americans. There’s one thing about the power of the little guy that I am very sad about because you see… I love America by the way. I consider it my new home, and I want my kids to grow up here. I am very grateful for the opportunity that I have in the United States, and I criticize the United States politics, and I criticize it out of love. The same way that I was criticizing what’s happening of Egypt out of love. What is worrying for me is how the power of the little man is diminishing.

(02:16:35)
It doesn’t matter now who you vote into power, they will not listen to you. They would listen to the people who paid them to be there, and it is very concerning because I can see the American democracies turning, not even slowly, very rapidly into an oligarchy. I’m sure that all of the millions of people who are voting, they don’t vote for the NRA, they don’t vote for APAC, they don’t vote for the pharmaceutical companies, they don’t vote for the military industry complex. Yet, the people in power, they come in, they take your vote and my vote, and they’re loyal to those people, not to us. It is very, very, very concerning. Very concerning. This is the danger of American policies, American politics and American democracies. It’s dangerous, because basically, the vote becomes just a ceremony that the someone with the more funding will get to power, and then he’s not loyal to you.
Lex Fridman
(02:17:41)
Still the fire. We are in Texas. Everybody’s armed to the teeth here.
Bassem Youssef
(02:17:47)
What are these arms going to do in front of tanks?
Lex Fridman
(02:17:51)
You said the American military is unique in this way.
Bassem Youssef
(02:17:55)
I know, but for now
Lex Fridman
(02:17:57)
For now, the tanks are… First of all, I believe Russia has more tanks than the United States. Tanks. I’m not an expert in military strategic deployment of arms, but the United States uses different kinds of weapons.
Bassem Youssef
(02:18:13)
They have drones and they have the lasers, and they’re sitting comfortably behind the screens. It’s kind of like it turns a big Xbox game.
Lex Fridman
(02:18:22)
They sell a lot of those things to everybody.
Bassem Youssef
(02:18:25)
It’s crazy because the defense budget is 68% of American military, it’s like almost 850 billion each year. Most of that weapons, we don’t even need it. We just do it because of the contracts. There was an incredible 60 Minutes, I’m sure that you saw it, the one about the gouging of the prices of the Department of… It was one of the most fascinating things that I’ve ever seen. They say like a valve, a safety of a oil valve, that used to be sold for $329, now it’s sold for $9,000. Why? Because there’s only five weapon companies and they can control the prices, and in 2006, the whole Apache fleet of the American army in Iraq was grounded because there was one valve that they were gouging the price and didn’t want to give them. The Stinger missile, the one that you carry and it’s like the anti-aircraft, used to be sold for $25,000. Now it’s sold for $400,000. Nobody is doing that because the DOD has fired 130,000 people, including engineers and negotiators.

(02:19:35)
Now, in order to cut expenses, now we’re paying more money. The thing is, we do not have a say in this. We do not have a say in how my tax money and your tax money is being spent, because I’m sure you don’t want your money to be sent to Israel like that. I’m sure, even if you’re Jewish, I’m sure, I’m sure that I don’t want my money to be given to some Muslim countries who kill other Muslims. I’m sure. Here’s the thing, what kind of power do we have other than speaking? What is left for us is free speech. Now when you speak, they call you anti-Semitic. You see why I’m angry.
Lex Fridman
(02:20:11)
Still, America’s holding pretty strong despite the criticisms on the free speech front. If you look at the freedom of the press, freedom of the speech index, America is not at the top.
Bassem Youssef
(02:20:23)
It is not. This is why, for example, it is very disheartening for me to see that the Western media, Western press, that used to be the beacon of freedom as now using as mouthpieces. It is funny how Nixon got angry in the New York Times in 1971 when they found leaks about Tim lying about the Vietnam War since the beginning. Now, he hired the plumbers, the special units, in order to go in and find the leaks. This was Watergate basically, because he was angry to see who leaked that instead of fixing the problem. Now, the New York Times have published this story about the rape that was a hoax that was written by Anna Schwartz, someone will have no experience, and now when it was leaked, instead of them correcting themselves, they went in and they had their own investigation to see who leaked. The New York Times in 2003 became the mouthpiece of George W. Bush of the WMD, and now as an American, I see the New York Times becoming a mouthpiece of a foreign country? Why do you do that?

TikTok

Lex Fridman
(02:21:28)
One of the things that’s really difficult to know is where to find the truth. It does seem that both sides use propaganda, and both sides lie a lot.
Bassem Youssef
(02:21:40)
Both sides as in?
Lex Fridman
(02:21:41)
Both Israel and Palestine. Pro-Palestine, Pro-Israel, there’s a lot of lies
Bassem Youssef
(02:21:48)
I know, but it’s a lot of inequality, man. There’s a lot of people on the internet, but who have the mainstream media siding with.
Lex Fridman
(02:21:59)
Thanks to social media.
Bassem Youssef
(02:22:00)
Yes, thank God for social media, because now it’s individuals. They’re the people. They’re people. You are comparing BBC, New York Times, Washington Post with just people with a TikTok account.
Lex Fridman
(02:22:13)
Who have more power in your view?
Bassem Youssef
(02:22:15)
It is actually very, very fascinating to see the little man having that power over the media, because-
Lex Fridman
(02:22:20)
In fact, disproportionately so. This is my problem.
Bassem Youssef
(02:22:24)
You cannot call people with TikTok propagandists while people being paid to casually give you the news and they deliberately lie to you.
Lex Fridman
(02:22:31)
Yes, I can. They’re both propagandists.
Bassem Youssef
(02:22:35)
Yes, but the mechanism and the intentions are different because here’s the thing-
Lex Fridman
(02:22:42)
I’d rather have the TikTok guy than the…
Bassem Youssef
(02:22:47)
The TikTok guy is a TikTok guy, but if you have the New York Times being exposed to be lying, and then they get this UN report, which is like a disgrace, and you just put the title and you don’t talk about it. I’m fine with CNN and Jake Tapper and all of those people spreading the rape allegations for years. I don’t even want them to refute them, I want them to bring the Israeli reports saying that it didn’t happen. The Israeli media themselves, they didn’t even bother, not once. Is that balanced? That’s not, so that’s why people in TikTok, because they have to take matters in their own hand.
Lex Fridman
(02:23:24)
The problem with the people in TikTok is the drug, the dopamine rush, of getting a lot of likes. Instead of talking about the death of civilians, they’ll talk about beheaded babies, or the equivalent of. They’re going to actually make up stories, because the made up stories are going to be more viral. Now, we’re just in the sea, in this muck of lies.
Bassem Youssef
(02:23:45)
There’s a lot of people who actually exposed those lies on TikTok. You have both.
Lex Fridman
(02:23:48)
True.
Bassem Youssef
(02:23:49)
You have both. It’s kind of like the democracy of the social media as we always it. But if you have the street-run media that is the legacy media, CNN, BBC, New York Times, Fox News, all of those people, and they are spreading lies and they’re not even doing the journalistic job in order to at least bring the other side, that’s problematic.
Lex Fridman
(02:24:09)
That’s worse. You’re supposed to be journalists.
Bassem Youssef
(02:24:12)
It’s supposed to be report. Report.
Lex Fridman
(02:24:17)
I see that this as a catalyst, an inspiration, for the citizen journalists to rise up.
Bassem Youssef
(02:24:24)
This is what you’re doing.
Lex Fridman
(02:24:25)
This, yeah,
Bassem Youssef
(02:24:26)
This is what you’re doing. No, this is what you’re doing, because you go into a deep dive. This is a no filter thing. There’s no spin.
Lex Fridman
(02:24:32)
The long form, the long form is going to save us.
Bassem Youssef
(02:24:38)
I see why you hate the TikToks, like a dopamine rush.
Lex Fridman
(02:24:40)
Stupid TikTok. Five hours later.
Bassem Youssef
(02:24:43)
I saw the resentment in your face.
Lex Fridman
(02:24:47)
Can’t look away.
Bassem Youssef
(02:24:48)
Those 30 seconds, I do four hours.
Lex Fridman
(02:24:53)
Both have a place, both are exciting, but it is very dangerous because you can’t look away. I almost never, maybe I’m doing it wrong, but I almost never feel better ever after having used TikTok.
Bassem Youssef
(02:25:08)
Makes two of us. I can’t. I have a team. By the way, I give my password to a team. I don’t even go there because once in a dark night, very late at night, I went TikTok, and it was like, two hours. What?
Lex Fridman
(02:25:26)
Yeah.
Bassem Youssef
(02:25:27)
What? I said, ” No, this is dangerous.” I’m really like an Instagram and Facebook guy. I don’t need that.
Lex Fridman
(02:25:35)
Even there, man.
Bassem Youssef
(02:25:37)
I barely get out of Twitter, I mean X, I can’t. It’s a cesspool. It’s just like the concentrated hate, X is too much. It’s too much. I can’t.
Lex Fridman
(02:25:47)
You don’t check it at all, you try not to check it at all? It is very intense.
Bassem Youssef
(02:25:51)
I don’t, I post something and I run.
Lex Fridman
(02:25:57)
Post and ghost. You’re doing comedy here in the United States right now?

Joe Rogan

Bassem Youssef
(02:26:02)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(02:26:03)
Joe Rogan has the Comedy Mothership, which is an incredible club. Have you considered doing that club?
Bassem Youssef
(02:26:09)
I would love to.
Lex Fridman
(02:26:09)
Do you know Joe?
Bassem Youssef
(02:26:11)
Of course. Who doesn’t new Joe?
Lex Fridman
(02:26:14)
I feel like it’s a small world of comedy. That’s why I…
Bassem Youssef
(02:26:17)
I think Joe’s story, like what he did and stuff that he did in the UFC and his podcast, it’s very impressive. The fact that he’s there and he’s bringing all of those people, whether in comedy or his podcast, is very impressive. This is what the media is all about, what the internet is all about, to give you the experiences of stuff that you might never experience. That is very important. You do it with people where you go into their brains. He goes, takes people, and they take their experiences and their lives and their stories. It’s very interesting. This is the beauty of that art form, because you have all of these experiences at the tips of your hands and it’s there for you to learn from. When he moved to Texas and we did the Comedy Mothership, anybody who would push comedy forward, that is the most difficult art form and the most demanding. The fact that you do that, and he might not even be making money out of it, but he’s doing that because of his passion, that is enough.
Lex Fridman
(02:27:25)
He really believes in creating this place where comedians could be really free. One of the cool things about the Comedy Mothership is comedian is king there. You have to bow down to the…
Bassem Youssef
(02:27:41)
Because the comedian who came there came after eating shit, dying out there.
Lex Fridman
(02:27:46)
Eating shit everywhere else.
Bassem Youssef
(02:27:47)
Basically, you’re a saint.
Lex Fridman
(02:27:50)
I have eaten shit for many years.
Bassem Youssef
(02:27:54)
Now, I’m going to give you shit.

Joe Biden

Lex Fridman
(02:27:58)
You already told me what you think about the state of politics in the United States, but now tell me what you really think. What do you think of the choice of Trump versus Biden? How did we end up here?
Bassem Youssef
(02:28:08)
I don’t know, man. The fact that you have two people over the age of 90, it is-
Lex Fridman
(02:28:14)
I think it’s over a hundred, but that’s all right.
Bassem Youssef
(02:28:16)
Combined like 170. It is so sad. It is so sad that this is what we can produce as a society, like a demagogue and a sleepy Joe. He’s not there, man. He’s gone. He’s gone. When old people could be a danger for themselves, he’s a danger for the whole world. The whole world. If an old person would die who would have a hip replacement, we can need them a new planet because of one decision. It’s not just that, it’s not that. I am a Democrat, and I told you I vote for Bernie Sanders. I supported him 2016, but I couldn’t vote then. Of course, a huge fan of Obama. One of my things is he’s the first Muslim president, but he killed Muslims. It’s like, that’s things Muslims do.
Lex Fridman
(02:29:24)
I love that line.
Bassem Youssef
(02:29:31)
I think the whole idea, my shock, is… I told you about what Biden said about “I’m a Zionist.” Okay, you’re a Zionist, but then it’s, “Jews are not safe in anywhere other than Israel.” It’s like, dude, what the hell are you saying? If you don’t care about me and you don’t care about my misery, why would I care about you winning or losing? I have a joke that I told people. Why would even Biden listen to us? He just raised $ 145 million in California alone from pro-Israeli groups. What can we, Arabs, working in the vape business do to him? We cannot compete with that. Practically. Life is unfair. The guy’s a politician. He needs bills to pay. He needs a campaign to run. He needs money. He will go to the people who will give me money. Joe Biden is the highest paid politician from Israeli lobbyists, $4.6 million over the years.
Lex Fridman
(02:30:35)
I also believe in great leaders that go against all of that. Unfortunately-
Bassem Youssef
(02:30:41)
Bernie Sanders was like that.
Lex Fridman
(02:30:43)
Bernie Sanders, yes, but also age. I don’t want to be ageist.
Bassem Youssef
(02:30:48)
Of course, no.
Lex Fridman
(02:30:50)
Because I remember listening to Bernie Sanders 20 years ago on Tom Hartman show, and I don’t want to say anything against Bernie, but he was sharper then.
Bassem Youssef
(02:31:00)
Of course.
Lex Fridman
(02:31:01)
There’s a thing with age.
Bassem Youssef
(02:31:02)
Of course. I think I’m a huge fan about putting a limit on your working years, because you don’t want to have a Mitch McConnell moment every now. Because now the whole thing of what is this, isn’t this not like a horse by [inaudible 02:31:17]? It is unfair. It is unfair. The whole idea that you have unlimited… You have a limit for the president, but you don’t have a limit for Congress people and senators? What do you mean? This is, basically, you can go in and be in governance forever, and the longer that you can get, the more corrupt you’ll get.
Lex Fridman
(02:31:35)
Yes, that’s the thing.
Bassem Youssef
(02:31:38)
That is very concerning for Americans.
Lex Fridman
(02:31:39)
Everybody. Everybody becomes corrupt after. That’s why two terms is a good limit.
Bassem Youssef
(02:31:44)
For everybody.
Lex Fridman
(02:31:46)
Maybe half a term for Egyptian leaders.
Bassem Youssef
(02:31:51)
Our half-term is 15 years,
Lex Fridman
(02:31:55)
Quarter term. You should come back and run for office there.
Bassem Youssef
(02:32:01)
Oh my god, no. There’s a curse in Egyptian of Egyptian presidency. No, nobody comes there. He is either dead or in jail. It’s not the most appealing job.
Lex Fridman
(02:32:13)
They might make a statue of you though. Make you look good.
Bassem Youssef
(02:32:16)
After my death. I look very good dead.

Putin

Lex Fridman
(02:32:24)
When you look at what happened with Navalny, since you kind of really thought about this in Egypt, what happened with Navalny in Russia? What do you think about that?
Bassem Youssef
(02:32:39)
What happened in Navalny in Russia is not something new in Russia. Putin have this whole history of poisoning and killing people. I would have to cite credit Putin. He’s bringing us the essence of the dark ages, the Middle Ages. Basically, Putin is the living example of what happens if Game of Thrones was reality. It’s like, death by poison. Like blow up a plane, it like mysteriously disappears. It is very dark, but it’s like, wow, it’s a television show.
Lex Fridman
(02:33:20)
Maybe that’s what attracts us to that part of the world is that it’s so much on display, this game of power, of geopolitics, of war.
Bassem Youssef
(02:33:32)
The same happens in the West, but behind closed doors. It’s not that open, it’s not that pronounced. It’s like, “Oops, Epstein.” I think because the West is more advanced in movies and cinemas, we kind of direct it better. I think the outcome is the way that you kind of set the scene, it’s like scene, and scene.
Lex Fridman
(02:33:58)
That’s why people about landing on the moon, they’re like… I get it, but we haven’t gone back.
Bassem Youssef
(02:34:06)
The Earth is flat.

War

Lex Fridman
(02:34:13)
If we zoom out, do you think there will always be war in the world?
Bassem Youssef
(02:34:17)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(02:34:17)
Always be suffering? Yes?
Bassem Youssef
(02:34:19)
Yeah. But, here’s the thing, I don’t think for long. I don’t think that will happen for them.
Lex Fridman
(02:34:25)
Wait a minute.
Bassem Youssef
(02:34:27)
Because here’s the thing. Humanity is destined to have war, it will have war, but something happened in the last 50 years. Now, we have much more lethal weapons. The problem is the beginning, it’s like swords against swords, horses, cavalry, like cannons, catapults, medium-sized. But now, like a press of a button, you can annihilate the whole planet, and this is the problem. Wars will always continue, the problem is when is going to be the tipping point where we are actually going to destroy ourselves. It is so easy now to destroy ourselves. The amount of weapons and the quality of weapons that we have, it is designed to kill more effectively. It is crazy. It’s like we can create our own destruction on ourselves, and I think we are not that far away from it.
Lex Fridman
(02:35:19)
Just looking at nuclear weapons. The fascinating thing about nuclear weapons is I’ve gotten to learn recently just how few people are involved in a full on nuclear war that basically kills everybody. Three plus billion people right away.
Bassem Youssef
(02:35:39)
The consequences the of the nuclear winter, it’s unlivable.
Lex Fridman
(02:35:45)
All it takes is one president can do it. It could be even a false alarm, misunderstanding,
Bassem Youssef
(02:35:52)
Like what happened in the Cuba Missile crisis.
Lex Fridman
(02:35:56)
Again. And now there’s more nations are prepared and ready to launch. I don’t know.
Bassem Youssef
(02:36:07)
You have a media and a 24 hours kind of thing that makes you at edge the whole time. That’s that’s crazy.
Lex Fridman
(02:36:13)
There’s a dark perspective on this where there’s certain members of the media that would kind of enjoy the prospect of nuclear war a little bit. Just let’s get as close to it as possible.
Bassem Youssef
(02:36:26)
You have another factor that will contribute to that: religion. Remember how the radical Islamists talk about the end of time and whatever, but most of the Islamists don’t have that much power. Problem is with Christian Zionists now being on the top of the world with America, they have been pushing for that kind of conflict to kind of escalate, escalate. Listen to Sarah Palin’s “God wants us here”, like Karl Rove, “All of the new gods”, the Dispensationalist Reagan. Here’s an incredible book called Forcing the Hands of God. Beautiful book I read. It’s published 1998, but it still matters today. The whole idea about, especially the Zionist Christians who love Israel, but they hate the Jews, they’re anti-Semites but they love Israel because of its role. This is all basically formed because of the interpretation of the Bible of Schofield and how they talk about the end of time, then Armageddon, and then the late great planet Earth, and then left behind Sirius and all of that.

(02:37:27)
It’s all about, we are heading to Armageddon. The problem is Islam, they’re people that believe that at the end of time. Then, we have the Christians that believe in the end of time. Then, you have Israel happy that those people are using it for the end of time. Then, the whole idea about them pushing as many weapons and troops and people in the Middle East to be there for the nuclear Holocaust. John Hagee, one of the pastors talk about that, about the brimstones and it’s not going to be a nuclear Holocaust. It’s crazy how people are so despising life that they are wanting death. Now, you all would have these revelations, but these revelations mean nothing if you don’t have an effective weapon in order to make it happen. This is the crazy thing, and I’m worried that the end is going to be by someone that wants to meet God a little bit earlier.
Lex Fridman
(02:38:20)
Somebody who’s really in a hurry. I have good news for you, maybe we’ll become a multi-planetary species.
Bassem Youssef
(02:38:28)
Maybe Elon Musk will lead the way.
Lex Fridman
(02:38:31)
To get out in space.
Bassem Youssef
(02:38:33)
Maybe he’s one of them. He’s a secret lizard.
Lex Fridman
(02:38:39)
I asked you offline to not mention the lizard people. They are-
Bassem Youssef
(02:38:43)
There’s like a whole people that believe in the lizard people, it’s crazy.
Lex Fridman
(02:38:48)
I actually have to be honest, I haven’t fully looked into lizard people. I probably should.
Bassem Youssef
(02:38:51)
You should.
Lex Fridman
(02:38:53)
Maybe I’m afraid of the truth.
Bassem Youssef
(02:39:04)
Removing my face.

Hope

Lex Fridman
(02:39:09)
Let’s say you’re wrong about the end of the world,-
Bassem Youssef
(02:39:12)
I hope so.
Lex Fridman
(02:39:12)
And it all turns out great and humanity flourishes. Why would that happen? What gives you hope for that trajectory for humanity?
Bassem Youssef
(02:39:26)
Younger people, the people of TikTok that you don’t like. There is a lot of bullshit there.
Lex Fridman
(02:39:36)
After you saying this, people just keep sending you TikTok videos. These younger people, these younger people?
Bassem Youssef
(02:39:43)
This woman showing her boobs, that woman?
Lex Fridman
(02:39:45)
That’s going to save us? All right, awesome. Thank you.
Bassem Youssef
(02:39:57)
Remember the joke that said, we thought that when we have internet, we’re going to have be more informed, and now we are watching twerking videos. That is true. But on the other side, the fact that you have the availability of information, I’m learning a lot. There’s people who are using that platform for that. It’s not the majority because it’s not very interesting and exciting, but I think there might be a tipping point where there’s enough people that will be aware and maybe they would collectively do something in order to bring back the power to the small man. Maybe it sounds very naive, but we don’t know. We don’t know, because you have already seen the legacy media and the legacy politicians shaking in the past few months.
Lex Fridman
(02:40:48)
They’re getting nervous.
Bassem Youssef
(02:40:49)
They’re getting nervous because people are calling them out, and those people were hiding behind their desk, behind in their offices and not to holding out how to support that. People now are calling them out. It is not going to happen this year or next year. But I think it’s something.
Lex Fridman
(02:41:02)
What advice would you give to those young folks?
Bassem Youssef
(02:41:03)
I will never give advice to those people.
Lex Fridman
(02:41:07)
Get off TikTok.
Bassem Youssef
(02:41:09)
I will never, because their input is different than mine. There’s one thing I learned when people saw me. Did the revolution fail in Egypt? The revolution is not an event. It’s not like, “Hey, we go in, we topple the government.” That’s not a revolution. A revolution is a process, it’s a very long process, and maybe that process, as much as we don’t like what happened in the Arab War, but the people there, the awareness that happened and the discussions that have been opened that you didn’t even imagine would happen in the Middle East is happening. Maybe the beginning of any hope of change is that people start talking, speaking out, talking about stuff they were not allowed to speak about. Like, for example, Israel.
Lex Fridman
(02:41:54)
The revolution continues. Bassem, you’re a beautiful human being. It was truly a pleasure and honor to meet you, I can just feel the love radiating from you. I hope I get to see you perform live. I hope to get to see you many more times. Thank you for being who you are.
Bassem Youssef
(02:42:11)
Thank you so much. AI would love to invite you for my new special, the Islamo-Nazi Bassem.
Lex Fridman
(02:42:18)
That should be the title of your autobiography.
Bassem Youssef
(02:42:20)
Islamo-Nazi. Thank you so much.
Lex Fridman
(02:42:22)
Thank you, brother. Thanks for listening to this conversation with Bassem Youssef. To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description. Now, let me leave you some words from John Stewart: “The press can hold this magnifying glass up to our problems, bringing them into focus, illuminating issues heretofore unseen, or they can use that magnifying glass to light ants on fire and then perhaps host a week of shows on the sudden, unexpected, dangerous, flaming ant epidemic. If we amplify everything, we hear nothing.” Thank you for listening, and hope to see you next time.

Transcript for Tulsi Gabbard: War, Politics, and the Military Industrial Complex | Lex Fridman Podcast #423

This is a transcript of Lex Fridman Podcast #423 with Tulsi Gabbard.
The timestamps in the transcript are clickable links that take you directly to that point in
the main video. Please note that the transcript is human generated, and may have errors.
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Table of Contents

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Introduction

Tulsi Gabbard
(00:00:00)
It’s a sad state of affairs when some of the most influential voices in our country will label someone a lover or supporter of dictators simply because you’re saying, “Hey, we shouldn’t be going to war. There is another way.”
Lex Fridman
(00:00:20)
The following is a conversation with Tulsi Gabbard, who was a longtime Democrat, including being the vice chair of the Democratic National Committee. She endorsed Bernie in 2016 and Biden in 2020. She has been both loved and heavily criticized for her independent thinking and bold political stances, especially on topics of war and the military industrial complex. She served in the US military for many years, achieving the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. And now she’s the author of a new book called For Love of Country.

(00:00:58)
This is a Lex Fridman podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description.

(00:01:03)
And now, dear friends, here’s Tulsi Gabbard.

War in Iraq


(00:01:07)
You’ve served in the US military for many years, achieving rank of Lieutenant Colonel. You were deployed in Iraq in 2004 and ’05, Kuwait in ’08 and ’09. What lessons about life and about country have you learned from that experience of war?
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:01:25)
So many. Central to those lessons learned was having my eyes open to the very real cost of war.

(00:01:35)
Of course, I served in a medical unit during that first deployment to Iraq. It was 2005 during the height of that war, and unfortunately we took a lot of casualties. We, across the entire US military, my brigade that I deployed with was from the Hawaii National Guard. We had approximately 3000 soldiers who were operating in four different areas of Iraq. And my first task every day was to go through a list of every combat related injury that had occurred the day before in the country.

(00:02:14)
I went through that list name by name, looking to see if any one of our nearly 3000 soldiers from Hawaii had been hurt in the line of duty. And then, if seeing them on the list, tracking them down. Where were they? Were they getting the care they needed? Would they be able to get sufficient care to stay in the country and return to duty? Did I need to get them evacuated? Usually it would be to military hospitals that at that time were in Landstuhl and Ramstein in Germany. And then from there, getting them to either Brooke Army Medical Center, which is here in Texas, that specialized in burn related injuries, or to Walter Reed, and tracking them and their care until they were finally home with their families. It never became a routine task. It never became like, okay, cool, check the list, kind of dot the Is, cross the Ts. It was that daily confrontation with the reality of the cost of war. Friends of mine were killed in combat.

(00:03:26)
Experiencing firsthand that high human cost of war caused me, a 20-something-year-old from Hawaii… I had left my seat in the state legislature to volunteer to deploy with my brothers and sisters in my unit to Iraq, and so recognize the cost of war, I think, in two fundamental ways. Number one is the high human cost of war on our troops and on the people in the country where this war was being waged. And also the cost on American taxpayers.

(00:03:56)
Seeing then, back again in 2005, and recognizing KBR Halliburton, one of the biggest defense contracting companies then, and I know that they’re still very much in that business now, Dick Cheney being connected with that company at one point or another, but in our camp specifically, which was one of the larger ones in Iraq at that time, there wasn’t anything that happened in our camp that didn’t have the KBR Halliburton logo imprinted on it. We had a big shack, a place where we ate our meals. They call it a dining facility, a DFAC in the military. They served four meals a day. They brought in, and they being KBR Halliburton, they imported workers in from places like Nepal and Sri Lanka and the Philippines to come in and cook food and work at this dining facility.

(00:04:48)
I got curious about how much it costs us as taxpayers. And so I started asking around some of the people, and I think at that time it was like, well, every time a soldier or a service member walks through the door, if I were to go in for breakfast and grab a banana and walk out, that’s an automatic $35 per head per meal four times a day, thousands and thousands of people.

(00:05:13)
And then we made friends. There’s a pretty large Filipino community in Hawaii. A lot of Filipino soldiers from Hawaii. We made friends with the Filipino workers who were there. They would often go in the back of the tents and set up their own rice cookers and cook their own meals, which is where the real good food was. But just started talking to them and getting to know them and asked like, “Hey, how much do you get paid?” And on average it was like, “Oh, I get paid like 500 bucks a month.” 500 bucks a month to go and do this work of either cleaning out porta-potties, picking up trash, the dining facility, doing laundry, all of these different tasks, because the military wanted soldiers to be out doing things that only soldiers could do. Understandable. But when I started putting two and two together and knowing that this company, one company alone, was making trillions of dollars, trillions of dollars, and yet this Filipino mom is making 500 bucks a month, maybe getting one day off a week, maybe, working 12 hours a day otherwise. And I said, “How often are you able to go home to your family?” “Well, they’ll let us go home a couple of weeks every other year.”

(00:06:26)
It was an eye-opening experience that growing up in Hawaii, I frankly hadn’t given much thought to before, but it’s what led me ultimately coming back from that first deployment there was no way that I could go back to the life that I had left behind. And I knew somehow, someway I needed to find a way to use those experiences to try to make a positive impact, to try to influence those… I mean, frankly, the politicians who are making decisions to go and launch these regime-change wars and send our men and women in uniform into war, and to what end, ultimately.
Lex Fridman
(00:07:11)
If we can just go back to that list. So the list is just name and injury, name and injury.
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:07:17)
Name, unit, potentially location if someone had documented that, and their injury.
Lex Fridman
(00:07:24)
And it’s just pages and pages of that.
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:07:26)
Yeah. Yeah. I didn’t get to call home every day, but when I called home and talked to my parents, I felt the tension in their voice. They didn’t want me to worry about anything at home. And so they were always like, “Hey, how are you? What can we send you?” And this and that. But it wasn’t like I was calling them from down the street and saying, “Hey, how’s it going? Let’s go have lunch,” or whatever. I knew that the reason for that tension was they were terrified of getting a phone call delivering the worst possible news. And that was what I thought of as I went through that list of how it is the reality of war. Behind every one of those names on that list was a husband or a wife, parents, sons and daughters, family members, who had no idea what we were dealing with, really. All they knew was what they saw on the news.

(00:08:31)
What my dad told me later when I got home after that deployment was that every time they saw the news, and they saw a helicopter shot down or crashed or some IED, they held their breath until they saw or heard the news of who it was or what it was.

Battle injuries and PTSD

Lex Fridman
(00:08:53)
What can you say about what the soldiers had to go through physically and psychologically when they get injured?
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:09:01)
The physical; some injuries appeared to be minor upfront. At that time, traumatic brain injury was not something that was talked about much, if at all. Many had visible wounds. Others are now what we know appeared like, “All right, cool, you checked out,” but had invisible wounds. Those who were injured in a way that did not allow them to get back to work, found it emotionally very difficult to be put on a plane and evacuated out of there. Feeling guilty that they were leaving their friends behind, and not thinking about themselves or not feeling bad for themselves, but instead feeling bad for being forced to be in a position to leave.

(00:09:59)
For soldiers, of course, we all have our own political opinions on things, but when it comes right down to it in a war zone, it’s about your friends. It’s about your brothers and sisters that you’re serving alongside. It’s not about the politicians or whatever insanity is going on in Washington. It’s about getting up and going out, getting the job done and coming back home together.

(00:10:25)
I had friends of mine who were from Hawaii, who were from American Samoa, a very culturally tight-knit community, who confided in me throughout that year that we were there, infantry soldiers who were going out on security patrols and doing raids every day, just some of the very traumatic experiences that they went through. No physical injury, but creating a kind of emotional stress and trauma that, as human beings, they were struggling in dealing with.

(00:11:08)
On a positive note, Polynesian culture especially, but also Asian culture and other cultures around the world, our guys found that shortly after we got there, the unit that we were replacing were taking the guys out on patrol and saying, “Hey, here’s this village. Here’s where we found friendlies.” Or, “Here’s where we know that there are insurgents operating, and they’ve got allies and lookouts.” And showing them the lay of the land basically.

(00:11:35)
And what our guys found was that as they were doing these ride-alongs, they call it a left seat, right seat when you’re coming in and taking over, that there was a bit of a tense, even adversarial type of relationship, where on the military side there was an assumption of suspicion or lack of trust just with the locally Iraqi people who lived around the base that we were at. And without anybody telling them to culturally, our guys began trying to build relationships.

(00:12:13)
For Hawaii and Samoa, and we had soldiers from Guam and Saipan, little things like you’re riding down in a Humvee, you’ve got a gunner in the turret with a 50 cal or a machine gun of some sort, little things like pointing the muzzle to the sky as you’re riding through a town rather than pointing it directly at where people are walking down the street was a huge gesture of an assumption of, “Hey, let’s actually talk and become friends.” We had our guys riding down the street and throwing shakas out to the local people there, breaking bread, sharing tea, and building those relationships.

(00:12:55)
Again, I served in a medical unit and what we saw was a downward shift in casualties from the unit that had been there before us, simply because of that basic human connection that our guys sought to make. And then, gradually, finding local people who lived in the town right next to us were saying, “Hey, you guys, somebody was digging a big hole a mile down the road. You might want to bypass that or check that out.” And finding weapons, caches and IEDs, improvised explosive devices, and other things that helped save people’s lives.
Lex Fridman
(00:13:33)
On the cost side of things, how is it possible for a company like Halliburton or others to get away with $40 bananas? However much it was, but the overhead costs.
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:13:45)
Look, what they will claim is that it’s expensive to move logistics through a country at war, but they get away with it, ultimately, this insane war profiteering, and they’re not alone. Obviously, there are other companies that this is their business model. They get away with it because of their political connections, and the lobbyists that they have, the relationships they have with politicians. And ultimately, what President Eisenhower warned against with regard to that cozy relationship between Congress and even what he called then the military industrial complex, it’s been alive and well. He warned us against it, and I would say it’s thriving more now than ever before.
Lex Fridman
(00:14:37)
How powerful is the military industrial complex as a thing? Is it a machine that can be slowed down, can be stopped, can be reversed?
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:14:47)
It can be. It’s powerful. I don’t think you can overstate the powerful nature of it because it extends so deeply within our government. It’s not just those in these specific big defense contracting companies that benefit from it. You look at the revolving door within the Pentagon, for example, where you have both high-ranking people who wear military uniforms as well as those who serve as high-ranking, Department of Defense civilians who are literally working their way into a big payout when they leave that job.

(00:15:26)
We see it with our own Secretary of Defense now. He retired as a general officer, went and served on one of the boards for one of the big defense contractors, and then now back as the Secretary of Defense. We see the same thing in Congress with members of Congress and senior professional staffers in Congress. Same exact revolving door where you have people, whether they’re writing contracts for the Department of Defense, for the company that then wins the bid for that contract, and then going and working for that company. Or those in Congress who are writing policies and doing exactly the same thing.

War on terrorism

Lex Fridman
(00:16:03)
You have been both a war hawk and a war dove at times. So what is your philosophy on when war is justified and when it is not?
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:16:13)
War is justified when it is in the best interest of our national security, and when it is the last resort, when all diplomatic efforts have been completed and exhausted and war is the last possible route that must be taken to ensure the safety, security, and freedom of the American people.
Lex Fridman
(00:16:41)
So that’s a high-level beautiful idea, but there’s messy details. So terrorism, for example.
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:16:48)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(00:16:49)
The United States involvement in the war in Iraq and Afghanistan was in part the big umbrella of the war on terrorism. So, when you decide whether something’s justified or not and whether something can be defeated or not, how hard is it? Is it even possible? To what degree is it possible to defeat terrorism?
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:17:11)
Well, first of all, part of the problem of our foreign policy has been how many conflicts, wars, military actions have been waged in the name of this “war on terrorism” in the name of national security, legislation like the Patriot Act that violates our civil liberties and freedoms in the name of the war on terrorism and national security when it’s not justified. I’ll use Afghanistan as an example.

(00:17:44)
I support the initial mission that lifted off shortly after the attack on 9/11, the Islamist terrorist attack on 9/11. It was a relatively small group of US military launched to go after those al-Qaeda cells and Osama bin Laden in the wake of that attack. That is the mission that should have been supported and focused on in its execution. Instead, as you know, attention was diverted very quickly to the regime-change war in Iraq that was waged on false pretenses, and the resources and focus was taken away from that initial mission that went to Afghanistan.

(00:18:34)
The war in Afghanistan blew up into something that became about regime change and governance and the Taliban, and less focus on al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. And it became this thing that even general officers had a hard time articulating what is the objective here? What are we trying to accomplish? What does winning look like? At what point do we know it’s time to exit and get out? And as you look at things like the Afghanistan files and others, the answers to these simple and essential questions shifted and changed over time, over a very long time.

(00:19:17)
Similarly, in Iraq. I bought into a lot of what was being sold by the administration and by Democrats and Republicans and Congress at the time. And very quickly, even as I was on the ground there, started to have my eyes opened up into how we had been lied to tremendously, and how that protracted war went on for a very, very long time with decisions being made that ultimately served to strengthen terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, the creation of ISIS and others, really undermining our national security interests in the meantime. Understanding the enemy that you are trying to defeat is essential to being able to build a strategy.

(00:20:06)
The declaration of President Biden, for example, saying, “Well, the war on terror is over. The war on terror is over.” What does that mean? Or, “The forever wars are over.” Well, what does that actually mean?”

(00:20:21)
I served on my last most recent deployment in 2021 to East Africa and Somalia, where al-Shabaab is one of those Islamist terrorist groups that follows the same ideology as al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hamas and others. This group has been allowed to grow and be strengthened, even though they are one of the main groups that provides funding to al-Qaeda in that entire region.

(00:20:49)
So any president or politician can declare a war to be over, but when you have an enemy like these Islamist terrorist groups who are still intent on their goal and their objective, which is to ultimately establish their Islamic caliphate and destroy Israel and exterminate the Jewish people, and basically kill or convert anyone who doesn’t adhere to their ideology, that continues on. And they will only become stronger the longer our leaders put their heads in the sand and pretend like, “Oh no, this doesn’t exist.”

(00:21:29)
This kind of war, this war specifically, is one that has to be waged militarily and ideologically. And the ideological component to this, which is defeating their ideology with a superior one, is one that I pointed out in Congress during the Obama administration, we, the collective we, were failing at. The Obama administration was failing at because they were so afraid of being labeled Islamophobes, that they refused to accurately identify that ideology driving these terrorist groups. And instead said, “We are countering violent extremism,” was the term that the Obama administration started to use and was coined and kind of mandated across the US government.

(00:22:14)
Well, again, you have to know the enemy that threatens you and why they’re doing what they’re doing if you have any hope of actually preventing their attack, both militarily, and as we’re seeing now with Hamas’s actions, not only directly in the assault on Israel, but how Hamas achieved their objectives in spreading their ideology around the world.
Lex Fridman
(00:22:43)
If you look at the lessons learned from the US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, how do you fight terrorism?
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:22:52)
Clearly understanding who they are and where they are and why they’re doing what they’re doing is essential, first of all. Obviously, there are different groups, different names. They have morphed and changed based on their locale and how they operate. Building relationships with people in other countries, both state leaders as well as religious leaders and others who share that same objective of defeating these Islamist terrorists on both fronts, and acting as a united front in taking that action. What exactly that action looks like, details on the ground dictate that. Details about these different groups will dictate that.

(00:23:37)
But we’ve seen examples of this before. I saw this in Somalia. We saw it in some cases in Iraq where, for example, you have Imams who recognize the threat that these terrorist groups pose to their own people and their own communities, and exerting their influence in defeating the terrorist Islamist ideology with their own teachings of Islam and preaching peace amongst their people.

(00:24:10)
War is ugly and it is messy. It is also an unfortunate reality of the world we live in. So, while I firmly believe that we must always pursue peace, I’m not a pacifist, I’m a realist, and recognize that where there are these threats, we must do what we can to work towards that safety, that security, that freedom and peace that we all want.

War in Gaza

Lex Fridman
(00:24:44)
If we look at the perspective of Israel and the Israel-Gaza war going on now, what do you do with the fact that the death of a civilian serves as a catalyst, gives birth to hate, potentially generational hate? So in Israel’s stated goal of destroying Hamas, they are creating immeasurable hate. What do you do with that? From a perspective of Israel, what is the correct action to take in response to October 7th?
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:25:21)
It’s a complex question with a complex answer. I think Israel’s approach has to be in recognizing that delineation as far as possible. And I know it’s tough when you have a terrorist group like Hamas that is so interwoven within the community of people in Gaza. But to recognize that there should be, and there is a shared purpose there for the Palestinian people to be able to live free and in peace and not under the oppression of this terrorist group, just as the people of Israel would like to live in peace and free from the threat of attack from a terrorist group that wants to exterminate them.

(00:26:12)
The complexities of what’s going on in Israeli politics is, I think, a different conversation, but also one that is directly intertwined with the answer to this question. When you have some people in the Israeli government who don’t want the Palestinian people in Gaza at all and want them to go and repatriate in other countries, I think that’s a big problem, and that further exacerbates this hatred and resentment that continues to grow there. This is a generation’s long challenge, unfortunately, of the resentment and tension that exists between many Israelis and many Palestinians that can only be resolved when there’s strong leadership representing both peoples who are able and willing to come together and recognize that the only way forward is to let the past be in the past and find a way towards peace in the future.
Lex Fridman
(00:27:16)
How do you think, how do you hope the war in Ukraine will end?
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:27:20)
The only way that this war ends is to do exactly what we’re talking about. There has to be a brokered dialogue and conversation about peace that has to occur with representatives from Russia and Ukraine. It is really truly heartbreaking to see both how efforts that began just weeks after Russia invaded Ukraine to do exactly this, were thwarted by the Biden-Harris administration, and other Western powers has cost so many innocent people’s lives. And this is where I get…
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:28:03)
… innocent people’s lives, and this is where I get… I have friends in Ukraine. I’ve been there more than a few times. I’ve enjoyed and appreciated the time that I’ve spent there. When I hear from my friends about how afraid they are of their husbands being conscripted and feeling like they have to hide for fear of being yanked off the streets, their friends and family members who’ve been killed in this war. The only way this ends is when both sides come to the table and find an agreement that neither side is going to be completely happy with, both sides being forced to make some concessions, but one where they will both walk away and this war can end.

War in Ukraine

Lex Fridman
(00:28:50)
What’s the role of the US president perhaps to bring everybody to the table? Do you think that the US president should sit down with Zelenskyy and Putin together?
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:29:01)
Yes. Yes. In an ideal world, yes. This should have happened long ago. The question of whether or not President Biden is the right person to do that at this time when all of the statements and comments that they have made, the Biden-Harris administration has made from the beginning of this war essentially point to their objective being to basically destroy Russia, and that’s one of the reasons why they have supported both the continuation of this war for as long as it’s lasted, as well as why they have thwarted efforts towards peace.

(00:29:44)
Whoever that most effective neutral broker is, that’s the best person to do this. The Biden-Harris administration, I think the role that they have to take is actually encouraging Zelenskyy to sit down and begin this process. Those kinds of engagements are the most, to me, the most powerful exercises of diplomacy that can’t be matched, especially when our president’s foremost role and responsibility is to serve as commander in chief, and I wish that we had leaders who were more willing to engage because I think we’d make a lot more progress more quickly to find areas both of mutual interest as well as to help de-conflict and de-escalate areas where there is tension or disagreement or adversarial interests.
Lex Fridman
(00:30:41)
Well, some of it is basic human camaraderie. People call me naive for this, but sometimes, just knowing that there’s a human on the other side. Even when it’s in private, if you look at Zelenskyy and Putin for example, just humor. Both are very intelligent, witty at times, even funny people. Yes, this is wartime. Yes, a lot of civilians and soldiers are dying. There’s hate, but if you can look above it all and think about the future of the countries, the flourishing of the people and the stopping of the death of civilians and soldiers, then in that place, you can have that basic human connection.
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:31:28)
I agree. I don’t think that’s naive at all and I think there are so many examples through history that point to the power of that, the real power in that. In the Cuban Missile crisis, how JFK had to literally find a secret way to communicate with Khrushchev to try to go around the backs of the military commanders who were urging him to take military action, and instead find, hey, we both ultimately want the same thing. Neither of us wants to launch a catastrophic nuclear war so let’s figure this out.
Lex Fridman
(00:32:05)
Of course, there’s examples throughout history. Leaders are complicated people. They’re manipulative people, so you have Hitler and Chamberlain meeting and Chamberlain kind of getting hoodwinked by Hitler’s charisma and being convinced that Hitler doesn’t have any interest in invading and destroying the rest of the world, so you have to-
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:32:26)
Be smart. Don’t be hoodwinked.

Syria

Lex Fridman
(00:32:31)
You’ve met, and you’ve been criticized for this, you’ve met with Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, and as part of the campaign when running for president, got criticized for not calling him a war criminal. What’s the right way to meet and communicate with these kinds of leaders?
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:32:50)
As I just stated, we need leaders who have the courage to meet not just with allies, but with adversaries in the pursuit of peace, in the pursuit of increased understanding. If policies are being made through the lenses and the barriers of bureaucrats and the media and others who have or may have their own interests. Our president, a leader, even members of Congress can’t make decisions with the kind of clarity that we the American people need them to make.

(00:33:32)
I think that these kinds of engagements are weaponized and politicized as they were against me by those who have their own interests, whether it be the military industrial complex or in Washington. If you’re not part of the official narrative of the US government, which was intent on a regime change war in Syria, then you’re an outcast. And it was unfortunate because people levied all kinds of accusations and smears against me for going and having the audacity to go and learn more, try to seek the truth, in the hopes of preventing more needless war and in the hopes of preventing yet another quagmire and disastrous war in the Middle East. And simply for going, and yes, meeting with Assad, also meeting with religious leaders in Syria, also meeting and talking with people on the streets of Damascus, talking with college students, talking with people from the opposition party who would like to see Assad replaced, talking with local law, just a whole host of people over the course of a few days, the accusation was like, “Oh, she loves dictators.”

(00:35:10)
It’s a sad state of affairs when some of the most influential voices in our country will label someone a lover or supporter of dictators simply because you’re saying, “Hey, we shouldn’t be going to war. There is another way.” And I’m not alone in this. People who were against the war in Iraq were given similar labels, until it became popular in our politics to have been against the Iraq war. We see the same thing now with people like Tucker, myself and others who are saying, “We should not be waging this proxy war against Russia via Ukraine and using the Ukrainian people’s lives in this war.” Well, now all of a sudden, you’re a Putin lover or a Putin puppet or whatever, the traitor, treason, all of these accusations that are used ultimately by people who are not interested in having a substantive conversation about the truth, about looking at these wars and conflicts with a comprehensive view on exactly all the dynamics that are at play.

(00:36:20)
And that’s what I found when I came back. I went to Syria looking forward to coming back and shedding light on different perspectives, experiences and stories that I found that would give people a more broad understanding of what was happening in that country. And what I found was there was zero interest in the mainstream media or in Congress in hearing any other perspective other than their own, which was, “We need to launch this regime change war through the use of arming and equipping known terrorists within Syria to overthrow the regime,” without them stating any realistic idea of who would take control once Assad was overthrown. But the reality actually being that no matter which opposition group they might try to prop up, they would not have the power to withstand the terrorist groups whose stated goal it was to go and take over power from Assad. They had no interest in trying to gain true understanding, and it was very disheartening. It was very disheartening and a big lesson learned about where their interests really were focused.
Lex Fridman
(00:37:40)
Yeah, it’s a simplistic narrative template that’s fit into every single situation. A lot of stuff is not talked about in the Russia-Ukraine war. One of the things that’s not talked about is, okay, so Putin is overthrown, then who do you think will come into power?
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:37:58)
Exactly.
Lex Fridman
(00:37:58)
One of the things I talk about with Arestovych is that Putin, and he gets criticized for this, that Putin, out of all the people that might take power is the most liberal, is the most dovish. In fact, every indication shows that he really hates this war, and so everybody that will step in if he steps down or if he is overthrown is just going to accelerate this war and the expansionism and the thirst for empire and all that kind of stuff that the U.S military industrial complex will feed into. So you have to think about what the future holds and what the different power players are and what the level of corruption there is, and the realistic view of the situation versus the idealistic view of the situation.
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:38:53)
Just on that note real quick, I think that was exposed in broad daylight when it appeared that the former head of the Wagner Group was about to try to launch a coup, and how that was so celebrated, even on MSNBC and Rachel Maddow and others touting that this was somehow going to be a great thing, without looking at who is this guy really? What has he been doing in different countries around the world and what would be his ruling philosophy and how that would differ or benefit American interests or the interest of security and peace.
Lex Fridman
(00:39:35)
But also the interest of Ukraine or Russia, or humanity overall, just the flourishing of nations, which is great for everybody, and collaborations with nations.
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:39:44)
I agree.
Lex Fridman
(00:39:45)
Friendly competition. One of the things I love about the 20th century is the friendly, sometimes not so friendly, competition between the Soviet Union and the United States in space, in the space race. That’s created some incredible engineering and scientific breakthroughs and all of this, and also made people dream about reaching out to the stars, and war destroys all of that, or damages it. Hopefully just damages it. Hopefully the Phoenix will rise again.

Warmongers


(00:40:13)
Well, let me ask you about the criticism you’ve mentioned. It’s probably the most common criticism of you, that you love Putin. So just to linger on it, what do you think is the foundation of this criticism?
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:40:29)
Well, I’ll tell you when it began. My first day in Congress was January 3rd, 2013. I believe it was the third, fourth, fifth, somewhere around there, and my last day was January 3rd, 2021. I had been given my experience of serving as a soldier in the Middle East, and the motivation that really drove me to run for Congress in the first place. I served on the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Armed Services Committee for almost eight years, the eight years that I was there, with my drive and motivation to actually be in a position to challenge the influence of the military industrial complex, to try to prevent us from needlessly going to war.

(00:41:19)
And so the likes of Hillary Clinton and the cabal of Warmongers in Washington, they weren’t fans of mine to say the least. I can’t say it was a total surprise, but it was disheartening nonetheless that the very day that I announced my candidacy, that I was running for president, which was in February, 2019. The hour that I walked up onto that stage to announce my candidacy, it was in Hawaii and I gave my announcement speech, NBC News published a hit piece that planted the seeds of suspicion in voters’ minds that somehow, I was a darling of Putin and Russia and whatever. It was baseless, all of it baseless. And that continued like a steady drumbeat throughout my candidacy, but that really was escalated when in a podcast with David Axelrod, Hillary Clinton said, “Oh, well, the Russians are grooming her.”

(00:42:22)
And this came from a very influential person. She was the former Secretary of State, the former US Senator, former First Lady, someone who wielded and continues to wield a lot of power in the Democratic Party and amongst voters, and that took it to a whole new level. What is the basis for this? Nothing. It is a tired yet dependable playbook that is used not only by people like Hillary Clinton, but also people like Mitt Romney and others to try to smear, discredit and destroy the reputations of people who have the audacity to question their objectives as they call for one war or another, or have the audacity to say that this is not in the best interest of peace, or in our country, our national security.

(00:43:29)
They keep going back to this playbook as they do today, because again, they’re not willing to debate the substance of one position versus another, which is what we should have. If people feel so strongly that we should be going and waging this war, that war, okay, great. Go make your case to the American people. Go stand on the floor of the United States House and actually have this debate. Allow those who are saying, “No, this is not a good idea,” to also stand freely and make that argument. Instead, they resort to the kind of name-calling that tells voters, “Hey, you can’t trust this person or anything that they say.”

(00:44:12)
Myself and some of my other colleagues got the same treatment when we tried to pass legislation in Congress that would have taken out provisions from the Patriot Act that are most egregiously violating our Fourth Amendment rights and civil liberties, authorities that have allowed our government to illegally surveil Americans without a warrant. And as we did so, we were called traitors. We had other members of Congress on the house floor saying that if you pass this legislation, you will be responsible for another nine-eleven style attack on our soil.

(00:44:48)
These are all distraction tactics to try to divert our attention away from what’s actually happening, and instead, just tell voters, “Hey, you can’t trust these people.” Obviously, this has happened to Trump. It’s happened to Bobby Kennedy. It’s happened to people like Rand Paul and others. There’s a small group, but a growing number, at least I’m on the Republican side at this point, people who are actually willing to stand up and challenge the military industrial complex, challenge the warmongers in both parties.
Lex Fridman
(00:45:22)
Well, people on the left have challenged the warmongers as well throughout the last few decades.
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:45:29)
Less so recently. I agree with you, but less so recently, and this is one of the reasons why I left the Democratic Party, one of the foremost reasons. I devote an entire chapter to this issue in my book, For Love of Country: Leave the Democrat Party Behind. Going into the detail of some of the things we’ve talked about, about my own experiences, about what I have learned along the way, but also how even in the last year or two years, certainly under this administration, people who I worked with in Congress who were Democrats, dependable voices for civil liberties, dependable voices, speaking out against the insanity of people who wanted to wage war for the sake of war. They’re largely silent now.

(00:46:25)
And unfortunately within the Democratic Party in Washington, there is no room for debate, that if you challenge the Biden administration’s position on foreign policy, you’re going to hear about it. And what we have seen is that’s exactly what’s happened, and people have retracted statements or just fallen silent or whatever the case may be. This debate that should be existent within both parties, on the Democrat side unfortunately, it just doesn’t exist anymore.
Lex Fridman
(00:47:02)
There seems to be some kind of mass hysteria over the war in Ukraine. It was strange to watch that the nuance aspect of the discussion was lost very quickly. It was, “Putin bad.” It was a war between good and evil. And in that, if you bring up any kind of nuanced discussion of how do we actually achieve peace in the situation, you’re immediately put on the side of evil.
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:47:32)
Yeah, which is pretty sick when you think about it.
Lex Fridman
(00:47:36)
The cynical view is, of course, it’s the military industrial complex machine, the war profiteers just driving this kind of conversation. I hope they don’t have that much power. I hope they just have incentives and they push people and they use people’s natural desire to divide the world into good and evil and fight for the side of good. People just have a natural proclivity for that, and that’s a good thing, that we want to fight for the side of good, but then that gets captured.
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:48:10)
And manipulated.
Lex Fridman
(00:48:11)
Yeah.
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:48:12)
Yes. I admire your hopefulness. I am hopeful also because of the goodness in people and the naturally compassionate nature of people. However, I will tell you from firsthand experience that what we talk about is the national security state, and the military industrial complex, this cabal of warmongers that extends not only within government but outside of government, extends to many powerful media outlets. They are incredibly powerful and don’t have any qualms at destroying those who try to get in the way of their power, and they’ve got a lot of tools. They’ve got a lot of tools to do that, which I think is why President Eisenhower chose to include this in his farewell address as a warning, because the only recourse, the only real power that has the ability to destroy them and stand up against them is a free people living in a free society, exercising the rights that we have enshrined in the Constitution and Bill of Rights.

Nuclear war

Lex Fridman
(00:49:33)
I just talked to Annie Jacobsen. She wrote a book on nuclear war, a scenario of how a nuclear war will happen, second by second, minute by minute. I apologize. If it happens, how it would happen. It is terrifying.
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:49:47)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:49:48)
It’s terrifying how easy it is to start, that one person can start it first of all, and then there’s no way to stop it. Even potentially with tactical nuclear weapons, that the machinery of it, how clueless everybody is combined with the machinery of it, it’s just impossible to stop, and it’s just between Russia and the United States especially. And then all of a sudden, you have nuclear winter and 5 billion people are dead, and they die through just essentially torture, slowly. How do we avoid that? How do we avoid a nuclear war? That’s something that you talk about and think about. How do we avoid this kind of escalation of a hot war?
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:50:40)
I think the most essential thing, first of all, is understanding exactly what you have just detailed. We are in this very strange and absurd time where we have talking heads and so-called pundits on TV. We have politicians, we have people who are talking about a nuclear war as though it is a war that can be won, period, and a war that can be waged somehow without that risk of escalation to the point of destruction of human civilization. And so they talk about this as though it’s just another war, and especially as they talk about the use of tactical nuclear weapons. “Oh, well, this is small and we think it’ll send a message without actually escalating to the point where we are dealing with the kind of destruction that we witnessed in World War II.” That’s a dangerous thing when it becomes normalized as, “Well, we’ve got this new missile that’ll go and it’s targeted and it’s strategic, and it’ll only harm this, quote unquote, military target.”

(00:52:06)
Ronald Reagan was 100% correct when he said a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be waged. It was true then and it’s true now, no matter how much these guys who are producing these weapons or those who are benefiting from that industry try to tell us, “Oh no, it’ll never happen.” So to me, that’s an important first step, to continue to inform and educate and sound the alarms to people. Don’t buy this crap because it’s not true, and I look forward to listening to your podcast, but the PSA that was put out by New York City’s Emergency Management Office about what to do in the event of a nuclear attack, you would find it funny if it wasn’t so deeply disturbing. How they created this public service announcement, they distributed it everywhere across the city, on the internet. I think it was on the radio where you had a woman who appeared to be an actor coming in and saying, “Hey, in the event of when the big one hits, here’s what you should do. Focus on doing these three things,” and I’m paraphrasing but I encourage you to watch it.

(00:53:23)
I’m paraphrasing but she said, “Get inside. Stay inside and stay tuned.” That was it. And, “Get inside, go away from the windows. Stay inside. Don’t go outside until you get the all clear, and stay tuned. Follow our account on Instagram and Twitter.” And at the very end of this short PSA, her closing words were, “We’ve got this.” And it was so disturbing in that it was so completely out of touch with reality. It creates this kind of false sense of security that, okay, well, it’s like here’s what you do when a tornado hits or when a big storm hits, and categorizing the big one, a nuclear attack within that same kind of preparedness that you would want people to have in the event of a natural disaster of some sort. And it is reflective of the carelessness with which people in our government, that careless attitude that people in our government have towards nuclear war and a nuclear attack, even as they set us up for failure in pushing us closer and closer to the brink of a nuclear war occurring, whether it be an intentional attack, or as we saw during the last Cold War, one that could be launched unintentionally. How many near misses were there during the last Cold War? I saw this documentary called The Man Who Saved the World, and it was some mid-level officer who happened to be on duty and who didn’t do what he was told in launching the nuclear missiles because of what they thought was an incoming attack, and it turned out to be a complete mistake or misread on the radar, but that’s what we’re facing.
Lex Fridman
(00:55:33)
But by the way, there’s so many things to say there, but one of the things that Annie Jacobsen details is just how organized the machinery of all of this is, where the humans involved don’t have to think. They just follow orders. There’s a very clear set of steps you take, and there’s very few places where you can inject your humanity and be like, “Wait a minute, what’s the big picture of this?” The only person that can think is the…
Lex Fridman
(00:56:03)
That can think is the president of the United States. The president of the United States gets six minutes after the warning. The early warning system says, whether it’s false or not, says that, “We believe that there’s been a nuclear weapon launched. You have six minutes before you can make the decision of launch back, initiate.” And to me, that’s what I’m voting based on, in the current situation.
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:56:36)
Right.
Lex Fridman
(00:56:36)
You really have to see that as one of the most important aspects of the United States President, is, “Who do you trust in those six minutes to sit there?”
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:56:45)
I agree.
Lex Fridman
(00:56:46)
And I’m not really sure, looking at Biden and Trump, boy, I don’t know, but I do know that I would like somebody who’s thinking independently, and not part of the machinery of warmongers, that that’s really … I mean, I don’t want to make it sound cynical or dramatic, but sometimes in such scary situations, in such dramatic situations, you kind of follow the momentum.
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:57:16)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(00:57:17)
When the right thing to do, the right thing for a leader to do is to step back and look of all human history, and ignore all the people in the room that are saying stuff, because most likely, what they’re going to be saying is warmongering type of things.
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:57:36)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(00:57:36)
That’s one of the things, why I also get criticized for, I still think Zelenskyy is a hero for staying in Kyiv. Everybody was telling him to flee. It was all the information was basically saying the world’s second biggest military is like coming at Kyiv. It’s just dumb on all fronts to stay in Kyiv, but that’s what a great leader does, is ignores everybody and stays.
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:58:05)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:58:06)
“Screw it. I’m going to die for my country. I’m going to die as a leader,” and that’s the right thing for a leader to do.
Tulsi Gabbard
(00:58:12)
It’s sad that … I mean, to me, that’s what we should expect of our leaders, is exactly that, and it’s sad that having a leader in that position fulfill their responsibility, and the oath that they take is seen as a heroic act, when we should … That’s your job. That’s what we elect our leaders to do, and yet, so many have failed. But to your point, it’s not cynical at all to know that in those rooms, especially in these moments of crisis, unfortunately, there are the predominant and prevailing opinion of this warmongering establishment that’s not specific to one party, is the knee-jerk reaction, which is to go to war, or to execute an act of war.

(00:59:17)
This is one of the biggest costs of this establishment, destroying the reputations of, and smearing and trying to cancel and censor those who are voices of peace, or just those who take a contrarian position and say, “Well, hey, why don’t we just pause for a moment and actually think this through? Why don’t we talk through, ‘What happens if we take this course of action? What happens if we go down a different path?’ Let’s actually be thoughtful about what our options are for A, B, and C, and then make the decision in a thoughtful manner based on that.” Even advocating for that is seen as a kind of heresy in the warmongering establishment in Washington, and the cost of their retaliation against those who are reasonable voices, who look at the world as it is, not some fantasy that they wish existed is, in those rooms, during those critical moments, people will, even if they know in their heart or their mind that this could end really badly, their instinct is to self-censor and not speak up because they don’t want to experience the wrath and ire, whether it be coming from four-star generals, or the secretaries of state, or defense, or these high-ranking people in positions of power and influence.

(01:00:48)
They don’t want to be the one guy in the room who’s just like, “Hey, guys, let’s just take a breath and actually think this through. What will happen, not just in the immediate response of this action that you’re advocating for, but what are all of the other people, other actors, stakeholders in the world, how will they respond, and then how will we respond to them? How will they respond to us?” Actually go through this exercise of, in the military, this is commonly referred to as, “What are the second, third, fourth order of effects that will occur as a result of pursuing a specific course of action?”
Lex Fridman
(01:01:25)
It’s weird how difficult it is to be that person in the room.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:01:29)
It requires courage-
Lex Fridman
(01:01:31)
Yeah, but like it-
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:01:31)
… which is sad, but it requires courage.
Lex Fridman
(01:01:33)
But why does it require, like even just to ask, “Okay, we’ve been in Afghanistan and Iraq for this number of years. What’s the exit plan?”
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:01:41)
Right.
Lex Fridman
(01:01:43)
Just bring that up every day at a meeting.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:01:45)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:01:46)
Like, “What’s the exit plan?” It’s strange that that gets criticized, the war in Iraq and so on, but I just remember there’s this pressure you can’t quite criticize, or ask dumb questions about, “Wait, what? Why are we going into Iraq again?” Like-
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:02:01)
But they’re not dumb questions.
Lex Fridman
(01:02:03)
Right. In retrospect, you’re like, “Oh, they’re not dumb questions at all,” but actually required a lot of courage to ask them while still working within the institution. It’s easier if you’re an activist from the outside saying, “No war,” this kind of stuff.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:02:15)
Sure. Sure.
Lex Fridman
(01:02:16)
But within the institution, in the position of power, to ask the questions like, “Maybe let’s not.”
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:02:23)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:02:23)
It seems really difficult, and the same kind of thing in the war in Ukraine and just any kind of military involvement. Again, I guess the cynical interpretation is that it’s the military industrial complex that permeates just the halls of power.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:02:41)
It does, and what is behind the military industrial complex? And there are different examples of this. You can look at the pharmaceutical industry as well. There’s a huge amount of money and a huge amount of power that wields tremendous influence over members of Congress. There are different examples of this across different sectors of our society, but I think the military industrial complex over time has proven itself to be the most powerful and influential, and that’s what is behind it, is this is why they try to destroy anyone who dares to ask the most obvious questions is because it is about power and wielding power.
Lex Fridman
(01:03:32)
Well, the good thing about the United States presidents is they have the power to say F you to everybody in the room, I think.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:03:39)
They do.
Lex Fridman
(01:03:40)
It just seems like they don’t quite take that power. People say like, “Yeah, the U.S. President doesn’t have that much power.” I don’t know about that. It’s just like if you look at the law, especially in the military, when you’re talking about war and the military, they have a lot of power.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:03:55)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(01:03:56)
So they can fire everybody.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:03:59)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(01:04:00)
They have a lot of power. They can stop wars, they can start wars. They have a lot of power.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:04:04)
The position of the presidency certainly does. Unfortunately, we have people, too often, who assume the presidency from a position of weakness because they’re afraid of losing power, and so they make those calculated decisions not based on what is right for the right reasons, but instead, driven by fear of loss of power and loss of influence, and that’s where, especially given all that we are facing, we need leaders in the presidency and in Congress who have courage to be that voice in the room to ask about, to remain mindful of and rooted in the Constitution to, even as we are seeing this legislation being billed as the anti-TikTok bill, that’s really not about TikTok, it’s about freedom of speech.

TikTok ban

Lex Fridman
(01:05:13)
Can you actually explain that bill?
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:05:15)
Yes. I guess the bottom line upfront is this is another piece of legislation being expedited through Congress with strong bipartisan support in the name of national security interests that is essentially a power grab and an assault on freedom and liberty. And I’ll just say this in, I think, probably the top three things that they’re not actually telling us that’s in the bill. Freedom of speech, it’s our ability to be able to express ourselves, whether it be in person, on a podcast, on a social media platform, in a newspaper, whatever the platform may be. This legislation gives the executive the power to decide which platforms are acceptable for us to be able to use TikTok itself.

(01:06:18)
The words, TikTok, is not actually in the bill, but it gives the power to the president to decide, “Who is a foreign adversary?,” single-handedly, no consultation with or agreement from members of Congress or anyone else. It actually gives the power to a cabinet secretary to designate, “Who is a foreign adversary?,” and if a social media platform has at least 20% ownership in a social media platform, that platform may be banned from doing business in America essentially, but it’s not just a foreign state actor that could be named as a foreign adversary. It also includes a line in the legislation that if, let’s say a person has at least 25% financial interest or ownership in a social media platform, they’re an American citizen who may be working or living in some other country, or working or living here, but doing business with other countries. If the executive branch of our government decides that this individual is under the influence of, or controlled by someone that they deem a foreign adversary, then that platform must not do business in America, and that person obviously, even an American citizen, is banned from conducting that business. They must divest, essentially.

(01:08:02)
So when you look at, and this is where there’s been a lot of chatter around this, when you look at Elon Musk, for example, well, you already have people in the Biden administration, even President Biden himself, implying that Elon Musk’s activities need to be investigated. Well, he is someone with Tesla who does business in a lot of countries, including China, and therefore, he must be investigated. It is not at all a stretch of imagination to say that X could be the next platform that the executive branch decides. Nope. We’ve designated this person to be a foreign adversary, and therefore, his business interest cannot be allowed for this social media platform, cannot be allowed to exist.

(01:08:44)
We’ve seen this already with people accusing him and X of interfering in our elections. Again, it’s ironic that it’s coming from the Democratic party, that they are claiming that a guy who has set himself, he’s committed to free speech and is allowing free speech on his platform, and is not allowing the federal government to manipulate his platform by deeming which accounts are okay to post their content and which accounts are not because of disinformation, or whatever they claim it to be, it’s not an accident that the social media platforms that have been proven to take action at the behest of the federal government and the White House to censor certain voices, they’re not included with or being targeted at all in this legislation or outside of it, yet, other platforms that are not cooperating or collaborating somehow are. So the underlying issue here, this is being sold as TikTok and national security, but ultimately, even as Ron Paul said, this is a legislation that’s the greatest assault on liberty since the Patriot Act was passed.
Lex Fridman
(01:10:03)
Yeah, it’s quite dark that it’s just a grab of power.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:10:07)
It is.
Lex Fridman
(01:10:08)
I mean, it’s not just with Elon, it’s probably with Zuck, with Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp. It puts pressure. It’s not just about banning, but it puts pressure for them to kind of moderate behavior, which is a slippery slope.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:10:29)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(01:10:29)
Of course, it’s a beautiful dance of power, because you don’t want tech companies to have too much power either, or individuals at the top of those tech companies to have too much power, but then, do you want that power in the hands of government?
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:10:45)
No.
Lex Fridman
(01:10:45)
The history of this nation is a fascinatingly effective journey towards the balance of power, and it does seem like this sneaky, little thing, as much as I hate TikTok on all fronts. My brain rots every time I use TikTok. I know it is also the national security dangers of China and so on, but it’s just like, “TikTok, man.”
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:11:09)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:11:10)
I just … I don’t know, it’s so addicting. It’s so addicting. So when I first saw this TikTok bill, I was like, “Yes,” on all fronts, but then they got me. The Trojan Horse got me. No-
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:11:22)
I mean, they all … And this is like The Social Dilemma documentary, I think exposed a lot, that there’s so much that these algorithms do in these various social media platforms that’s problematic to say the least. Data security and privacy is a serious issue. These are serious things, and so let’s have a conversation about these serious things, and cease these attempts to have our government try to tell us what we are and aren’t allowed to see, where we are and aren’t allowed to say what we want to say. That’s really what it comes down to.
Lex Fridman
(01:12:07)
Yeah, more and more trust people to, whenever social media companies do bullshitty things for the people to make documentaries about it, to discover, for great journalists to do great journalism, and find the flaws in the hypocrisy and the call for transparency, all those kinds of things. I don’t trust, in most cases, government regulation of technology companies because they seem to be really out of touch.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:12:34)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:12:34)
One, they want power.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:12:36)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:12:36)
They’re really intimidated by the power that the tech companies have, and two, they don’t seem to get at the technology at all. So they’re hindering innovation, and they’re just greedy for power, and those are not-
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:12:48)
Yeah. It’s a bad combination.
Lex Fridman
(01:12:49)
It’s a bad combination.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:12:51)
The thing here too, though, is this extends far beyond social media companies. This is a very specific example, but it’s one example of many how those who are greedy for power are continuing to try to find ways to tell us how to live our lives. They’re increasingly trying to tell us, again, what we’re allowed to see and hear, whether it be social media companies, or what shows up in a Google Search engine, for example, and if they’re not finding a willing and compliant social media company or big tech company, then they’re looking for ways to reach their hand into those tech companies and force compliance, but in the age of disinformation, misinformation, hate speech, all of the excuses that are given for government, either directly or indirectly through big tech, to try to censor certain voices, it really undermines the truth, which is the way to defeat bad speech is with better speech and more speech. Whether it’s hate speech or things that you might be offended by, or things that you might disagree with, the answer is not to have some entity with the power of censorship and being the “Authority” to decide what is good speech and acceptable, and what is bad speech and unacceptable. It’s what you said, let’s encourage this debate, and encourage people who are inspired by like, “No, man.”

(01:14:39)
“I saw this thing or this thing is happening, and it’s pissing me off, so I’m going to bring a superior argument. I’m going to show what the right way is.” And gosh, this is what our founders envisioned for us as a society in this country, and we would be so much stronger with a more engaged people and a more informed people if we had this and had it supported.
Lex Fridman
(01:15:06)
Do you think … What are the chances that the TikTok ban bill passes?
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:15:12)
The way that it passed through the House of Representatives with such an overwhelming bipartisan support and so quickly, and President Biden saying that if it comes across his desk, he’ll sign it, I thought it would pass through very quickly. I’m only slightly encouraged by the fact that the Senate, at least, appears to be saying, “Hey, there are serious free speech concerns around this bill, serious civil liberties concerns around this bill. We need to do our due diligence.” I won’t say I’m cautiously optimistic because I understand how that place works, but their pause at least gives people the opportunity to continue to kind of sound the alarm and for people to call their senators and express their concerns with this, that are very real, valid concerns.
Lex Fridman
(01:16:05)
Yeah, this is really messed up. Just, in case we didn’t make it clear, I think this is really, really big danger if this thing passes. Even if you hate Elon Musk or your whatever, this is really, really, really dangerous. If the government gets a say over the platforms on which we communicate with each other, it’s a huge problem.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:16:24)
And there’s a section in there as well, just kind of the last piece on this, is if you use a VPN, and you try to use a VPN to access this, you could have problems with the law, and you take that a step further and say, “Well, how would they know?” There’s a surveillance aspect to that. So once you start peeling back the layers of this really toxic onion, it really leads seriously to a pretty dark, and dangerous, and oppressive place.

Bernie Sanders

Lex Fridman
(01:17:00)
You were a long-time Democrat. You were the vice chair of the Democratic National Committee, until you resigned in 2016 to endorse Bernie. I should say I love Bernie. I loved him before he was cool, all right? Anyway, can you go through what happened in that situation, and with the Democratic National Committee and with Bernie, and why you resigned?
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:17:26)
As a vice chair of the Democratic National Committee, one of the things that the rules of the DNC required was that officers of the DNC, of which we were, as I think there were five or six of us who were vice chairs at the time, you have to remain neutral in a Democratic primary. So you’re not as a party supposed to be tipping the scales in any direction for any candidate during a primary election. And so I had no plans to get involved for any candidate or against any candidate during that primary, and just the hopes of like, “All right, we got to make sure that this is a fair and balanced primary so that voters have the best opportunity to vote for the candidate of their choosing.” I saw a couple of things pretty quickly. Number one is that the chair of the DNC at the time was a woman named Debbie Wasserman Schultz, a congresswoman out of Florida, and she made very serious decisions unilaterally that many times, we found out about via tweet or press release that showed she was tilting the scales in the favor of Hillary Clinton in that 2016 primary.

(01:18:51)
The other thing that I saw was how the mainstream media and those who are supposed to be in a position to be neutral arbiters to facilitate debates and forums and conversations so that voters can be best informed in who they want to vote for, were calling Hillary Clinton the most qualified person ever to run for president in the history of our country because of the positions that she had held as secretary of state, as a U.S. senator, as first lady, and yet, they glossed over those titles without ever holding her, asking questions even, or holding her to account for her record, especially in the area of foreign policy. The job she was running for was to be commander in chief, to be the president of the United States. That responsibility to serve as commander in chief is the foremost responsibility a president has. It’s essentially the one area where the president can unilaterally make decisions without education, healthcare, immigration. Congress has to actually pass legislation. President can come through and say, “Hey, here’s the policies that I want.”

(01:20:07)
“Here’s legislation that I’ll propose,” but those changes can’t be made without Congress, working with Congress to pass them. So she was essentially being let off the hook for her record, as an American, as a soldier, as a veteran. That was a big problem for me, and so I made the decision to resign as vice chair of the DNC so that I could endorse Bernie Sanders, who largely at heart, I believe is a non-interventionist. He hasn’t focused a lot on foreign policy. It’s not at the heart of what his focus has been for decades, but he was certainly far more of a non-interventionist than Hillary Clinton, who has shown through her record to be the queen of warmongers in Washington. I wanted to be in a position where I would have a platform to inform voters about her record so that they could make that decision for themselves, so that they could see, “Hey, in this area, on this issue, which is incredibly important, there is a clear contrast between these two candidates running in the Democratic primary,” and that’s what drove my decision to resign and to endorse Bernie Sanders, and that’s what I went on to do throughout the rest of that primary election.
Lex Fridman
(01:21:34)
What do you like most about Bernie, the positive?
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:21:37)
You know, what I like most about him is he is who he is, unapologetically so, both in personality, but also in what he advocates for, and what he’s advocated for for a long time. So you can agree or disagree with his positions, but he is who he is.

Politics

Lex Fridman
(01:22:02)
Like I said, you were a long-time Democrat. You ran for president in 2020 as a Democrat. Now, you’re an independent, and you wrote an excellent book, describing your journey ideologically, philosophically through that. Why did you choose to leave the Democratic party?
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:22:25)
In the book, I go into a number of the central reasons why I made that choice, but fundamental to them is that the Democratic party has become a party that is opposed to freedom, that is opposed to the central and foundational principles that exist within our founding documents, and that serve as the identity of who we are as Americans and what this country is supposed to be about. It has become a party that is controlled by this elitist cabal of warmongers, who are driving forward this “Woke agenda,” and we see it through their racializing of everything. We see this through their defund the police mission. We see this through their open border policies. We see this through how, in their education policy, they’re failing our kids, and how they are pushing this narrative, that ultimately is a rejection of objective truth.

(01:23:52)
The fact that it’s a question up for debate about whether or not … Well, actually, it’s not a question up for debate for them. They are actively pushing …
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:24:03)
… question up for debate for them. They are actively pushing for boys who identify as girls to compete against girls in sports, changing our language so that the word woman, the identity of being a woman is essentially being erased from our society and it is the height of hypocrisy and, frankly, an act of hatred towards women that they are so intent on doing this, and ironic that it’s coming from the party that for so long proclaimed themselves to be the greatest feminists and the most pro-woman party in the country.

(01:24:47)
I go into detail around each of these issues and more in the book. But you will see as we go through each of these issues, fundamental and foundational to every one of them is that, sadly, the Democratic Party has become a party that is so consumed by their desire for power, this insatiable hunger for power, that they are willing to destroy our republic, our democracy, our freedom, just so that they can try to hold on to power and gain more power.
Lex Fridman
(01:25:26)
So these are just different mechanisms for power. The identity of-
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:25:29)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(01:25:29)
… politics and the warmongering are related to each other in that they’re mechanisms to attain more power.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:25:35)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(01:25:38)
You’re making it sound like only the Democratic Party are full of power-hungry people. So to you, the Republican Party, I don’t know if you’ve met those folks, but some of them-
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:25:48)
A couple of them.
Lex Fridman
(01:25:49)
… are also in love with power and are…
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:25:52)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(01:25:53)
At times, to some degree, politicians in general are corrupt, sometimes within the legal bonds, sometimes slightly outside of the legal bonds. And so, to you, to what degree is sort of the Democratic Party worse than the Republican Party? So I don’t want to paint a picture of this beautiful vision of the Republican Party that-
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:26:15)
No.
Lex Fridman
(01:26:15)
… they’re somehow not-
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:26:16)
That doesn’t exist.
Lex Fridman
(01:26:17)
… power-hungry.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:26:18)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:26:18)
[inaudible 01:26:18].
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:26:18)
And I’m glad you brought this up. The book details why, after 20 or so years as a member of the Democratic Party, I decided to leave. But also… And it goes through my experiences and things that I have seen and learned along the way, but I also point out exactly that fact in the book. But from the very beginning what the prologue is we should not be naive to think that this only exists within the Democratic Party.

(01:26:49)
There are very serious problems within both of our political parties, specifically coming from politicians who are driven by this desire for power and who are so afraid of losing that power that they’re willing to do whatever they feel they need to do, which centers around taking away our freedom because the more free we are to make our own decisions, even if they may end up being the wrong decisions, but to learn from those things and know that we’ve got to live with the consequences, the beauty and messiness of what a free society looks like.

(01:27:27)
They’re so afraid of us because they see us as the people and our freedom as the central threat to their ability to remain in power. I think the difference that we’re seeing today is that, unfortunately, we talked about this a little bit how the Democratic Party has become a party where you must walk in lockstep with the leadership of that party or risk being faced with your reputation being destroyed and smeared and all of these different attacks. And the reason why they do that is to put people like me and Bobby Kennedy and others up as an example of saying, “Hey, if you step out of line, if you challenge us, this is what we’re going to do to you.”

(01:28:15)
The Republican Party has also done that, and they also have politicians and leaders who are more interested in feeding the thriving system in the Washington establishment. But we are also seeing that the Republican Party also has some voices and, I would say, increasing voices of people. And I would put Donald Trump in this category who are challenging the, quote, unquote, norms of the Republican Party that are represented by people like Nikki Haley or Mike Pence, for example. The Republican Party is not a monolithic entity, and it means different things to different people.

(01:29:03)
And that’s where I think the real challenge in this next election is less… it’s really less about one political party over another, and it’s more about our opportunity as voters to select leaders… First of all, to fire those who are against freedom and who are warmongers, who, by their essence, are willing to take away our freedom in the name of national security and vote for people… Nobody’s perfect. We shouldn’t hold anybody up on a pedestal, but vote for those who are committed to the Constitution and who hold those values that represent the interests of the people.
Lex Fridman
(01:29:53)
I am not a fan of this choice, but here we are, Biden versus Trump. So let me ask you sort of a challenging question of pros and cons. Can you give me pros and cons of each? What’s the biggest strength and biggest limitation of, let’s say, Biden?
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:30:12)
This is a tough question. I’ve known President Biden for a lot of years. I knew his son Beau, who served in the National Guard the same time that I did. I considered Joe Biden a friend. He’s someone over the years that I’ve talked to and shared laughs with and spent time with in different situations. The positive characteristics that drew me to Joe Biden of the past, they are not represented in how he has led as president, and I’ll let the pundits theorize as to how that is or why that is.

(01:30:58)
But the truth that I know exists, which points to his weakness, is that instead of listening to his better angels, he has instead at every turn… If you go back and I look back to his inauguration speech where he promised to be a president for all Americans, and during his campaign, promised to be the uniter in chief, to bring a country together that was deeply divided. That’s the Joe Biden that I’ve known for many years.

(01:31:34)
A guy who has worked with different people with different backgrounds and different political views but tried to find at different points in time a way to work together. At every turn, he has done the exact opposite of what he spoke about during his inauguration speech and has left us as the American people today more divided, less secure, both from an economic standpoint as well as a national security or safety and security standpoint, and less free as a society and as a people.
Lex Fridman
(01:32:20)
So the biggest criticism would be he divided us or continued the division that’s been there. Who do you be the greatest uniter? To me, over the past few decades, to me, Obama. You’ve been very critical of Obama on the foreign policy side-
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:32:36)
Mm-hmm.
Lex Fridman
(01:32:37)
… on many fronts. But to me, that guy did really good. Maybe some people say just rhetoric, but I think rhetoric matters in your president. I think he was out of all the presidents we had as probably the most effective uniter of the people. Would that be fair to say?
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:32:57)
During his 2008 campaign, yes. I think that his message resonated with so many people across generations and across different views, different backgrounds to where people cried on the night that he was elected because they felt so hopeful. I talked to people, and I know people who set aside their entire lives to work on his campaign to be a part of this hope and change mission that he laid out that would bring us together. Some of the people that I know personally, they gave up their lives during the campaign, and after he won, they went to Washington, DC, because they wanted to be able to do the work that they had that he had laid out and continue to be a part of this mission that they expected would extend beyond the campaign.

(01:33:59)
And they’ve expressed to me personally how heartbroken they were because so quickly after he was elected, instead of bringing in a new generation of fresh leadership that was not a part of the Washington establishment, he instead immediately chose to surround himself with people who were more of the same old, same old. Who were essentially part of the problem. And many of his actions after that proved that fear and that brokenheartedness that they felt to be true. I’ll mention one example related to civil liberties that we talked about.

(01:34:45)
He was someone as a US senator who gave some pretty powerful speeches on the Senate floor about his concerns with the Patriot Act, his concerns with surveillance from the NSA, his concerns with a violation of our Fourth Amendment Rights and civil liberties. But when, as president, he was confronted with leaked information about this surveillance occurring under those authorities in his presidency, he sided… he took the side of the national security state and did not take action to right the wrongs that he correctly pointed out as senator and during his campaign for the presidency, which is unfortunate because he really did build this unifying momentum throughout his campaign.
Lex Fridman
(01:35:37)
What do you think that is? Why is it so hard as a president to kind of act on the promises of the campaign? But also just, I mean, his speech is basically anti-war speech that really resonated to me. The fact that he was against the war in Iraq early on.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:35:54)
Yes. And that was a huge point of distinction between him and Hillary Clinton.
Lex Fridman
(01:35:58)
Mm-hmm.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:35:58)
Probably one of the biggest.
Lex Fridman
(01:36:00)
Why is it so hard when you step into the office of President to sort of act on your ideals?
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:36:09)
I think it goes back to what we talked about a little bit, which is what are you driven by and what are you afraid of? And if you are concerned for whether or not you can get re-elected, who’s going to fund that re-election effort? Who’s going to fund the presidential library and your legacy that will follow?

(01:36:37)
There have been some documented examples around how he promised to crack down on Big Pharma, but when push came to shove, his Department of Justice campaign funding was threatened, and they chose not to take action even when they had a very, very strong case to make. This was with regard to the opioid crisis in the country. And this just goes back to the heart of why it’s so essential that we have leaders who have courage and who are focused on doing what we elect them to do.
Lex Fridman
(01:37:19)
And who are resistant to the love of money and power.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:37:25)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(01:37:27)
It’s hard.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:37:28)
And we are human. We are fallible. We are flawed by nature. And I’ll go into kind of the next one you asked about Trump.
Lex Fridman
(01:37:36)
Mm-hmm.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:37:37)
The weakness side and the lessons that I hope have been learned from 2016 for him and his team is you have to be in a position where you are surrounding yourselves with other people of courage who aren’t just thinking about their next political job or their next job getting a cable news contract or looking for fame themselves or looking at how they can monetize their position for their… whatever their next financial interest might be. But people of courage who know what they’re up against to really seriously clean house across the federal government and the corruption and rot that is so deeply entrenched in order to truly be effective.

(01:38:27)
And if he is re-elected, that is my hope that that he sees… he’s learned from what went wrong in 2016. That he went in with a largely non-interventionist, more focused on peace agenda, and yet he surrounded himself with people who are at the heart of the warmongers in Washington and who directly went against the policies that he advocated for. On the strength side, I think it’s easy to point out because it’s also what has caused him to be so attacked in ways that we haven’t seen before. Certainly not in my lifetime by the Democrats, by the Biden administration, not only now, but something that started back in 2016 when he was a candidate.

(01:39:28)
He’s a guy who, by all measures, has been successful in his own life, and because of that, he’s not coming in with this desire to please Washington that many other politicians have. And because he is so willing to challenge the, quote, unquote, norms, and these are not norms that serve the interests of the American people. These are norms that serve the interests of the most powerful, he’s a direct threat. And so that attitude and that mindset of not coming in with the kind of caution that too many politicians come in with of wanting to be the popular one at the parties or whatever it is that they want, that is the strength that he brings.
Lex Fridman
(01:40:19)
Yeah, I just had a conversation with Dana White, and he’s good friends with Trump, and he talks to the fact that he seems to be resistant to the attacks. Some aspect of that is just the psychology of being able to withstand their attacks that are there in the political game, and that can break people. You just don’t want the headaches.

Personal attacks


(01:40:44)
So to withstand the attacks is tough, and something about his psychology allows for that. I mean, I guess a question for you also in your own psychology, you’ve been attacked quite a bit. We’ve mentioned some of that sort of misrepresentations, and how do you deal with that by yourself? How do you not become cynical or overcompensate the other direction, that kind of stuff?
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:41:08)
It really stems from having a clear sense of purpose. I never saw… I’ve served in state government, I’ve served on our city council in Honolulu and served in Congress, but at no time have I seen this as a, quote, unquote, political career. I don’t have that ladder-climbing ambition that a lot of politicians have. My sense of purpose is deeply rooted in my dedication and my desire in my life to be pleasing to God and to live a life of service. And what better way to be pleasing to God than to try to do my best to work for the well-being of God’s children?

(01:42:01)
Being rooted in that has made it so that, as the attacks are coming from different directions, even as people who I was friends with, former colleagues of mine, others, even family members, even as they have turned away or become attackers against me themselves because of different reasons related to politics, of course, it’s a sad thing, especially when it’s someone that personally and have had a personal friendship or relationship with. But I don’t live my life trying to please politicians or please the people who show up on TV or anyone else. As long as I am doing my best to be pleasing to God, that is where I draw my happiness from and my fulfillment and contentment and strength.

God

Lex Fridman
(01:43:00)
So you’ve spoken about the value of religious faith in your life, of your Hindu faith, and seeing the Bhagavad Gita as a spiritual guide. So what role does faith in God play in your life?
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:43:13)
It’s everything. It is central to who I am, what inspires me, what motivates me, where I find strength, where I find peace, where I find shelter, and where I find happiness. And this has been a constant throughout times of challenge, times of darkness, times of heartbreak, times of happiness, in always feeling very secure in knowing that God’s unconditional love is ever present, and no matter what else is happening in my life, that God is my best friend. And remaining centered and grounded in always remembering that and meditating upon that truth is it’s everything to me.
Lex Fridman
(01:44:15)
The interesting thing about the Hindu God is how welcoming the religion is of other religions. Just-
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:44:24)
It’s true.
Lex Fridman
(01:44:25)
… how accepting it is. So in that way, in many ways, it’s one of the most beautiful religions on earth. So who do you think God is to you in specifically the texts, but also you personally? What does He represent? So for Hinduism, it’s also God can be [inaudible 01:44:54]. There’s also a aspect where there’s a… it’s a part of all of us. There’s a uniting thing, not a singular figure outside of us.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:45:04)
I think one of the things that’s most commonly misunderstood about Hinduism that people don’t know is that Hinduism is truly a monotheistic religion. That there is one God, and He goes by many names that describe His different qualities and characteristics. And as you pointed out, Hinduism is uniquely of a non-sectarian spiritual practice, essentially. It’s not a, quote, unquote, religion that you convert into, or you leave behind, or whatever the case may be. Bhagavad Gita, a central scripture and text that comes from India, literally means Song of God. And the principles that are conveyed throughout the Bhagavad Gita are applicable to all of us.

(01:46:02)
They are timeless truths that, whether you consider yourself Christian or Catholic or Muslim or Jewish or Hindu, these truths are eternal and relevant through all time. So for us as kids growing up, we learned from and had bedtime stories that came from both the Bhagavad Gita and the New Testament. My dad was raised Catholic, my mom was raised Episcopalian, and both of them were attracted to the Bhagavad Gita as they were in their own lives searching for a more personal relationship with God than they had been able to find elsewhere in their own spiritual journeys. And that’s where the application of… There’re teachings in the Bhagavad Gita, for example, that talk about Bhakti Yoga.

(01:47:04)
Bhakti Yoga essentially translates into dedicating your life, striving to develop a loving relationship with God. Karma Yoga. There’s a chapter in the Bhagavad Gita that speaks about Karma Yoga. Karma is a word that has become a part of the… Both karma and yoga have become very common terms, but what it really means is trying to dedicate your actions in life that have… in a way that have a positive impact on others, being of service to others. And so for me, growing up, I never really understood as kid the idea of sectarianism of one religion battling against another because I knew and understood and experienced that the real meaning of religion was love for God.

(01:47:59)
No matter what name you worship Him by or how you worship that is the real meaning of religion. And the application of that in your life is you ask, “How do I see God in a personal way?” I see… I know that God is my best friend. God is my confidant. When I am struggling with a problem in my life or during those quiet moments by myself where I am anxious or I’m sad, I turn to God for that solace, for that clarity, for that strength to both know what the right thing to do is and the strength to act accordingly and to constantly strive to further develop that very personal loving relationship with God.
Lex Fridman
(01:49:01)
Tulsi, this was an honor to finally meet you, to talk to you. This was amazing. Thank you.
Tulsi Gabbard
(01:49:05)
Thank you, Lex. It’s so wonderful to be here. Thank you for the opportunity.
Lex Fridman
(01:49:09)
Thanks for listening to this conversation with Tulsi Gabbard. To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, let me leave you with some words from Dwight D. Eisenhower in his 1961 farewell address. “A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction. American makers of plowshares could with time and as required, make swords as well.

(01:49:45)
But now, we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. This conjunction of immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.” Thank you for listening, and hope to see you next time.

Transcript for Mark Cuban: Shark Tank, DEI & Wokeism Debate, Elon Musk, Politics & Drugs | Lex Fridman Podcast #422

This is a transcript of Lex Fridman Podcast #422 with Mark Cuban.
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Table of Contents

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Introduction

Mark Cuban
(00:00:00)
The person who controls the algorithm controls the world, right? And if you are committed to one specific platform as your singular source of information or affiliated platforms, then whoever controls the algorithm or the programming there controls you.
Lex Fridman
(00:00:20)
The following is a conversation with Mark Cuban, a multi-billionaire businessman, an investor and star of the series Shark Tank, longtime principal owner of the Dallas Mavericks, and is someone who is unafraid to get into frequent battles on X, most recently over topics of DEI, wokeism, gender and identity politics with the likes of Elon Musk and Jordan Peterson. This is the Lex Fridman podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, dear friends, here’s Mark Cuban.

Entrepreneurship


(00:00:55)
You’ve started many businesses, invested in many businesses, heard a lot of pitches privately and on Shark Tank. So you’re the perfect person to ask what makes a great entrepreneur?
Mark Cuban
(00:01:07)
Somebody who’s curious, they want to keep on learning because business is ever-changing. It’s never static. Somebody who’s agile, because as you learn new things and the environment around you changes, you have to be able to adapt and make the changes. And somebody who can sell, because no business has ever survived without sales. And as an entrepreneur who’s creating a company, whatever your product or service is, if that’s not the most important thing and you’re just dying and excited to tell people about it, then you’re not going to succeed.
Lex Fridman
(00:01:39)
But it’s also a skill thing. How do you sell? What do you mean by selling?
Mark Cuban
(00:01:42)
Selling is just helping. I’ve always looked at it about putting myself in the shoes of another person and asking a simple question, can I help this person? Can my product help them? From the time I was 12 years old, selling garbage bags door to door and just asking a simple question, do you use garbage bags? Do you need garbage bags? Well, let me save you some time. I’ll bring them to your house and drop them off to streaming. Why do we need streaming when we have TV and radio? Well, you can’t get access to your TV and radio everywhere you go. So we break down geographic and physical barriers, and Cost Plus Drugs. What’s the product that we actually sell? We sell trust. In a simplistic approach, we buy drugs to sell drugs, but we add transparency to it. And bringing transparency to an industry is a differentiation, and it helps people.
Lex Fridman
(00:02:30)
Trust in an industry that’s highly lacking in trust.
Mark Cuban
(00:02:33)
Exactly.
Lex Fridman
(00:02:35)
Okay. So what’s the trick to selling garbage bags? Let’s go back there. At 12 years old, is it just your natural charisma? I guess a good question to ask, are you born with it or can you develop it?
Mark Cuban
(00:02:45)
Oh, you can definitely develop it. Yeah. Because selling garbage bags door to door was easy, right? It was like… 12-year-old Mark going, “Hi, my name is Mark. Do you use garbage bags?” You know what the answer is going to be, right? “Can I just drop them off for you once a week? Whenever you need them, you just call and I’ll bring them down.” “Sure.” So that was easy.
Lex Fridman
(00:03:02)
But I’m sure you’ve been rejected.
Mark Cuban
(00:03:04)
Oh, yeah. Of course. Not everybody says yes.
Lex Fridman
(00:03:06)
What was your percentage?
Mark Cuban
(00:03:08)
I don’t remember, but it’s pretty close to a hundred percent.
Lex Fridman
(00:03:10)
Oh, okay. So that’s why you don’t remember.
Mark Cuban
(00:03:12)
Yeah. Right? Because who’s going to say no to a 12-year-old kid who’s going to save time and money? But typically, my career where I’ve started companies, it’s to do something that other people aren’t doing. Whether it was connecting PCs to local area networks and at MicroSolutions. And the salesmanship was walking into a company and just saying, look talk to me and I can help you improve your productivity and your profitability. Is that important to you? And the answer is obviously always yes. And then the question is, can I do the job and can I do it cost effectively? And so you didn’t have to be a born salesperson to be able to ask those questions, but you have to be able to be willing to put in the time to learn that business. And that’s the hardest part.
Lex Fridman
(00:03:55)
I’m sure there’s a skill thing to it too, in how you solve the puzzle of communicating with a person and convincing them.
Mark Cuban
(00:04:03)
Yeah, there’s skill from the perspective that I read like a maniac. Then now you can give me an example of any type of business and it’ll take me two seconds to figure out how they make money and how I can make them more productive. And I think that’s probably my biggest skill, being able to just drill down to what the actual need is, if any. And then from there, being able to say, well, if this is what this company does, and this is what their goal is, how can I introduce something new that they haven’t seen before? And is that a business that I can create and make money from?
Lex Fridman
(00:04:35)
So figure out how this kind of business makes money in the present and then figure out, is there a way to make more money in the future by introducing a totally new kind of thing?
Mark Cuban
(00:04:43)
Correct.
Lex Fridman
(00:04:45)
And you can just do that with anything.
Mark Cuban
(00:04:46)
Pretty much. Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:04:48)
And you think you’re born with that?
Mark Cuban
(00:04:50)
No, I worked at it. Because going back to what I said earlier about curiosity, you have to be insanely curious because the world is always changing. My dad used to say, we don’t live in the world we were born into, which is absolutely true. If you’re not a voracious consumer of information, then you’re not going to be able to keep up. And no matter what your sales skills or ability are, they’re going to be useless.
Lex Fridman
(00:05:12)
You learn about life from your dad. You mentioned your dad.
Mark Cuban
(00:05:16)
My dad did upholstery on cars, got up, went to work every morning at seven o’clock, came back five or six, seven o’clock, exhausted, and I learned to be nice. I learned to be caring. I learned to be accepting. Just qualities that I think he really tried to pass on to myself and my two younger brothers were just be a good human. And I think he didn’t have business experience. So as I got into business, he would just say, “Sorry, Mark, I can’t help you. I don’t understand what you’re doing.” Neither one of my parents had gone to college. You’ve got to figure it out for yourself.

(00:05:52)
But he was also very insistent that… He worked at a company called Regency Products where they did upholstery on cars, and he would bring me there to sweep the floors, not because he wanted me to learn that business, because he wanted me to learn how backbreaking that work was. He lost an eye in an accident at work, a staple broke, and the only thing he wanted for my brothers and I was for us to never have to work like that, to go to college to figure it out.
Lex Fridman
(00:06:18)
You said to be nice. That said, you also said that when you were first starting a business, you were a bit more of an asshole than you wish you would’ve been.
Mark Cuban
(00:06:25)
Absolutely. Yeah. Yeah, because I was more of a yeller. I didn’t have-
Lex Fridman
(00:06:30)
No, really? Mark Cuban?
Mark Cuban
(00:06:33)
What you see on the sidelines would be at a Mavs’ game. Maybe a little bit. But I also didn’t have any patience for somebody I thought wasn’t using my common sense, because I was always on the go, go, go, go, go, particularly when I was younger, just trying to be successful, trying to get to the point where I had independence. And I would tell this to people. Either you’re speeding up and getting on the train, or we’ll stop and drop you off at the next station, but let’s go where you go.
Lex Fridman
(00:07:02)
Did you have trouble with the hire fast, fire fast part of running a business?
Mark Cuban
(00:07:06)
Yeah, always, because I hated firing people. ‘Cause it meant, one, it was an admission of a mistake in the hiring. And two, the salesperson in me always wanted to come out ahead, and I was always horrible at firing, but I always partnered with people who had no problem with it. So I always delegated that.
Lex Fridman
(00:07:23)
Well, that’s the tricky thing. When you’re working with somebody and they’re not quite there, and you have to decide, are they going to step up and grow into the person that that’s the right or they’re not. And in that gray area is probably where you have to fire.
Mark Cuban
(00:07:37)
Well, it’s hard, yeah, for sure because it’s obviously a failure somewhere in the process. What did we do wrong? And when I would interview people for jobs, 99% of the people I’ve ever interviewed I’ve wanted to hire, because in my mind, it was like, okay, I can figure out how to make this person work. And then they wouldn’t. And then people at the company would be like, “Mark, you suck at this.” And so I always delegated the hiring.
Lex Fridman
(00:08:06)
Yeah, I’m the same. I see the potential in people. I see the beauty in people, which is a great way to live life. But when you’re running a company, it’s a different thing.
Mark Cuban
(00:08:15)
It’s different. And you got to know what you’re good at and what you’re bad at, right? I was good at… I was a ready-fire-aim guy, and I always partnered with people who were very anal and perfectionist because where I could just go, go, go, go, go, go, they would keep me inside the baselines.
Lex Fridman
(00:08:29)
They would do the due diligence, I suppose.
Mark Cuban
(00:08:32)
Yeah, or just, yeah, the detail work, the dot the I’s and the cross the T’s.
Lex Fridman
(00:08:35)
What does it take to take that first leap into starting a business?
Mark Cuban
(00:08:38)
That’s the hardest part. It really depends on your personal circumstances. I got fired. I was sleeping on the floor of six guys in a three-bedroom apartment, so I couldn’t go any lower. So there was no downside.
Lex Fridman
(00:08:38)
Starting at the bottom.
Mark Cuban
(00:08:50)
Yeah, there was no downside for me starting a business. And it was just like… I was 25 when we started MicroSolutions, and I’d just gotten fired and it was like, look, I’m a lousy employee. I’m going to just start going to some of my prospects that I had at my job and asked them to front the money that I needed to install some software and found this company, Architectural Lighting, who put up $500 for me. That allowed me to buy software and have 50% margins and that’s how I started my company.
Lex Fridman
(00:09:22)
But by way of advice, would you say? It’s a terrifying thing.
Mark Cuban
(00:09:25)
Yeah, you’ve got to be in a position where you’re confident. I get emails and approached by people all the time, what kind of business should I start? That tells me you’re not ready to start a business. Either you’re prepared and you know it or you don’t. In the United States, with the American Dream, everybody always looks at themselves and say, okay, I have this idea. And then you go through this process of saying, okay. You talk to your friends or family, what do you think? And they almost always, oh, it’s a great idea. Then you go on Google and you say, oh my god, no one else is doing it. Without thinking, 10 companies have gone out of business trying the same thing. But okay, it’s on Google. And then people stop because that next step means, okay, I have to change what I’m doing in my life.

(00:10:11)
And that’s not easy for 99% of the people. Some people look at that as an opportunity and get excited about it. Some people get terrified because it’s, okay, maybe I’m comfortable, maybe I have responsibilities. And so whatever your circumstances are, if you want to take that next step, you have to be able to deal with the consequences of changing your circumstances. And that’s the first thing. Do you save money? If you have a job, but d’you have a mortgage? Do you have a family? You’ve got to save money. You can’t just walk. They’ve got to eat and they’ve got to have shelter. But on the other side of the coin, if you’ve got nothing, it’s the perfect time to start a business.
Lex Fridman
(00:10:49)
Desperation is a good catalyst for starting a business, but in many cases, the decision, as you’re talking about you’re going to have to make is to leave a job that’s providing some degree of comfort already. So I suppose when you’re sleeping on the floor and there’s six guys, it’s a little bit easier.
Mark Cuban
(00:11:05)
It’s really easy, right? Particularly when you get fired and you don’t have a job and you’re looking at bartending at night to try to pay the bills. And so it wasn’t hard for me, but to your point, it really comes down to preparation. If it’s important enough to you, you’ll save the money. You’ll give up whatever it is you need to give up to put the money aside. If you have obligations, you’ll put in the work to learn as much as you can about that industry so that when you start your business, you’re prepared. And you can always, at night, on weekends, whenever you find time, lunch, start making the calls to find out if people will write you a check or transfer you the money to buy whatever it is you’re selling. And by doing those things, you can put yourself in a position to succeed. It’s where people just think, okay, Geronimo, I’m leafing off the edge of a cliff and I’m starting a business. That’s tough.
Lex Fridman
(00:11:57)
But sometimes that’s the way you do it, though.
Mark Cuban
(00:11:59)
There’s always examples of any situation or scenario, right?
Lex Fridman
(00:12:03)
Anecdotal evidence for everything.
Mark Cuban
(00:12:05)
But if you’re going into a new business, you’re going to have competition unless you’re really, really, really, really, really lucky. And that competition is not going to just say, okay, let Lex or Mark just kick our ass. And so, you’ve got to be prepared on how you’re going to deal with that competition.
Lex Fridman
(00:12:18)
What do you think that is about America that has so many people who have that dream and act on that dream of starting a business?
Mark Cuban
(00:12:28)
I think we’ve just got a culture of consumption and more. And to get more, you’ve got to… Creating a business gives you the greatest potential upside and the greatest leverage on your time, but it also creates the most risk.
Lex Fridman
(00:12:47)
So that capitalist machine, there’s a lot of elements. By contrast, the respect for the law, like an entrepreneur can trust that if they pull it off, the law will protect them. There won’t be a government.
Mark Cuban
(00:12:59)
Hopefully that’s still the case. Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:13:00)
Well, yeah. There’s always…
Mark Cuban
(00:13:03)
Versus other countries, right? So us versus other countries. Joe Biden of all people said to me, it was at an entrepreneurship conference that when he was vice president, he had put together, and we had gone up there, a bunch of us from Shark Tank to talk to young entrepreneurs from around the world. And he said to me, “Mark, I’ve been to every country around the world, and the one thing that separates us is entrepreneurship. We’re the most entrepreneurial country in the world, and there’s no one else who’s even close.” And when you look at the origin of the biggest companies in the world, for the most part, there’s an American origin story somewhere behind there. And I think that just gets perpetuated on itself. We see those Horatio Alger stories, we see examples of the Jeff Bezos of the world, the Steve Jobs of the world, and those are the types of people we want to copy.
Lex Fridman
(00:13:58)
Yeah, we want to be really careful and try to really figure out what that is because we don’t want to lose that.
Mark Cuban
(00:14:04)
For sure.
Lex Fridman
(00:14:05)
We want to protect the… Whatever. And that’s a lot of the discussions about what’s the right way to do government, big government, small government, what’s the right policies, but also culture, who we celebrate. One of the things that troubles me is that we don’t enough celebrate the entrepreneurs that take risks and the entrepreneurs that succeed. It seems like success, especially when it comes with wealth, is immediately matched with distrust and criticism and all that kind of stuff.
Mark Cuban
(00:14:32)
Yeah, well, it’s changing for sure, because you can go back just 12 years, right? Traditional media dominated, let’s just say through 2012, that was the peak of linear television. Newspapers weren’t as strong, but they still had some breadth and depth to them. And then social media comes along and everybody gets to play in their own sandbox and share opinions with people who think just like them. And it also gives them the opportunity to amplify those feelings. And I think that’s where celebrating entrepreneurs really started to subside some. There were always people who were progressive that were like, billionaires are bad or millionaires are bad, depending on the time period, but you didn’t really see it on an ongoing basis. It wasn’t going to be on the evening news. It wasn’t going to be in the front page of the newspaper. It was going to be if you read a book and someone talked about it, or you read a magazine and there was an article talking about this progressive movement or that progressive movement, whatever it may be, or political parties. But now all of that is front and center in social media.
Lex Fridman
(00:15:41)
Yeah, we’re trying to figure it out, how we deal with the mobs of people and the virality of it all. And I think we’ll find our footing and start celebrating greatness again.

Shark Tank

Mark Cuban
(00:15:51)
Well, that’s the whole reason I do Shark Tank.
Lex Fridman
(00:15:52)
That’s true. That show celebrates the entrepreneur. That’s true.
Mark Cuban
(00:15:56)
t’s the only place where every single minute of every single episode, we celebrate the American Dream. And the reason I do it is we tell the entire country, and it’s shown around the world even, we’re amazing advertising for the American Dream, and I don’t even know how many countries, but every time somebody walks onto that carpet from Dubuque, Iowa or Ketchum, Idaho, that sends a message to every kid who’s watching, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12-year-old kid that if they can do it from Ketchum, Idaho, you can do it. If they can have this idea and get a deal or even present to the Sharks and have all of America see it, you can do it. And I’m proud of that. 15 years of that, it’s just been insane. Now kids walk up to me and go, yeah, I started watching you when I was five or 10, and I started a business because I learned about it from Shark Tank. And so I think it celebrates it, and we convey it, and I don’t think it’s going away, but there are different battles we have to fight to support it.
Lex Fridman
(00:16:57)
Yeah, I love even when the business idea is obviously horrible. Just the guts to step up.
Mark Cuban
(00:17:04)
To be there.
Lex Fridman
(00:17:05)
To believe in yourself. To really reach. That’s what matters, because some of the best business ideas are probably, maybe even you and Shark Tank will laugh at.
Mark Cuban
(00:17:17)
Oh, for sure. Without question. The good ones, we’re not going to recognize every good one. And then sometimes we’ll just motivate people to work even harder to get it done because of what we say to them, and that’s fine too. There’s been great success stories that we said no to.
Lex Fridman
(00:17:30)
What stands out as a memorable business on you’ve been pitched on Shark Tank. What’s the best one that stands out on-
Mark Cuban
(00:17:37)
There’s no best one, right? They’re all different. They’re all best in their own way, I guess. There’re stupid ones, and we haven’t had any world-changing earth-shattering ones because those aren’t going to apply to Shark Tank. They don’t need us. So we typically get businesses that need some help at some level or another. But there’s ones I’ve passed that I wish Spikeball, do you know what Spikeball is? So it’s just rebounding net that you can put on the beach and you have these yellow balls, and you play a game of, it’s just a competitive game, but they’re killing it. So if you go to beaches in New York or LA, you’ll see kids playing it all the time. And it was a fun game that I wish I had done a deal with, and there’s been others.
Lex Fridman
(00:18:21)
And you passed.
Mark Cuban
(00:18:21)
And I passed. They were getting some traction and they wanted to create leagues, Spikeball leagues, and they wanted me to be the commissioner, and I don’t want to be a commissioner of a new Spikeball league.
Lex Fridman
(00:18:32)
So you have to have this gut feeling of will this scale, will this click with people?
Mark Cuban
(00:18:39)
Of course, yeah. Can it be protected? Is it differentiated? Is it something that makes me think, why didn’t I think of that? Or is it just a good solid business that’s going to pay a return to the founder and may not be enough of a business to return to an investor?
Lex Fridman
(00:18:56)
Yeah, and I guess the question you’re trying to see, will this scale? There’s promise? Will the promise materialize into a big thing?
Mark Cuban
(00:19:06)
Well, see, I don’t even care if it’s going to be a big thing, right? Because it’s all relative to the entrepreneur. We had a nineteen-year-old from Pittsburgh Laney, who came on with this simple sugar scrub, and there was nothing outrageously special about it. I didn’t see it becoming a hundred-million-dollar business. I thought it could become a two, three, five-million-dollar business that paid the bills for her. And that was good enough. And six months after the show aired, she called me up, she goes, “Mark, I’ve got a million dollars in the bank. What am I going to do?” I’m like, “Enjoy it. Put aside money for your taxes and go back to work.” And so it doesn’t have to be a huge business. It’s just got to be one that makes the entrepreneur happy.
Lex Fridman
(00:19:45)
But then there’s the valuation piece. Do a lot of the entrepreneurs overvalue their business?
Mark Cuban
(00:19:52)
Yeah, that’s the nature of it, right? And that’s really where the biggest conflicts in Shark Tank happened. That’s an evaluation. They think this is the best business ever. We had one lady couple that came on and they had this scraper for cat’s tongues, right?
Lex Fridman
(00:20:10)
Nice.
Mark Cuban
(00:20:10)
Bizarre. One of the most bizarre pitch ever.
Lex Fridman
(00:20:14)
I love it.
Mark Cuban
(00:20:15)
And they had this insane valuation and it was on because it was corny and fun TV, not because it was a good business.
Lex Fridman
(00:20:21)
Oh, really? Okay. You didn’t see the potential.
Mark Cuban
(00:20:23)
None. Yeah, none.
Lex Fridman
(00:20:25)
There’s a lot of cats in the world, Mark. Come on.
Mark Cuban
(00:20:27)
Yes, there are. And they’ll go very well without me.
Lex Fridman
(00:20:30)
So how do you determine the value of a business, whether it’s on Shark Tank or just in general?
Mark Cuban
(00:20:35)
It’s actually really easy. So if you take, just to use an example, a business that’s valued at $1 million, and I want to buy 10% of that company for $100,000, then in order for me to get my money back, they’ve got to be able to generate a hundred thousand dollars in after-tax cash flow that they’re able to distribute. Can they do it or can they not? Right? And if it’s a $2 million… Whatever the valuation is, that’s how much cash, after-tax cash they have to generate to return that money to investors. Or the other option is, do I see this as business potentially having an exit? Do they have some unique technology or do they have something specific about them that some other company would want to acquire? Then the cash flow isn’t as, I don’t want to say important, but isn’t going to guide the valuation.
Lex Fridman
(00:21:28)
And how do you know if a company’s going to be acquired? So it’s the technology, like the patents, but also the team, is it-
Mark Cuban
(00:21:34)
Yeah, it could be any of the above. It could be a super products’ company that I think is going to take off.
Lex Fridman
(00:21:41)
And how do you know if they can generate the money? You made it sound easy.
Mark Cuban
(00:21:45)
Yeah, can the person sell? And if not them, can I do it or someone on my team do it for them?
Lex Fridman
(00:21:52)
So you’re looking at the person.
Mark Cuban
(00:21:54)
Yeah, for sure. Yeah. That’s where Barbara Corker is the best. She can look at a person and hear them talk for 20 minutes and know, can that person do the job and do the work.
Lex Fridman
(00:22:02)
Can you tell if they’re full of shit or not? So one of the things with entrepreneurs, they’re like we said, overvaluing, so they’re maybe overselling themselves, but also they might be full of in terms of their understanding of the market or also-
Mark Cuban
(00:22:17)
Oh, yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:22:17)
… or exaggerating what they’re think or do, all that kind of stuff. Can you see through that?
Mark Cuban
(00:22:21)
Yeah, for sure. Just by asking questions. So if they are delusional at some level or misleading at another level, I’m going to call them on it. So you get people trying to sell supplements that come on there and it’s a cure for cancer or whatever it may be, or there’s this latest fad that increases your core strength without doing any exercises. Shit Like that I’m just going to bounce, I’m going to pound on them. Right.
Lex Fridman
(00:22:48)
I still love that. I still love the trying. Just trying.
Mark Cuban
(00:22:51)
No, give them credit, right? Because they know all of America’s going to see it, and they’ve deluded themselves to believe this story so strongly.
Lex Fridman
(00:22:58)
There’s a delusional aspect to entrepreneurship. You,
Mark Cuban
(00:23:04)
That’s a great question. Do you have to be ambitious and set aside reality at some level to think that you can create a company that could be worth 10, a hundred, a billion dollars, yeah, at some level. Because you don’t know. It’s all uncertainty. But I think if you’re delusional, that works against you because everything’s grounded in reality. You’ve got to execute. You’ve got to produce, you can have a vision and you can say, this is where I want to get to and that’s my mission, or this is my driving principle. But you still got to execute on the business plan, and that’s where most people fail.
Lex Fridman
(00:23:40)
Yeah, you have to be kind of two-brained, I guess. You have to be able to dip into reality when you’re thinking about the specifics of the product, how to design things, the first principles, the basics of how to build the thing, how much it’s going to cost, all of that.
Mark Cuban
(00:23:53)
Yeah. Because if you can’t do the basics, you’re not going to be able to do the bigger things. And at the same time, you’ve got to be… One of the things that entrepreneurs do that I always try to remind any of that I work with on is we all tend to lie to ourselves. Our product is bigger, faster, cheaper, this or that, as if that is a finite situation, that’s never going to change. And there’s always somebody, I call them leapfrog businesses. Whoever’s competing against you, if you do a B or C, they’re going to try to do C, D and E, and you better be prepared for that to come, because otherwise they’re out of business too. So you’re never in a vacuum. You’re always competing against sometimes an unlimited number of entrepreneurs that you don’t even know exist who are trying to kick your ass.
Lex Fridman
(00:24:37)
And the tricky part of all this too is you might need to frequently pivot, especially in the beginning.
Mark Cuban
(00:24:43)
Hopefully not.
Lex Fridman
(00:24:45)
So you think in the beginning, the product you have should be the thing that carries you a long time.
Mark Cuban
(00:24:51)
Yeah, because that’s your riskiest point in time. And so if you’ve done your homework, which includes going out there and testing product market fit, you should have confidence that you’re going to be able to sell it. Now, if you didn’t do your homework and you go out there and you sell whatever it is and you’ve raised money or whatever, just to pivot, you’ve already shown that you haven’t been able to read the market. And so it’s not that pivots can’t work and always don’t work. They can, but more often than not, they don’t. You pivot for a reason. That’s because you made a huge mistake.
Lex Fridman
(00:25:28)
Well, I also mean the micro- pivots, which is iterative development of a-
Mark Cuban
(00:25:33)
Oh, yeah, just iterations. Yeah. Entrepreneurship, having any business is just continuous iteration, continuous. Your product, your sales pitch, your advertising, introducing new technology, how do you use AI or not use AI? Where do you use it? What person’s the right person? There’s just a million touch points that you’re always reevaluating in real , early ‘time that you have to be agile and adapt and change.
Lex Fridman
(00:26:00)
But especially in software, it feels like business model can evolve really quickly, too, like how are you going to make money on this?
Mark Cuban
(00:26:07)
Yeah, software for sure, because anything digital, because it can change in a millisecond.

How Mark made first billion

Lex Fridman
(00:26:13)
Speaking of which, how did you make your first billion?
Mark Cuban
(00:26:16)
So my partner, Todd Wagner and I would get together for lunches, and we were at California Pizza Kitchen and Preston Hollow in Dallas, and he was talking about how we could use this new thing called the internet. This is the late ’94, early ’95, to be able to listen to Indiana University basketball games because that’s where we went to school. And he look, when we would listen to games, we would have somebody in Bloomington, Indiana have a speakerphone next to a radio, and then we would have a speakerphone in Dallas and a six-pack or 12 pack of beer, and we’d sit around listening to the game because there was no other way to listen to it. So I was like, okay, my first company, MicroSolutions, I’d written software, done network integration. And so I was comfortable digging into it, and so like, okay, let’s give it a try.

(00:27:08)
So we started this company called AudioNet, and effectively became the first streaming content company on the internet. And we’re like, okay, we’re not sure how we’re going to make this work, but we were able to make it work when we started going to radio stations and TV stations and music labels and everything and evolved. Audionet.com, Which was only audio at the beginning, to broadcast.com in 1998, which was audio and video, and became the largest multimedia site on the internet. Took it public in July of 1998. It had the largest first day jump in the history of the stock market at the time. And then a year later we sold it to Yahoo for $5.7 billion in Yahoo stock, and I owned right around 30% of the company, give or take. And so after taxes, that’s what got me there.
Lex Fridman
(00:28:02)
Well, there’s a lot of questions there. So the technical challenge of that, you’re making it sound easy, but you wrote code, but still, in the early days of the internet, how do you figure out how to create this kind of product of just audio at first and then video at first?
Mark Cuban
(00:28:18)
A lot of iterations like you talked about. We started in the second bedroom of my house, set up a server. I got an ISDN line, which was a 128K line and set up, downloaded Netscape server, and then started using different file formats that were progressive loading and allowing people to connect to the server and do a progressive download so that the audio, you can listen to the audio while it was downloading onto your PC.
Lex Fridman
(00:28:47)
Yeah, it was a super choppy. So you’re trying to figure out how to do it.
Mark Cuban
(00:28:49)
Oh yeah, for sure. For sure. It would buffer it. It wasn’t good, but it was a start.
Lex Fridman
(00:28:53)
But it was good enough the first
Mark Cuban
(00:28:55)
Kind. Yeah, because there was no other competition, right? There was nobody else doing it. And so it was like, okay, I can get access to this or this. And then there were some third party software companies, Zing and Progressive Networks and others that took it a little bit further. So we partnered with them and I started going to local radio stations where literally we would set up a server. Right next to it, I had a $49 radio, the highest FM radio that I could find, and we’d take the output of the audio signal from the radio with these two analog cables, plug it into the server, encode it, and make it available from audionet.com. Then I would go on Uunet bulletin boards. I would go on CompuServe, I would go on Prodigy, I would go on AOL, I’d go wherever I could find bodies, and I’d say, okay, we’ve got this radio station KLIF in Dallas.

(00:29:48)
It’s got Dallas sports and Dallas News and politics, and if you’re in an office or you’re outside of Dallas, connect to audionet.com and now you can listen to these things on demand. And that’s how we started. And it started with one radio station, and then it was five, then it was 10, then it was video content, then the laws were different then. So we could literally go out and buy CDs and host them and just let people listen to whatever music. And we went from 10 users a day to a hundred to a thousand, to hundreds of thousands to a million over those next four years.
Lex Fridman
(00:30:25)
How did you find the users? Is it word of mouth?
Mark Cuban
(00:30:27)
Word of mouth.
Lex Fridman
(00:30:27)
Just word of mouth.
Mark Cuban
(00:30:28)
Didn’t spend a penny on advertising.
Lex Fridman
(00:30:29)
So the thing you were focusing on is getting the radio stations and all that.
Mark Cuban
(00:30:32)
But radio and TV, anything, any content at all.
Mark Cuban
(00:30:34)
You
Lex Fridman
(00:30:34)
Pick up the phone, how’d you,
Mark Cuban
(00:30:37)
Wherever I put everything that was public domain, I’d go out and buy a video or a cassette, whatever it was. And this was before the DMs, the digital minimum Copyright Act of 90, whenever it kicked in. So literally anything that was audio we would put online so people could listen to it. And if you think about somebody at work, they didn’t have a radio most likely. And if you did, you couldn’t get reception. Definitely didn’t have a TV, but you had a PC and you had bandwidth available to you and the companies weren’t up on firewalls or anything at that point in time. So our in-office listening during the day just exploded because whoever’s sitting next to you, what are you listening to? And that was the start of it. And then in early 98, we started adding video and just other things, and we had ended up with thousands of servers.

(00:31:26)
There was no cloud back then. And just pulling together all those pieces to make it work. But where we really made our money was by taking that network that we had built and then going to corporations and saying, look, it’s 1996, ’97, ’98. And to communicate with your worldwide employees, what they would do is they would go to an auditorium that had a satellite uplink, and then they would have people go to theaters or ballrooms and hotels that had satellite down links and they would broadcast the product introductions, whatever. And so we said to them, look, you’re paying millions of dollars to reach all your employees when you can do it. Pay us a half a million dollars, and we’ll do it just on their PCs at work. So we did. When Intel announced the P 90 PC, we charged them $2 million or whatever to do that.

(00:32:20)
When Motorola announced a new phone or a new product, we would charge them. And so we used a consumer side to do a proof of concept for the network, and then we would take that knowledge and go to corporations, and that’s how we made our revenue.
Lex Fridman
(00:32:34)
And there’s some selling there with the corporations?
Mark Cuban
(00:32:36)
Yeah, a lot of selling there, but we were saving them so much money, and they were technology companies. They wanted to be perceived as being leading edge. And so it was win-win.
Lex Fridman
(00:32:45)
How much technical savvy was required? You said a bunch of servers. At which point do you get more engineers? How much did you understand could do yourself? And then also, once you can’t do it all yourself. How much technical savvy is required to understand enough to hire the right people to keep building this and innovation?
Mark Cuban
(00:33:03)
I did all the technology, and then we hired engineer after engineer after engineer to implement it. And so, yeah, from putting together a multicast network to software to just all these different things,
Lex Fridman
(00:33:17)
Was this a scary thing?
Mark Cuban
(00:33:19)
It’s terrifying, right? Because as we were growing, trying to keep up with the scale, and literally, we’re buying off-the-shelf PCs, and then server cards as the technology advanced and hard drives and things would fail, and we would have to… We didn’t have machine learning back then to do an analysis of how to distribute server resources. There was a time when Bill Clinton and all the Monica Lewinsky stuff happened. They released the audio of their interviews of him or something like that. And literally, I knew at that point in time when that was released, everybody at work was going to want to listen to it, right? So we had to take down servers that were doomed.
Mark Cuban
(00:34:00)
… Was going to want to listen to it. We had to take down servers that were doing Chicago Cubs baseball and just make all these on-the-fly decisions because we didn’t have the tools to analyze or be predictive. It was all technology-driven and marketing.
Lex Fridman
(00:34:17)
The acquisition by Yahoo. Can you tell the story of that, but also in the broader context of this internet bubble? This is a fascinating part of human history.
Mark Cuban
(00:34:28)
On the acquisition side, we were the largest media site on the internet, and it wasn’t close. There was nobody close. We were YouTube and relatively speaking, we would be 10X YouTube relative to the competition because there was nobody there. It became obvious to Yahoo, AOL, and others that they needed a multimedia component. We had the infrastructure, sales, all that stuff.

(00:34:52)
Yahoo, when we went public in ’98 or right before, I think it was, they made an investment of $2 million, which gave us a connection to them. After we went public, they decided they needed to have multimedia, so in April of ’99, we made a deal, and then July of 2000 is when it closed.
Lex Fridman
(00:35:18)
Can you explain to me the trickiness of what you did after that?
Mark Cuban
(00:35:24)
The collar?
Lex Fridman
(00:35:25)
Yeah.
Mark Cuban
(00:35:25)
Okay. When we sold to Yahoo, we sold for $5.7 billion in stock, not cash. After Micro Solutions, when I sold that, I took that money and initially I told my broker I wanted to invest like a 60-year-old man because I wanted to protect it, but then he started asking me all kinds of questions about all these technologies that I understood, like networks I had installed. We had become one of the top 20, let’s say, systems integrators in the country. At one point in time, we were the largest IBM token ring installer in the country. It was crazy. Banyan, Blast from the Past.

(00:36:08)
Anyway, these Wall Street bankers or analysts rather, that were the big analysts of the time would call me up because they would ask my broker, “What does he know about this product, this product?” I knew them all, what was working and not working. The ones that worked, I say that it’s working and they say something, the stock would go up $20. My broker was like, “You know this better than they do. You need to invest.”

(00:36:32)
I started buying and selling stocks, and this was in 1990 and was just killing it. I was making 80, 90, 100% a year over those next four years to the point where guy came in and asked to use my trading history to start a hedge fund, which we did. I sold within nine months, it was great. The point being as it goes forward, so when we sold to Yahoo, I already had a lot of experience trading stocks, and I had seen different bubbles come and go. The bubble for PC manufacturers, a bubble for networking manufacturers, they went up, up, up, up, up, and then they came straight down after the hype where somebody just leapfrogged.

(00:37:14)
When we sold to Yahoo, I was like I’ve got a B next to my name. That’s all I need, or all I want. I don’t want to be greedy. I’d seen this story before where stocks get really frothy and go straight down. I knew that because all of what I had was in stock, I needed to find a way to collar it and protect it. Understanding stocks and trading and options and all that, my broker and I, we went and shorted an index that had Yahoo in it.

(00:37:42)
The law at the time was you couldn’t short any indexes that had more than 5% of that stock in it, of the Yahoo stock. I took pretty much $20 million dollars, everything I had at the time, and I shorted the index.
Lex Fridman
(00:37:58)
This is fascinating, by the way, because based on your estimation that this is a bubble.
Mark Cuban
(00:38:02)
Or just mine not wanting to be greedy.
Lex Fridman
(00:38:04)
Sure. The foundation of this kind of thinking is you don’t want to be greedy.
Mark Cuban
(00:38:09)
Yeah. How much money do I need? Where other people were saying, oh, I think you can go up higher, higher, higher. I went on CNBC and I told them what I had done, and Yahoo stock had gone up significantly from the time I had collared. One of the guys, Joe Kernan was on there, “Don’t you feel stupid now that Yahoo stock has gone up X% more?” I’m like, “Yeah, I feel real stupid sitting on my jet.”
Lex Fridman
(00:38:37)
There is some fundamental way in which bubbles are based on this greed.
Mark Cuban
(00:38:42)
For sure, and I’d seen it before, like I just said. What I did was we put together a collar where I sold calls and bought puts, and as it turned out, when the market just cratered, I was protected. Over the next two, three years, whatever it was, it converted to cash, paid my taxes, etc, but it protected me. As it turns out, it was called one of the top 10 trades of all time.

(00:39:08)
What was even more interesting out of that period, my broker at that time was at Goldman Sachs, and I had asked him to see if there was a way to trade the VIX, the volatility index, and there wasn’t. One of the people that Goldman that we were working with to try to create this actually left Goldman and created indexes that allowed you to trade the VIX.
Lex Fridman
(00:39:32)
It’s not trivial to understand that it’s a bubble. You’re lessening your insight into all this by saying you just didn’t want to be greedy, but you still have to see that it’s a bubble.
Mark Cuban
(00:39:43)
Yeah, obviously if I thought it was going to keep on going up and there was intrinsic value there, I would’ve stayed in it. It wasn’t so much Yahoo, it was just the entire industry. We’re looking at the magic seven or whatever it is stocks now and people were asking is it in a bubble? I would get into cabs and people would just start talking about internet stocks.

(00:40:06)
There were people creating companies with just a website and going public. That’s a bubble where there’s no intrinsic value at all. People aren’t even trying to make operating cap profits, they’re just trying to leverage the frothiness of the stock market, that’s a bubble. You don’t see that right now. You don’t see any IPOs right now for that matter, so I don’t think we’re in a bubble now, but back then, yes, I thought we were in a bubble, but that wasn’t really the motivating factor.
Lex Fridman
(00:40:32)
Do you think it’s possible we’re in a bit of an AI bubble right now?
Mark Cuban
(00:40:35)
No, because we’re not seeing funky AI companies just go public. If all of a sudden we see a rush of companies who are skins on other people’s models or just creating models to create models that are going public, then yeah, that’s probably the start of a bubble. That said, my fourteen-year-old was bragging about buying NVIDIA with me in his Robinhood account. He tells me the order, I place it, and he was like, “Oh, yeah, it’s going up, up, up.” I’m like yeah, we’re not quite there yet, but that’s one thing to pay attention to.
Lex Fridman
(00:41:09)
Yeah, we’re flirting with it. You said that becoming a billionaire requires luck. Can you explain?
Mark Cuban
(00:41:15)
Yeah. There’s no business plan where you can just start it and say yeah, I’m definitely going to be a billionaire. If I had to start all over, could I start a company that made me a millionaire? Yeah, because I know how to sell and I know technology, and I’ve learned enough over the years to do that. Could I make $10 million? Probably. $100 million? I hope so. But $1 billion, just something good has got to happen.
Lex Fridman
(00:41:39)
Timing.
Mark Cuban
(00:41:40)
Timing. Internet stock market was going nuts when we started, and that certainly I couldn’t predict or control. It’s like AI right now, AI’s been around a long, long, long, long time. The NVIDIA GPUs, you couldn’t predict that now’s the time that they were going to get to that cost-effectiveness where you could create models and train them and although it’s expensive, it’s still doable. We had ASICs for custom applications and we had CPUs that were leading the way, but GPUs were more for gaming and then crypto mining, and then all of a sudden they were the foundation for AI models.
Lex Fridman
(00:42:27)
I think luck being essential to becoming a billionaire is a beautiful way to see life in general. First of all, I personally think that everything good that’s ever happened to me is because of luck. I think that’s just a good way of being. It’s like you’re grateful.

(00:42:43)
That said, there’s some examples of people that you’re like, they seem to have gotten lucky a lot. We’ll mention Jeff Bezos. It seems like he did a lot of really interesting, powerful decisions for many years with Amazon to make it successful.
Mark Cuban
(00:43:01)
But he was really able to raise money, a lot of money, and people were really dismissive of him because they weren’t profitable and we were in an environment where it was possible to raise [inaudible 00:43:16]-
Lex Fridman
(00:43:15)
It was possible to raise that money. What about somebody you get sometimes feisty with on the internet, Elon. Could even look at Zuck, and Bill Gates, and Warren Buffett.
Mark Cuban
(00:43:25)
Look, Zuck was just trying to get laid and it took off and he wrote some good stuff.
Lex Fridman
(00:43:29)
Aren’t we all? Isn’t that the foundation of human civilization?
Mark Cuban
(00:43:32)
At some level, right? More power to them, you can’t take anything away from them. Snapchat, same thing, took off. Apps didn’t take off in 2007 when the iPhone came out, apps took off in 2011, 2012, and if you were there with the right app at the right time.

(00:43:48)
Even Facebook in 2004, the bubble had burst and the price for computers had fallen enough. And kids in school all needed computers or laptops. If he had tried to do something like that five years earlier… He was too young, but five years earlier or five years later, or Friendster might’ve been the ultimate or MySpace,
Lex Fridman
(00:44:12)
Friendster, I remember Friendster.
Mark Cuban
(00:44:14)
Or MySpace. I had a MySpace account, and that was before Facebook.
Lex Fridman
(00:44:17)
Yeah, the timing’s important, but there’s the details of how the product is built, the fundamentals of the product.
Mark Cuban
(00:44:25)
But that’s what gets you. When the opportunity is there, that’s what allows you to take advantage of that opportunity and the kismet of it all because it wasn’t like any of the people I mentioned, there weren’t others trying the same thing. You had to be able to see it. You had to be able to visualize it and put together a plan of some sort, or at least have a path, and then you had to execute on it and do all those things at the same time and have the money available to you because it wasn’t like whether it was Google or Facebook, they raised a shitload of money. It wasn’t bootstrapping it that got them there.
Lex Fridman
(00:44:59)
Raising money is not just about sales, it’s about the general feeling of the people with money at that time.
Mark Cuban
(00:45:07)
And proximity.
Lex Fridman
(00:45:09)
Oh, yeah. Sure.
Mark Cuban
(00:45:10)
If Zuck wasn’t at Harvard and he was at Miami of Ohio University or he was at Richland Community College, same idea, same person, same execution, and nothing.
Lex Fridman
(00:45:20)
I believe in the power of individuals to realize their potential no matter where they come from.
Mark Cuban
(00:45:29)
I agree 100% with that.
Lex Fridman
(00:45:31)
But luck is required.
Mark Cuban
(00:45:33)
The only delta is scale. We’re not all blessed with the access to the tools you need to hit that grand slam.
Lex Fridman
(00:45:42)
But then also, billion is not the only measure of success, right?
Mark Cuban
(00:45:45)
Absolutely not. Right. Everybody defines the success in their own way.
Lex Fridman
(00:45:49)
How do you define success, Mark Cuban?
Mark Cuban
(00:45:51)
Waking up every day with a smile, excited about the day. People always say when you get that kind of money, does it make you happy? My answer always is if you are happy when you are broke, you’re going to be really, really, really happy when you’re rich.
Lex Fridman
(00:46:08)
But you got to work on being happy when you’re broke, I guess.
Mark Cuban
(00:46:11)
You’re just being happy. If you were miserable in your job before, there’s a good chance you’re still going to be miserable if that’s just who you are.
Lex Fridman
(00:46:19)
That’s a pretty good definition of success, by the way.
Mark Cuban
(00:46:21)
Thank you.
Lex Fridman
(00:46:21)
How do you reach that success by way of advice to people?
Mark Cuban
(00:46:27)
We talked about my dad, my parents. I never looked at my dad and said okay, you’re not successful. He busted his ass and when he came home, we enjoyed our time together. There was nothing at any point in time where I felt like this is miserable, we’re awful, we don’t have this, we don’t have that. We celebrated the things we did have and never knew about the things we didn’t have. I think you have to be able to find your way to whatever it is that puts a smile on your face every day. Some people can do it, and some people can’t.
Lex Fridman
(00:47:07)
It’s not always about the smile on the outside, it could be a smile on the inside.
Mark Cuban
(00:47:11)
Whatever it is, whatever makes you feel good.
Lex Fridman
(00:47:14)
Even the struggle, like with your dad, the really, really hard work can be a fulfilling experience because the struggle leading up to then seeing your kids and seeing your family.
Mark Cuban
(00:47:29)
Exactly right. That was my dad’s grand slam, seeing three kids go to college, be successful, be able to spend time with them. That was the other thing he really made me realize is the most valuable asset isn’t the money, it’s your time. That’s why from a young age, I wanted to retire because I wanted to experience everything that I possibly could in this life. He got joy from us, I get joy from my kids, and that’s the most special thing that you ever can have.
Lex Fridman
(00:48:00)
Beautifully said. You have made some mistakes in your life?
Mark Cuban
(00:48:05)
Yeah, a lot of them.
Lex Fridman
(00:48:06)
One of the bigger ones on the financial side we could say is Uber.
Mark Cuban
(00:48:12)
Yeah, we call that not doing something. Yeah, it wasn’t a mistake, it was just… It was a mistake.
Lex Fridman
(00:48:16)
I like how you tried to…
Mark Cuban
(00:48:20)
I always try to look at mistakes at things you did that didn’t turn out as opposed to things you didn’t do, the negative.
Lex Fridman
(00:48:27)
Can you tell the story of that? And maybe it’s just interesting because it is illustrative how to know when a thing is going to be big and not, what are the fundamentals of it, and how to take the risk and all this kind of stuff.
Mark Cuban
(00:48:40)
The backstory of that is Bill Gurley came to me and said, “Mark, there’s this guy, Travis, that has this company, Red Swoosh, which is a peer-to-peer networking company that I think you can help.” I invested and would spend a lot of time with Travis.

(00:48:57)
It’s funny because back then, that was 2006, I was an investor at Box.net with Aaron Levy and… Oh, there was one other company, but there were three of them where there’d be emails where I’d introduce them and we’d all talk in these emails and they’d all gone to have astronomical success.

(00:49:20)
Red Swoosh had its issues. I always look at peer-to-peer as stealing bandwidth from the internet providers when bandwidth was a scarce commodity. What Travis did with that though, was great. He convinced gaming companies who wanted to do downloads of the clients for those games to use his peer-to-peer on Red Swoosh. He busted his ass, and I think he sold it for $18 million, so he did well.

(00:49:47)
So it was natural for him to come to me, and I still have the emails and ask me about Uber Cab. I thought okay, this is a great idea. I really, really like it. He showed me his budgets, and I think they were raising money at $10 million or $15 million or whatever. I’m like, “Your biggest challenge is going to be you’re going to have to fight all the incumbent taxi commissions. They’re going to want to put you out of business. That’s going to be a challenge and I think you don’t have enough money designated for marketing to get all that done.” I said, “I’d invest, but not quite at that valuation.” Never came back to me.
Lex Fridman
(00:50:26)
Yeah, there’s some lessons there connected to what you’re doing now we’ll talk about [inaudible 00:50:32], it’s looking at an industry that seems like there’s a lot of complexity involved, but it’s hungry for revolution and the cabs are that.
Mark Cuban
(00:50:43)
Yeah, for sure. They were dominated by an insulated few, they were not very transparent, you didn’t know the intricacies, they were very politically driven, an old boy insensuous network. I told him, “Travis, the best thing about you is you’ll run through walls and break down barriers. The bad thing about you is you’ll run through walls even if you don’t have to.”
Lex Fridman
(00:51:07)
There you have to see, is it possible to raise enough money? Is it possible to do all this? Is it possible to break through? It’s a fascinating success story with Uber.
Mark Cuban
(00:51:18)
I think he tried to go too big. He had too big an ambition, which cost him in the end, not financially and personally, but just in terms of being able to stick it out with them, but that’s what makes him a great entrepreneur.
Lex Fridman
(00:51:32)
It’s a fascinating success story. You have certain companies like Airbnb just go into this thing that we take completely for granted.
Mark Cuban
(00:51:41)
And change it all.
Lex Fridman
(00:51:42)
Just change it all.
Mark Cuban
(00:51:43)
Linda Johnson, who worked as our general counsel at broadcast.com, was Brian’s GC and chief operating officer. They had a smart, smart team.
Lex Fridman
(00:51:55)
They believed in it. It’s a beautiful story because you’re like all right, all the things that annoy you about this world, they’re an inefficient, and it just seemed like a pain in the ass-
Mark Cuban
(00:52:05)
See, I probably would’ve said no like a lot of people did to Airbnb because I’m like I don’t want people sleeping in my bed.
Lex Fridman
(00:52:12)
I would’ve too. I was like this is not going to work. I’ve done couchsurfing and stuff and it was always… It didn’t seem right. It didn’t seem like you could do this at a large scale.
Mark Cuban
(00:52:20)
To monetize it. Yeah, but he did more power to him.

Dallas Mavericks

Lex Fridman
(00:52:24)
In 2000, I think January, you purchased a majority stake in the NBA team, Dallas Mavericks for $285 million. At this point, maybe you can correct me, but it was one of the worst performing teams in franchise history.
Mark Cuban
(00:52:42)
It’s true.
Lex Fridman
(00:52:44)
How did you help turn it around?
Mark Cuban
(00:52:46)
I had this big, tall guy named Dirk Nowitzki, and I let him be Dirk Nowitzki, and I got out of the way. I think more than anything else, there was the turnaround on the business side, and then there was the turnaround on the basketball side. On the basketball side, I just went in there, immediately said whatever it takes to win, that’s what we’re going to do. Back then, they had three or four coaches that were responsible for everything and I was like okay, we spend more money training people on PC software than we do developing the most important assets of the business.

(00:53:19)
I made the decision to go out there and hire 15 different development coaches, one for each player. Everybody thought I was just insane, but it sent the message that we were going to do whatever it took to win. Once the guys believed that winning was the goal as opposed to just making money, attitudes change, efforts went up, and the rest is history.
Lex Fridman
(00:53:47)
The assets of the business here are the players.
Mark Cuban
(00:53:48)
The players.
Lex Fridman
(00:53:48)
The players.
Mark Cuban
(00:53:48)
Yeah, for sure. On the business side, the first question I asked myself is what business are we in? I really didn’t know the answer immediately, but within the first few months, it was obvious that the entire NBA thought we were in the business of basketball. We were not, we were in the experience business.

(00:54:08)
When you think about sporting events that you’ve been to, you don’t remember the score, you don’t remember the home runs or the dunks, you remember who you were with, and you remember why you went. It was my first date with a girl who’s now my wife or I went with my buddies and he threw up on the person in front of us. My dad took me, my aunt, my uncle took me. Those are the experiences you remember.

(00:54:28)
Once I conveyed to our people that this is what we were selling, that what happened in the arena off the court was just as important as what happened on the court, if not more so because if mom or dad are bringing the 10-year-old, you have to keep them occupied because they have short attention spans.

(00:54:45)
I would get into fights with NBA, put aside the refs, but getting in fights in the NBA, I would say NBA, nothing but attorneys, because they had no marketing skills whatsoever. To their credit, they realized that was a problem and started bringing in better and better marketing people.
Lex Fridman
(00:55:01)
Part of the selling is you’re selling the team, selling the sport, selling the people, the idea, all of it.
Mark Cuban
(00:55:09)
Yeah, the experience. Have you ever been to an NBA game?
Lex Fridman
(00:55:12)
Miami Heat.
Mark Cuban
(00:55:13)
Do you remember walking into the arena and you feel the energy? That’s what makes it special.
Lex Fridman
(00:55:18)
Yeah, the energy is everything. Especially playoff games.
Mark Cuban
(00:55:20)
Right, for sure. Even a regular season game, even against the worst team, that’s where we get… Because the tickets tend to be a little bit cheaper on the resale market, that’s where parents will bring their kids. You hear kids screaming the entire game, and the parents are thrilled to death, they got to do something with their kids. The kids are thrilled to death because they got to see basketball, an NBA game, and scream at the top of their lungs.

(00:55:44)
If it turns out to be a close game, and that ball’s in the air, and if it goes in, everybody’s hugging and high-fiving people you’ve never seen before in your life, and if it misses, you’re commiserating with people you’ve never seen. That’s such a unique experience that’s unique to sports. We never sold that and that’s exactly what we started.
Lex Fridman
(00:56:01)
I have to say, just going to that game turned me around on basketball because I’m more of a football guy. Basketball wasn’t like the main sport. I was like oh, wow, okay.
Mark Cuban
(00:56:09)
It’s fun. It’s different. The energy in a stadium is completely different than the energy and arena. In the stadium, particularly if it doesn’t have a roof, it’s hard to bottle that energy. You feel it and you see… I’m from Pittsburgh, so there’s the terrible towels and people screaming defense and everything at Steelers games, but in an arena, the energy level is just indescribable.
Lex Fridman
(00:56:33)
How much of it is the selling that tickets in person, but also versus what you see on TV? When you’re owning a team, do you get any of the cut for the what’s shown on TV?
Mark Cuban
(00:56:44)
Yeah. There’s a TV deal that’s done with either a local TV broadcaster and we get all of that, or a network broadcaster like ABC, ESPN, T&T, whatever, we get one 30th of that.
Lex Fridman
(00:56:58)
What role does the TV play in turning a team around?
Mark Cuban
(00:57:01)
It keeps fans connected. Look, when the team is doing really well, it’s easy. There’s more viewers, everybody’s more excited. When you’re not, there’s still going to be hardcore fans and general fans and kids that like to watch the game.
Lex Fridman
(00:57:15)
What about the personality of the people in the stands? Clearly, you’re part of the legend of the team because you’re literally there going wild.
Mark Cuban
(00:57:26)
Yeah, screaming the whole game. It’s funny, the way I am here is how I am 24 hours a day, unless there’s a Mavs game. For whatever reason, that’s where I let out all that stress and frustration. The fan’s the sixth man. We need fans to bring that energy and amplifying that as much as we can is important.

DEI debate

Lex Fridman
(00:57:49)
You’ve had a beef recently on Twitter on X with Elon over DEI programs. What to you is the essence of the disagreement there?
Mark Cuban
(00:57:59)
I wouldn’t call it a beef.
Lex Fridman
(00:58:01)
It’s a bit of fun?
Mark Cuban
(00:58:03)
Yeah, it’s fun for me. It’s his platform, he gets to run it any way he please. He pays for that right, and so I have total respect for whatever choices he makes even if I don’t agree with them, but because it’s his platform, people are less likely to disagree with him, particularly somebody who’s got a platform themselves.

(00:58:33)
When we start talking about DEI and it’s just de facto racist and this stuff, stuff that I just think is nonsense. I have no problem sharing my opinion. If he disagrees, okay, he can disagree, I don’t care. It’s fun to engage, but he doesn’t really engage, he just comes back with snark comments, which is his choice.
Lex Fridman
(00:58:58)
In your comments, you do a bit of snark too.
Mark Cuban
(00:59:01)
Yeah, a little bit.
Lex Fridman
(00:59:04)
You’re pretty, let’s say, rigorous in your response. There is some exchange of ideas, there’s some snark, there’s some fun, all that kind of stuff. You do voice the opinion that represents a large number of people and that’s great. That’s really beautiful. But just lingering on the topic, what to you is the good and the bad of DEI programs?
Mark Cuban
(00:59:28)
Really simple, D is diversity. That means you just expand your pool of potential applicants to people who you might not otherwise have access to. To look where you didn’t look before, to look where other people aren’t looking for quality employees. That’s simple.

(00:59:47)
The E in equity means when you hire somebody, you put them in a position to succeed. The I, inclusion, is when you’ve hired somebody and they may not be typical, if you will, you show them some love and give them the support they need so they can do their job as best they can and feel comfortable and confident going to work. It’s that simple.
Lex Fridman
(01:00:08)
That’s a beautiful ideal. When it’s implemented, implemented poorly perhaps, or in a way that doesn’t reach that ideal, do you see, maybe when it’s quota based, do you see that it can result in essentially racism towards Asian people and white people, for example?
Mark Cuban
(01:00:27)
There’s a lot to unpack there. First, you can’t do quotas. There are illegal unless you’re… And I’m not the lawyer on this subject, but unless you’re trying to repair something that’s happened in the past, some discrimination that’s happened in the past. It’s not quota-based, and I think that’s really just a straw man that people put out there.

(01:00:50)
Now, does that mean that there aren’t DEI programs that are implemented poorly? Of course not. Everything that’s implemented poorly in one company to another. Sales, marketing, human resources, you can pick any element of business and find companies that implement it poorly, but that’s the beauty of capitalism in a free market or mostly free market where if you make these choices and they are the wrong choices, you’re going to lose your best people. You’re not going to be able to hire the best people. You’re not going to execute on your business plans in the way that we discussed, regardless of the size of the company.

(01:01:28)
It also, I think, depends on where you’re having the discussion. When I’m in a different group of people off of X, the feedback’s completely different. To your question of reverse racism, yes, it happens because people are people. There’s no human being that is 100% objective. It’s also, there’s very, very, very few jobs that can be determined on a purely quantitative basis.

(01:02:07)
How do you tell one janitor from the other, who’s the best? How do you tell one salesperson that you’re hiring versus another you’re hiring because they haven’t sold your product yet, so you don’t know? We talked earlier about firing people because you made mistakes.

(01:02:21)
Yes, there’s discrimination against any group, white, Asian, black, green, orange, whatever it may be, but I truly believe that there’s far more discrimination against people of color than there are people who are white. I think it’s become a straw man, that reverse discrimination because of DEI is prevalent or near ubiquitous.
Lex Fridman
(01:02:48)
Much of American history was defined by intense radical racism and sexism. But in the recent years, there was a correction and I think the nature of the criticism is that there’s an overcorrection where DEI programs at universities and companies, when they’re not doing their job well, are often hard to criticize because when you criticize them within the company or so on, they have a very strong immune system. If you criticize a DEI program, it seems like it’s very easy to be called racist, and if you’re called racist or sexist, that’s a sticky label.
Mark Cuban
(01:03:33)
You’re getting into the culture of organizations and leadership within organizations, and accepting any type of criticism, put aside DEI. When I criticized the referees in the MVA, I got fined. That was their option. I knew what I was getting into, not that they’re completely analogous, but it’s cause and effect.

(01:03:56)
If I’m in a major company and I’m publicly criticizing or even internally criticizing a sales plan or a product, our product sucks. There was a Google engineer that got fired for saying Google had AGI, and nobody believed they did and they knew that created problems. It wasn’t DEI related, but it was saying something publicly that was, in the CEO’s eyes, to the detriment of the company.

(01:04:23)
I think those are all analogous. If you’re trying to accomplish something within an organization because you think there’s a problem and there’s people speaking out saying look, we’re getting it wrong, I think I’m a victim of all this, and the company… Then leadership has got to make a decision. Do they agree or not agree? Are they right or are they wrong? Is it positive or negative to the company? And you decide.

(01:04:50)
This conversation that conservatives are being silenced in organizations now, I haven’t seen it. The other side of your question, I think unpacking it, is what’s driving all this? Put aside universities for one. In corporate America, when I talk to people in corporate America about DEI, they always start talking about ideology.

(01:05:25)
I’ve talked to Bill Ackman, who you’ve had on, and when I asked him, “Bill, you run your own companies. Who’s telling you what to do?” “They are.” “Who’s they? “It’s the universities, the people who have this ideology of DEI.” I’m like, “Did they force you? Did they coerce you? Did you lose control of your company?” “No, it’s not me. It happens to other people.” Then I talk to other people, same thing.

(01:05:52)
I try not to go one-on-one in Twitter conversations on this topic. In the DMs, I’ll talk to people who are really conservative and I’ll ask the same question and be like, “Who’s forcing you to do this?” “It’s the ideology that’s everywhere. Didn’t see the Harvard thing in University of North Carolina.” I’m like I’ve never had anybody try to push me in this direction to do this. This was my business choice. I’m not trying to tell other people you have to do this. You make your own business choices. Where companies have made their business choices, and if somebody doesn’t feel confident or comfortable with it, they may feel they’re being discriminated against.

(01:06:30)
There was something I just read in the Wall Street Journal, where the Wall Street Journal had a company interview 2 million people, and the difficulty in firing and how people, when they were fired, 40% of the people who were fired felt like it was wrong, that they were doing a great job. Then it talked about the HR person going through the hassle of trying to explain to this person through performance reviews that they weren’t doing a good job, yet the people still thought they were doing a great job, despite being told they’re not doing a good job.

(01:07:04)
I see that as being an analogous to all this huffing and puffing about reverse discrimination and conservatives not being able to speak up because if 40% of people who have been fired don’t believe they should have been fired, there’s a disconnect somewhere in how you think you’re doing your job. If you just feel like, I can’t speak up because of it, because of you’re white, and that doesn’t comport well with DEI programs, a lot of things are going to happen.

(01:07:39)
Either that’s going to come up in your performance review, HR or your boss is going to have to address it in some way, it’s going to get to HR at some level, and then decisions are going to have to be made. You can’t just fire somebody because they spoke up. Somebody’s going to have to communicate with you. I think a lot of… I just don’t trust the supposed volume-
Mark Cuban
(01:08:00)
I just don’t trust the supposed volume that people say it’s happening at, versus everything I’ve read and seen. And when I talk to people in positions of authority within organizations and ask them who’s forcing them to implement these ideologies, nobody says… Nobody says yes, that there is somebody. But on Twitter, it sounds great.
Lex Fridman
(01:08:22)
It is true for Conservatives, but in general, you can sell books, you can get likes when you talk about this ideology, and there’s a degree to which, “Is this woke ideology in the room with us right now?” Meaning it’s this boogie monster that we’re all…
Mark Cuban
(01:08:38)
Or is it a positive?
Lex Fridman
(01:08:40)
I guess another way to say that is they don’t highlight a lot of the positive progress that’s been made in the positive version of the word “woke” in terms of correcting some of the wrongs done in the past.

(01:08:51)
But that said, if you ask people in Russia, a lot of them will say, “There’s no propaganda here. There’s no censorship.” And all that kind of stuff. It’s sometimes hard to see when you’re in it that this stuff is happening. It does seem difficult to criticize DEI programs, not horribly difficult, terrible, they are this monster that infiltrates everything, but it is difficult and it requires great leadership.
Mark Cuban
(01:09:20)
So where have you criticized it and been condemned? Academic or…
Lex Fridman
(01:09:24)
Academic.
Mark Cuban
(01:09:25)
Okay. Academic, let’s… Two different worlds.
Lex Fridman
(01:09:28)
Companies and academic, yeah.
Mark Cuban
(01:09:29)
Two different worlds.
Lex Fridman
(01:09:30)
But I also think it’s not… I really want to point my finger at the failure of leadership of basically firing mediocre people. People that are not good at their job. The problem to me is DEI’s defense mechanism, like immune system, is so strong that the shitty people don’t get fired. So the vision, the ideal of DEI is a beautiful ideal. It’s just like…
Mark Cuban
(01:10:01)
Well, maybe it’s because I’m an entrepreneur, when I see an ideal that you try to implement it, and support it, and get to that point. But universities and companies are night and day different.

(01:10:12)
I can see an argument for the ideology in a university. I can see, you look at the amount of money spent on it. And so while the goal is right, the way they implement it in universities, the way they implement most things in universities, is wrong. There’s a reason why tuition has gone up a multitude, or a multiple, of inflation. They’re not well run organizations across the board. So I’m not going to argue with that at all. So when you’ve seen me argue with DEI, I haven’t waded into DEI in universities at all.
Lex Fridman
(01:10:46)
That’s mostly focused on companies.
Mark Cuban
(01:10:48)
A hundred percent because that’s where I exist. But at the same time, I read Christopher Rufo’s book where he talks about the genealogy of wokeism and ideology, but then he gets to the point, and I hope I’m remembering this right, where he says that the response to it is decentralized activism, if you will, that’s not the word he used, to try to counter that DEI.

(01:11:12)
And that seems, to me, to be counter to the whole Conservative movement right now, other than school boards where it’s centralized, and the Republican candidate is all about centralized power in him. And to me, that’s just a conflict in a lot of the underpinning of the whole DEI conversation, that a lot of which goes through Christopher Rufo right now.
Lex Fridman
(01:11:41)
Let’s continue on a theme of fun exchanges on the internet.

(01:11:45)
So Elon tweeted, “The fundamental axiomatic flaw of the woke mind virus is that the weaker party’s always right (in even if they want you to die).”

(01:11:57)
And you responded, at length, but the beginning is, “The fundamental axiomatic flaw of the anti-woke mind is that it allows groups with historical power to play the victim by taking anecdotal examples and packaging them into conjured conspiratorial ideology that threatens to upend the power structures they have been depending on.”
Mark Cuban
(01:12:22)
Says it all, right?
Lex Fridman
(01:12:24)
Well, there’s a tension there. So, yes, but both can be abused. Both positions of power can be abused. There’s power in DEI, and there’s shitty people that can crave power, and hold onto power, and sacrifice their ideals.
Mark Cuban
(01:12:45)
Okay. Put aside universities.
Lex Fridman
(01:12:47)
Dammit.
Mark Cuban
(01:12:48)
Because I’m not going to argue that universities implement DEI well, and I’m not going to tell you that they need to be spending twenty-some million dollars a year on DEI positions. To me, that’s insane. Do I look at the Harvard and North Carolina decision and say it was a great decision? No, because I think having a diverse student body helps make for kids who are better prepared for the real world. But I’m not running a university, so it’s not my choice. Maybe at some point in the future I will, but not now. And in terms of terms the corporate side of it, who’s telling anybody what to do?
Lex Fridman
(01:13:37)
Well, maybe you can give me some help.
Mark Cuban
(01:13:41)
Sure. I’m here to help you, Lex.
Lex Fridman
(01:13:44)
There’s an example in the AI world of a system called Gemini 15, Google…
Mark Cuban
(01:13:52)
Everybody was black or whatever, people of color.
Lex Fridman
(01:13:54)
George Washington was Black, Nazis were Black.
Mark Cuban
(01:13:57)
So why is it when that came out, it was a big uproar, but when somebody… So, who was it? One of the people who were trying to fuck with me, I forget which one.
Lex Fridman
(01:14:09)
There’s so many people.
Mark Cuban
(01:14:10)
But he pointed out to Elon that Grok, Elon’s AI, was woke when it answered certain questions, and other people have pointed out other things to Elon about Grok, however it’s pronounced, that was leaning left or woke. And Elon’s response was, “Oh, it’ll change. It’s a mistake. We’re fixing it.” When it happens to Gemini and Google, it’s the end of the world. “Look how woke they are. And it’s a reflection of all their culture.” Now Google comes out and says it’s a mistake. And then they doxxed the guy who’s the Product Manager or whatever of AI, of that product who… And then they go back and look at his old tweets, and show that he’s very left leaning and very DEI supportive, and that’s the end of the world.
Lex Fridman
(01:15:01)
It’s not the end of the world, but Google’s so much dependent on trust, that trust a Google search has as objective as possible, channel into the world of information. And so that brand is really important for us.
Mark Cuban
(01:15:19)
So you’re giving them too much power. And maybe I’m not recognizing the power. So I’ll tell you a personal experience.

(01:15:29)
Up until a month ago, maybe if you put in keto gummies, Shark Tank keto gummies, into Google, it would show up with scammy ads, scam ad, after scam. And I would get emails, up until a month ago, from elderly people asking me why the gummies weren’t working, and why the companies were charging all this money on a month-by-month basis when they tried to cancel. And they said it was the number one deal on Shark Tank of all time and all Shark… It was a mistake.
Lex Fridman
(01:16:07)
Well, there’s fraud, there’s mistakes, but the mistakes…
Mark Cuban
(01:16:12)
No, but why didn’t Google fix it? This just didn’t happen once over one week, over two weeks. And because it was hard to fix. As it turns out, I was working with them to try to find a fix, and we would both look at the same page. And, if you were inside of Google within the Google. com domain, it would show one page. If you were outside of Google, it would show another. And it took us looking at it at the same time for anybody to realize it. Meaning that there’s a lot of technology problems that are hard to fix.
Lex Fridman
(01:16:41)
They’re super complex, and we could talk about it forever with social media. The criticism towards Google, towards other companies when they’re based in Silicon Valley, there could be an ideological drift into an ideological bubble out of which the technology is created, and they could be blind to the obvious bias that comes inherent to…
Mark Cuban
(01:17:00)
But they’ve got billions of customers who are not going to… So what you’re saying is, the free market stops with artificial intelligence, that people don’t pay attention and respond, that Google doesn’t listen to the responses, that people inside of Google will ignore their own best financial interest, and even their own best personal interest, because they know they’re going to get doxxed now by Elon and others, and so I just don’t see that.

(01:17:27)
And Elon’s not allowed to make those same mistakes, but… Elon’s allowed to make those mistakes, but Google isn’t?
Lex Fridman
(01:17:33)
Oh, no. Elon is 100% should be criticized for the ridiculousness of overstatements that he makes about various products. He’s having a bit of fun, like you are also, and I also believe in the free market, but it’s not always efficient. There’s a delay.
Mark Cuban
(01:17:50)
Just takes time. It’s fine.
Lex Fridman
(01:17:52)
So which is why Elon is important when calling out, I think overstating the criticism of Gemini, but Elon and others are just…
Mark Cuban
(01:17:58)
Gemini wasn’t even a fully available public product yet.
Lex Fridman
(01:18:03)
It’s still a bias that resonates with people.
Mark Cuban
(01:18:06)
That’s the way neural networks work though. That’s why there’ll be millions of models, because weights and biases, putting together a neural network.
Lex Fridman
(01:18:16)
No. So the Black George Washington is a correction on top of the foundation model to keep it “safe.” One of the big criticisms of all of the models, frankly, probably even Grok, a little bit less so, is they’re trying to be really conservative in the sense of trying to be careful not to say crazy shit, because we don’t know how the thing…
Mark Cuban
(01:18:44)
It’s brand new and we know what happens, and they do it on the front end with prompts, and they try to do it on the back end with the neural networks that are underneath them, and it doesn’t always work. And that’s why there’s going to be millions of models rather than just four foundational models, or five, that everybody uses.
Lex Fridman
(01:19:02)
Well, I guess the main criticism is you want to have some transparency of all the teams that are involved and that this kind of… To the degree there’s a left-leaning ideology within the companies, it doesn’t affect the product.
Mark Cuban
(01:19:16)
But that’s the beauty of…
Lex Fridman
(01:19:17)
The free market.
Mark Cuban
(01:19:19)
That’s where the market corrects it. And not only from the outside, because everybody is going to test it. When YouTube first came out, or not first came out, after Google bought them, there used to be different commands you could give it. There were prompt commands that you could give it, and you could find all the nasty porn that got loaded before they kicked it off. And it was just the nastiest shit ever. And even now to this day, if there’s some horrific tragic event, somebody’s loading it up.

(01:19:53)
Now, I know that’s not direct to your point of internal influence to the output, but people on the outside are going to check for that now. It’s almost like the new bug contest to try to find bugs in software. And then on the inside, if it’s all left-leaning, and all you have is left-leaning employees, because most Conservatives won’t want to work there, then again that’s self-correcting as well.
Lex Fridman
(01:20:16)
That’s the hope, but it can self-correct in different kinds of ways. You can have a different company that competes and becomes more conservative. My worry is that it becomes two different worlds where there’s like…
Mark Cuban
(01:20:27)
Already is.
Lex Fridman
(01:20:29)
No, come on, don’t give up.
Mark Cuban
(01:20:31)
Oh, I’m not giving up. So where does this go? Is the question. What happens next? And going back, I’ve been in so many PC revolutions, or evolutions, where porn was the big issue. Now we don’t even talk about porn being an issue, even though every post on Twitter now has “link in bio” for a porn post, we don’t even think that’s a negative anymore. That’s just an accepted thing. And now it is become very… Where your politics on Twitter. But again, as you extend that and things grow, as AI models become more efficient, and trainable for a lot less money, or even locally on a PC or a phone, we’re all going to have our own models, and there’s going to be millions, and millions, and millions of models and not just foundational models.

(01:21:29)
Now maybe they’re built some on open source, maybe it’ll be copy-pasta where you can just cut and paste and create your own model and train it yourself. Maybe it’ll be mixture of experts where maybe it’ll be a Meta front end. Like we’re working on a project where we take 30 different AI models and there’s just a Meta search engine where it searches all of them, and you can compare all the outputs and see what you think is the best, like a search engine. Because you might get, “Is DEI good?” “Is the Covid vaccine good?” You’re going to get a variety of outputs and you have to make that decision yourself.

(01:22:09)
That’s what I think is going to happen with AI as well, because I think brands… There’s no way the Mayo Clinic and the Harvard Medical School are just going to contribute all their IP to ChatGPT, or Gemini, or whatever. It’s going to have to be licensed or they’re going to do their own.
Lex Fridman
(01:22:27)
That’s a very hopeful message. But that said, human history doesn’t always autocorrect really quickly, self-correct, really quickly. Sometimes you get into these very painful things. You have Stalin, you have Hitler, you can get to places very quickly where the ideological thing just builds on itself.
Mark Cuban
(01:22:50)
Twitter is not real world. There’s 20…
Lex Fridman
(01:22:54)
Twitter is not real world. That’s true, yes, but you could still have a nation captured by an ideology.

(01:23:00)
I think America has been really good at having these two blue and red, always at tension with each other, dividing the populace, and in the process of doing that, figuring stuff out. Almost like playing devil’s advocate, but in real life.
Mark Cuban
(01:23:18)
And that’s fair. And that’s right. As opposed to Pravda telling you everything you want to know and everybody believing it, because there’s control of everything.

(01:23:26)
And so going back to what you said earlier, people in Russia don’t think invading Ukraine… A lot of them see it as a positive. I’m sure you have relatives and friends who think it’s the best thing that ever happened, because they believe in Putin.
Lex Fridman
(01:23:42)
They’re denazifying Ukraine, they’re removing the Nazis from Ukraine.
Mark Cuban
(01:23:46)
Because exactly what Putin said. And we don’t have one uniform media outlet. That’s the difference. Even though people like to talk about mainstream media as being the source of a lot of the friction, there is no such thing as mainstream media anymore. Fox is the biggest cable news channel with the biggest audience, and they call everybody else mainstream media. It’s insane the things that we accept from our sources of information. To me, that’s the bigger problem. The bigger problem is trying to figure out what is free speech and what is the line of tolerance for free speech? And at what point does hateful free speech crowd out other people? Putin’s the master of that. You’re going to jail or you’re going to be dead if you disagree. Now, God help us if we ever get to that point here, but the person who controls the algorithm controls the world. And if you are committed to one specific platform as your singular source of information or affiliated platforms, then whoever controls the algorithm or the programming there controls you, in a lot of respects. And I think that’s where our biggest problem has been. We get people attached to specific platforms, and apps, and media outlets, and they become part of that team, and they identify as such, and either you’re part of the team or you’re not. And that to me is the fundamental problem.

(01:25:18)
It’s not woke ideology, because I never felt any pressure to make the choices that I’ve chosen, including diversity, equity, and inclusion, and I’ve never forced anybody or told anybody to do it. I just said, “Here’s my experiences.” Whenever I’ve talked to people who talk about the woke ideology, no one ever got forced. If you look at Dylan McDermott, if there was a way to gauge the number of impressions that she had, and where they sourced from, I’d be willing bet any amount of money that 90% plus of the impressions and discussions of Dylan McDermott were on, right-leaning media.
Lex Fridman
(01:25:57)
Several things, actually, let’s even go there. You gotten a bit of a beef with, again, fun, with Jordan Peterson about this.
Mark Cuban
(01:26:03)
That’s the guy whose name I couldn’t think of.
Lex Fridman
(01:26:05)
So the topic there was the gender transition and Dylan Mulvaney. Can you explain the nature of the beef? It’s an interesting claim you’re making and most of the people who are concerned about this are Conservatives.
Mark Cuban
(01:26:21)
The point is that if you looked at impressions when you run an ad, you’re curious about impressions and who sees them, but if you look at the impressions related to Dylan McDermott, like I just said, I bet 90% or more were in conservative media, and I don’t know how many followers she had, 250,000 followers or whatever when the Bud Light ad came out. And if it weren’t for Kid Rock shooting at Dylan McDermott Bud Light cans, she’d be long forgotten.
Lex Fridman
(01:26:53)
But most of the people that care about censorship are going to be free speech advocates. So most people that care about Putin suppressing speech, or anybody else suppressing speech, are going to be libertarian. So there’s probably an explanation of that.

(01:27:08)
The criticism that Jordan Peterson could provide, I guess he said that Dylan Mulvaney popularized the kind of mutilation in his view, that can affect… There’s a very serious life-changing process that a person goes through, and when that’s applied to a child, it can do a lot of harm to a person if…
Mark Cuban
(01:27:32)
But my point still holds, I don’t know how many kids were following, and you could look at the followers list, it’s not like it’s hidden. Back then, if they had 250,000 followers and now we’re on TikTok where he might get 50 some thousand views or likes, I don’t know how many views, but likes, I’ve never seen any evidence that Dylan McDermott influenced people to transition their gender. As he transitioned to her, it was documented on TikTok over the course of a year. And again, when you go back and look at the views on those TikToks, it wasn’t enormous.
Lex Fridman
(01:28:14)
But the trends start. It could be… What worries people is for young kids there to be a trend of, especially when you feel like an outsider, you feel not yourself, less than yourself, all this kind of stuff that kids feel like, that if it’s because popular enough, if it’s a trend, you would gender transition without meaning to do that. It is just part of a trend. That’s the worry they have.
Mark Cuban
(01:28:44)
That is a big stretch, to think that all the things that have to happen before you transition gender, and I’m not saying kids might find it cool, or in the moment expedient, if you will, to dress up as the other gender. Great, who cares? But to go through the actual physical transition, I don’t remember what the numbers were that I read, but I do remember that the latest numbers that came out in terms of transitioning were from JAMA, which is a medical association, that said from 2021 to 2022, the numbers went down.

(01:29:27)
But the bigger point is there are no numbers for 2023 when, post-Dylan McDermott. So there’s no way to know if the assertion is true, even marginally true. Now, you can easily suggest it, but you can say that about any social media influencer. Kids are dying because… It’s just like when people accused Trump of potentially influencing people to inject bleach into their veins. That’s a big old leap to say that because Trump says it, that people are going to start injecting, and then they find somebody who actually did. And it’s like, “Oh, it must be true. This is a trend now.” I’m just not buying it that there aren’t enough roadblocks in the way.

(01:30:18)
Now, I’m not saying it never happens, and for me, to me, you should have to wait until you’re 18 to actually have any surgery to transition. And if your parents approve it earlier, then you can have a conversation with your doctor. But you’re suggesting that everybody in that process to transition, a minor is corrupt. That the doctor, the sociologist, the psychologist, all the people involved, the hospital where the surgery is happening, the insurance company that’s paying for it, they all have been corrupted by this trend. I just don’t see that.
Lex Fridman
(01:30:55)
Well, not corrupted, but people, it’s back to the DEI thing, there could be pressure, and we are…
Mark Cuban
(01:31:02)
Pressure to operate? So think about all the people who have to be complicit to do an operation.
Lex Fridman
(01:31:07)
It’s not complicit like evil complicit. It’s more…
Mark Cuban
(01:31:10)
No, it is evil complicit. Because somebody…. In hospitals right now, they won’t perform abortions because of state law. In Alabama, they stopped IVF treatment immediately after that ruling by that judge, the Q Anon judge, to think that they’re not going to pay attention to the possible consequences of being the hospital that does transgender, that gives doctors operating rights there and not be aware of the risks associated with it and double check, to me, that’s just insane. They’re risking their entire business, and livelihood, and personal relationships for not checking that this fourteen-year-old boy who wants to be a girl or vice versa, is there waiting for surgery. I just don’t see that.
Lex Fridman
(01:31:58)
In America, yes. But if we look at humans in general, and Jordan Peterson, I think unjustly, incorrectly brought up Auschwitz.
Mark Cuban
(01:32:09)
That was ridiculous.
Lex Fridman
(01:32:10)
But if we look… To me, World War II is a very interesting time. It does reveal a lot about human nature, and that humans are able to commit atrocities without really speaking up. The point I want to make is that when you’re in this situation where everybody is around you is committing an atrocity, you can be the good German…
Mark Cuban
(01:32:37)
But…
Lex Fridman
(01:32:38)
Human nature is such that you can do [inaudible 01:32:41] things.
Mark Cuban
(01:32:40)
But that is in a time of war.
Lex Fridman
(01:32:45)
But it’s still human nature. It’s interesting to remember that.
Mark Cuban
(01:32:48)
It’s a time of war when you feel like there’s nationalism, patriotism, everything that comes up. Russia, the moms of the kids sent to Ukraine who didn’t come back, in Russia, feels certainly different than the everyday Russian who’s just taking whatever information that’s available from a unified controlled media.
Lex Fridman
(01:33:09)
But we should remember human nature. It’s interesting.
Mark Cuban
(01:33:12)
I’m not dismissing human nature at all, but there’s a difference. I think that human nature, self-preservation influences those decisions. There’s nothing about self-preservation involved in DEI, wokeness, transgenderism to compare it to Auschwitz. That’s insane.
Lex Fridman
(01:33:29)
Well, that comparison is almost always, probably always, is insane comparison between anything and the Holocaust.
Mark Cuban
(01:33:37)
I agree.
Lex Fridman
(01:33:37)
I think there’s a name for that rule, but once you bring up Hitler, the conversation ends.

Trump vs Biden

Mark Cuban
(01:33:42)
Goes away.
Lex Fridman
(01:33:43)
I do appreciate you bringing up Trump and bleach as an example. So continuing on fun exchanges between you and Elon, you said, “If they were having Biden’s last wake and it was him versus Trump, and he was being given last rights, I would still vote for Biden.” To which Elon replied, caricaturing you, “If Biden were a flesh-eating zombie with five seconds to live, where, upon being reelected, Earth would plunge into a 1000 years of darkness, I would still vote for him.”

(01:34:16)
That’s basically quoting you, but in a caricature. And you responded, “While, I have your attention. Wanted to say thank you! Your consultants at Tesla followed up about using Cost Plus drugs…” About which we’ll talk about. “… To save the company money. Truly appreciated.” And in parentheses, “(My limit is 300 years of darkness.)” Very well done, Mark.

(01:34:41)
What’s your intuition, if we just stick on Biden and Trump for a sec, what’s your intuition why Biden would make a better president than Trump?
Mark Cuban
(01:34:48)
Look at the basics. If you look at the people he’s hired, there hasn’t been any turnover in his cabinet at all. If you look at the people he’s hired over the course of his career, or while he was Vice President in particular, there’s nobody who’s turned on him, and came out, and written books, and made public statements about how he’s bad for the country.

(01:35:12)
Now, compare that to Trump, the people closest to him, almost all of them turned, unless there’s a financial relationship involved, and to me that says everything.
Lex Fridman
(01:35:26)
The dynamics of the team is important to you when you [inaudible 01:35:28].
Mark Cuban
(01:35:27)
If you’re going to be the most powerful person in the world, you better know how to manage and lead. And that’s not to say Biden hasn’t made a lot of mistakes. Immigration, the border, is a horrific mistake, and hopefully he recognizes that. And I don’t like the fact that he doesn’t admit his mistakes and just say, “Okay, I got to fix it.” Or, “I made a mistake in Afghanistan.” Whatever it may be. The position of Commander in Chief and President, you’re going to make mistakes.

(01:35:59)
Then I look at the other guy, never admits a mistake, and the list is long.

Immigration

Lex Fridman
(01:36:04)
What do you think about the immigration situation? A lot of Conservatives are using that… The theory is that the reason it’s happening is because they would be able to illegally vote.
Mark Cuban
(01:36:19)
That’s insane.
Lex Fridman
(01:36:20)
For Biden.
Mark Cuban
(01:36:21)
You can’t be an illegal immigrant and vote.

(01:36:24)
And now, in a lot of states, because of the Conservatives, they’ve passed laws saying you have to show identification. When I voted in Texas, you had to show state identification. They can’t vote. You can’t register as an illegal alien, that I’m aware of, to vote.
Lex Fridman
(01:36:39)
But of course, that story, and it really worries me, enables, or serves as a catalyst for questioning the legitimacy of an election.
Mark Cuban
(01:36:49)
I remember going to the debate with Trump in 2016, and he was debating Clinton, and one of the things he said was, “We don’t even know if this election will be legitimate if I lose.” This was in 2016 before he was even elected, and that was where he was going. That’s just what he does. He’s never admitted a mistake. The guy’s failed a zillion times. Most people say, “Okay, I learned from them.” I read a book about Roy Cohn, and Roy Cohn was the ultimate deny, deny, deny, and that was one of Trump’s mentors. And you can see almost everything that Roy Cohn ever did in the same way that Donald Trump approaches things.
Lex Fridman
(01:37:27)
But, given how drastic the immigration situation is, that story becomes more believable.
Mark Cuban
(01:37:33)
Of course it does, but the facts are still the facts. And in red states, they’re going to be checking every ID, they’re going to be making sure that’s not the case, and you can also make the argument, “Well, in the blue state, it doesn’t matter.” In the swing states, they’re still going to be checking because they know Trump is going to sue the out of them when he loses. And so again, that’s where people will take those self-preservation steps to keep their job and do the right thing.

(01:38:01)
There’s still enough people who believe in this country and how amazing it is to do the right thing. And a lot of the premise of what some Conservatives are saying and doing, the underpinning of it is that their fellow citizens will not do anything, not some things, anything, that serves the best interest of this country. And to me, that’s just wrong. That is just misleading and wrong.
Lex Fridman
(01:38:27)
I just worry about… I don’t care about Trump or Biden, I care about democracy. I just worry. I worry about the viral nature of the idea of this illegal immigrants.
Mark Cuban
(01:38:39)
It’s very functional. Either they get across… There’s a thousand different ways, an unlimited number of ways to enter the United States of America undetected, and the south border where it’s the easiest and the worst, and Biden needs to take steps to reduce that.

(01:38:55)
Remember, when Biden was vice president and Obama was president, they called Obama, the Deporter in Chief. He had no problem deporting people. And I think if I had to guess, and this is just a guess, that when they looked at the initial statistics for immigration when Biden took over, they thought there was room for more immigrants, not because they would vote, but you can make a fiscal argument that, in a world where the birth rate is flat to declining, we need immigrants. And immigrants typically don’t have a higher crime rate or anything than indigenous American citizens. Indigenous isn’t the right word, but American citizens. And so they made a calculated mistake. They made a decision that was wrong, and now they have to fix it or it’s going to hurt them severely.

(01:39:48)
But I don’t buy what Elon’s pushing that the whole reason is they are voters and will become voters.
Lex Fridman
(01:39:57)
And we should say the obvious, you’re a descendant of immigrants.
Mark Cuban
(01:40:02)
For sure.
Lex Fridman
(01:40:02)
And the immigrants is what makes this country great, in many parts, the diversity of this nation. And we should probably keep the people that are already been in this country for a while and are killing it, like PhD students and all this. It’s like [inaudible 01:40:17].
Mark Cuban
(01:40:16)
That’s not what Donald Trump wants, though. He wants to ship them all out. There’s just a whole lot of hyperbole when it comes to talking to all, about talking about all of these things we’re talking about. When it’s right versus left, my team versus your team, my tribe versus your tribe, the only way to stand out is hyperbole.

(01:40:34)
The hard part, and why I like this conversation, is how do you distinguish hyperbole versus reality? And I get where you’re going, Lex, where it’s like what… The smallest spark sometimes can cause people to change, and then that spark becomes bigger, and then it becomes more widespread, and then all of a sudden your country has changed. It’s not what you thought it was. I get that completely. And yes, you always have to be on top of that to make sure, but a lot of that comes from lack of leadership, and lack of trust, because there’s nobody who’s saying, “All right, Republicans, that’s all hyperbole and you’re wrong for that. Democrats, you fucked up on immigration. You up in Afghanistan. Here’s where you made these mistakes. Own it.”

(01:41:23)
There’s nobody who says, “We’re not going to just bring in Republicans if the Republicans win.” And there’s nobody who says, “We’re not going to just bring in Democrats. We’re going to bring in a mix. We’re going to try to get balance on the Supreme Court.” There’s no leadership that’s doing it. That’s the fundamental problem. It’s not about the ideology of woke. No leadership.
Lex Fridman
(01:41:45)
Leadership, whatever systems we’ve created, it’s really frustrating that if you don’t like Trump, it’s really is Trump derangement syndrome. He’s definitely Hitler, and if you don’t like Biden, he’s senile, lizard person…
Lex Fridman
(01:42:00)
Senile lizard person that-
Mark Cuban
(01:42:04)
Right, everybody gets labeled right because that works on social media. Look, if Elon changed the algorithm just by taking himself out of it, seriously, I’m not saying don’t post, right? Post all you want, but if you look at his followers, they’re almost all right-leaning. If you look at the people he engages with positively, they’re almost all right-leaning. And if you look at the people he engages with negatively, like me, I consider myself an independent, but I lean left on the DEI topic. That influences the algorithm. And so you see what you see because of what he says.
Lex Fridman
(01:42:44)
Yeah, well, I mean for sure. But there could be a lot of influential people on Twitter that influence the algorithm and all that kind of stuff. But I do feel it’s not even about ideology where you lean, it’s about the algorithm, not prioritizing drama. The attention grabbing thing or the lower lizard version of that where people just want the drama. They want to tear you down.
Mark Cuban
(01:43:13)
Right. When I last read through all the stuff on their algorithm, right, maybe it’s changed, whoever has the biggest account and gets engagement on that account influences what people see the most.
Lex Fridman
(01:43:26)
Yeah, I mean, that’s interesting. I don’t know if that’s, to the degree that’s true, they’ve pretty-
Mark Cuban
(01:43:31)
I’m sure it’s still the case.
Lex Fridman
(01:43:32)
…Pretty rigorous description of the way the algorithm works. It’s actually kind of fascinating. There’s a clustering of people based on interests-
Mark Cuban
(01:43:41)
But I think they called the nearest neighbor approach, and I think that’s what they do. And so whoever has the biggest account, has the most neighbors who in turn have their neighbors who in turn have their neighbors, and that’s how they discern what comes next.
Lex Fridman
(01:43:53)
But there’s a clustering still. So if you don’t give a shit about Elon, you’re not-
Mark Cuban
(01:43:57)
And you’re not following him, yeah, you’re not following-
Lex Fridman
(01:43:59)
You’re not going to have an influence. It’s not going to have an influence.
Mark Cuban
(01:44:02)
When you get a break, just create a burner account on Twitter and see who they recommend to you.
Lex Fridman
(01:44:07)
Elon.
Mark Cuban
(01:44:08)
And not just Elon, I mean the people that Elon likes. And I’m saying that’s not Elon saying add this person, add this person and suggest this person, this person, and this person. I’m saying that’s what the algorithm is.
Lex Fridman
(01:44:19)
Yeah. There should be transparency around that. For sure. That’s the-
Mark Cuban
(01:44:22)
And there is. There is. And that’s the whole point, right? He knows there’s transparency and he knows the impact. That’s why when I say take yourself out of the algorithm, don’t include his account, that changes I think the output of the algorithm.
Lex Fridman
(01:44:34)
Well, when he wasn’t owning Twitter, he was one of the biggest accounts, if not the biggest account already.
Mark Cuban
(01:44:39)
He wasn’t. But still. even the Kim Kardashian accounts, whatever, it wasn’t open source to Elon’s credit. It is now. So I couldn’t see it to know. Right? So I didn’t get the sense one way or the other of one element being dominant over the other. But obviously conservatives felt that left leaning was more dominant back then.
Lex Fridman
(01:45:00)
Yeah, I would love to see numbers on all of this.
Mark Cuban
(01:45:02)
Yeah, you and me both.
Lex Fridman
(01:45:04)
DEI, everything like this. Sometimes anecdotal data really frustrates me. It frustrates me primarily because of how sexy it is. People just love-
Mark Cuban
(01:45:05)
That’s a great way to describe it.
Lex Fridman
(01:45:15)
Love a story, and I’m like, Goddamn it, this is not science. This is-
Mark Cuban
(01:45:20)
It’s not even common sense.
Lex Fridman
(01:45:22)
Well, no, I think anecdotal stories often have a wisdom in them.
Mark Cuban
(01:45:27)
No doubt, right? There’s something to be gained from seeing them.
Lex Fridman
(01:45:30)
There’s a signal there, but how representative is that signal of the broader thing?
Mark Cuban
(01:45:35)
There’s a whole lot more noise than signal more often than not.

Drugs and Big Pharma

Lex Fridman
(01:45:37)
All right, so as I mentioned, Cost Plus Drugs, there’s so many questions I can ask here, but what’s the big question? What’s broken about our healthcare system?
Mark Cuban
(01:45:47)
There’s no transparency. And when the lack of transparency leads to lack of trust and when you can’t trust the healthcare system other than maybe your doctor, that’s a broken system.
Lex Fridman
(01:45:58)
So what aspect of this system does Cost Plus Drugs is trying to solve?
Mark Cuban
(01:46:04)
So the thing we’re trying to solve for is trust. And the way we feel we get there is through complete transparency. So when you go to costplusdrugs.com and you put in the name of the medication, if it’s one of the 2,500 and growing that we carry, we will first show you our costs, what we actually pay for it, then we’ll show you our 15% markup. Then we’ll show the pharmacy fill fee and shipping, and that’s your total price. And that alone, that transparency alone, is completely revolutionizing how drugs are priced in America today. And it’s led to research being done comparing our pricing to CMS and ours being cheaper than even the government is negotiating, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. And so just that transparency alone has had an impact and saved millions of people hundreds of millions of dollars or more.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:59)
And maybe it results in more transparency in other parts of the system too, seeing the business of it. What do the so-called middlemen companies. So the PBMs-
Mark Cuban
(01:47:09)
Correct. The pharmacy benefit managers.
Lex Fridman
(01:47:10)
Thank you. CVS Caremark, Cigna’s Express Scripts, and United Health’s Optum Rx, they control majority of the market. What do they do wrong?
Mark Cuban
(01:47:22)
They put profits over everything. And they know in an industry that’s completely opaque, they can pretty much do what they want and nobody gets to see what they’re doing in detail. And so the first thing when you sign a contract with one of those big PBMs, it says you can’t disclose any of this. And the fact that you can’t be disclosed means they could tell Lex’s company that they’re getting a great price and they’re only being charged X. And they can tell Mark’s company, oh, you’re getting a great price and we’re charging Mark X plus, right? But Mark doesn’t know any better because there’s no way to know.
Lex Fridman
(01:48:03)
The markup is not transparent.
Mark Cuban
(01:48:05)
The cost isn’t transparent, the markup isn’t transparent. And there’s different things, like I was just talking to a company in a presentation a couple days ago, and they took the step to leave the big three PBMs to go to a rebate free PBM that was smaller. And what they said led to the decision, they had a contract with the PBM for these things called rebates, where depending on the volume of medications you buy, they’ll kick back to you a percentage of them. And as it turns out, when they compared what was contracted for to what they actually got, they were getting underpaid every single year. They just don’t care. They’ll take products. There’s a drug called Humira, and it is the number one revenue drug in the country. And there’s also a biosimilar, multiple biosimilars, but one we carry called Yusimry. And, Humira, the pre-rebate price is about $8,000 per month. After rebates, depending on the size of the company, it’ll be anywhere from three to $6,000 a month. You can go to get your doctor to prescribe that biosimilar Yusimry and you pay $594. But those big three PBMs won’t allow their clients to get Yusimry because they don’t get a rebate on Yusimry. So they’d rather keep a drug on their formulary, even though their patients, their customers would save a lot of money, they’d rather keep a drug and exclude another because they’ll make a lot more money.
Lex Fridman
(01:49:39)
So the CVS Caremark spokesperson, I think responded to you, Phil Blando, with the usual language that so deeply exhausts me, but I was wondering if there’s any truth to it. Employers, unions, health plans and government programs work with CVS Caremark precisely because we deliver for them. Lower drug costs, better health outcomes, and broad pharmacy access through our true cost, cost vantage and choice formulary initiatives, we are the leading agent of change, innovation, and transparency in the market.
Mark Cuban
(01:50:18)
That’s a whole lot of nothing.
Lex Fridman
(01:50:20)
So they are not transparent?
Mark Cuban
(01:50:23)
No. Call them up. You go to Cost Plus Drugs, we’ll give you our price list of all 2,500 plus drugs.
Lex Fridman
(01:50:29)
The actual cost?
Mark Cuban
(01:50:30)
The actual cost, and what we sell it for because it’s just a plus 15%. Call up any of the big three companies and ask them for the same thing. They’re going to laugh at you. It’s so bad, in fact, if you do business with them right now and you just ask for your claims data, meaning how many people use Humira that we’re paying, what are we paying for it? They won’t even give it to you unless you really, really scream and yell at them and then they’ll charge you and take six months to get it. So when we moved away from them, we wanted to get what our claims data was to understand what we were going to be facing. They wouldn’t give it to us until six months later, I forget the exact month. And then they charge us for it as well, our own data.
Lex Fridman
(01:51:08)
On the CEO front, you’ve said that CEOs don’t understand healthcare coverage and it’s costing them big. What’s the connection between Cost Plus Drugs and companies?
Mark Cuban
(01:51:20)
I can speak for my own companies, and this applies to all companies, bigger companies that’s self-insured, because we self-insure. When we started Cost Plus, I finally said, okay, it’s time for me to understand how I’m paying for my healthcare for my employees and their families. And the first thing I looked at was a lot of these companies use employee benefits consultants, and turns out I was paying $30 per employee per month, which was millions of dollars a year, and they were just sending us to the companies that paid them the biggest commissions. I’m like, how fucking dumb am I? So I’m like, okay, we’re cutting that. And then I looked at our medication, our prescription deal that goes through the PBMs that we were using and that the consultant connected us with. And I took a list of, this was early on in Cost Plus Drugs, list of the generic drugs that we sold that cost more than $30 that the Mavericks also had purchased.

(01:52:20)
We were able to get that claims data, and it turns out we spent $169,000 with that PBM, one of the big three PBMs, and it would’ve cost us buying from Cost Plus Drugs $19,000. And that’s just a simple example. Then I looked at the insurance side of things. We self-insure, so there weren’t premiums per se, but we were getting charged $17.15 cents per employee per month just to use the network that they put together for us, providers, hospitals or whatever. And I’m like, all right, are there companies that won’t charge us to put together these networks? Turns out there’s a lot of them. And those insurance companies and those PBMs are also responsible for determining what claims, what to authorize and what to deny. So for a drug, it may be, all right, this is an expensive drug, but before they’ll say they’ll pay for the drug that your doctor wants to prescribe for you, you have to try these three other drugs in what’s called step up therapy to see if these other cheaper drugs work or they’re not even necessarily cheaper, they may be being pushed because they’re getting a higher rebate.

(01:53:31)
And so I’m like, that’s insane. I want my employees to get the medication that the doctors say is best. And so I didn’t realize those were the intricacies of where my healthcare dollars went. There’s not a single CEO who does because that’s not a core competency that they need. And the CFOs, that’s not their core competency and the HR people, they contribute and they understand it some because they’re dealing with the claims, but they spend most of their prescription drug related time or healthcare related times trying to get pre-authorizations approved. So your kid breaks their arm or you get sick and you go to the doctor and before the doctor will do a surgery or do whatever, they have to go to the insurance company and get preauthorized. And then they always say no. And then you have to go back and somebody has to argue for you. And that just eats up employee time because I’m sick or my kid’s sick and you’re wasting my time. Eats up HR time.

(01:54:29)
The CEOs don’t know any of this, right? So what I’m saying is one, the smartest thing to do is to get a healthcare CEO at every company with over let’s say 500 employees that focuses on all these things. You’d save a shitload of money. And two, healthcare is your second largest line item expense after payroll. And in some companies it’s hundreds, billions of dollars and you don’t understand it and you’re letting these guys rip you off? And it’s because these big CEOs don’t understand it and are getting ripped off that the industry is the way it is because that allows the opacity to continue.
Lex Fridman
(01:55:07)
That’s fascinating. So that most companies outsource, offload the expertise on the healthcare side when they really should be internally, there should be an expert that [inaudible 01:55:20]-
Mark Cuban
(01:55:19)
Yes, because it’s the wellness of your employees and their families and-
Lex Fridman
(01:55:22)
It costs a lot of money.
Mark Cuban
(01:55:24)
Yeah, but if your employees aren’t healthy or if they’re worried about their kids and what is more worrisome and detrimental to the performance of a company? A DEI program or having to go to HR and scream and yell and explain, and your doctor wasting their time doing the same thing to get authorization for a surgery or a medication? It’s insane.
Lex Fridman
(01:55:49)
What made you decide to step into this cartel-like situation where so much is opaque?
Mark Cuban
(01:55:56)
So I got a cold email from a Dr. Alex Oshmyancy, who’s my co-founder. He’s a radiologist by trade in a physicist and a smart mother fucker. And he had a pharmacy that he wanted to create a compounding pharmacy that would manufacture generic drugs that were in short supply because it happens all the time that things aren’t available. I’m like, you’re thinking too small. We should do something on a much bigger scale. And then it was right around the time they were sending the pharmacy bro, Martin Shkreli, to jail. And so I was reading up on that and he increased the price of this drug, Daraprim, I think it was like 7500% or increased a low cost drug to $7,500, one of those.

(01:56:34)
And I’m like, well, if he can just jack up the price to this drug and charge more and get away with it, this has to be an incredibly inefficient market. And so the question is why is he able to do it? And it was immediately apparent that it was a lack of transparency. And so can we start a company that is fully transparent with our costs, our markup and our selling price, and see if it works? And so we went for it and it took off immediately. I mean, you read a press release from a company saying they were creating a cost advantage program basically pretending to replicate us? We haven’t been in business two years. How insane is that?
Lex Fridman
(01:57:13)
Did you get a lot of pressure? I mean, I’m sure they’re very good at playing games, so cartel-type situations they protect. It feels like healthcare is very difficult to get in there.
Mark Cuban
(01:57:23)
Yeah, it does. And the whole industry is an arbitrage, but we don’t work inside the system. We work outside the system. And so we don’t work with those biggest companies, the biggest companies with the most dominant control. It’s very insulated and very controlled, like you said, we work outside them, we won’t work with them. And so because of that, we don’t have access to every medication because they’ve told a lot of the big brand manufacturers that if they work with us, they’ll take them off their formularies or change the rebate structure so that they won’t be prescribed as much.
Lex Fridman
(01:57:52)
That’s dark.
Mark Cuban
(01:57:53)
Yeah, it is dark. But we’ll get past that, right? Because there’s a downstream impact of all this in the rebates and the greediness of those big three PBMs. When you go to a local pharmacy here in Austin, and let’s just say you have a friend here that is on Medicare or Medicare Advantage, and they go to a local pharmacy and they get a drug that costs $600. Well, in the insurance company, that $600, the pharmacy first buys that drug for probably that price, minus 5%. So $570. Then there’s probably a copay by the patient, and that’s probably $20. So now the net investment that the pharmacy, the local pharmacy has for that brand medication is $550. Where it gets really fucked up is those big three PBMs, they’re not reimbursing them $550 or more. They’re reimbursing them $500 or less. And literally those community pharmacies are eating that loss, and as a result, they’re going out of business left and right.

(01:59:01)
And the most insane part of it is yes, with corporate employer insurance, that happens, but it happens more with Medicare Part D and Medicare Advantage. It happens all the time with those, almost with every script. So the government is complicit in these community pharmacies going out of business. So how does that connect to Cost Plus Drugs and what we’re doing and the big brands? The big brands know that if all these community pharmacies are going, tens of thousands of them are going to go out of business because of the way this pricing is, they’re going to lose a connection between their brand medications and grandma and grandpa and Aunt Sally and all that business is going to get transferred to the big companies and they’re going to have even less leverage. So they’re working with us to come up with programs that are very supportive of independent pharmacies, and that’s going to allow us to break the cartel because it’s in their best interest not to allow them to be so vertically integrated that they destroy the entire community and independent pharmacy industry.
Lex Fridman
(02:00:03)
Is there other aspects of the healthcare industry that could use this kind of transparency and revolutionizing?
Mark Cuban
(02:00:10)
Yes. Yeah. So what we’re going to do with our own healthcare, we’re not going to be in the business of selling healthcare or anything like that or operate, but the things we do for my companies, we’re only going to do deals with providers, healthcare providers, that allow us to be completely transparent. So that whatever contracts we do, we’re going to post them all. Whatever pricing we get, we’re going to post them all so that every company who’s our size or even bigger will have a template that they can work on, which will take it away from the big three insurance companies and the big three PBMs. Because now without that transparency, they have to use consultants who are getting paid by those big three, those big companies and aren’t giving them the best response. And so now that transparency will overcome that.
Lex Fridman
(02:00:56)
And you’re using your, how should I say it, celebrity? Your name to push this forward?
Mark Cuban
(02:01:02)
Yeah, that’s why it’s the only company I’ve ever put my name on.
Lex Fridman
(02:01:04)
It’s weird that people aren’t getting into this space. Public people, there’s not a big, you look at tech, there’s these CEOs are open and public and public and they’re pushing the company and they’re selling everything, and it’s all transparent. But you don’t see that in healthcare.
Mark Cuban
(02:01:25)
No, because it’s a big business. And most people, if I was 25 trying to start a company, I’d work in the system. If I can build it up big enough, they would just buy me and I’d make money and buy a sports team, but I don’t need that money now.

AI

Lex Fridman
(02:01:38)
Let me ask you about AI. You got a little bit of an argument about open source. I think you stepped in between Vinod Khosla and Mark Andreessen. You think AI should be open sourced?
Mark Cuban
(02:01:50)
Yeah, for sure.
Lex Fridman
(02:01:51)
So all that discussion we’ve been having about Google and so on, one of the-
Mark Cuban
(02:01:55)
Well, they’re two different things, meaning that Meta is doing open source. That’s a good choice for them. I think that’s a smart choice, but it’s just a business decision for everybody else. I don’t think it should be forced.
Lex Fridman
(02:02:07)
Forced, yes. And even Google’s open sourcing some of the models and-
Mark Cuban
(02:02:12)
Because they’re all… That’s a very incestuous industry where the people all work together at some level. They read the same papers, they go to the same conferences. It’s like the early days of streaming and the internet where people used the same technology everywhere, and now they just try different things. And you get one smarter or a couple of smart people in one company like Anthropic, and they do things a little bit better and efficient, model efficiency gets better. So it’s just a business choice, but I don’t think it should be forced, but I think it’s a smart business decision.
Lex Fridman
(02:02:42)
Open sourcing is a smart business decision.
Mark Cuban
(02:02:44)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(02:02:44)
It’s a tricky one. I mean, Google is a pioneer in that with TensorFlow in the AI space. That’s a tricky decision to give-
Mark Cuban
(02:02:51)
It really, really is, right?
Lex Fridman
(02:02:52)
To give away the code.
Mark Cuban
(02:02:53)
Go back to historically there was digital computing, which was a dominant player, and they thought, and IBM to a certain extent thought that they wouldn’t be subject to a problem with the PC industry. And then all of a sudden, with their mainframes and everything, they had captive software they wouldn’t use off the shelf software. So for a digital equipment mainframe or an IBM mainframe, you needed software that was written for it. There was nothing off the shelf. And when the PC industry came along, it was the exact opposite. There was MS-DOS and then Windows, things that were off the shelf that every PC could use. And that changed how people thought about software. And I think the same thing will happen here where it’s going to be as models become more efficient and easier and less expensive to train, I think there’ll be more reasons to open source.
Lex Fridman
(02:03:49)
Yeah, that’s the hope. It creates more competition and a lot of different diversity of approaches in how they’re implemented deployed, what kind of products they create, all of that. Vinod compared to the danger of that to the Manhattan Project.
Mark Cuban
(02:04:04)
Yeah, I’m not buying that at all.
Lex Fridman
(02:04:06)
You don’t see the parallels between nuclear weapons and AI?
Mark Cuban
(02:04:08)
No, no. I think, I’m not an AI fatalist at all, right? I’m an AI optimist, but it’s not to say that there isn’t a lot of scary shit that can happen with it.
Lex Fridman
(02:04:21)
Yeah.
Mark Cuban
(02:04:21)
Militarily. Like I said earlier, I’m a big believer that there’s going to be millions and tens of millions of models and people will take their expertise and either get hired for it and contribute or create their own models and license. So that you see now with this thing called mixture of experts where you connect things and people can take their expertise and we’ll be able to take that expertise and retain it in a way that they want to retain it. So I don’t think there’s going to be one medical database. I told this to people at a couple of big companies that were doing healthcare initiatives. Branding is so important in the healthcare space for hospitals, the Mayo Clinics, the MD Andersons, they’re huge brands. And I don’t think they’re just going to give up their expertise to some main singular model and say, okay, whatever expertise we have is available to you in Gemini or Chat GPT or so-and-so’s version of Meta’s open source. There’s just, that would be business suicide. And so I think you’re going to see each of them have their own models and update them as they go and license them.
Lex Fridman
(02:05:40)
Yeah, and make money from the expertise.
Mark Cuban
(02:05:43)
You have to. You have to.

Advice for young people

Lex Fridman
(02:05:45)
You don’t give away messages. You have, yeah, any expertise evolves and growth and all that kind of stuff, and you want to own that growth. What advice would you give to young people? You have an exceptionally successful career. You came from little, made a lot. What advice would you give them?
Mark Cuban
(02:05:59)
Love your life. Find the things that you can enjoy. Be curious. You don’t have to have all the answers. When you’re 12, 15, I get emails from 13, 15-year-old kids, right?
Lex Fridman
(02:06:11)
What do I do?
Mark Cuban
(02:06:12)
What do I do? I feel like I’m being held back. I’m like a 15, you feel like you’re being held back? But just be curious because you don’t have to have the answers. You don’t have to know what you’re going to be when you grow up. I’m a hardcore believer that everybody has something that they’re really, really, really good at. That could be world-class, great. Every single human being on this planet. And the hard part is just finding what that is. And in some places having resources to enable it. But be curious so you can find out what it is. I took one technology class in college, Fortran programming, and I cheated on it, right?

(02:06:52)
I mean, it wasn’t until I got a job at Mellon Bank and I started learning how to program in this thing called Ramus, this scripting computing language that I realized, oh, this is interesting to me and I like it. And that’s what got me a job selling software and going on from there. You just don’t know what that’s going to be until you go out and experience different things. So for anybody young out there listening, enjoy your life. Find things to smile about, be curious, read, watch, expose yourself to as many different ideas as you can because something’s going to click at some point. You may be 15, you may be 25, you may be 55, but it can happen.
Lex Fridman
(02:07:33)
One thing to mention is sometimes it’s difficult or your parents, people around you might not be conducive or might not be of help in finding the thing you’re good at. In fact, in my own life, the society was such that, I don’t know if they’ve helped much at the thing I was good at. I’m still not sure what that is, but I think-
Mark Cuban
(02:07:56)
The interviewing done pretty well for you.
Lex Fridman
(02:07:58)
Well, it’s not even, there was a thing where I saw the beauty in people. Like I, very intensely. So you can call that empathy, all that kind of stuff.
Mark Cuban
(02:08:10)
Someone called it wokeness.
Lex Fridman
(02:08:13)
Super woke, I guess you could say, just super woke, that’s me. But in the education system I came up in, it was a very hard mathematics, science and so on, and it didn’t notice that whatever that was in me, but you have to keep the flame going. You have to try to find your way and see what that’s useful. And others around you might not always notice it. So it might take time. So it could be lonely. You can really have to find the strength to believe in yourself.
Mark Cuban
(02:08:44)
Oh, for sure. And I’ll tell you one quick story. 1992, I went to Moscow State University to teach kids how to start businesses. I had sold Micro Solutions and I wanted to travel, and I took Russian in high school. My Ruski is like [inaudible 02:09:04]-
Lex Fridman
(02:09:07)
Good enough to remember that.
Mark Cuban
(02:09:09)
Yeah, right? Yeah. But it was interesting to me, and I bring it up because they didn’t know what the word profit meant. But at the same time, I would go around and meet people, and it was as entrepreneurial right after the Soviet Union fell, entrepreneurship went through the roof. A lot of it was mafia driven, but it was, people found that spark because I think that is natural. And so you just never know when and how and when the circumstances will come together for you to be able to take advantage.
Lex Fridman
(02:09:48)
That spark is really important to comment on is in Russia and Ukraine, I think the system kind of suppresses that spark somehow. As you said you saw the natural entrepreneurship, but there’s not the entrepreneurial spirit once you grow up in both of the nations I mentioned. There is [inaudible 02:10:08]-
Mark Cuban
(02:10:08)
No, I believe it, right?
Lex Fridman
(02:10:09)
But there’s something about the system that-
Mark Cuban
(02:10:10)
Without question.
Lex Fridman
(02:10:12)
Be reasonable, be [inaudible 02:10:14]-
Mark Cuban
(02:10:14)
There would have been no reason for me to go over to do what I was doing if it was otherwise.
Lex Fridman
(02:10:18)
But, that’s the thing that really can help a country flourish.
Mark Cuban
(02:10:22)
It’s going to be interesting with Ukraine if they’re able to survive this, because as horrific as it is, as you saw across Europe after World War II, the rebuilding creates opportunities.
Lex Fridman
(02:10:35)
Rebuilding creates opportunities, but first, the war has to end. How that ends-
Mark Cuban
(02:10:39)
I don’t know either,
Lex Fridman
(02:10:40)
Is a really complex path. What gives you hope about the future of humanity?
Mark Cuban
(02:10:46)
Just looking in my kids’ eyes, just talking to them and seeing their spirit, their friends’ spirit. And obviously we’re blessed as can be, right? And it’s not the same for every kid, but I get emails that I don’t respond to all of them, but from 13, 14, 15-year-old kids around the world, because Shark Tank’s shown everywhere asking me business questions. And it’s just like they took the time. They were that curious and that interested. And I see it when I talk to schools, when I go to different groups, that spark in kids’ eyes that there’s something bigger and better and exciting out there. And that’s not to say there’s not fear. Yeah, climate and any other number of things, but that’s the beauty of kids. And I think Gen Z really embodies that. And to me, that’s just really exciting.
Lex Fridman
(02:11:43)
They dream. They dream big, they see the opportunity for making the world better. It’s cool. It’s cool to see young people in their eyes, that dream. And I could be the one to do it too, which is super powerful-
Mark Cuban
(02:11:56)
It’s funny because when I go talk to elementary school kids, one of the things I do, I said, okay, let’s look around. You see that light there one day, that light didn’t exist. Then somebody had the idea, then somebody created a product out of it, and now your school bought that. You see that chair? Chairs didn’t always look like that. Somebody had that idea. Why not you? So when you walk out and, what I make them do, ask yourself, why not me? Why can’t I be the one to change the world?
Lex Fridman
(02:12:24)
Thank you for that beautiful, hopeful message and thank you for talking today, Mark. You’re fun to follow. I’m a big fan of yours, but you’re also an important person in this world. I really appreciate everything you do.
Mark Cuban
(02:12:36)
Well, I appreciate it. Thanks for saying that, Lex, and keep on doing what you’re doing. This was great. I really enjoyed this.
Lex Fridman
(02:12:41)
Thanks for listening to this conversation with Mark Cuban. To support this podcast. Please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, let me leave you with some words from Oscar Wilde. Imagination was given to man to compensate him for what he’s not, and a sense of humor was provided to console him for what he is. Thank you for listening and hope to see you next time.

Transcript for Dana White: UFC, Fighting, Khabib, Conor, Tyson, Ali, Rogan, Elon & Zuck | Lex Fridman Podcast #421

This is a transcript of Lex Fridman Podcast #421 with Dana White.
The timestamps in the transcript are clickable links that take you directly to that point in
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Table of Contents

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Click link to jump approximately to that part in the transcript:

Introduction

Dana White
(00:00:00)
Khabib beat Conor. Putin was on FaceTime before he even made it to the locker room. Trump sitting president, ex-president, watching all the fights calling, wants to talk about the fights. Valentina Shevchenko, every time she goes home, she meets with the president of the country. The list goes on and on and on. Elon Musk, Zuckerberg, I mean, the list goes on and on and on. The most powerful people in the world are all obsessed with fighting.
Lex Fridman
(00:00:30)
The following is a conversation with Dana White, the president of the UFC, a mixed martial arts organization that revolutionized the art, the sport, and the business of fighting. And Dana is truly the mastermind behind the UFC. This is the Lex Fridman Podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, dear friends, here’s Dana White. Do you remember when you saw your first fight?

Mike Tyson and early days of fighting

Dana White
(00:01:00)
I think so. I remember being at my grandmother’s house and I think it was an Ali fight, and all my uncles were going crazy during the fight, and there was just this buzz and this energy in the house that I liked at a very young age, and I’m pretty sure that was my first fight.
Lex Fridman
(00:01:17)
Ali was something special.
Dana White
(00:01:18)
Yeah, incredible. I mean, when you look around, not just here in the office, but at my house, Ali and Tyson are everywhere.
Lex Fridman
(00:01:27)
Would you put Ali as the greatest of all time boxing?
Dana White
(00:01:30)
Well, I would put Ali as the greatest of all time human being. I mean, it’s easy as a fight fan to focus on him as a fighter, but when you focus on him as a human and you think about what he meant at that time and place, the things he said, the poems he came up with, just the overall brilliance of Muhammad Ali. The guts to have the strength mentally, physically, and emotionally to go against the grain at the time that he did it. It was a very dangerous time for him to be who he was. Yet, because of how smart he was and because of his personality and how if you sat down with him, you could be the biggest racist on the planet, it’s hard to get in the room with Ali and not like Ali.
Lex Fridman
(00:02:26)
Yeah, he’s all love, humor, all of it.
Dana White
(00:02:29)
100%
Lex Fridman
(00:02:30)
And had the guts in the ring and the guts to take a stand.
Dana White
(00:02:34)
100%
Lex Fridman
(00:02:34)
When it was hard.
Dana White
(00:02:35)
He might be one of the all time greatest humans. Just an impactful, powerful human being who happened to be a great boxer.
Lex Fridman
(00:02:47)
And sometimes the right moment meets the great human being. That’s important.
Dana White
(00:02:52)
I agree with you. And he was the right guy in the right place at the right time. And he’s also a guy who used his platform for all the right things.
Lex Fridman
(00:03:03)
So that might’ve been your first fight, but when did you fall in love with fighting? The art of it? The science of it?
Dana White
(00:03:09)
Yeah, I would say I really fell in love with it, so I was a senior. It was 1987 and Hagler Leonard happened, and I watched that fight and I taped it and I watched that fight like a million times. I was a huge, huge Hagler fan, and I like Sugar Ray Leonard too, but I was a huge Hagler fan. And I just remember I watched that fight a million times because I was pissed off and I felt like Haggler got robbed in the fight. But that was really what made me start to love the sport of boxing.
Lex Fridman
(00:03:49)
The battle of it.
Dana White
(00:03:50)
Yeah. I was 17 and then after that, USA’s Tuesday Night Fights came out on television. It was on every Tuesday night. Religiously, never missed Tuesday Night Fights. I was there, watched all those fights. And a lot of the things you see in the UFC, not necessarily just the production, but I would say the feel and the style and all those things are all things that I loved about boxing and things that I hated about boxing, right down to the commentary.
Lex Fridman
(00:04:31)
You loved and hated?
Dana White
(00:04:34)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:04:35)
Hated the commentary.
Dana White
(00:04:36)
Certain things that I loved about boxing, I incorporated into the UFC. Things that I hated about boxing, I made sure that the UFC stayed far away from. I can’t stand Larry Merchant. Can’t stand Larry Merchant. And I used to watch HBO Boxing and mute the commentary so that I didn’t have to listen to them. Lampley too. You would spend this money for the pay-per-view to watch these people that you idolized to hear these idiots rip them apart while the fight was happening.
Lex Fridman
(00:05:09)
Oh they were criticizing them?
Dana White
(00:05:09)
100%.
Lex Fridman
(00:05:10)
Or taking them apart. I’ve gotten used to the UFC, so I’m trying to remember looking back.
Dana White
(00:05:17)
It was bad.
Lex Fridman
(00:05:17)
It was bad?
Dana White
(00:05:18)
It was really bad.
Lex Fridman
(00:05:20)
But the sweet science, the art of boxing was beautiful still.
Dana White
(00:05:24)
100%.
Lex Fridman
(00:05:25)
Like the stories you told.
Dana White
(00:05:25)
I want to do this with you right now. Hey, will you bring your cell phone over here and pull up YouTube? I want to do this for you so that you can understand this and understand where I was coming from.
Lex Fridman
(00:05:36)
For the commentary?
Dana White
(00:05:37)
Yeah, at this point in time.
Lex Fridman
(00:05:39)
I have all good memories. You’re going to ruin it for me.
Dana White
(00:05:41)
Yeah, no, there are nothing but great memories about boxing, but the presentation and a lot of the things, but how fucking weird is it that I even cared about this shit at that point in my life and that time in my life? What impact could I possibly have on it? So think about Tyson and how much everybody loved Tyson at the time, and listen to this entrance.
Speaker 1
(00:06:04)
…Of the former undisputed heavyweight champion. And here he comes, Mike Tyson, as he heads toward the same ring he made his disgraceful exit in June of ’97.
Lex Fridman
(00:06:12)
Wow.
Speaker 1
(00:06:14)
…But proud.
Dana White
(00:06:15)
One of the baddest motherfucking walk-ins of all time, by the way.
Lex Fridman
(00:06:15)
Look at that.
Dana White
(00:06:19)
So what this guy should be doing, and this is one of the Albert brothers, shut the fuck up. Stay out of the way.
Lex Fridman
(00:06:26)
Yeah, maybe build them up.
Dana White
(00:06:30)
Or that. Or don’t say anything. Just let the fans… That’s why we watch it. That’s why we paid our money.
Lex Fridman
(00:06:38)
You don’t need to say anything.
Speaker 1
(00:06:40)
Scary imposing music. Will he be able to intimidate his opponent tonight? Will it even matter? I really thought that’d be more of an explosion by the crowd here, but very mixed. Even with a win tonight, no matter how one sided, he will still have his detractors following the two fights. With Holyfield, his stock plummeted, the pundits came down hard feeling they were duped, that his knockouts were over second rate fighters. Now the crowd erupts more as he gets into the ring, but it’s certainly nothing overwhelming.
Lex Fridman
(00:07:27)
What a dick. You’re right. I don’t remember that. You’re right.
Dana White
(00:07:32)
Imagine.
Lex Fridman
(00:07:33)
You’re right.
Dana White
(00:07:34)
Imagine you paid your money to watch Mike Tyson and you got to listen to these fucking jerkoffs talk shit about him the whole way to the… First of all, one of the coolest walk-ins ever. The first time anybody had heard DMX.
Lex Fridman
(00:07:48)
Yeah, that’s right.
Dana White
(00:07:51)
He’s walking into some scary imposing music. Will it even matter? It’s just all that stuff. I literally used to analyze every ounce of the production that would happen on television and at a time when I didn’t even know why I was doing it, but-
Lex Fridman
(00:08:10)
But it was in there somewhere. You were thinking about it.
Dana White
(00:08:12)
Right? So yeah, I hated HBO commentary. I thought at the time, HBO Boxing was obviously the gold standard, but when you really think about boxing at that time, their production, the only thing that changed over 30 years was HD. I mean, even the commentators were the same for 30 years. And then you had the time when Larry Merchant gets up and literally starts fighting with Floyd Mayweather during the interview and says, “If I was 30 years younger, I’d kick your ass right now.”
Lex Fridman
(00:08:43)
Oh yeah, I remember that.
Dana White
(00:08:44)
I mean, these are the interviews that we have to listen to when we’re trying to watch a boxing match?
Lex Fridman
(00:08:49)
The level of boxing was good.
Dana White
(00:08:51)
Think about a fighter. A fighter has been gone for months away from their families and away from everything, training, cutting weight, sparring. Then they go in and they have to fight that night? And then if you watch your fight back, you got to listen to this bullshit from these guys? And then you get interviewed and your interview is this? It’s just…
Lex Fridman
(00:09:13)
And it’s not just about the pay-per-view money. It’s about these are legends of humanity.
Dana White
(00:09:18)
100%.
Lex Fridman
(00:09:18)
We should celebrate the highest form of accomplishment.
Dana White
(00:09:21)
100%.
Lex Fridman
(00:09:22)
Because these are Mike Tyson.
Dana White
(00:09:23)
So you know who goes in there and interviews fighters? Joe Rogan, who has trained and done everything and has the utmost respect for the sport and the athletes. Or you got Daniel Cormier who was a former world champion himself and has actually been through it, done it, knows. And those are the type of people that we put in the booth, people that are actually experienced in it, not these people who’ve never been in a fight in their fucking life.
Lex Fridman
(00:09:52)
But they’re also, both DC and Rogan are big kids. They love it.
Dana White
(00:09:52)
100%.
Lex Fridman
(00:09:56)
They really love it.
Dana White
(00:09:58)
Well, everybody does. I mean, it’s the difference between our commentary and what I feel their commentary was. We don’t hire paid talking heads. We hire people that have actually been in it, done it, love it, and are super passionate about the sport. And I would say that none of them that ever covered the sport back then were. I don’t know if that was Marv Albert or what Albert brother that was, but he sounded like he’s a fan of the sport or? Anyway, you got me on this, and once I get on this, I lose my mind.
Lex Fridman
(00:10:34)
Maybe we wouldn’t have a UFC if they didn’t fuck it up so bad for the Tyson walk-up.
Dana White
(00:10:39)
It would be different. You’re not wrong. You’re not wrong. It would be different. There’s no doubt about it. All those experiences growing up being a boxing fan help create what the UFC is today.
Lex Fridman
(00:10:49)
It’s interesting because humans have been fighting for millennia, and it seems like with the UFC, the rate of innovation is just insane. In these last three decades, it seems like we’ve discovered how to do unarmed combat faster and better than any time in human history.
Dana White
(00:11:09)
I agree with you 100%. The first UFC happened in 1993. Martial art versus martial art. And now over the last 30 years, martial arts has evolved faster than… And like you just said, combat sports, fighting, whatever you want to call it, martial arts, it has evolved so much in 30 years more than the last 300 years.

Jiu jitsu

Lex Fridman
(00:11:35)
What did you think when you saw UFC 1 with Hoist?
Dana White
(00:11:39)
I remember everybody talking that this fight was going to happen and there was going to be no rules and all this other stuff. And we’re like, “There’s no way. That’s bullshit.” And then we ended up at some guy’s house that night in Boston and watching it and it was happening and it was fun and it was exciting and everything else. And then I fell off after that. The first one I watched, but I was too big of a boxing fan. Plus once grappling started taking over, and by grappling meaning the wrestling and the jiu-jitsu guys had just laid there, I completely lost interest. It’s funny that I’m having this conversation with you right now because I was out last night with my friends and we were talking about, because one of my buddies who’s a host here in town, just did jiu-jitsu for the first time.
Lex Fridman
(00:12:25)
Nice.
Dana White
(00:12:25)
…Yesterday. And he was like-
Lex Fridman
(00:12:27)
Did he get his ass kicked?
Dana White
(00:12:28)
Yeah, yeah. But when you first go in, our first jiu-jitsu lesson, me, Lorenzo, and Frank was with John Lewis, and I remember thinking, “Holy shit, I can’t believe that I’m 28 years old and this is the first time I’m experiencing this, that another human being could do this to me on the ground.” It is such an eyeopening, mind blowing experience when you do it for the first time and then you become completely addicted to it. And we were training three, four days a week trying to kill each other, me and the Fertittas, and that’s how we fell in love with the sport. I think that first time that you do jiu-jitsu, it’s like the red pill and the blue pill in The Matrix. Do you want to believe that this is the world that you live in, or do you want to see what the real world looks like?
Lex Fridman
(00:13:22)
Just is a real red pill.
Dana White
(00:13:24)
It really is.
Lex Fridman
(00:13:25)
You realize, “Holy shit, all that shit talking I’ve been doing about me being a badass,” you realize you’re not. You get dominated by another human being, you realize, “No.”
Dana White
(00:13:35)
And I mean dominated. I mean completely treats you like you’re a little kid. And then we had the opportunity to roll with a lot of different guys at the time because of the whatever, and we don’t have a good relationship at all. But I’ll tell you this, Frank Shamrock came in one day and Frank Shamrock had me in side control. The pressure that this guy put on my chest made me tap. It felt like there was a car on my chest. And with zero effort from him, it was absolutely effortless. And when you train with somebody that’s at such a level when you’re not, it is the most humbling, mind blowing experience you can have, especially as a man, but as a human being.
Lex Fridman
(00:14:26)
Just for fun, do you remember what your go-to submission was?
Dana White
(00:14:30)
Yeah, so when we first started out and started doing it, I had a pretty good guillotine in the beginning. So I’d catch a lot of people in guillotines.
Lex Fridman
(00:14:37)
So you’re okay being on bottom? So the guard was pretty good?
Dana White
(00:14:40)
Yeah, I was okay with the bottom. I was comfortable there. But you know what I never liked? I never liked gi. We started fucking around with a gi in the beginning, that’s how we started. And then once I took the gi off, I felt like I had no submissions because I couldn’t grab onto anything. So after that, I went all no gi and I never wanted to wear a gi.
Lex Fridman
(00:15:01)
That’s fascinating because no gi has become big now and there’s a lot of interesting people. I got trained with Gordon Ryan, and the level there is just fascinating. It’s become the science and it looks like fighting now. It looks more like fighting as opposed to with the gi, sometimes it doesn’t quite look like fighting. And I feel like it’s transferable to actual MMA fighting, no gi stuff.
Dana White
(00:15:24)
Or street.
Lex Fridman
(00:15:25)
Street, yeah.
Dana White
(00:15:27)
I mean, if you start off in your first year you’re in a gi, man, you better hope guy’s got winter jackets on or something if something happens in the street because, I know all the jiu-jitsu fucking people are going to go crazy over this, but in my opinion, no gi is way better than gi.
Lex Fridman
(00:15:44)
That said, I also do judo. So in the street scenario, if you’re comfortable on the feet and you can clinch and you can throw, because most of us wear clothing, especially in Boston in the winter setting, so if you’re comfortable on the feet, you could still do well. The problem with jiu-jitsu is most people are not comfortable on the feet, the sports jiu-jitsu. Most people want to get to the ground as quickly as possible. So what’d you think of Hoist at that time in the early… Because it blew a lot of people’s minds that there’s more to this puzzle.
Dana White
(00:16:17)
100%, and the fact that you had these guys like Ken Shamrock that were jacked and you had all these wrestlers or the big massive guys that they had in the different weight classes, and this skinny little dude like Hoist was out there beating everybody. I mean, if you look at the way the Gracie’s played that, you couldn’t have had a better advertisement for Gracie Jiu-jitsu at the time.
Lex Fridman
(00:16:42)
But also for MMA, because there’s just a lot of surprising elements. A lot of people’s prediction was wrong. They didn’t think the skinny guy would win. And they’re like, “Oh shit, there’s more to this.”
Dana White
(00:16:56)
What’s the real beautiful thing about jiu-jitsu? It’s like when you talk about if you wanted to get your daughter into a martial art, “Should I put my daughter into karate or should I put her into this?” You put your daughter into jiu-jitsu 100% because it’s not about size or strength, it’s about technique. And you give your daughter a bunch of jiu-jitsu and a little bit of Muay Thai.
Lex Fridman
(00:17:19)
Yeah, she becomes dangerous.
Dana White
(00:17:21)
It’s like the perfect combo. Because you can put your son into anything. Your son can get into some… Boys are going to learn how to fight and they’re going to do whatever. But girls are different. And the other thing, I mean, this is the biggest selling point for jiu-jitsu for women. I mean, when a woman, no matter how big, how small can put a guy to sleep in three and a half seconds.

Origin of UFC

Lex Fridman
(00:17:39)
What’s the origin story of the UFC as it is today as you’ve created it and you and Lorenzo and Fertitta brothers built it?
Dana White
(00:17:48)
It started with John Lewis and seeing him. Frank and I were out one night at the Hard Rock and John Lewis was there and he’s like, “Oh, that’s that ultimate fighting guy.” And I was like, ” I know him.” And Frank’s like, “I’ve always wanted to learn ground fighting.” And I said, “Yeah, I’m interested in it too.” So we went over, we talked to John Lewis and we made an appointment to wrestle with him on Monday. And we told Lorenzo and Lorenzo came with us. And that was the beginning of the end. I mean, we started doing jiu-jitsu and started to meet a lot of the fighters.

(00:18:25)
At the time, there was a stigma attached to the sport that these guys were despicable, disgusting human beings, which was the furthest thing from the truth. These kids had all gone to college, had college degrees, most of them because they wrestled in college. And we started to meet some of them. We loved the different stories. You had Chuck Liddell who had this mohawk, looks like an ax murderer, but graduated from Cal Poly with honors in accounting. Then you had Matt Hughes who was this farm boy, literally lived on a farm. And so there were all these cool stories with all these good people that weren’t what people thought they were. And Lorenzo and I always felt like there’s something here. If this thing was done the right way, this could be big.

(00:19:15)
And what was crazy was I was in a contract negotiation with Bob Meyrowitz, the old owner of the UFC over Tito’s contract and Chuck Liddell. They didn’t even want Chuck Liddell in the UFC.I was trying to get Chuck in the UFC and they didn’t even want him. And we got into this contract dispute over Tito’s contract and Bob Meyrowitz said, “You know what? There is no more money, okay? I don’t even know if I’ll even be able to put on one more event.” And he flipped out. When we hung up the phone, I literally picked up the phone and called Lorenzo and I said, “Hey, I just got off the phone with Bob Meyrowitz, the owner of the UFC, I think they’re in trouble and I think we could buy it and I think we should. You should reach out to him.” So Lorenzo called Meyrowitz, and I don’t remember the timeline, but within the next two months, we ended up owning the UFC for $2 million bucks.
Lex Fridman
(00:20:07)
And you’ve said that you fought a lot of battles during that time.
Dana White
(00:20:11)
I mean, the early days of building this company and building the sport, it was the wild, wild west, man. It was crazy back then. I was literally at war every day with all different types of people. Plus traditionally, there’s bad people that are involved in fighting, man, there’s lots of bad people. And we had to sift our way through that for the first seven, eight years.
Lex Fridman
(00:20:36)
So in general, there’s corruption that people steal money. They’re thinking just about themselves, not the bigger business.
Dana White
(00:20:42)
Let me tell you about this. I mean, I want to say it was the Netherlands. I don’t remember exactly where. It could have been Amsterdam. I mean, MMA promoters were like car bombing each other, and then the other guy shot up the other guy’s house with machine guns and that’s the kind of shit that was going on. I’ll tell you the story. So Affliction, do you remember Affliction?
Lex Fridman
(00:21:04)
Yeah.
Dana White
(00:21:04)
So there was a guy, I want to say his name was Todd Beard or something like that. This guy used to text me every day when they started their MMA thing telling me he was going to kill me.
Lex Fridman
(00:21:05)
Legitimately, that’s what-
Dana White
(00:21:19)
Legitimately going to kill me. “You punk motherfucker. I’m going to fucking kill you. You don’t understand who I am and what I’ve done,” and this and that. I think this guy would get drunk or do drugs every night or whatever his deal was. This guy would call me, text me, and threaten my life every day. I used to go, “Fuck you,” and this and that.
Lex Fridman
(00:21:38)
You said, “Fuck you” to that guy?
Dana White
(00:21:39)
Oh yeah, man. Especially back then. But I mean, this is the type of shit that went on in the early days. This guy who was one of the owners of Affliction was not a good human, let’s put it that way.
Lex Fridman
(00:21:53)
What about the business side of it? It’s tough to make money in this business.
Dana White
(00:21:57)
Yeah, we weren’t making money, so trying to build this thing corrupt. The guys that worked for In Demand pay-per-view at the time were not good dudes and that thing was a fucking total monopoly. God, I wish I could remember his name right now. He used to run In Demand and he was a fucking bad guy. Then he comes over and starts running DirecTV, who we always had a great relationship with and he’s the reason we left DirecTV and said, “Fuck it. We’ll just go streaming then.” I don’t remember his name. I’d have to ask Lorenzo.
Lex Fridman
(00:22:38)
So in general, just in this whole space, there’s a lot of shady people?
Dana White
(00:22:42)
Everybody you deal with, you’re dealing with a lot of different forces and your hands are in a lot of different businesses. From the venue business to the merchandise business to the video game business, the pay-per-view business, the list goes on and on of all the different types of… The production…
Dana White
(00:23:00)
The list goes on and on of all the different types of the production business, of all these different… When I first started this, we had a production team that was the production team that was in it before we bought it. So there was this incident with Phil Baroni, where Phil Baroni, we did an interview with him, and Baroni flips out in the interview when they’re interviewing him and goes crazy. And I thought it was awesome. So I’m like, “We’re going to leave this in. We’re going to leave this interview in.” And the production guys were arguing with me. They’re like, “We can’t leave this in. This is totally unprofessional.” I said, “I don’t give a shit. This is what we’re doing. We’re going to do this and clip it like this and do it like that.”

(00:23:46)
We’re sitting in the venue that night, and I lean over to Lorenzo because the fight’s coming up. I go, wait till you see this interview with Baroni. They didn’t fucking do it. They didn’t do it. These guys were guys that were freelance guys that worked for Showtime at the time or something like that.
Lex Fridman
(00:24:03)
[inaudible 00:24:03].
Dana White
(00:24:03)
I literally got up from my fucking seat, went back there, kicked the fucking door of the truck open, and I said, “You motherfuckers. You ever do that again and I’ll fire every one of you.” Let’s just put it this way. I ended up firing every one of them anyway and going with a whole new crew. But these were the type of things that early on… There’s so much stuff. I mean, I could sit here for three days and walk you through all the stuff that used to go on back in those days. But it was the Wild Wild West, man.
Lex Fridman
(00:24:30)
But how’d you figure out, how’d you know how to deal with all this mess? First of all, to fire people, to fire people that aren’t doing a good job, all of that. How to be a leader, how to be a…
Dana White
(00:24:38)
Well, that’s the thing too.
Lex Fridman
(00:24:40)
… business leader.
Dana White
(00:24:41)
In the early days, there was two employees, me and another girl that worked for me, for my company before I started doing this, and then we slowly started to bring people on and you started to build a team. And then before you know it, we had 10 people. We used to do our Christmas parties back then too. There’d be eight to ten people at our Christmas party. But a lot of it is, you’ll learn as you go. You know what me and the Fertittas knew about production when we bought this UFC? I want to say we had two or three weeks to pull off an event. This is what we knew about production.
Lex Fridman
(00:25:15)
Really?
Dana White
(00:25:15)
Jack shit. So we had to dive in and we had to learn it. We had to figure it out, and we knew what we wanted. We knew what we liked. We knew what we were looking for. It’s just about building a good team, and I think that’s one of the things, if you want to talk about what I’ve accomplished in the last 25 years of my life, I’ve been really good at building teams.
Lex Fridman
(00:25:39)
Already have a vision of what you want the final thing to look like, and then build a team that can bring that to life.
Dana White
(00:25:43)
A hundred percent. Well, you have to have the vision. Without the vision, there’s nothing. So that’s sort of what I do. I am the vision part of this thing. We’re going to open a PI in Mexico, we’re going to do this, we’re going to do that. And then you build the team to come in and help execute.
Lex Fridman
(00:26:09)
A lot of people that do fighting promotions fail. You succeeded against the long odds. What’s the secret to your success, if you would, just looking back over the years?
Dana White
(00:26:20)
Well, the secret to success, I would say, first of all is passion and consistency. You have to love what you do. You have to get up every day. And I get here every day at 9:30 in the morning. When we sold in 2016, a lot of people in the company made a lot of money, and they all took off and they retired. Other than the Fertittas, I made the most money. I’m still here. I get here at 9:30 every morning. Last night I left here at 8:30. And I don’t know how late I’m going to be here tonight, but I love what I do. We get up every day and grind. I work just as hard now as I did back then.

(00:27:03)
The difference between back then and now is I don’t have to do a bunch of the that I don’t really like to do, like budget meetings. I don’t like budget meetings. I sat through enough fucking budget meetings and… Horrible budget meetings. Horrible. We’re losing millions of dollars a year, and I’m in these budget meetings. So I get to pick and choose what I do these days. Back in the early days, you don’t get to pick and choose. You have to be involved in everything.
Lex Fridman
(00:27:33)
So cost, you’re just looking at cost and stuff.
Dana White
(00:27:35)
A hundred percent. You literally go through line by line, every fucking number in the company and where did the money go and how can we save costs? How can we do this better? How can we… They are brutal, and there are multiple times a week and-
Lex Fridman
(00:27:53)
Probably helps to deeply appreciate how much this shit costs though.
Dana White
(00:27:56)
A hundred percent. Well, you have to know that. In the early days when you start your business, you have these people, who, when I hear them say, “You know what? I want to work for myself. I want to create my own schedule, and I want to do all the…” If that’s your thought process going into it, you’re never going to be successful. You have to pay attention to every single detail of the business early on. You’re involved in everything. There’s no days off, there’s no birthdays, there’s no Christmas, there’s none of that shit. I literally moved the birth of my second son for a Chuck Liddell fight. We had a Chuck Liddell fight coming up and they’re like, “Yeah, your son’s going to be born on this date.” And I’m like, “Yeah, that’s not going to work. We’re going to have to take him earlier. So they literally gave my wife a C-section and took my son early.
Lex Fridman
(00:28:44)
You were all in.
Dana White
(00:28:44)
All in. Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:28:46)
And the fascinating thing, like you said, you’ve said that you could care less about money. You’re doing this for the love of it.
Dana White
(00:28:55)
Yeah, I was doing this when I was broke, and I’m doing this now when I’m not broke. I’m doing this because I love it. And I feel like there’s so much more to do, and this is truly my passion in life. It’s like the Sphere. We’re doing the Sphere? Why? Why would I do the Sphere? It’s going to cost me a bunch of money. It’s really challenging. Most people think it can’t be pulled off, and you’re looking at weird angles, different things going on inside other than the fight and all this other stuff. But yeah, I’m doing it because it’s awesome and it’s challenging and it’s hard, and I think that if anybody can do it right, it’s us. So why not take that challenge?
Lex Fridman
(00:29:37)
It’s actually why I’m here. I’m going to the Sphere for the first time because I’m hanging out with Darren Aronofsky who put together the thing that’s in there now, and I can’t believe you’re thinking of… I don’t know how you’re going to solve that puzzle.
Dana White
(00:29:48)
There’s many puzzles to solve for this one. Many puzzles.
Lex Fridman
(00:29:53)
Can you speak to that? What are interesting challenges that you’re encountering?
Dana White
(00:29:59)
Yeah, so there’s a lot. So you have the octagon and then behind it is the world’s biggest screen, ever. So what is the theme? How do you program it? First of all, it’s super expensive to shoot, and the format for the Sphere, angles. We were talking about today. I just had a big meeting today about the Sphere this afternoon, and making sure that all my departments, all the details that I want all start to come together here in the next two weeks. I want the creative, the commercial. I have some goals. I will tell people as we get closer what I’m looking to achieve with this other than putting on one of the greatest, most unique sporting events of all time, and probably the greatest combat sporting event of all time. But yeah, there’s challenges. There’s a laundry list of challenges for this thing, and not to mention the fact that it’s on Mexican Independence Day, and we’re going to weave in the whole history of combat in Mexico-
Lex Fridman
(00:31:09)
Yeah. Nice.
Dana White
(00:31:10)
… into this event.
Lex Fridman
(00:31:12)
But the production, this is hilarious, because you were just talking about knowing nothing about production, so many years ago.
Dana White
(00:31:17)
And now tackling the Sphere, yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:31:19)
The hardest production effort.
Dana White
(00:31:20)
Ever.
Lex Fridman
(00:31:21)
And that will be live?
Dana White
(00:31:23)
It’ll be live. It’ll be live on pay-per-view, it’ll be live in the arena, and it’ll also be in movie theaters.
Lex Fridman
(00:31:31)
Nice. So it will be shown at the Sphere later too? Will you try to create an experience?
Dana White
(00:31:37)
ESPN’s doing a doc on it.
Lex Fridman
(00:31:38)
Nice.
Dana White
(00:31:39)
The making of the Sphere. Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:31:41)
Well, you’re feeling good about it?
Dana White
(00:31:42)
Oh, yeah. I feel incredible about it. I can’t wait. It’s going to be fun.
Lex Fridman
(00:31:47)
I can’t wait to see how you solve the puzzle.

Joe Rogan

Dana White
(00:31:50)
Thank you.
Lex Fridman
(00:31:50)
Another guy that I feel like could care less about the money is Joe Rogan. How important is he to the UFC, to the rise of the UFC, and what in general do you love about Joe?
Dana White
(00:32:02)
It’s a fact, he doesn’t care about money, and he did the first 13 shows for free for us. You know what I mean? That was at a time when we were hurting and he’s like, “Wait a minute, you want me to do the commentary? You’re saying that I get to sit in the best seat in the house and watch these fights for free? Yeah, I’m in.” And then obviously, when we turned things around, we made it up to Joe. But Joe is one of the things that I loved early on about…

(00:32:30)
So I’ll tell you the story. So we buy the UFC. They’re based in New York. We’re moving the corporate offices to Vegas. So I have to fly out to New York, go into the offices and start going through everything and figuring out what needs to come back to Vegas and what we can just throw away. So they literally had a VHS machine and a TV, and there were a million tapes in this place, man. So I didn’t know what tapes were these definitely we have to keep, or these we don’t need. So I had to sit there and go through every single tape. And I popped in a tape and there was an interview on the Ivory Keenen Wayans show, the oldest Wayans brother, and he had a talk show at the time, and he had Joe Rogan, the guy from Fear Factor on the show, and he was promoting Fear Factor, but all he would talk about was UFC.
Lex Fridman
(00:33:23)
Yeah, that’s Joe.
Dana White
(00:33:24)
And he was talking about how people think that these guys in the martial arts movies are tough, and he was talking about what UFC fighters would do to these martial arts guys if they ever got their hands on them. And I was like, this is exactly what I need. A guy who isn’t afraid to speak his mind and knows the sport inside and out, but more importantly, is super passionate about it and loves it.

(00:33:53)
So when you see Joe Rogan on camera, and I was talking about the paid talking heads that they had in HBO boxing that were terrible, Joe Rogan does not come off as a paid talking head. He comes off as a guy who loves this. And so early on, no media would cover us. So I had to buy my way onto radio. So we’d do these radio tours, and they would drop us in. You’d have to get up at 3:30 in the morning in Vegas, on the west coast, because they’re at 6:30 in the morning in New York and Boston and Florida and all these other places. So they drop you into these markets to do radio, and the fighters were horrible at it. Fighters getting up at 3:30 in the morning, especially leading up to a fight, never good. They sound like they’re tired, they act like they’re tired, and they definitely act like they don’t want to be on there, and it’s bad radio. What you can’t have is bad radio. So the only two people that could pull off these radio tours were me and Joe Rogan. So me and Joe Rogan would alternate doing these radio tours all over the country.
Lex Fridman
(00:35:04)
Just talking about fighting, talking about-
Dana White
(00:35:04)
Exactly.
Lex Fridman
(00:35:05)
… what this whole thing is,
Dana White
(00:35:06)
A hundred percent.
Lex Fridman
(00:35:07)
… getting people excited.
Dana White
(00:35:08)
Two guys that are really into it and passionate about it and love it. And it’s one of the things about Rogan too, when early on, nobody understood the ground game. Joe Rogan would walk you through what was happening literally before it would happen. He would tell you the setup, what was going to come next and everything. He’d just absolutely articulate it perfectly, brilliantly, and people at home started to understand. And the impact that Joe Rogan has had and continues to have on this sport is immeasurable. He’s the biggest podcaster in the world, and he is on the UFC pay-per-views 14 times a year, and he’s always talking about the sport. It’s immeasurable what this guy has done for this company and the sport.
Lex Fridman
(00:36:00)
Yeah, still to this day, like I’ll have dinner with him offline, he’ll just talk fighting. He just loves it.
Dana White
(00:36:05)
It’s true.
Lex Fridman
(00:36:06)
Loves every aspect of it.
Dana White
(00:36:07)
Yep. Joe Rogan is one of those guys. I saw that early on. Why would you go after the Fear Factor guy to be such a key component, to not only the company, but to the sport? I saw it in the fucking interview on Ivory Keenen Wayans.
Lex Fridman
(00:36:28)
I value loyalty a lot, and I remember there was a moment not too long ago, maybe a year ago when I was sitting with Joe and he had a phone call with you. Joe was getting canceled for something, and they didn’t want him commentating the fights, and you on the phone offered your resignation over this. I got teary-eyed over that. That’s such a… You’re a good man. You know?
Dana White
(00:36:58)
Thank you.
Lex Fridman
(00:36:59)
That was powerful.
Dana White
(00:37:01)
Anybody who is with me, has been with me, knows. When you’re with me, you’re with me. It’s a two-way street. It’s not a one-way street. I’m not one of these guys that is going to roll over and… It’s like going through COVID. I wasn’t laying any of these people. Some of these people have been with me for 20 years. We’re going to lay them off. This will motherfucker will burn, burn, before I would do that to my people. None of that type of stuff is ever going to happen while I’m here. I can’t say what’s going to happen when I leave, but when I’m here, the people who are with me and have been with me, they know exactly what’s up, and Joe knows what’s up. And again, it’s a two-way street. Joe Rogan has been very loyal to me, and I’m very loyal to Joe Rogan.

Lorenzo Fertitta

Lex Fridman
(00:37:57)
Lorenzo, another guy you have close friendship with, you seem to have been extremely effective together as business partners. What’s the magic behind that? How can you explain that?
Dana White
(00:38:07)
I love him. Lorenzo and I work really well together because we have two different personalities. I’m the guy that always… I’m going here. Lorenzo was always here. You could walk in a room and say, “Lorenzo, you just lost $10 million. Lorenzo, you just won $10 million.” It never changes. And I’m a guy that goes like this, right? So we almost balance each other out. There’s a lot of things that he’s really fucking good at, and there’s a lot of things that I’m really good at, and they’re both on the opposite sides of the spectrum.
Lex Fridman
(00:38:41)
So that level headed thing was useful when the UFC was losing money and it was unknown whether it’s going to survive those low points?
Dana White
(00:38:50)
Yeah. A hundred percent. What’s incredible when you think of the story of the UFC, at the time the casino business was cranking, and station casinos was killing it. And stations, their money from stations is what was funding the UFC. Then in the ’08, ‘9 crash, the UFC was killing it in ’08 and ’09, and the casino businesses were hurting. So timing on everything, the way that it all worked out couldn’t have worked out better for them, and obviously for all of us. When you think about the UFC and how big it is and how far it reaches and how many people it touches, the Fertittas Brothers made a $2 million investment, then put in another 44 million, and look at how many lives that investment has changed over the last 25 years. It’s fascinating.
Lex Fridman
(00:39:55)
And it’s also crazy. Just forget the business of it. Just the effect it has on the history of humanity in terms of this is what we do, we’re descendants of apes that fight. And this is like the organizations that catalyze the innovation in how we fight. It’s crazy.
Dana White
(00:40:13)
[inaudible 00:40:13].
Lex Fridman
(00:40:13)
You created a whole new sport.
Dana White
(00:40:15)
That people all over the world participate in now. Literally, there isn’t a place on earth that we can’t get a fighter from now.

Great fighters

Lex Fridman
(00:40:23)
You said in the UFC 299 post-fight press conference that sometimes fighters might complain that they get matched up, uneven odds, but that’s actually when legends are made. I think you gave Dustin Poirier as an example. Can you elaborate on that a little bit? What makes a legend, what makes greatness in a fight?
Dana White
(00:40:45)
So behind the scenes, fighters are a very paranoid bunch of people. They’re very paranoid, and there’s been this theme with fighters where they’re trying to get me beat, right? We don’t determine who wins and loses. If we did, we’d be the WWE, okay? You do. I’m the bells and whistles guy. I make sure that as many people that we can possibly let know that you’re fighting on Saturday know that you’re fighting on Saturday. Who you are, who you’re going against, and why people should give a shit. That’s what I do.

(00:41:26)
Then the night you show up, I put on the best live event that I possibly can, and I put on the best television show that I possibly can. Once that door shuts, it’s all up to you. You determine whether you lose or not. And if you get into a position where you become so paranoid that you think that the powers that be here are against you, and you try to steer yourself away from certain fights… That’s one of the big things that happens in these other organizations. In these other organizations, the inmates run the asylum. So if they don’t want to fight bad enough, these other companies don’t push and they don’t do this and they don’t… We put on the best possible matchups that we can make.

(00:42:22)
And in this business, you might be an older fighter, but if you’re still ranked in the top 10, there’s young guys coming for you. Killers. Young killers are coming out and they want your position. So you being the veteran that you are have to prepare yourself to go in. And everybody was saying, when we made that fight with Saint-Denis that Poirier was in big trouble, dah, dah, dah, dah, dah. That’s awesome. That helps build the entire thing that Poirier, and then Poirier goes out and does what he did that night. That’s what makes fucking legends.
Lex Fridman
(00:43:06)
It’s interesting because sometimes being the underdog is a really good thing for the long-term story of who you are as a fighter.
Dana White
(00:43:13)
Especially when you’re a big name and a name that people recognize and a name that people know. And they’re like, “Oh man.” I remember Israel Adesanya and Sean Strickland. A hundred out of a hundred people knew for a fact that Israel was going to win that fight, and here comes Strickland. And we could go on for days with this. You know what I mean? That is what creates legendary moments, legendary fights, and it’s what builds stars and legends.
Lex Fridman
(00:43:42)
Arguably, Conor McGregor with Jose Aldo.
Dana White
(00:43:45)
Yep. Conor McGregor with a bunch of people in the beginning. People said he couldn’t wrestle, people said he wouldn’t be able to defend a take down, blah, blah, blah, blah. Nate Diaz against Conor McGregor, you know what I mean?
Lex Fridman
(00:43:56)
Mm-hmm. And Conor McGregor against Khabib, underdog, probably. But if he won, there’s an opportunity to win. If he won, that’s the legend forming. He’s now in the conversation for the greatest of all time without argument.
Dana White
(00:44:11)
And if you look at the way that Khabib ran through so many people, Conor hung in there-
Lex Fridman
(00:44:17)
Yeah. It could have been.
Dana White
(00:44:18)
… and made a fight of it.

Khabib vs Conor

Lex Fridman
(00:44:19)
It could have been. What do you think about that matchup? It’s one of the greats, one of the great matchups that you’ve made, Conor McGregor versus Khabib.
Dana White
(00:44:28)
Yeah. At the time, I was incredibly criticized for putting together the spot that had the scene with the bus in it. The fucking medias, but they were saying that I was pandering to the violence that happened and trying to… I’m telling you a story, telling you a story of how we got here and how big this fight is, and how bad the blood is between these guys. And I mean, I think that’s what we do the best job at, is telling the fucking stories of why.

(00:45:09)
We go into Monday. It’s fight week. We got a whole list of things that we do fight week. And then you get right down to the press conference on Thursday, the weigh-ins on Friday, and then the fights on Saturday. Now my people fly back home, they go to bed on Sunday night, and it’s Groundhog Day. We wake up again on Monday and it starts all over again. Every weekend, every Saturday, for a year. So there’s lots of stories that need to be told, there’s lots of… When you think about what I compete with, whatever takes your attention on a Saturday night is my competitor.
Lex Fridman
(00:45:47)
So you’re always trying to build a foundation for great stories, and if the fighters step up, they step up and they can together create greatness.
Dana White
(00:45:56)
That’s it. That’s exactly right. So when we are aligned, like when you get to the UFC, I mean, you just saw it with MVP, you’re going to see it with Kayla Harrison.
Dana White
(00:46:00)
You just saw it with MVP, you’re going to see it with Kayla Harrison and so many others that have come from other organizations, and they get here. They notice immediately the difference between fighting here and fighting wherever they were before. It’s not even comparable to the impact it has on you when you leave whatever organization you’re with and you come to the UFC. And I think that it gives them a sense of, holy shit. MVP when he came, I mean there were probably more people at the press conference than any fight he’d ever fought in, in Bellator. You know what I mean? And you feel that energy and you feel the difference of the impact of being here, and I think it takes a lot of these guys to another level.
Lex Fridman
(00:46:49)
Yeah. Just the aura of it.
Dana White
(00:46:51)
100%.
Lex Fridman
(00:46:51)
This is where you’re supposed to step up. Yeah, it’s the way people feel about Ted Talks, giving lectures.
Dana White
(00:46:57)
Right.
Lex Fridman
(00:46:57)
This is your moment. You get 15 minutes and you better say some interesting shit. And Kayla Harrison, by the way, is a badass. I can’t wait to see what happens there.
Dana White
(00:47:05)
She was walking around with this sleeveless shirt the night of the fights and holy shit, she’s jacked, man. It’s crazy.
Lex Fridman
(00:47:12)
Two time Olympic gold medalist.
Dana White
(00:47:13)
Right.
Lex Fridman
(00:47:14)
You don’t fuck with those people. You win a medal, you’re made of something special.
Dana White
(00:47:18)
So true. Especially in judo.
Lex Fridman
(00:47:20)
Yeah, especially in American judo where you don’t have many training partners that are great.
Dana White
(00:47:24)
That’s what I’m saying.

Jon Jones

Lex Fridman
(00:47:25)
So you better fucking work for it. Ridiculous question, but who’s in the conversation for the greatest of all time?
Dana White
(00:47:32)
Jon Jones.
Lex Fridman
(00:47:34)
You’ve talked about Jon Jones, but what are the metrics involved here?
Dana White
(00:47:38)
He’s never been beat. He destroyed everybody at light heavyweight, which at the time was the toughest weight class in the company, in the sport. And then he moved up to heavyweight, won easily at heavyweight. When you look at a guy and you look at what he was doing outside the octagon at the same time, which shouldn’t be part of it, shouldn’t be part of the equation, but when you do, wow, there’s no debate. Nobody can debate who’s the greatest of all time. It’s absolutely positively Jon Jones. He’s never lost. He’s never been beat in the octagon ever.
Lex Fridman
(00:48:21)
So that’s one of the metrics, pure sheer dominance. But there’s others. Losing sometimes is a catalyst for greatness.
Dana White
(00:48:33)
I don’t disagree. But when you’ve never lost, you’ve never lost. We’ve never found somebody. And the other thing that you have to factor in too is longevity. Because sometimes with a lot of these guys, the sport passes them by. You get younger guys that are faster, this, that, and the sport evolves. Nobody’s been able to beat Jon Jones. Oh, and the other thing that you measure is, when you said dominance, it’s true, if you’re this guy that has unbelievable power and you’re just going in and you’re just fucking knocking everybody out and nobody’s ever pulled you into the deep water before, that was when my opinion of Jon Jones started to change.

(00:49:18)
Gustafsson took him into the deep water. Gustafsson hit him with some shit he’d never been hit with. Gustafsson tested him and put Jon Jones in a place where, I bet if you sat down and interviewed John Jones, going into the deep rounds of that, Jon Jones thought he was going to die. You know what I’m saying?
Lex Fridman
(00:49:36)
And he’s willing to go there.
Dana White
(00:49:37)
And he kept going. He was willing, willing to do whatever it took to win that fight.
Lex Fridman
(00:49:44)
And it breaks my heart because he beat DC, and DC is one of the greatest of all time.
Dana White
(00:49:48)
That’s the thing too. And I believe that DC doesn’t get the credit he deserves because of the Jon Jones thing. When you look at DC and what he’s accomplished, and Jon Jones beat him twice.
Lex Fridman
(00:49:59)
Yeah.
Dana White
(00:50:00)
It’s undeniable. You can hate all you want. Jon Jones is the greatest of all time.
Lex Fridman
(00:50:05)
Do you think Habib was tested enough?
Dana White
(00:50:09)
I think that Habib had the potential to be in the running for that. He just didn’t stick around. First of all, he had injuries that he should have been where he got a lot sooner had he not had the injuries that he had and the setbacks in his career. But there’s no doubt, Habib is one of the all-time greats.

Conor McGregor

Lex Fridman
(00:50:29)
What’s the good, the bad, and the ugly of your relationship with Conor?
Dana White
(00:50:33)
There’s literally no ugly. Conor McGregor has been an incredible partner to work with. If Conor showed up to things on time, there wouldn’t be one fucking bad thing I could say about Conor. You know what I mean?
Lex Fridman
(00:50:45)
It’s only being late to shit?
Dana White
(00:50:46)
If you put a fucking gun to my head and said, “Don’t lie, mother-fucker. Tell me all the bad things about Conor McGregor.” I’d say the guy doesn’t show up on time. That’s it.
Lex Fridman
(00:50:57)
That’s it.
Dana White
(00:50:57)
If Conor McGregor showed up to shit on time, and sometimes he does. Sometimes he does. He’s been a great partner. If you look at what a huge superstar he became, the fights that he was involved in, let me tell you what Conor McGregor never did. We never walked in a room and said, “Conor, this guy just fell out. We want you to fight this guy.” And he was like, “No way. I’m not taking this fucking risk. I’m at this point in my career where my money, my this, my that,” he was like, “Fuck it, let’s do it.” He’d always say, “Let’s do it.”

(00:51:28)
The other thing that Conor McGregor never did, no matter how big he was or whatever it was, and we were heading into a fight, “Oh, Conor, this guy just fell out. Aldo fell out. We’re looking for another,” “Yeah, I’ll do it, but I’m going to need another 200,000. I’m going to need another $1 million.” Conor McGregor never did that chicken shit, bullshit kind of stuff. He never did any of that. Conor was as solid a guy as you could possibly work with.
Lex Fridman
(00:51:54)
Just fuck it, I’ll do it.
Dana White
(00:51:56)
I’ll do it. There’s actually a scene, because we were filming something, I don’t know if it was embedded or what we were filming at the time. Me and Lorenzo walk into his house that he rented here in Vegas, and I’m pretty sure it was when Aldo fell out, and we’re telling him this, that, and we’re looking at some options. He says, “I’m going to the gym. When I’m done working out, let me know.” He just woke up out of bed, he is in his fucking underwear, and he gets hit with this and he is like, “All right, I’m going to the gym. Let me know when I get out who I’m fighting.” Doesn’t care. Doesn’t want to know. Doesn’t want any more money. Nothing. Fucking shows up and he delivers. Conor has been incredibly successful, he’s made a lot of money, and he’s had his ups and downs outside and inside the octagon. But as for a guy who was on the dole and was a plumber, he’s actually a really smart businessman and he has been one of the best partners that I’ve ever had in the history of the sport.
Lex Fridman
(00:52:55)
And an important part of the history of the UFC.
Dana White
(00:52:57)
Big.
Lex Fridman
(00:52:58)
He opened it up to all kinds of new eyes.
Dana White
(00:53:01)
Yep. He literally set Europe, Australia, Canada, and many other parts of the world on fire, man. He was our first legit megastar.
Lex Fridman
(00:53:15)
And I personally think he doesn’t get enough credit for just how good he was as a fighter. People love to talk shit about Conor.
Dana White
(00:53:22)
So true.
Lex Fridman
(00:53:23)
I suppose that’s part of his magic.
Dana White
(00:53:25)
But it comes with success. When you’re successful, there’s always people out there that are going to talk shit. You always have a bunch of know nothing, do nothing fucking losers that love to talk shit.
Lex Fridman
(00:53:37)
You think if you were to do it all over again, Habib is the right matchup?
Dana White
(00:53:41)
Yeah. Listen, the thing that you can’t do is avoid match-ups. You know what I mean? This is what we’re talking about when you talk about being a legend. Conor McGregor needed Habib. Habib needed Conor McGregor. You can hate each other as much as you want, but you have to fight these other legendary bad mother-fuckers to yourself. Become a legend. I mean, it’s like Jon Jones needed Cyril Gun and Cyril Gun needed Jon Jones, because if Cyril could have beat Jon, the first guy, if anybody can ever figure it out and beat Jon Jones, it’s a big deal. And it’s almost like your obligation as a fighter. And when you think about Jon Jones became who he is today, and the reason I’m sitting here telling you how great he is, because all these other guys gave him the opportunity to beat them. Or they beat Jon. It’s all about giving these other guys the opportunity. Saint Denis, Poirier gave him the opportunity to come in and beat him. That’s how this all works.
Lex Fridman
(00:54:51)
It’s the two of them together, the two fighters together.
Dana White
(00:54:54)
You have to have them both. Listen, I could line up a bunch of no-name bums that Jon Jones could run through. That’s what they do in all the other organizations. We would have nothing to fucking talk about right now.
Lex Fridman
(00:55:08)
That’s why, luckily, a perfect record in the UFC is not as important as who you fought, how you fought.
Dana White
(00:55:13)
So true. But when you have a perfect record in the UFC, holy shit, right?
Lex Fridman
(00:55:21)
Yeah.
Dana White
(00:55:23)
When you can have a perfect record in the UFC, you are absolutely one of the most special athletes on planet earth.

Trump

Lex Fridman
(00:55:31)
You and Trump are friends. I just talked to Ivanka last night about her experience in the Miami event. She loves it. She’s training too. You’re talking about getting girls to train. She’s trained.
Dana White
(00:55:43)
And the kids are training, yeah. Her father’s the biggest fucking fight fan on the planet. Calls me all the time to talk about the fights. And Don Jr. said that I’m the only guy on earth that he bros out with. It’s funny when you talk about how powerful fighting is. This last Miami event, the President of Ecuador and the President of Spain both posted about the fights. Habib beat Conor. Putin was on FaceTime before he even made it to the locker room. Trump, sitting President, ex-President, watching all the fights, calling, wants to talk about the fights. Valentina Shevchenko, every time she goes home, she meets with the President of the country. The list goes on and on and on. Elon Musk, Zuckerberg, the list goes on and on and on, the most powerful people in the world are all obsessed with fighting.
Lex Fridman
(00:56:42)
When did you first discover that Trump loves fighting?
Dana White
(00:56:45)
I first discovered that Trump was a big fight fan, obviously, you saw him, we were talking about how big boxing fans we were, he was a part of all the big fights back then. But when we first bought the UFC, this thing was so bad venues didn’t even want us. And we ended up doing our first event in Atlantic City at the Trump Taj Mahal. Now, think about this. At that time, Trump brand here, UFC brand, I can’t go low enough. And he had us at his venue two times, back to back, showed up for the first fight of the night, and stayed till the last fight of the night. Then after that, any good thing that would ever happen to me in my career, Trump would reach out. Whether it was, we were on the front page of the New York Times at one time and he said, “Congratulations, Dana. I always knew you guys were going to do it.” Little things like that, but that are big things and mean a lot, especially coming from a guy like him.
Lex Fridman
(00:57:44)
He saw something in you like, this is going to be…
Dana White
(00:57:46)
100%. He definitely saw it. And then comes ’15, ’16, whenever it was, I don’t remember, but he called me and he said, “Listen, if you don’t want to do this, I completely understand, but I would be honored if you would speak at the National Republican Convention for me.” And I’m not a very political guy, you know what I mean? And everybody told me not to do it. “Do not do this.” But I was like, why would I not do this? This guy’s been great to me. And I did it. And our relationship is just like, you know what I mean? I consider Donald Trump to be one of my very, very good friends.
Lex Fridman
(00:58:31)
Any favorite stories?
Dana White
(00:58:34)
There’s so many stories. Once he won the election, I’d be at work and I’d be down the hall in the matchmaking room, whatever, and my secretary would yell, “The President’s on the phone!”, fucking come running down the hallway and grab the phone, and he’d want to talk about the fight that was coming up or the fight that happened. Or I’d be in my car and I’d answer the phone and it’s like, “Hi. This is the White House. We have the President of the United States on the phone.” That’s a trip, when that first starts happening. And then just to sum him up, this is the kind of guy that you want to talk about a fighter, this is the most resilient human being I’ve ever met. If you see the shit that this guy’s going through publicly every day.

(00:59:26)
And I’ll call him on the phone as a friend and be like, “Hey, you good? How you doing?” Unfazed, unfazed like nothing’s going on. And then he’ll start talking to me about this and that and all this other. One time, there’s only been one time, I’ve never talked about this publicly, but one time I called him and he was not good. He was a mess. I’ve never heard him like that and I’ve never seen him like that. When Ivana died, the only time I’ve ever seen him fucked up. Obviously, as soon as I heard it, I reached out. And I have never, look at all the stuff that’s gone on with Trump, all the bad stuff that they say, they’re trying to attack him, they’re trying to ruin him, unfazed. I called him that day and it’s the first time I’ve ever seen that guy busted up and not good.
Lex Fridman
(01:00:25)
But that says something that that’s the only time.
Dana White
(01:00:27)
100%.
Lex Fridman
(01:00:28)
Because that that guy is, I mean, walking through fire.
Dana White
(01:00:30)
He does not get rattled. He will walk through fire. He’s an absolute savage.
Lex Fridman
(01:00:34)
You think he wins the Presidential election?
Dana White
(01:00:36)
I don’t know, man. It’s going to depend on how this whole… Politics is the most dirtiest, scummiest thing on planet earth, man, and who knows how this is all going to play out. It’s all dirty. It’s all ugly. And obviously I’m rooting for him and I’m behind him and I hope he does. But we’ll see.
Lex Fridman
(01:00:56)
What’s dirtier, the fighting game in the early days or politics?
Dana White
(01:01:01)
There’s nothing dirtier than politics, nothing. There’s literally nothing dirtier.
Lex Fridman
(01:01:05)
All right.
Dana White
(01:01:06)
It is the dirtiest thing on planet Earth.

Elon vs Zuck

Lex Fridman
(01:01:08)
I just wanted to get that on record. Another guy who doesn’t seem to be phased by the fire, I’ve gotten to know him, is Elon. I have to ask you, it’s a bit of fun. You were a part of thinking about putting together Zuck versus Elon. I trained with both. I did a phone call with Elon and you when we were training on the mat.
Dana White
(01:01:29)
I remember, yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:01:30)
You really think that could have been a good fight?
Dana White
(01:01:32)
It would’ve been the biggest fight ever done.
Lex Fridman
(01:01:34)
The spectacle of it.
Dana White
(01:01:35)
Two of the most powerful, wealthiest men in the world. Lots of guys talk hit and go back and forth and sue each other and do all this stuff. These two guys were literally talking about facing each other in the octagon and fighting. And they’re in a business that’s looked at as geeky. You know what I mean? They’re tech nerds. They’re this, they’re that. These are two dudes that were willing to throw down and fight. And you know as well as I do, there’s a lot of public speculation about this. I was taking serious real time and working on this thing. I had projections, I had numbers. I was looking at venues. I was on the phone with the fucking coliseum in Italy. You name it, I was in it. These guys were serious. And this was something that was really going to happen. And I’ll tell you right now, in the short amount of time that it was going down, it was fun. I was having a blast with it.

Mike Tyson vs Jake Paul

Lex Fridman
(01:02:30)
What do you think about Tyson, Tyson fighting Jake Paul?
Dana White
(01:02:34)
I love Mike Tyson, and I’m not a fan of anybody fighting at our age. But he’s a grown man, obviously, and he’s going to do what he’s going to do. But at least I know, I talked to his wife a couple of days ago, and he’s taken this serious and he’s training for it. So we’ll see how it plays out.
Lex Fridman
(01:02:59)
Why do you think he fights though? What is that about? Is there a broader lesson there about fighters, about great fighters?
Dana White
(01:03:07)
I think that Mike Tyson is actually one of those unique guys who has crossed over. Any of these other boxers from his era, they have no way of making money other than fighting. Mike Tyson has made a lot of money outside of fighting. Tyson still has that aura. You could be at a restaurant and he walks in and you’re like, “Holy fuck. Mike Tyson’s here.” He still has that type of aura and energy in a room, and he makes lots of money outside of the ring. I think that he ends up getting these offers that he can’t refuse.
Lex Fridman
(01:03:44)
Oh, you think it’s financial? I mean, that’s a good question to ask. You work with a lot of fighters. For how many of them is it about money and for how many is it about the fact of the pure love of fighting?
Dana White
(01:03:58)
Well, the guys that get into it for the right reason are the guys who get into it for greatness. Because you want to be the fucking best. And when you’re in it for that reason, you love it and you want to be looked at as the best ever, and you have the talent, the money happens. Then you have other guys who get in, believe me, I’ve dealt with fighters who just wanted to be famous and just wanted to make money. You know what I mean? And listen, it is what it is. It’s your life and you live it the way that you want and do your thing. But the ones that are beloved are the guys who really want to be fucking great and they’re the ones that are remembered. When you look at Tyson in his early years, when he came up under Cus D’Amato, he was a student of the game.

(01:04:47)
He loved everything. He became completely infatuated with the fight game. Then he became such a massive superstar, it’s almost like the whole thing starts to turn on you. All the things that come at you at a young age and that kind of money, it’s tough. It’s tough to navigate and get through. You say something like that and people are like, “Oh, poor him. He had fucking $100 million and couldn’t…” At that age and with all the shit that people talk and all the things that you got to put up with and the fame, a lot of people deal with fame, some people handle it really well and some people don’t. And the perfect example of that was Forrest Griffin and Stephan Bonner. They fought that unbelievable fight on the Ultimate Fighter. Everything blew up after that. Forrest dealt with fame really well and Stephan did not.

Forrest Griffin vs Stephan Bonnar

Lex Fridman
(01:05:42)
That was a special fight.
Dana White
(01:05:43)
It really was.
Lex Fridman
(01:05:44)
What do you think attracted people to that fight? That was a big leap for the UFC.
Dana White
(01:05:50)
It was everything.
Lex Fridman
(01:05:51)
It was everything.
Dana White
(01:05:52)
It was everything.
Lex Fridman
(01:05:52)
Why do you think people loved that fight? What attracted people to that fight? Why did it change everything?
Dana White
(01:05:58)
Well, what happened that night is that the rest of the show was a disaster. We had the co-main event and the main event. Diego Sanchez ran through Kenny Florian in seconds. Oh my God, that was terrible. And the fights that led up to that weren’t anything to talk about either. Then Stephan and Forrest got in there and just went toe-to-toe in this unbelievable slug fest live on free television when cable still mattered. And what I heard was at the time, you had people picking up the phone going, “Are you watching this show?” The numbers just started climbing. Then you got a razor-thin decision. Who’s going to win? You got the crowd stomping their feet. It sounded like a train was going through the place and everybody’s chanting, “One more round!” Me and the Fertitta brothers get together and we talk. We’re going to give them both contracts.

(01:06:52)
So we give them both contracts and the place erupts. It couldn’t have been a more perfect fight at the most perfect time. It all came together. It’s almost like this was meant to be. You know what I mean? Yeah. So we had so many problems with Spike TV at the time, because halfway through the season, the president of the company got fired. All the things that we thought we were going to get that year, we had this runaway hit show. And normally at that time when you would see runaway hit shows, there’d be commercials. It’d be on billboards. It’d be on the side of buses in L.A. and New York. We got none of that. We didn’t even know if we were going to get a second season coming out of that. And when that fight was over, I swear to God, I was like, “I don’t even give a fuck. We’re going to end up somewhere now after this fight.” And we didn’t even make it out of the building that night. The Spike guys did the contract with us in the alley on a fucking napkin after the fight.
Lex Fridman
(01:08:00)
So you already saw the magic of the fight itself. It captured something.
Dana White
(01:08:04)
Once that happened and all the shit, and at that time, I didn’t know the ratings, it’s not like we were streaming and we could see, we had no idea, but I knew.
Lex Fridman
(01:08:12)
You just knew this was [inaudible 01:08:13].
Dana White
(01:08:12)
I knew .
Lex Fridman
(01:08:13)
What is that? It’s just two people being willing to stand toe to toe and just go to war.
Dana White
(01:08:21)
And when you think about what was at stake. There was a car. Remember the Kia? The winner got a Kia.
Lex Fridman
(01:08:27)
I don’t even remember that.
Dana White
(01:08:28)
That’s what was the fucking. And Stefan and Forrest, the will to win, they both wanted to win that fight so bad.
Lex Fridman
(01:08:38)
It was bigger than the Kia probably.
Dana White
(01:08:40)
Forrest drove that Kia to 200,000 miles. The biggest mistake Kia ever made was not doing a fucking commercial with Forrest Griffin about that car. Forrest Griffin loved that car so much, he drove it. I think he still has it. It’s got 200,000 miles on it, that car. You couldn’t have a better fucking commercial than that. And we reached out to them too. I said, “Kia should know about this.” They fucking…
Dana White
(01:09:00)
… and we reached out to them too. I said, “Kia should know about this.” They fucking blew it. You got a bunch of… You know how those guys are in the business world. They don’t fucking get anything.
Lex Fridman
(01:09:09)
Maybe it was about the Kia then.
Dana White
(01:09:11)
It was about winning. They both wanted to win the Ultimate Fighter so bad. It’s the Kia, it’s the win, it’s the contract you get, the whole thing.
Lex Fridman
(01:09:22)
But I think at that point, you even forget all of that. When you’re in there, you probably just, there’s a primal thing where I’m not backing down.
Dana White
(01:09:31)
Listen, they’re both bad dudes. They were both real fighters at the end of the day. That’s why the fight was so great. You know what I mean?
Lex Fridman
(01:09:36)
They just throw all the caution to the wind and just fight. Those are some of the greatest moments in the FC too when the technique is falls apart and you’re just like, well, fuck it.
Dana White
(01:09:49)
Well, it’s because you’re in those deep rounds. You’ve been through a war now it’s all about heart and dog, who can dig deeper and who’s got it and who wants it. I mean, we all know when that moment happens in a fight, when you see that both of these guys are fucking exhausted.

(01:10:06)
And for people that are watching this, people that don’t know a lot about… Everybody thinks they know a lot about fighting. 99.9% of the people out there don’t know fucking jack shit about fighting or what it takes to do what these people do. But when you get into those later rounds and fatigue sets in, and then fatigue makes you start to fucking doubt yourself, and then you start to wonder, can I even make it through the rest of this round?

(01:10:30)
And then you start to think, am I going to fucking die right now? And these kids dig fucking deep. And they just, like you said, all the other shit flies out the window and now they’re just on fucking autopilot to fight and win. Those are definitely the best fights you’ll ever see in any combat sport.
Lex Fridman
(01:10:47)
I mean, that saying is true. The exhaustion makes cowards of us all. I mean, there’s something about… Because I’ve competed a lot in jujitsu. There’s the violence of being hit too, but even just exhaustion, it makes you question everything.
Dana White
(01:11:03)
So true.
Lex Fridman
(01:11:04)
It just takes you to some weird place where your brain starts to think you’re going to die for sure. Your brain starts to think, why am I doing this? All these excuses, all this.
Dana White
(01:11:16)
I love that shit.
Lex Fridman
(01:11:17)
And then…
Dana White
(01:11:18)
I love that shit.
Lex Fridman
(01:11:19)
The truly heroic action is to say, “Fuck it,” in that moment and just get in there.
Dana White
(01:11:24)
When you think about these fights that you see in the UFC every fucking Saturday when these men and women get to this point where they’ve been in a dog fight, yet they keep fucking going and you keep trying to win. You can’t imagine what’s going on inside their heads. Self-doubt and all these other things that come into play when exhaustion sets in and they fucking power through it.
Lex Fridman
(01:11:49)
Yeah, those moments, sometimes they don’t have a glorious knockout at the end. But your decision in the third round or the fifth round to still keep pushing forward, not running.
Dana White
(01:12:02)
100%.
Lex Fridman
(01:12:03)
That doesn’t matter what happened. That is a person winning a battle over themselves.
Dana White
(01:12:09)
So true. It’s so true, and it happens every fucking weekend. It’s so impressive. I say it all the time. The people that are involved in this sport are this much of the population. The people that make it to the top five are incredibly unique, special human beings, man. It’s fucking awesome.

Gambling

Lex Fridman
(01:12:31)
You love gambling.
Dana White
(01:12:32)
I do.
Lex Fridman
(01:12:35)
What’s the biggest win of your gambling career, maybe psychologically, if not financially?
Dana White
(01:12:42)
Well, two things. I won $1,000,000 hand one night. It’s happened one time. $1,000,000 hand one night at Mandalay Bay. And then one summer I beat Caesars for 12 million throughout the summer.
Lex Fridman
(01:13:02)
Throughout the summer.
Dana White
(01:13:03)
Yeah. Then I’m on a pretty good run right now too.
Lex Fridman
(01:13:07)
Now this is blackjack?
Dana White
(01:13:08)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:13:09)
What’s the biggest loss?
Dana White
(01:13:13)
The biggest loss was… Here is… I would call this the biggest loss for many different reasons. This is what you live and you learn in life and you figure things out as you go along. One night I’m over at the Rio and they got big suites over there. I go over there with some buddies and we got one of the suites and we have some dinner and we start drinking. We’re having some drinks at dinner and blah, blah, blah. Starts to ramp up, having a good time.

(01:13:48)
And I make my way down to the Thai limit room. We start gambling. And I continue to drink having a blast. I end up leaving and going home that night, and I lost 80 grand. I wake up the next morning, I’m like, fuck. Those motherfuckers got me for 80,000 last night and dah, dah, dah, dah, dah.

(01:14:15)
I’m at work the next day and the host over there calls me and he says, “Hey, Dana, are you coming back? Do you still need the room that you guys had where you ate and all this shit you stay?” And I said, “No, I don’t need the room, but don’t get too comfortable with my fucking 80 grand. I’m coming back for it.”

(01:14:35)
Dead fucking silence on the other end of the phone. And he’s like, “Dana, you lost $3 million last night.” I said, “What the fuck are you talking about? I only have a million and a half dollar credit line.” He goes, “Yeah, you made us call the GM of the hotel and you started calling him a fucking pussy and da, da, da, da, da.” And I went, “Yeah, no, that sounds like something I would do. Yeah.”
Lex Fridman
(01:15:06)
That’s the real number.
Dana White
(01:15:08)
That was the real number. And then there’s been a lot of cases where people are in Vegas and they’re like, “Oh, I lost all this money. And they were giving me free drinks and I drank too much, and I was taken advantage of.” No, you stupid motherfucker. Man up. You got fucking drunk. Alcohol is free, but you don’t have to fucking drink it. You know what I mean? And this was a huge learning lesson for me. I never drank again when I was playing cards after that night. But yeah, when you asked me, that’s the one that stands out…
Lex Fridman
(01:15:08)
That one came back right now.
Dana White
(01:15:50)
In my head the most as far as having a bad loss. And then of course I said, “Call the GM,” and I started calling him a pussy at three o’clock in the morning.
Lex Fridman
(01:16:00)
Of course you did.
Dana White
(01:16:00)
That is something I would absolutely do.
Lex Fridman
(01:16:03)
How do you deal with those psychologically? When you gamble, maybe this applies to fighting too, do you love winning or hate losing more?
Dana White
(01:16:14)
They go hand in hand. The way that I play is I live in Vegas, so 2024 is a war for me. I go to war in ’24. Okay. All these nights that I play are little battles inside the war that I will fight in ’24. Now, at the end of the year, we will tally up all these little battles and see where I stand on wins and losses.

(01:16:43)
And there’s lots of talk out there about my gambling, places that I’ve been kicked out of and things like that. And I do pretty well. I do pretty well, but it’s what I like to do. I don’t gamble in a way that I would ever hurt myself or hurt my family. I’m sure you’ve heard the Norm MacDonald stories. Norm MacDonald lost his entire personal wealth four times or something like that. Yeah, that’s not going to happen to me.
Lex Fridman
(01:17:20)
You manage it, but just psychologically you’re able to be even keel.
Dana White
(01:17:24)
Yeah. When I win, it’s awesome. It’s always great to win. Winning is a great feeling in business, in sports, in life, and definitely in gambling. Losing is never fun, but it’s part of the game. You know what I mean? If you want to be in the game and it’s sports, it’s business or whatever, there’s going to be wins and there’s going to be losses. And you have to take them both in stride and you have to be able to…

(01:17:54)
There’s a of people… When you gamble and you lose and you go into a deep, dark depression, I’ve seen this with guys that do it, get depressed. Gambling isn’t for you. If you are the type of person that’s on social media and people say horrible things to you and you get depressed and da, da, you shouldn’t be on social media. You know what I mean?

(01:18:17)
These are all part of being in the game. When you’re in the fucking game, great things happen and really bad things happen, and you got to take it all in stride. And you got to pick yourself up the next day, strap your fucking shoes back on and get out there and go to fucking war again. That’s how it works.
Lex Fridman
(01:18:33)
That’s some goggin shit right there. All right. I love that motivational speech.
Dana White
(01:18:38)
It’s the truth though.
Lex Fridman
(01:18:39)
Yeah, it is.
Dana White
(01:18:39)
It’s the truth though.
Lex Fridman
(01:18:41)
It’s true.
Dana White
(01:18:41)
Listen, every day when you get out of bed, life’s standing right there to kick you in the fucking face, man. Could be anything. Could be you get up and you walk downstairs, you got a fucking flat tire, and you’re late for work, and you got this and that. Life is going to throw all kinds of crazy shit at you, and you have to be ready for it, and you got to fucking deal with it. You can’t curl up into a ball. You can’t run away from it. You can’t hide. You have to take all this shit head on. You have to get up…

(01:19:06)
Every day when I get up out of bed, I strap up and I’m getting ready for fucking war. Because I know I’m coming in here. I know a bunch of bad shit’s going to happen that I’m going to have to fucking deal with. And if that’s not bad enough, when I finally get out of here, I’m probably going to go to the casino and I’m going to get into another fucking war. You know what I mean?

(01:19:24)
I thrive in chaos. I actually love chaos. Everybody talks about retiring. Fuck that shit. What am I going to do when I retire? What would I do? I like to go to war. I like to battle. I like to win. Sometimes I lose, but then I have to come back from the loss. And I love to build brands. I love to set short term and long-term goals and then knock them all down. This is just the stuff that excites me.

(01:19:53)
And whether it’s business or gambling. I like being a fan of things too. I like live music. When I find a band that I like, I get excited to go watch the band live or a Celtics game. I love the fucking Boston Celtics, and I love going to the games and watching them. This is the year. Hopefully we’re going to fucking win it this year. These are all things that make me happy and excite me in my life.

(01:20:20)
And it’s funny because there’s this post that I post maybe three, four nights a week. I also love this city. I can’t tell if the city of Las Vegas was built for me or I was built for this fucking city, but I love it. And there’s this turn on Summerlin Parkway every night, and it’s dark. And from there you can see the entire city, and it’s all fucking lights and it’s badass.

(01:20:44)
And I’m usually driving home after a fucking incredible day. This amazing day and this unbelievable fucking life I have, and I have this just moment of gratitude. Every time I take that turn and I’m like, God damn, I love this fucking city. And just every night when I go home, I’m just so happy and grateful for this life that I have.
Lex Fridman
(01:21:06)
You’re grateful, you’re celebrating. Even if the day is full of shit, full of problems, you have to solve all of this. You’re still able to put that behind you, just turn it off?
Dana White
(01:21:14)
I love that too. I love problem solving. I love taking things that seem impossible. Fucking what’s been shit on more than this company right here? Power Slap, right? This thing’s a fucking beast. It’s an absolute beast. In 13 months, that’s the most successful thing I’ve ever been a part of. And I love every fucking minute of it, especially the negativity. I love negativity.
Lex Fridman
(01:21:45)
You almost feed on it. That’s great. That’s great. You’re built for this.
Dana White
(01:21:48)
I eat that shit for breakfast, man. I love it.
Lex Fridman
(01:21:51)
What’s your favorite movie about Vegas, Casino?
Dana White
(01:21:55)
Yeah, it would have to be Casino. No doubt about it.
Lex Fridman
(01:21:57)
Yeah.
Dana White
(01:21:58)
You ever see a movie that changed your life, that actually impacted your life in some way, shape, or form?
Lex Fridman
(01:22:05)
Probably.
Dana White
(01:22:06)
Which one?
Lex Fridman
(01:22:07)
That’s a good question. I’ll have to think. Well, I have a lot, a lot. Casino could be one of them, probably taught me about women. Forrest Gump for me is a simple movie, but it was a really good movie to show. Because I’ve been really fortunate in my life over and over and over, and I don’t think I deserve any of it. I just always felt like Forrest Gump. When I finally saw it really connected with me. It was like, okay, this universe works in weird ways and stuff just materializes. And you just be good to people, put that good karma out there and it happens for you. That was a movie like that.
Dana White
(01:22:46)
I’m actually very superstitious about that. I believe that what you put out, you get back. And I believe that when you have, you should take care of other people and you should always try to bring people up with you and all that kind of stuff. But the movie that changed the whole trajectory of my life was Vision Quest.
Lex Fridman
(01:23:08)
Oh, yeah. Well, yeah. That’s a good one too. Yeah.
Dana White
(01:23:10)
Vision Quest, man, I fucking love that movie.
Lex Fridman
(01:23:11)
That’s a good one.
Dana White
(01:23:13)
It’s basically, it’s telling the story of a kid who really wasn’t anybody in high school, and nobody knew who he was. He wasn’t popular or any of that kind of shit. And he decided that that was the year that he was going to make his mark. And he was a good wrestler at 178 pounds, but he was going to move down to 160-something to take on the Shute, the scariest guy and the whatever.

(01:23:34)
But there’s all these little things in the movie that really lay out what life is all about. One of the parts is he’s in a class and the teacher’s talking about some poem. And he says, “What does this poem mean to you?” Well, this girl’s walking through the park and all the leaves are falling off the trees, and she realizes that she’s going to die someday. And that a lot of people think they have all this time so they fucking waste it, and they never go out and do what they really set out to do or accomplish or do anything great in their life. That’s one meaning.

(01:24:11)
Then he’s got the guy that he works with at work, he’s cutting weight and his nose is bleeding and all this shit. And this guy keeps going, “Why the fuck are you doing this? Pick that thing up and eat it like a fucking man. This is ridiculous. I don’t know why you’re doing this to yourself, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.” Then when he meets the girl and he gets to the point where he feels like he wants to quit, where does he go? He goes to that guy’s fucking apartment because he knows when he shows up at this guy’s apartment, he’s going to go, “Yeah, fuck this shit.”

(01:24:37)
No, he went to work. He went to work to talk to him, and he wasn’t at work. He took the night off. He shows up at the shitty little fucking apartment that the guy lives in and the guy’s putting a suit and tie on and shit. He’s like, “They said you called in sick. What’s going on?” He’s like, “Well, yeah. Aren’t you wrestling this guy tonight?” And he’s like, “Yeah, but why would you? You’re going to get docked a night’s pay and all this other shit.” He says, “You know what, man?” Then it all gets laid out. I get the goosebumps even telling you this fucking part of it.
Lex Fridman
(01:25:04)
Is that the Pele speech?
Dana White
(01:25:05)
Pele. Yeah. When he’s saying about, “I’m fucking cooking in an overnight hotel fucking thing, and I live in this shitty apartment. A human being can lift himself upside down and backwards and kick a ball into a fucking net, and the whole stadium goes crazy. And this guy runs around. And I’m sitting here in my fucking apartment alone and I start crying. Yeah. I start crying.”

(01:25:26)
The guy who’s been shitting on him the whole fucking time actually really respects him for what he’s done and sees what this kid is capable of doing and all this shit. This fucking movie spoke to me on so many different levels. And I think it’s probably the most underrated movie of all time when you really break down the meaning of what this movie is about. And it really fucking spoke to me.
Lex Fridman
(01:25:49)
That’s probably the greatest movie on one-on-one combat…
Dana White
(01:25:53)
I would agree.
Lex Fridman
(01:25:54)
Ever made.
Dana White
(01:25:55)
I would agree. And especially if you can really hear the messages that it’s giving you in this movie, it’s excellent. You know it’s funny. They just did the… And I saw this after the fact, which completely fucking pissed me off. They did the 25 year or the 30-year thing. It was filmed in Spokane, Washington. They showed the movie at a movie theater there, and the cast members came out and spoke about it. I would’ve fucking flown there for that. Are you shitting me? I’d have been there in fucking 30 seconds to go up there and be a part of that. That movie literally changed my life.
Lex Fridman
(01:26:30)
Yeah, I suppose me too. It made me want to wrestle. I mean, probably the reason I was… Maybe it made me fall in love with wrestling.
Dana White
(01:26:39)
Well, you know what’s funny? I wasn’t even into wrestling at all, and I didn’t have to be for that movie to…
Lex Fridman
(01:26:44)
Yeah, it’s this basic human story.
Dana White
(01:26:46)
It’s such a great movie.
Lex Fridman
(01:26:47)
I mean, that’s what fighting does. It brings out the basic, the humanity of a person really, for the people that choose to step up and step in the ring. And then chase greatness and actually do it from against the long odds. That’s why it’s a beautiful game.
Dana White
(01:27:03)
And it’s so true. I mean, when you think about, I’m 54 years old right now, like that. I mean, it just fucking flew by. And you think when you’re young that you have all this time. You have no time. There’s no time. I mean one of the quotes on the wall in the gym in there is, “There is no tomorrow,” from Rocky III. There is no tomorrow. Fuck that shit. Let’s get all this shit done today.

Mortality

Lex Fridman
(01:27:33)
Do you think about your death?
Dana White
(01:27:35)
Man, I’m not afraid of death. Not even a little bit. I’m not afraid of it. I don’t know if that’ll be the case when I’m facing it, when I’m looking down the barrel of it, laying in a hospital bed somewhere.
Lex Fridman
(01:27:49)
But for now, just squeezing as much as you can out of it.
Dana White
(01:27:52)
100%. I literally, I don’t even like to sleep. My life is so fucking awesome, I don’t even want to go to bed at night. I don’t even want to go to sleep. I want to stay up fucking, I wish I could do fucking 24 hours and never have to sleep. That’s how much I love my life.
Lex Fridman
(01:28:05)
What has watching thousands of fights over the years taught you about human nature, about us humans?
Dana White
(01:28:12)
I don’t care what color you are, what country you come from or what language you speak, we’re all human beings. Fighting’s in our DNA. We get it and we like it. And it’s true. Fighting is in our DNA. It’s a part of who we are.

(01:28:23)
And no matter where you are, if a fight breaks out, it creates this fucking energy, this buzz, this sense of fear. I mean, a lot of different emotions happen in people when fights break out. But one thing that is always the case, everybody’s watching, man. Everybody’s, fucking all of their eyes are on the fight.

(01:28:46)
I mean, we were just in Mexico, fucking fight broke out in the good seats right here with these seats that are super expensive. And security never fucking came. They just let these guys fight until they gassed out. And then everybody put their chairs back together and snapped back down and fucking. I literally got up from my table, walked over, and was watching this fight at the fights.
Lex Fridman
(01:29:09)
At the fights. I mean humans fight and humans love watching fighting.
Dana White
(01:29:14)
Absolutely. And that was my thought process going into buying the UFC, and I believe that this would work everywhere. And thank God we were right.
Lex Fridman
(01:29:23)
Well, Dana, thank you for bringing this very human thing of fighting, the art of it, the science of it, the heroic stories, the vision quest stories of it all.
Dana White
(01:29:34)
Boom.
Lex Fridman
(01:29:35)
Really appreciate you talking today, brother.
Dana White
(01:29:36)
Thank you. Pleasure, buddy. Thank you for the kind words.
Lex Fridman
(01:29:40)
Thanks for listening to this conversation with Dana White. To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, let me leave you with some words from Muhammad Ali. “Impossible is just a big word thrown around by small men who find it easier to live in a world they’ve been given than to explore the power they have to change it. Impossible is not a fact, it’s an opinion. Impossible is not a declaration, it’s a dare.” Thank you for listening and hope to see you next time.

Transcript for Annie Jacobsen: Nuclear War, CIA, KGB, Aliens, Area 51, Roswell & Secrecy | Lex Fridman Podcast #420

This is a transcript of Lex Fridman Podcast #420 with Annie Jacobsen.
The timestamps in the transcript are clickable links that take you directly to that point in
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Table of Contents

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Click link to jump approximately to that part in the transcript:

Introduction

Annie Jacobsen
(00:00:00)
The United States has 1,770 nuclear weapons deployed, meaning those weapons could launch in as little as 60 seconds and up to a couple of minutes. Some of them on the bombers might take an hour or so. Russia has 1,674 deployed nuclear weapons. Same scenario. Their weapons systems are on par with ours. That’s not to mention the 12,500 nuclear weapons amongst the nine nuclear armed nations. The sucking up into the nuclear stem, 300 mile an hour winds, you’re talking about people miles out getting sucked up into that stem. When you see the mushroom cloud, Lex, that would be people 30, 40 mile wide mushroom cloud blocking out the sun, and that speaks nothing of the radiation poisoning that follows.

(00:00:58)
In addition to the Launch on Warning concept, there’s this other insane concept called Sole Presidential Authority. And you might think, in a democracy that’s impossible, right? You can’t just start a war. Well, you can just start a nuclear war if you are the commander in chief, the President of the United States. In fact, you’re the only one who can do that. We are one misunderstanding, one miscalculation away from nuclear Armageddon. No matter how nuclear war starts, it ends with everyone dead.
Lex Fridman
(00:01:36)
The following is a conversation with Annie Jacobsen, an investigative journalist, Pulitzer price finalist and author of several amazing books on war, weapons, government secrecy, and national security, including the books titled Area 51, Operation Paperclip, The Pentagon’s Brain, Phenomena, Surprise, Kill, Vanish, and her new book, Nuclear War. This is a Lex Fridman podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, dear friends, here’s Annie Jacobsen.

Nuclear war


(00:02:13)
Let’s start with an immensely dark topic, nuclear war. How many people would a nuclear war between the United States and Russia kill?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:02:24)
I’m coming back at you with a very dark answer and a very big number. And that number is 5 billion people.
Lex Fridman
(00:02:37)
You go second by second, minute by minute, hour by hour what would happen if the nuclear war started? There’s a lot of angles from which I would love to talk to you about this. First, how would the deaths happen in the short term and the long term?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:03:00)
To start off, the reason I wrote the book is so that readers like you could see in appalling detail just how horrific nuclear war would be. And as you said, second by second, minute by minute. The book covers nuclear launch to nuclear winter. I purposely don’t get into the politics that lead up to that or the national security maneuvers or the posturing or any of that. I just want people to know nuclear war is insane. And every source I interviewed for this book, from Secretary of Defense, all retired, nuclear sub-force commander, STRATCOM commander, FEMA director, et cetera. On and on and on, nuclear weapons engineers. They all shared with me the common denominator that nuclear war is insane.

(00:03:58)
First millions, then tens of millions, then hundreds of millions of people will die in the first 72 minutes of a nuclear war. And then, comes nuclear winter where the billions happen from starvation. And so, the shock power of all of this is meant for each and every one of us to say, “Wait, what?” This actually exists behind the veil of national security. Most people do not think about nuclear war on a daily basis, and yet hundreds of thousands of people in the nuclear command and control are at the ready in the event it happens.
Lex Fridman
(00:04:43)
But it doesn’t take too many people to start one.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:04:47)
In the words of Richard Garwin, who was the nuclear weapons engineer who drew the plans for the Ivy Mike thermonuclear bomb, the first thermonuclear bomb ever exploded in 1952. Garwin shared with me his opinion that all it takes is one nihilistic madman with a nuclear arsenal to start a nuclear war. And that’s how I begin the scenario.
Lex Fridman
(00:05:16)
What are the different ways it could start? Literally, who presses a button and what does it take to press a button?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:05:25)
The way it starts is in space, meaning the US Defense Department has a early warning system, and the system in space is called SBIRS. It’s a constellation of satellites that is keeping an eye on all of America’s enemies so that the moment an ICBM launches, the satellite in space… And I’m talking about 1/10 of the way to the moon, that’s how powerful these satellites are in geo-sync. They see the hot rocket exhaust on the ICBM in a fraction of a second after it launches, a fraction of a second.

(00:06:09)
And so, there begins this horrifying policy called Launch on Warning, right? And that’s the US counterattack. Meaning the reason that the United States is so ferociously watching for a nuclear launch somewhere around the globe is so that the nuclear command and control system in the US can move into action to immediately make a counterstrike. Because we have that policy, Launch on Warning, which is exactly like it says. It means the United States will not wait to absorb a nuclear attack. It will launch nuclear weapons in response before the bomb actually hits.

Launch procedure

Lex Fridman
(00:06:57)
So the president, as part of the Launch on Warning policy, has six minutes… I guess can’t launch for six minutes, but at six minute mark from that first warning, the president can launch.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:07:15)
And that was one of the most remarkable details to really nail down for this book when I was reporting this book, and talking to Secretary of Defenses, for example, who are the people who advise the president on this matter, right? You say to yourself, ” Wait a minute. How could that possibly be?” So, let’s unpack that. So, in addition to the Launch on Warning concept, there’s this other insane concept called Sole Presidential Authority. And you might think, in a democracy that’s impossible, right? You can’t just start a war. Well, you can just start a nuclear war if you are the commander in chief, the President of the United States. In fact, you’re the only one who can do that. And we can get into later why that exists. I was able to get the origin story of that concept from Los Alamos, they declassified it for the book.

(00:08:08)
But the idea behind that is that nuclear war will unfold so fast only one person can be in charge. The president. He asks permission of no one. Not the Secretary of Defense, not the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not the US Congress. So, built into that is this extraordinary speed you talk about, the six-minute window. And some people say, “That’s ridiculous. How do we know that six minute window?” Well, here’s the best hitting the nail on the head statement I can give you, which is in President Reagan’s memoirs, he refers to the six-minute window and he says… He calls it irrational, which it is. He says, “How can anyone make a decision to launch nuclear weapons based on a blip on a radar scope.” His words. “To unleash Armageddon.” And yet, that is the reality behind nuclear war.
Lex Fridman
(00:09:08)
Just imagine sitting there, one person, because a president is a human being, sitting there, just got the warning that Russia launched. You have six minutes. I meditate on my immortality every day. And here, you would be sitting and meditating, contemplating not just your own mortality, but the mortality of all the people you know, loved ones. Just imagining. What would be going through my head is all the people I know and love personally, and knowing that there’ll be no more, most likely. And if they somehow survive, they will be suffering and will eventually die.

(00:09:55)
I guess the question that kept coming up is how do we stop this? Is it inevitable that it’s going to be escalated to a full-on nuclear war that destroys everything? And it seems like it will be. It’s inevitable. In the position of the President, it’s almost inevitable that they have to respond.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:10:16)
I mean, one of the things I found shocking was how little apparently most presidents know about the responsibility that literally lays at their feet. You may think through this six-minute window, I may think through this six-minute window. But what I learned, for example, former Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta was really helpful in explaining this to me because before he was SecDef, he served as the director of the CIA. And before that, he was the White House Chief of Staff. And so, he has seen these different roles that have been so close to the President. But he explained to me that when he was the White House Chief of Staff for President Clinton, he noticed how President Clinton didn’t want to ever really deal with the nuclear issue because he had so many other issues to deal with.

(00:11:15)
And that only when Panetta became Secretary of Defense, he told me, did he really realize the weight of all of this, because he knew he would be the person that the president would turn to were he to be notified of a nuclear attack. And by the way, the Launch on Warning, it’s the ballistic missile seen from outer space by the satellite. And then, there also must be a second confirmation from a ground radar system. But in that process, which is just a couple minutes, everyone is getting ready to notify the president. And one of the first people that gets notified by NORAD or by STRATCOM or by NRO, these different parties that all see the early warning data, one of the first people that’s notified is the Secretary of Defense as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because those two together are going to brief the president about, “Sir, you have six minutes to decide.”

Deterrence


(00:12:25)
And that’s where you realize the immediacy of all of this is so counter to imagining the scenario. And again, all the presidents come into office, I have learned, understanding the idea of deterrence, this idea that we have these massive arsenals of nuclear weapons pointed at one another ready to launch so that we never have nuclear war. But what we’re talking about now is, what if we did? What if we did? And what you’ve raised is this really spooky, eerie subtext of the world right now because many of the nuclear armed nations are in direct conflict with other nations. And for the first time in decades, nuclear threats are actually coming out of the mouths of leaders. This is shocking.
Lex Fridman
(00:13:24)
So deterrence, the polite, implied assumption is that nobody will launch. And if they did, we would launch back and everybody would be dead. But that assumption falls apart completely, the whole philosophy of it falls apart once the first launch happens, then you have six minutes to decide, “Wait a minute. Are we going to hit back and kill everybody on earth? Or do we turn the other cheek in the most horrific way possible?”
Annie Jacobsen
(00:13:57)
Well, when nuclear war starts, there’s no battle for New York or battle for Moscow. It’s just literally… It was called in the Cold War, push button warfare. But in essence, that is what it is. Let’s get some numbers on the table if you don’t mind, right? Because when you’re saying like, “Wait a minute. We’re just hoping that it holds.” Right? Let’s just talk about Russia and the US, the arsenals that are literally pointed at one another right now. The United States has 1,770 nuclear weapons deployed, meaning those weapons could launch in as little as 60 seconds and up to a couple minutes. Some of them on the bombers might take an hour or so. Russia has 1,674 deployed nuclear weapons. Same scenario. Their weapons systems are on par with ours. That’s not to mention the 12,500 nuclear weapons amongst the nine nuclear armed nations.

(00:15:04)
But when you think about those kinds of arsenals of just between the United States and Russia, and you realize everything can be launched in seconds and minutes, then you realize the madness of mad, this idea that no one would launch because it would assure everyone’s destruction. Yes. But what if someone did? And in my interviews with scores of top tier national security advisors, people who advise the president, people who are responsible for these decisions if they had to be made, every single one of them said it could happen. They didn’t say this would never happen. And so, the idea is worth thinking about because I believe that it pulls back the veil on a fundamental security that if someone were to use a tactical nuclear weapon, “Well, it’s just an escalation.” It’s far more than that.

Tactical nukes

Lex Fridman
(00:16:11)
So to you, the use of a tactical nuclear weapon, maybe you can draw the line between a tactical and a strategic nuclear weapon. That could be a catalyst. That’s a very difficult thing to walk back from.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:16:23)
Oh, my God. Almost certainly. And again, every person in the national security environment will agree with that, certainly on the American side. Strategic weapons, those are big weapons systems. America has a nuclear triad. We have our ICBMs, which are the silo-based missiles that have a nuclear warhead in the nose cone, and they can get from one continent to the other in roughly 30 minutes. Then we have our bombers, B-52s and B-2s, that are nuclear capable. Those take travel time to get to another continent. Those can also be recalled. The ICBMs cannot be recalled or redirected once launched.
Lex Fridman
(00:17:09)
That one is a particularly terrifying one. So land launched missiles, rockets with a warhead, can’t be recalled.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:17:18)
Cannot be recalled or redirected. And speaking of how little the presidents generally know, as we were talking a moment ago, President Reagan, in 1983, gave a press conference where he misstated that submarine launched ballistic missiles could be recalled. They cannot be recalled. Here’s the guy in charge of the arsenal if it has to get let loose, and he doesn’t even know that they cannot be recalled. So, this is the kind of misinformation and disinformation. UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, recently said when he was talking about the conflicts rising around the world, he said, “We are one misunderstanding, one miscalculation away from nuclear Armageddon.”
Lex Fridman
(00:18:11)
So, just to linger on the previous point of tactical nukes. You were describing strategic nukes, land launched bombers, submarine launched. What are tactical nukes?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:18:23)
That’s the triad, right? And we have the triad, and Russia has the triad. Tactical nuclear weapons are smaller warheads that were designed to be used in battle. And that is what Russia is sort of threatening to use right now. That is this idea, that you would make a decision on the battlefield in an operational environment to use a tactical nuclear weapon. You’re just upping the ante. But the problem is that all treaties are based on this idea of no nuclear use, right? You cannot cross that line. And so, what would happen if the line is crossed is so devastating to even consider. I think that the conversation is well worth having among everyone that is in a power of position. As the UN Secretary General said, “This is madness.” Right? “This is madness. We must come back from the brink. We are at the brink.”
Lex Fridman
(00:19:32)
Can we talk about some other numbers? You mentioned the number of warheads. Land launched, how long does it take to travel across the ocean from the United States to Russia, from Russia to the United States, from China to the United States, approximately how long?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:19:52)
When I was writing an earlier book on DARPA, the Pentagon Science Agency, I went to a library down in San Diego, called the Geisel Library, to look at Herb York’s papers. Herb York was the first chief scientist for the Pentagon for DARPA, then called ARPA. And I had been trying to get the number from the various agencies that be to answer your… What is the exact number and how do we know it? And does it change? And as technology advances, does that number reduce? All these kinds of questions. And no one will answer that question on an official level. And so, much to my surprise, I found the answer in Herb York’s dusty archive of papers. And this is information that was jealously guarded. I mean, it’s not necessarily classified, but it certainly wasn’t out there. And I felt like, “Wow. Herb York left these behind for someone like me to find.”

(00:20:59)
He wanted to know the answer to your question as the guy in charge of it all. So, he hired this group of scientists who then, and still are in many ways, the supermen scientists of the Pentagon, and they’re called the JASON Scientists. Many conspiracies about them abound. I interviewed their founder and have interviewed many of them. But they whittled the number down to seconds specifically for Herb York. And it goes like, because this is where my jaw dropped. And I went, “Wow.” So, 26 minutes and 40 seconds from a launch pad in the Soviet Union to the East Coast. And it happens in three phases. Very simple. And interesting to remember, because then suddenly all of this makes more sense. Boost phase, mid-course phase and then terminal phase, okay?

(00:21:55)
Boost phase, five minutes. That’s when the rocket launches. So, you just imagine a rocket going off the launch pad and the fire beneath it. Again, that’s why the satellites can see it. Now it’s becoming visual, now it makes sense to me. Five minutes. And that’s where the rocket can be tracked. And then imagine learning, “Wait a minute. After five minutes, the rocket can no longer be seen from space. The satellite can only see the hot rocket exhaust.” Then the missile enters its mid-course phase, 20 minutes. And that’s the ballistic part of it, where it’s flying up at between 500 and 700 miles above the earth and moving very fast and with the earth until it gets very close to its target. And the last 100 seconds are terminal phase. It’s where the warhead re-enters the atmosphere and detonates.

(00:22:55)
26 minutes and 40 seconds. Now in my scenario, I open with North Korea launching a one megaton nuclear warhead at Washington DC. That’s the nihilistic madman maneuver. That’s the bolt out of the blue attack that everyone in Washington will tell you they’re afraid of. And North Korea has a little bit different geography. And so, I had MIT Professor Emeritus Ted Postol do the math, 33 minutes from a launch pad in Pyongyang to the East coast of the United States. You get the idea, it’s about 30 minutes.

(00:23:37)
But hopefully now that allows readers to suddenly see all this as a real… You almost see it as poetry, as terrible as that may sound. You can visualize it and suddenly it makes sense. And I think the sense-making part of it is really what I’m after in this book. Because I want people to understand, on the one hand, it’s incredibly simple, it’s just the people that have made it so complicated.
Lex Fridman
(00:24:05)
But it’s one of those things that can change all of world history in a matter of minutes. We just don’t, as a human civilization, have experience with that. But it doesn’t mean it’ll never happen. It can happen just like that.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:24:23)
I mean, I think what you’re after, and I couldn’t agree more with, is why is this fundamentally annihilating system, a system of mass genocide? As John Rubel in the book refers to it. Why is it still exist? We’ve had 75 years since there’ve been two superpowers with the nuclear bomb. So, that threat has been there for 75 years, and we have managed to stay alive. One of the reasons why so many of the sources in the book agreed to talk to me, people who had not previously gone on the record about all of this, was because they are now approaching the end of their lives. They spent their lives dedicated to preventing nuclear World War III. And they’ll be the first people to tell you we’re closer to this as a reality than ever before. And so, the only bright side of any of this is that the answer lies most definitely in communication.

Nuclear submarines

Lex Fridman
(00:25:35)
So, there’s a million other questions here. I think the details are fascinating and important to understand. So one, you also say nuclear submarines… You mentioned about 30 minutes, 26, 33 minutes. But with nuclear submarines, that number can be much, much lower. So, how long does it take for a warhead missile to reach the east coast of the United States from a submarine?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:26:04)
Just when you thought it was really bad, and then you realize about the submarines. I mean, the submarines are what are called second strike capacity. Submarines were described to me this way, they are as dangerous to civilization… And let me say a nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered submarine is as dangerous to civilization as an asteroid. They’re unstoppable. They are unlocatable, the former Chief of the Nuclear Submarine Forces, Admiral Michael Connor, told me it’s easier to find a grapefruit-sized object in space than a submarine under the sea.

(00:26:48)
These things are like hell machines, and they’re moving around throughout the oceans, ours, Russia’s, China’s, maybe North Korea’s constantly. And we now know they’re sneaking up to the east and west coast of the United States within a couple hundred miles. How do we know that? Why do we know that? Well, I found a document inside of a budget that the defense department was going to Congress for more money recently and showed maps of precisely where these submarines… How close they were getting to the eastern seaboard.
Lex Fridman
(00:27:23)
Wat, wait, wait. So, nuclear subs are getting within 200 miles?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:27:27)
Couple hundred miles, yes. They weren’t precise on the number, but when you look at the map-
Lex Fridman
(00:27:27)
Couple hundred.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:27:32)
Yeah. And that’s when you’re talking about under 10 minutes from launch to strike.
Lex Fridman
(00:27:37)
Undetectable.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:27:38)
And they’re undetectable. The map making is done after the fact because of a lot of underwater surveillance systems that we have. But in real time, you cannot find a nuclear submarine. And just the way a submarine launches goes 150 feet below the surface to launch its ballistic missile. I mean, it comes out of the missile tube with enough thrust that the thrusters, the boot, they ignite outside the water and then they move into boost. And so, the technology involved is just stunning and shocking. And again, trillions of dollars spent so that we never have a nuclear war. But my God, what if we did.

Nuclear missiles

Lex Fridman
(00:28:25)
As you write, they’re called the handmaidens of the apocalypse. What a terrifying label. I mean, one of the things you also write about, so for the land launched ones, they’re presumably underground. So the silos, how long does it take to go from pressing the button to them emerging from underground for launch? And is that part detectable or it’s only the heat?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:28:55)
What’s interesting about the silos, America has 400 silos, right? We’ve had more. But we have 400, and they’re underground, and they’re called Minutemen after the Revolutionary War heroes. But the joke in Washington is they’re not called Minutemen for nothing, because they can launch in one minute. The president orders the launch of the ICBMs, ICBM stands for Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. He orders the launch, and they launch 60 seconds later. And then, they take 30 some odd minutes to get to where they’re going.

(00:29:32)
The submarines take about 14 or 15 minutes from the launch command to actually launching. And that has to do, I surmise, with the location of the submarine, its depth. Some of these things are so highly classified and other details are shockingly available if you look deep enough, or if you ask enough questions, and you can go from one document to the next, to the next and really find these answers.
Lex Fridman
(00:30:03)
Not to ask top secret questions, but to what degree do you think the Russians know the locations of the silos in the US and vice versa?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:30:12)
Lex, you and I can find the location of every silo right now.
Lex Fridman
(00:30:16)
Oh, no.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:30:17)
They’re all there. And before they were there on Google, they were there in Maps because we’re a democracy and we make these things known. Now, what’s tricky is that Russia and North Korea rely upon what are called road mobile launchers. Russia has a lot of underground silos. All of the scenario takes you through these different facilities that really do exist, and they’re all sourced with how many weapons they have and their launch procedures and whatnot. But in addition to having underground silos, they have road mobile launchers, and that means you just have one of these giant ICBMs on a 22 axle truck that can move stealthily around the country so that it can’t be targeted by the US Defense Department.

(00:31:08)
We don’t have those in America, because presumably the average American isn’t going to go for the ICBM road mobile launcher driving down the street in your town or city, which is why the Defense Department will justify we need the second strike capacity capability, the submarines, because… The wonky stuff that is worth looking into, if you really dig the book and are like, “Wait a minute.” It’s all footnoted where you can learn more about how these systems have changed over time. And why, more than anything, it’s very difficult to get out of this catch-22 conundrum that we need nuclear weapons to keep us safe. That is the real enigma. Because the other guys have them, right? And the other guys have-
Annie Jacobsen
(00:32:01)
The other guys have them. And the other guys have more sinister ways of using them, or at least that’s what the nomenclature out of the Pentagon will always be when anyone tries to say, “We just need to really think about full disarmament.”
Lex Fridman
(00:32:16)
You’ve written about intelligence agencies. How good are the intelligence agencies on this? How much does CIA know about the Russian launch sites, and capabilities, and command and control procedures, and all of this and vice versa?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:32:33)
I mean, all of this, because it’s decades old, is really well known. If you go to the Federation of American Scientists, they have a team led by a guy called Hans Kristensen who runs what’s called the Nuclear Notebook. And he and his team every year are keeping track of this number of warheads on these number of weapon systems. And because of the treaties, the different signatories to the treaty all report these numbers. And of course, the different intelligence community, people are keeping track of what’s being revealed honestly and reported with transparency and what is being hidden. The real issue is the new systems that Russia is working on right now, and that will lead us… We are moving into an era whereby the threat of actually having new weapon systems that are nuclear capable is very real because of the escalating tensions around the world. And that’s where the CIA would guess is doing most of its work right now.
Lex Fridman
(00:33:38)
So most of your research is looking at the older versions of the system, and presumably there’s potentially secret development of new ones, hopefully not-
Annie Jacobsen
(00:33:50)
Which violates treaties.
Lex Fridman
(00:33:52)
Yes.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:33:52)
So yes, that is where the intelligence agencies… But at a point, it’s overkill, literally and figuratively. People are up in arms about these hypersonic weapons. Well, we have a hypersonic weapons program, Falcon. Google Blackswift. This is Lockheed’s doing. DARPA exists to create the vast weapon systems of the future. That is its job. It has been doing that since its creation in 1957. I would never believe that we aren’t ahead of everyone. Call me over- informed or naive, one or the other. That would be my position because DARPA works from the chicken or the egg scenario. That once you learn about something, once you learn Russia’s created this Typhoon submarine, which may or may not be viable, it’s too late if you don’t already have one.
Lex Fridman
(00:34:50)
We’ll probably talk about DARPA a little bit. One of the things that makes me sad about Lockheed, many things make me sad about Lockheed, but one of the things is because it’s very top secret, you can’t show off all the incredible engineering going on there. The other thing that’s more philosophical, DARPA also, is that war seems to stimulate most of our, not most, but a large percent of our exciting innovation in engineering. But that’s also the pragmatic fact of life on earth is that the risk of annihilation is a great motivator for innovation, for engineering, and so on. But yes, I would not discount the United States in its ability to build the weapons of the future, nuclear included. Again, terrifying. Can you tell me about the nuclear football, as it’s called?

Nuclear football

Annie Jacobsen
(00:35:50)
I think Americans are familiar with the football, at least anyone who follows national security concepts because it’s a satchel. It’s a leather satchel that is always with a military aide in Secret Service nomenclature. That’s the mil aide. And he’s trailing around the president 24/7, 365 days a year, and also the vice president, by the way, with the ability to launch nuclear war in that six-minute window all the time. That is also called the football, and it’s always with the president. To report this part of the book, I interviewed a lot of people in the Secret Service that are with the president and talk about this. And the Director of the Secret Service, a guy called Lou Merletti, told me a story that I just really found fascinating. He was also in charge of the president’s detail, President Clinton this was, before he was director of the Secret Service.

(00:36:51)
And he told me the story about how, he said, “The football is with the president at all times, period.” They were traveling to Syria, and Clinton was meeting with President Assad. And they got into an elevator, Clinton and the Secret Service team, and one of Assad’s guys was like, “No.” About the mil aide. And Lou said it was like a standoff because there was no way they were not going to have the president with his football in an elevator. And it sums up. For me anyways, you realize what goes into every single one of these decisions. You realize the massive system of systems behind every item you might just see in passing and glancing on the news as you see the mil aide carrying that satchel. Well, what’s in that satchel? I really dug into that to report this book.
Lex Fridman
(00:37:56)
What is in that satchel?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:37:56)
Okay. So well, okay. First of all, people always say, “It’s incredibly classified.” I mean, people talk about UFOs. “It’s incredibly…” I mean, come on, guys. That is nothing burger. You want to know what’s really classified? What’s in that football? What’s in that satchel? But the PEAD, Presidential Emergency Action Directives, those have never been leaked. No one knows what they are. What we do know from one of the mil aides who spoke on the record, a guy called Buzz Patterson, he describes the President’s orders. So if a nuclear war has begun, if the president has been told, “There are nuclear missiles, one or more, coming at the United States, you have to launch in a counterattack. The red clock is ticking. You have to get the blue impact clock ticking.” He needs to look at this list to decide what targets to strike and what weapon systems to use. And that is what is on, according to Buzz Patterson, a piece of laminated plastic. He described it like a Denny’s menu. And from that menu, the president chooses targets and chooses weapon systems.
Lex Fridman
(00:39:14)
And it’s probably super old school, like all top secret systems are, because they have to be tested over and over and over and over and over, probably-
Annie Jacobsen
(00:39:23)
Yes, and it’s non-digital.
Lex Fridman
(00:39:24)
Non-digital. It might literally be a Denny’s menu from hell.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:39:29)
Right. And meanwhile, I learned this only in reporting the book. There is a identical black book inside the STRATCOM bunker in Nebraska. So three command bunkers are involved when nuclear war begins. There’s the bunker beneath the Pentagon, which is called the National Military Command Center. Then there is the bunker beneath Cheyenne Mountain, which everyone has or many people have heard of because it’s been made famous in movies. That is a very real bunker. And then there is a third bunker, which people are not so familiar with, which is the bunker beneath Strategic Command in Nebraska.

(00:40:13)
And so it’s described to me this way, the Pentagon bunker is the beating heart, the Cheyenne Mountain bunker is the brains, and the STRATCOM bunker is the muscle. The STRATCOM commander will receive word from the president, “Launch orders.” And then directs the 150,000 people beneath him what to do from the bunker beneath STRATCOM. He gets the orders, then he has to run out of the building and jump onto what’s called the doomsday plane. We’ll get into that in a minute. Let me just finish the… I mean, but again-
Lex Fridman
(00:40:57)
No, this is good. All right.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:40:57)
… these are the details. These are the systematic sequential details that happen in seconds and minutes. And reporting them, I never cease to be amazed by what a system it is. A follows B. It’s just numerical, right?
Lex Fridman
(00:41:19)
Yeah, but as we discuss this procedure, each individual person that follows that procedure might lose the big picture of the whole thing. I mean, especially when you realize what is happening that almost out of fear, you just follow the steps.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:41:38)
Yep. Or okay, so imagine this. Imagine being the president, and you got that six minute. You’re looking at your list of strike options. You’re being briefed by your chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and your SecDef. And this other really spooky detail. In the STRATCOM bunker, in addition to the nuclear strike advisor who can answer very specific questions, if the president’s like, “Wait a minute, why are we striking that and not that?” There’s also a weather officer. And this is the kind of human detail that kept me up at night because that weather officer is in charge of explaining to the president really fast, how many people are going to die and how many people are going to die in minutes, weeks, months, and years from radiation fallout.
Lex Fridman
(00:42:38)
Because a lot of that has to do with the weather system.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:42:41)
Yes. Yes. And so these kinds of the humanness balanced out with the mechanization of it all, it’s just really grotesque.
Lex Fridman
(00:42:58)
So the doomsday plane from STRATCOM?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:43:00)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:43:01)
What’s that? Where’s it going? What’s on it?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:43:01)
Right.
Lex Fridman
(00:43:05)
[inaudible 00:43:05].
Annie Jacobsen
(00:43:05)
Okay, ready?
Lex Fridman
(00:43:06)
Yeah.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:43:06)
It’s going to fly in circles. That’s where it’s going. It’s flying in circles around the United States of America so that nuclear weapons can be launched from the air after the ground systems are taken out by the incoming ICBMs or the incoming submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This has been in play since the ’50s. These are the contingency plans for when nuclear war happens. So again, going back to this absurd paradox, nuclear war will never happen. Mutual assured destruction, that is why deterrence will hold. Well, I found a talk that the deputy director of STRATCOM gave to a very close-knit group where he said, “Yes, deterrence will hold. But if it fails, everything unravels.” And think about that word unravels. And the unraveling is the doomsday plane launches. The STRATCOM commander jumps in. He’s in that plane, he’s flying around the United States, and he’s making decisions because the Pentagon’s been taken out. At 9/11, by the way, Bush was in the doomsday plane.
Lex Fridman
(00:44:25)
And Bush had to make decisions quickly, but not as quickly as he would’ve needed to have done if there’s a nuclear launch.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:44:35)
I mean-
Lex Fridman
(00:44:35)
Six minutes.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:44:37)
… it basically happens in three acts. There’s the first 24 minutes, the next 24 minutes, and the last 24 minutes. And that is the reality of nuclear weapons.

Missile interceptor system

Lex Fridman
(00:44:54)
What is the interceptor capabilities of the United States? How many nuclear missiles can be stopped?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:45:02)
I was at a dinner party with a very informed person, somebody who really should have known this, and this is what I was considering writing and reporting this book. And he said to me, “Oh Annie, that would never happen because of our powerful interceptor system.” Okay. Well, he’s wrong. Let me tell you about our powerful interceptor system. First of all, we have 44 interceptor missiles total, period, full stop. Let me repeat, 44. Earlier we were talking about Russia’s 1,670 deployed nuclear weapons. How are those 44 interceptor missiles going to work? And they also have a success rate of around 50%. So they work 50% of the time.

(00:45:58)
There are 40 of them in Alaska, and there are four of them at Vandenberg Air Force Base in Santa Barbara. And they are responsible at about nine minutes into the scenario. After the ICBM has finished that five-minute boost phase we talked about, now it’s in mid-course phase, and the ground radar systems have identified, yes, this is an incoming ICBM. And now the interceptor missiles have to launch. It’s essentially shooting a missile with a missile. Inside the interceptor, which is just a big giant rocket, in its nose cone, it has what’s called the aptly named Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle. There’s no explosives in that thing. It’s literally just going to take out the warhead ideally with force. So one of them is going mach 20. I mean, the speeds at which these two moving objects hurtling through space are going is astonishing. And the fact that interception is even possible is really remarkable, but it’s only possible 50% of the time.
Lex Fridman
(00:47:16)
Is it possible that we only know about 44, but there could be a lot more?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:47:20)
No, impossible. That I would be willing to bet.
Lex Fridman
(00:47:24)
And how well-tested are these interceptors?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:47:26)
Well, that’s where we get the success rate that’s around 50% because of the tests. And actually the interceptor program is, are you ready for this? It’s on strategic pause right now, meaning the interceptor missiles are there, but developing them and making them more effective is on strategic pause because they can’t be made more effective. People have these fantasies that we have a system like the Iron Dome. And they see this in current events, and they’re like, “Oh, our interceptors would do that.” It’s just simply not true.
Lex Fridman
(00:47:59)
Why can’t an Iron Dome-like system be constructed for nuclear warheads?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:48:03)
We have systems I write about called the THAAD system, which is ground-based, and then the Aegis system, which is on vessels. And these are great at shooting down some rockets, but they can only shoot them one at a time. You cannot shoot the mother load as it’s coming in. Those are the smaller systems, the tactical nuclear weapons. And by the way, our THAAD systems are all deployed overseas, and our Aegis systems are all out at sea. And again, reporting that, I was like, “Wait, what? You have to really hunker down. Are we sure about this?” People really don’t want to believe this is an actual fact. After 9/11, Congress considered putting Aegis missiles and maybe even THAAD systems along the West Coast of the United States to specifically deal with the threats against nuclear-armed North Korea. But it hasn’t done so yet. And again, you have to ask yourself, “Wait a minute. This is insanity.” One nuclear weapon gets by any of these systems, and it’s full-out nuclear warfare. So that’s not the solution. More nuclear weapons is not the solution.

North Korea

Lex Fridman
(00:49:10)
I’m looking for a hopeful thing here about North Korea. How many deployed nuclear warheads does North Korea have? So does the current system, as we described it, the interceptors and so on, have a hope against the North Korean attack? The one that you mentioned people are worried about.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:49:31)
So North Korea has 50, let’s say 50 nuclear weapons right now. Some NGOs put it at more than 100. It’s impossible to know because North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has no transparency. They’re the only nuclear-armed nation that doesn’t announce when they do a ballistic missile test. Everyone else does. No one wants to start a nuclear war by accident. So if Russia is going to launch an ICBM, they tell us. If we’re going to launch one, and I’m talking test runs here, with a dummy warhead, we tell them. Not North Korea. That’s a fact. So we’re constantly up against the fear of North Korea. In the scenario, I have the incoming North Korean one-megaton weapon coming in, and the interceptor system tries to shoot it down. So there’s not enough time. And this, by the way, I ran through by all generals from the Pentagon who run these scenarios for NORAD and confirmed all of this as fact. This is the situation.

(00:50:42)
So in the scenario, I have the nuclear ICBM coming in. The interceptor missiles try to shoot down the warhead. The capability is not like what’s called shoot and look. There’s not enough time to go, “And we’re going to try to get it. We missed it. Okay, let’s go for another one.” So you have to go… So in my scenario, we fire off four, which is about what I was told, one to four, because you’re worried about the next one that’s going to come in. You’re going to use up 10% of your missile force, of your interceptor force on one, and all four miss. And that’s totally plausible.
Lex Fridman
(00:51:19)
Right. How likely are mistakes, accidents, false alarms taken as real, all this kind of stuff in this picture? So we’ve assumed the detection works correctly. How likely is it possible, anywhere? You described this long chain of events that can happen. How possible is it just to make a mistake, a stupid human mistake along the way?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:51:45)
There have been at least six known absolute, oh my God, close calls, how, thank God this happened, type scenarios. One was described to me with an actual personal participant, former Secretary of Defense, Bill Perry, and he described what happened to him in 1979. He was not yet Secretary of Defense. He was the Deputy Director of the Research and Engineering, which is a big job at the Pentagon. And the night watch fell on him essentially. And he gets this call in the middle of the night. He’s told that Russia has launched not just ICBMs, but submarine-launched ballistic missiles are coming at the United States. And he is about to notify the president that the six-minute window has to begin when he learns it was a mistake.

(00:52:41)
The mistake was that there was a training tape with a nuclear war scenario. We haven’t even begun to talk about the nuclear war scenarios that the Pentagon runs. An actual VHS training tape had been incorrectly inserted into a system at the Pentagon. And so this nuclear launch showed up at that bunker beneath the Pentagon and at the bunker beneath STRATCOM because they’re connected, as being real. And then it was like, oh, whoops. It’s actually a simulation test tape. And Perry described to me what that was like, the pause in his spirit and his mind and his heart when he realized, “I’m about to have to tell the president that he needs to launch nuclear weapons.” And he learned just in the nick of time that it was an error. And that’s one of five examples.
Lex Fridman
(00:53:36)
Can you speak to maybe is there any more color to the feelings he was feeling? What’s your sense? And given all the experts you’ve talked to, what can be said about the seconds that one feels once finding out that a launch has happened, even if that information is false information?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:54:00)
For me personally, that’s the only firsthand story that I ever heard because it’s so rare and it’s so unique. And most people in the national security system, at least in the past, have been loath to talk about any of this. It’s the sacred oath. It’s taboo. It’s taboo to go against the system of systems that is making sure nuclear war never happens. Bill Perry was one of the first people who did this. And a lot of it, I believe, at least in my lengthy conversations with him, we had a lot of Zoom calls over COVID when I began reporting this.

(00:54:40)
And he had a lot to do with me feeling like I could write this book from a human point of view and not just from the mechanized systems. Because, and I only lightly touch upon this because it’s such a fast sweeping scenario, but Perry, for example, spent his whole life dedicated to building weapons of war only later in life to realize this is madness. And he shared with me that it was that idea about one’s grandchildren inheriting these nuclear arsenals and the lack of wisdom that comes with their origin stories. When you’re involved in it in the ground up, apparently it has perhaps you’re a different kind of steward of these systems than if you just inherit them, and they are pages in a manual.

Nuclear war scenarios

Lex Fridman
(00:55:45)
People forget. You mentioned the nuclear war scenarios that the Pentagon runs. I’d love to… What do you know about those?
Annie Jacobsen
(00:55:53)
I mean, again, they are very classified. I mean, it was interesting coming across levels of classification I didn’t even know existed. ECI, for example, is exceptionally controlled information. But the Pentagon nuclear war gaming scenarios, they’re almost all still classified. One of them was declassified recently, if you can call it that. I show an image of it in the book, and it’s just basically almost entirely redacted. And then there’ll be a date, or it’ll say, “Phase one.” And that one was called Proud Prophet. But what was incredible about the declassification process of that is it allowed a couple of people who were there to talk about it, and that’s why we have that information.

(00:56:43)
And I write about Proud Prophet in the book because it was super significant in many ways. One, it was happening right… In 1983, it was an insane moment in nuclear arsenals. There were 60,000 nuclear weapons. Right now there’s 12,500. So we’ve come a long way, baby, in terms of disarmament. But there were 60,000. And by the way, that was not the ultimate high. The ultimate high was 70,000. This is insane. And Ronald Reagan was president, and he orders this war game called Proud Prophet, and everyone that mattered was involved. They were running the war game scenarios.

(00:57:25)
And what we learned from his declassification is that no matter how nuclear war starts, there was a bunch of different scenarios, with NATO involved, without NATO, all different scenarios. No matter how nuclear war starts, it ends in Armageddon. It ends with everyone dead. I mean, this is shocking when you think about that coupled with the idea that all that has been done in the 40 some odd years since is, okay, let’s just really lean in even harder to this theoretical phenomena of deterrence. Because that’s all it is, it’s just a statement, Lex. Deterrence will hold. Okay. Well, what if it doesn’t? Well, we know from Proud Prophet what happens if it doesn’t.
Lex Fridman
(00:58:20)
So almost always, so there’s no mechanisms in the human mind and the human soul that stops it in the governments that we’ve created. The procedure escalates always.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:58:31)
I mean, here’s a crazy nomenclature, jargon thing for you. Ready? Escalate to deescalate. That’s what comes out of it. Think about what I just said. Escalate to deescalate. So someone strikes you with a nuclear weapon, you’re going to escalate it. General Hyten recently said he was STRATCOM commander. He was saber-rattling with North Korea during COVID, and he said, “They need to know if they launch one nuclear weapon, we launch one. If they launch two, we launch two.” But it’s actually more than that. They launch one, we launch 80. That’s called escalate to deescalate. Pound the you know what out of them to get them to stop.
Lex Fridman
(00:59:14)
But to make a case for that, there is a reason to the madness because you want to threaten this gigantic response. But when it comes to it, the seconds before, there is still a probability that you’ll pull back.
Annie Jacobsen
(00:59:36)
Which brings us to the most terrifying facts that I learned in all of that, and that has to do with errors. Not errors of like we spoke about a minute ago with a simulation test tape. I’m talking about if one madman, one nihilistic madman were to launch a nuclear weapon as I write in this scenario, and we needed to escalate to deescalate. We needed to send nuclear weapons at, let’s say North Korea as I do in my scenario.

(01:00:08)
Well, what is completely unknown to 98% of the planet is that not only do the Russians have a very flawed satellite system so that they cannot interpret what is happening properly, but there is an absolutely existential flaw in the system, which Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta confirmed with me, which is that our ICBMs do not have enough range. If we launch a counterattack against, say, North Korea, our ICBMs must fly over Russia. They must fly over Russia. So imagine saying, “Oh, no, no. These 82 warheads that are going to actually strike the Northern Korean peninsula are not coming for you, Russia.” Our adversary right now that we’re saber-rattling with. “Just trust us.” And that is where nuclear war unfolds into Armageddon. And that hole in national security is shocking. And as Panetta told me, no one wants to discuss it.
Lex Fridman
(01:01:22)
And if one nuclear weapon does reach its target, I presume communication breaks down completely, or there’s a high risk of breakdown of communication.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:01:36)
Well, let’s back up. We are both presumptuous to assume that communication could even happen prior to, and let me give you a very specific example. During the Ukraine war, if perhaps you remember, I think it was in November of 2022. News reports erroneously stated that a Russian rocket, a Russian missile had hit Poland, a NATO country. It turned out to be a mistake, but for several hours, this was actually the information that was all over the news, breaking news. 36 hours later, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, gave a press conference and talked about this and admitted that he could not reach his Russian counterpart during those 36 hours. He could not reach him. How are you going to not have an absolute Armageddon-like furor with nuclear weapons in the air if people can’t get on the phone during a ground war?
Lex Fridman
(01:02:48)
I’d like to believe that there’s people in major nations that don’t give a damn about the bullshit of politics and can always just pick up the phone. Very close to the top, but not at the very top, and just cut through the bullshit of it in situations like this.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:03:09)
I hope that’s true. I doubt it is, and let me tell you why. Most, and neither you nor I are political, from what I gather. So I just write about POTUS, President of the United States. You have no idea what my politics are because they shouldn’t matter. No one should be for nuclear war, or no one should be for national insecurity. Yes, you want to have a strong nation. But once you get into politics, then you’re talking about sycophants. And the more a political leader becomes divisive, becomes polemic, the more his platform is predicated on hating the other side, either within his own country or with alleged enemy nations. The more you surround yourself, as we see in the current day with sycophants, with people who will tell you not only what they think you want-
Annie Jacobsen
(01:04:00)
… defense with people who will tell you not only what they think you want to hear, but will help them to hold onto power. So you don’t have wise decision makers. Long gone are the days where we had presidents who had advisors on both sides of the aisle. That’s really important, because you want to have differing opinions. But as things become more viperous, both here in the United States and in nuclear armed nations, all bets are off at whether your advisors are going to give you good advice.

Warmongers

Lex Fridman
(01:04:38)
Who are the people around the President of the United States that give advice in this six minute window? How many of them just, maybe you could speak to the detail of that, but also to the spirit of the way they see the world. How many of them are warmongers? How many of them are kind of big picture, peace, humanity type of thinkers?
Annie Jacobsen
(01:04:59)
Well, again, we’re talking about that six minute window, so it’s not exactly like you can, let me put a pot of coffee on and really tell me what you think and we can strategize here, right? You have your SecDef and your chairman, maybe the vice chairman.

(01:05:13)
We haven’t even begun to talk about the fact that at the same time, these advisors also have a parallel concern, and that’s called continuity of government. So while they’re trying to advise on the nuclear counterstrike in response to the incoming nuclear missile, they have to be thinking, “How are we going to keep the government functioning when the missiles start hitting, when the bombs start going off?” And that is about getting yourself out of the Pentagon, let’s say. Getting yourself to one of these nuclear bunkers that I write about at length in the book.

(01:05:50)
So how much can you ask of a human, right? Because it comes down to a human. Secretary of Defense is a human. Imagine that job while trying to advise the president. And then there’s also a really interesting term which I learned about called jamming the president, which is often understood in Washington that the military advisors would, we don’t know if this is legit, we’ve never seen it put to the test, but jamming the president means the military advisors are going to push for a really aggressive counter attack immediately.

(01:06:26)
And again, you’re the president who’s not really been paying attention to this because he has many other things to deal with. Speed is not conducive to wisdom.
Lex Fridman
(01:06:36)
Can you speak to the jamming the president? So your sense is the advisors would by default be pushing for aggressive counter attack.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:06:46)
That is a term in sort of the national security nuclear command and control historical documentation that many of the people that you might call the more dovish type people are worried about, that the more hawkish people, the military advisors, are going to be jamming the president to make these decisions about which targets. Not if, but what.
Lex Fridman
(01:07:15)
The argument will be about which targets, not about if.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:07:18)
Yes. Yes.
Lex Fridman
(01:07:19)
I hope that even the warmongers would at this moment… Because what underlies the idea of you wanting to go to war? It’s power. It’s like wanting to destroy the enemy and be the big kid on the block. But with nuclear war, it just feels like that falls apart. Do you think warmongers actually believe they can win a nuclear war?
Annie Jacobsen
(01:07:44)
Well, you’ve raised a really important question that we looked at the historical record for that answer. Because astonishingly, all of this began, like when Russia first got the bomb in 1949, the powers that be, and I write about them in the book is in a setup for the moment of launch. It’s called How We Got Here. And you see, and I cite declassified documents from some of these early meetings where nuclear war plans were being laid out. And absolutely back in the 1950s the generals and the admirals that were running the nuclear command and control system believed that we could fight and win a nuclear war despite hundreds of millions of people dying. This was the prevailing thought. And only over time did the kind of concept come into play that no, we can never have a nuclear war. It’s the famous Gorbachev and Reagan joint statement. “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” But before that, many people believed that it could be won, and they were preparing for that.

President’s cognitive ability

Lex Fridman
(01:09:07)
Not to be political and not to be ageist, but do cognitive abilities and all that kind of stuff come into play here? So if so much is riding on the president, is there tests that are conducted? Is there regular training procedures on the president that you’re aware of? Do you know?
Annie Jacobsen
(01:09:29)
I don’t think that has anything to do with ageism. I think it’s an earnest question, a really powerful one. And if people were to ask that question of themselves or their sort of dinner party guests or their family around the dinner table guests, you might come to a real good conclusion about how bad our political system is and how bad our presidential candidates are. Because why on earth there would be two candidates, one of whom has cognitive problems and the other of whom has judgment problems? These are the two biggest issues with the nuclear launch, judgment and cognition. And so where’s the young-ish, thoughtful, forward looking, wise, dedicated civil servant running for president? I know that sounds fantastical, but I wish it weren’t.
Lex Fridman
(01:10:32)
So that’s one of the things that you really think about when voting for president is this scenario that we’ve been describing, these six minutes. Imagine the man or woman sitting there six minutes waiting for the pot of coffee.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:10:47)
But I think about that issue with any war. I mean, prior to writing Nuclear War: A Scenario, I previously wrote six books on military and intelligence programs designed to prevent nuclear war. And I believe the president as commander in chief should be of the highest character possible. Because the programs, the wars that we have fought since World War II have all been… How many octogenarian sources have I interviewed? I’m talking about Nobel Laureates and weapons designers and spy pilots and engineers in general. They’ve all said to me with great pride, “We prevented World War III, nuclear World War III.”

(01:11:43)
But that idea that the commander in chief and everyone within the national security apparatus should be making really good decisions about war. It’s the oldest cliche in the world that the wars are fought by the young kids. It’s not a cliche; it’s true. And so the character part about the president should be in play whether we’re thinking about nuclear war or any war, in my opinion.
Lex Fridman
(01:12:11)
Well, I agree with you first of all, but it feels like with nuclear war, one person becomes exponentially more important. With regular war, the decision to go to war or not, advisors start mattering more. There’s judgment issues. You could start to make arguments for more leeway in terms of what kind of people we elect. It seems like with nuclear war, there’s no leeway. It’s like one person can resist the jamming the president force, the warmongers all the calculation in considering what are the errors, the mistakes, the missiles flying over Russia, the full dynamics of the geopolitics going on in the world, consider all of humanity, the history of humanity, the future of humanity, all of it just loaded in to make a decision. Then it becomes much more important that your cognitive abilities are strong and your judgment abilities against powerful wise people just as a human being are strong. So I think that’s something to really, really consider when you vote for president.

(01:13:32)
But to which degree is it really on the president versus to the people advising?
Annie Jacobsen
(01:13:37)
Oh no, it’s on the president. The president has to make the call. And that six minute window happens so fast. I mean, the president is going to be being moved for part of that time. The Secret Service is going to be up against STRATCOM. STRATCOM saying, “We need the launch orders,” and the Secret Service is going to be saying, “We need to move the president.” So it’s not as much that he’s delegating the issues; it’s more like the issue is being postponed. Because there is only one issue, for the president to say, “These targets.” For him to choose from the Denny’s like menu, “Okay, this is what we’re going to go with.”

(01:14:13)
And then this astonishing thing happens. The president takes out his wallet. He has a card in it that’s colloquially called the biscuit, and that card with the codes matches up an item in the briefcase in the football that then is received by an officer underneath the Pentagon in that bunker. It’s a call and response, Lex. It’s like alpha zeta, that’s it. And then back so that the individual in the bunker realizes they are getting the command from the president. And then that order is passed to STRATCOM. And STRATCOM, the commander of STRATCOM, and I interviewed a former commander of STRATCOM, commander of STRATCOM then follows orders, which is he delivers the launch orders to the nuclear triad, and what’s done is done.

Refusing orders

Lex Fridman
(01:15:19)
What would you do if you were the commander of STRATCOM in that situation? What would you do? Because I think my gut reaction right now, if you just throw me in there, I would refuse orders.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:15:28)
Okay, so good question. I asked that exact question to one of my very helpful sources on the book, Dr. Glen McDuff, who is at Los Alamos and who for a while was the classified… They have a museum that’s classified within the lab, and he was the historian in charge of it. He’s a nuclear weapons engineer. He worked on Star Wars during the Reagan era. And he does a lot having to do with the history of Los Alamos. By the way, because I’ve reported on nuclear weapons for 12 years now, and Oppenheimer movie had a very, to me, positive impact on Los Alamos’ transparency with people like me. They had a real willingness to share information. I think before perhaps they were on their heels feeling they needed to be on the defensive, but now they’re much more forthcoming. They were super helpful. I can tell you the origin story of the football, which they declassified for the book. But I asked this question to Dr. Glen McDuff in a different manner. I said, “Is there a chance that the STRATCOM commander would defy orders?” And he said, “Annie, you have a better chance winning Powerball.”
Lex Fridman
(01:16:54)
Why do you think? What’s his intuition behind that?
Annie Jacobsen
(01:16:58)
You don’t wind up as STRATCOM commander unless you are someone who follows orders. You follow orders.
Lex Fridman
(01:17:08)
You don’t think there’s a deep humanity there? Because his intuition is about everything we know so far, but this situation has never happened in the history of earth.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:17:19)
You’re raising a really tricky, interesting conundrum here. Because during COVID, when President Trump and the leader of North Korea were kind of locked in various relationships with one another, good, bad, threatening, non-threatening, friendly; just bananas, you might say, not presidential behavior. If you were someone watching C-span like I do, nerding out on what STRATCOM was actually saying about all this, you noticed that STRATCOM commanders were speaking out publicly to Congress more so than ever I had ever seen before. And this issue came up, would you defy presidential orders?

(01:18:07)
So the caveat I would say to McDuff’s answer of easier to win the Powerball is that if the commander of STRATCOM interpreted the president’s behavior to be unreliable, to be non-presidential, then dot dot dot. But now you’re into some really radical territory.
Lex Fridman
(01:18:40)
I mean, fundamentally, it feels like just looking at all the presidents of the United States in my lifetime, it feels like none of them are qualified for this six minutes. I could see as being the commander of STRATCOM being like, “This guy?” Basically respecting no president. I know you’re supposed to, commander in chief, but in this situation… I mean everybody, Bush, Obama, Trump, Biden. If I was a commander of STRATCOM, I’d be like, “What does this guy know about any of this?” I would defy orders. I mean, in this situation, when the future of human civilization hangs in the balance, to be the person that says, “Yes, launch,” no matter what, I just can’t see a human being on earth being able to do that in the United States of America. That’s a hell of a decision. Like, this is it. That’s it.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:19:49)
That’s it. Well, but now you’ve raised a great important presentation essentially, because what you’re saying is, “People, be aware.” Be aware of why you’re voting, or why certain individuals are being escalated to even being able to run for president. What does that mean? Why are people in America not more involved? As citizens do we have a responsibility for that? Because you’ve opened up the door for people to understand, okay, the ultimate thing is the nuclear launch decision. So if a person can’t be trusted with that, everything unravels from there.
Lex Fridman
(01:20:26)
Also, I want to look up who’s the commander of STRATCOM now. Speaking of which, you’ve interviewed a lot of experts for this book. Is there some commonalities about the way, you’ve talked about this a little bit, but in the way they see this whole situation? What scares them the most about this whole system and the whole possibility of nuclear war?
Annie Jacobsen
(01:20:54)
I first learned about nuclear weapons from a guy called Al O’Donnell, who appears in my earlier books, because I interviewed him for over a period of four and a half years because he was an engineer who actually wired nuclear bombs in the 1950s. He was a member of the Manhattan Project in 1946. Worked on Operation Crossroads, the first explosions of nuclear bombs after the war ended, after World War II ended, and went on to arm, wire, and fire 186 out of the 200 some odd atmospheric nuclear tests that the United States did before this was banned. I learned from him the power of these weapons. And I learned from him this very almost nationalistic idea about how important it was to have nuclear weapons. And while I learned a lot about his human side, I also saw the side of him that was very Cold War warrior. So he was kind of the first.

(01:22:04)
And then, I don’t know, there’ve been 100 people that have been directly involved in nuclear weapons along the way. Billy Waugh, who was my main sort of central figure in a book I wrote about the CIA’s paramilitary called Surprise, Kill, Vanish. And Waugh HALO jumped a tactical nuclear weapon into the Nevada test site with a small team. Almost unknown to anyone, right? Only recently declassified. And so his position was like, “Tactical nuclear weapons may end up being used.”

(01:22:41)
I’m trying to speak here to the scope of different people I have interviewed over the years. And what has happened is as I’ve gotten closer to the present day, in arrears, there seems to be a growing movement from some of these Cold warriors off the position of, “Nuclear weapons make us great and strong,” toward “Something must be done to reduce this threat.”

Russia and Putin

Lex Fridman
(01:23:17)
How much do you know, in the same way that you know about the United States, how much do you know about the Russian side? Maybe the Chinese side, India and Pakistan, all of this? How their thinking differs, perhaps?
Annie Jacobsen
(01:23:35)
Well, for that, you want to go to the experts. So for Russia, for example, there’s a guy called Pavel Podvig who is probably the West’s top expert on Russian nuclear forces. He works in parallel with the U.N. He also studied in Moscow. So my information comes from him. You do all the footwork to know what questions to ask, and then you take the very specific questions to him. And I learned from him about how the Russian command and control goes down. And it’s very similar to ours, because America and Russia have been at sort of nuclear dueling with one another for 75 years now. And so everything we have, they have, with the exception of we have a great satellite system and they have a super flawed one. Theirs is called Tundra. And even Pavel Podvig admitted that there’s serious flaws in Tundra. The Russian satellite system, for example, can mistake sunlight for flames, can mistake clouds for a nuclear launch. This is a fact.

(01:24:52)
What was interesting in interviewing him was also this recent very, very dangerous shift in Russian nuclear policy, which is this: Many Russian experts will tell you that Russia has always maintained that it never had a launch on warning policy. Now, I don’t know if I believe that’s true, but I’m just telling you what they say. And this is coming from the generals, the Cold War generals in Soviet Russia saying, “Oh, no, no, no. We would wait.” They were kind of playing the noble warrior. “We would wait to absorb a nuclear attack until we launched.” Okay? So many Americans experts will tell you that that’s just posturing and propaganda. But that was their official position, and that changed just two years ago when Putin gave a speech and he said that their position had changed, that they will no longer wait to absorb an attack. That once they learn of, how did he phrase it? He called it like the trajectory of the missiles, which is a way of, we’re talking about parody, the same way we see the missile coming over in Midcourse. Putin made that same statement, and said, “We would launch.”
Lex Fridman
(01:26:04)
What do you know of the way Putin thinks about nuclear weapons and nuclear war? Is it just something to allude to in a speech? Or do you think he contemplates the possibilities of nuclear war?
Annie Jacobsen
(01:26:18)
I don’t know, but if I had to guess it would go like this. I would look at his background, and he comes from the intelligence world. My experience in interviewing old timers who’ve spent decades working for the CIA or even NRO or NSA, I know the way they think from having spent hundreds of hours interviewing them. And then I know the way that military men think, and it’s very different. Putin’s not a military person per se; he’s an intelligence officer. So what would concern me there if I had to guess about his mindset has to do with paranoia. Most intelligence officers must have a degree of healthy paranoia, or they’re going to wind up dead. And so that’s not a great quality to have.
Lex Fridman
(01:27:11)
You would be more trigger-happy perhaps. So you would be more prone to respond to erroneous signals.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:27:19)
And you’d be suspicious, and you can see that now. There’s such a incredible distrust and sort of real conflict between Russia, between its leader and NATO, between its leader and all of the West. And then that is fueled by his closest advisors. From the statements they have made that I’ve read in translation, they seem to be fostering that same idea that NATO really has it in for Russia. America really has it in. And that is so dangerous and disheartening.
Lex Fridman
(01:28:09)
And perhaps makes it less likely that the president would pick up the phone and talk to the other president.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:28:16)
Or that the close advisors near the president would make that happen.

Cyberattack

Lex Fridman
(01:28:21)
You were talking about the procedure with the football. Is there any concern for cyber attacks? For security concerns at every level here, false signals, errors, shutting down the channels of communication through cyber attacks, all that kind of stuff?
Annie Jacobsen
(01:28:42)
To answer those questions, I interviewed a number of people, but most specifically General Touhill, who was Obama’s cyber chief. He was actually America’s first cyber chief. The nuclear command and control system and really the triad functions on analog systems. It functions on old school systems. If there’s not digital interface, you can’t hack into it. So most of the issues that I raise in the book have to do with what happens to cyber after a nuclear attack? What happens to cyber in the minutes after a bomb, a nuclear weapon strikes America, and how that impacts the ability for people to communicate with one another? That’s when chaos takes control.

Ground zero of nuclear war

Lex Fridman
(01:29:43)
Well, let’s talk about it. So God forbid if a nuclear weapon reaches its target, what happens? Perhaps you could say what you think would be the first target hit. Would it be the Pentagon?
Annie Jacobsen
(01:30:04)
I was told by many people I interviewed that the biggest fear in Washington, DC is what’s called a bolt out of the blue attack. That’s an unwarned nuclear attack against Washington, DC. The target would be the Pentagon, and that’s what I begin the scenario with. I reported in graphic, horrifying detail what happens.
Lex Fridman
(01:30:04)
Yes, you did.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:30:26)
Because I don’t know what’s worse, me writing that all out, or the fact that it’s all documented by the Defense Department. I mean, they have been documenting the effect of nuclear weapons on people and animals and things since the earliest days of the Cold War. And all of the details I pull are from these documents like The Effects of Nuclear Weapons. And again, this document was the original information, the original data, and this document come from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was all classified. And then it was built upon by those 200 some odd atmospheric nuclear weapons tests we did.

(01:31:14)
We’re talking about millimeters and inches. We’re talking about the Defense Department knowing that, oh, seven and a half miles out the upholstery on cars will spontaneously combust. The pine needles will catch on fire. They will start more fires. You have all kinds of mayhem and chaos happening based on reported facts from observations. And this is really shocking and grotesque at the same time.
Lex Fridman
(01:31:48)
So one warhead reaches the Pentagon, everybody in the Pentagon perishes.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:31:57)
180 million degrees. The fireball on a one megaton nuclear weapon is 19 football fields of fire. Think about that. Nothing remains. Nothing remains.
Lex Fridman
(01:32:13)
There’s then a radius where people die immediately, and then there’s people that are dead when found, and then there’s people that will die slowly in centric rings.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:32:31)
And again, rings defined by Defense scientists. But before that, the bomb goes off. Then there’s this blast wave that’s like several hundred miles an hour pushing out like a bulldozer, knocking everything down, bridges, buildings. I mean, you can read FEMA manuals about what the rubble will be like. You’re talking about 30 feet deep rubble as the buildings go over, 6, 7, 8, 10 miles out. That speaks nothing of the mega fires that will then ensue. So once all these people die, and third degree radiation burns. Did you even know there was such a thing as fourth degree radiation burns? We’re talking about the wind ripping the skin off people’s faces many miles out.

(01:33:25)
And then you have a sucking action. Many people are familiar with what the nuclear mushroom cloud looks like. Its stem actually creates, and again, this is from physicists who advise the Defense Department on this, the sucking up into the nuclear stem, 300 mile an hour winds. You’re talking about people miles out getting sucked up into that stem. When you see the mushroom cloud, Lex, in a nuclear war, that would be people. Those are like the remnants of people and of things in the cloud; 30, 40 mile wide mushroom cloud blocking out the sun, and that speaks nothing of the radiation poisoning that follows.

Surviving nuclear war

Lex Fridman
(01:34:14)
And then the power grid goes out. Basically everything we rely on in terms of systems in our way of life goes out. You write, “Those who somehow managed to escape death by the initial blast, shockwave, and firestorm suddenly realize an insidious truth about nuclear war, that they’re entirely on their own.” Here begins a “fight for food and water.” I mean, that is a wake-up call on top of a wake-up call that we go back to a kind of primitive fight for survival, each on their own.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:34:58)
And by the way, those details were given to me by Obama’s FEMA director, Craig Fugate. FEMA is the agency in America that plans for nuclear war. And what Fugate said to me was, “Annie, we plan for asteroid strikes. These are called low probability but high consequence events.” And FEMA is the organization that when there’s a hurricane or an earthquake or a flood, FEMA steps in and they do what’s called population protection planning. They take care of people. And what Fugate told me is after a nuclear strike, after a bolt out of the blue attack, he used those terms, there is no population protection. Everyone’s dead. And he means that metaphorically, but also kind of more literally. Because he just said at that point, “You just hope that you stocked Pedialyte.”
Lex Fridman
(01:35:57)
What do you think happens to humans? How does human nature manifest itself in-
Lex Fridman
(01:36:01)
How does human nature manifest itself in such conditions? Do you think brutality will come out? People will, just for survival, will steal, will murder, will.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:36:14)
I can’t imagine that not happening. I think that’s why people love post-apocalyptic television shows and films because they see that. And then, of course, there’s always one great charismatic person who’s trying to restore morality. These are great narratives that people like to tell themselves in the world of science fiction. But what we’re dealing with is science fact in this scenario. It is meant to terrify people into realizing, wait a minute, this is a conversation that absolutely should be had, while it can still be had, because the realities, when you have the director of FEMA telling you this, it’s a real wake-up call.

(01:36:57)
By the way, Craig Fugate was so transparently human with me, and I quote him directly in the book. But he spoke about, you asked me earlier about what would be going through the president’s mind, and we don’t know, I don’t know, but Craig Fugate told me what would be going through his mind. He said along the lines, I’m paraphrasing, it’s almost something you couldn’t even comprehend. It would just ruin you. His words are really powerful.

(01:37:29)
Of course, the FEMA director, in the scenario, is notified in that first window while the ballistic missile is on its way and no one in America yet knows. I have the FEMA director pull over to the side of the road and jump in a helicopter that’s sent for him to take him to the bunker that FEMA goes to, which is called Mount Weather. And so, Fugate was aware that, as FEMA director, you would likely be taken to a safe place, however many hours you’re going to be safe, or days or maybe weeks or maybe months.

(01:38:04)
But as I also learned from the cyber people I interviewed, that there’s a complete fallacy that these military bases can continue functioning. They run on diesel fuel, and when the fuel stops pumping, there’s no more generators.
Lex Fridman
(01:38:20)
Electricity’s gone. Communication lines are all gone. The food supply. All of it, all the supply chains is gone. It’s terrifying, and that’s just in the first few days, first few hours. In part five, you described the 24 months and beyond after this first hour we’ve been talking about. What happens to earth? What happens to humans if a full-on nuclear war happens?

Nuclear winter

Annie Jacobsen
(01:39:01)
For that, I was super privileged to talk to Professor Brian Toon, who’s one of the original five authors of the nuclear winter theory. That theory was published in the early 1980s. One of Professor Toon’s professors was Carl Sagan, who was sort of the most famous author of the nuclear winter theory.

(01:39:29)
There were all kinds of controversies about it when it came out, including the Defense Department saying it was Soviet propaganda, which it wasn’t. What the nuclear winter authors conceded back in the ’80s was that their modeling was just the best it could be based on what they had at the time. And so, now flash forward to where we are in 2024, and talking to Professor Toon who’s been working on this issue for all these decades since, he shared with me how the climate models today with the systems we have, the computer systems, reveal that actually nuclear winter is worse.

(01:40:13)
To answer your questions, the bombs stop falling, in my scenario, 72 minutes after they first launch. The bombs stop falling, and then the megafires begin. Each nuclear weapon will have, according to the Defense Department, a megafire that will burn between 100 and 300 square miles. 1000 weapons, 1500 weapons, think about those megafires. Everything is burning, forests, cities. Think about the pyrotoxins in all the cities. High-rises burning. All of this soot gets lofted into the air, according to Toon, some 300 billion pounds of soot. What happens? It blocks out the sun. Without sun, we have nuclear winter. We have a situation whereby ice sheets form. You’re talking about bodies of water in places like Iowa being frozen for 10 years.
Lex Fridman
(01:41:19)
So temperature drops.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:41:20)
Temperature plummets. There are all kinds of papers that have been written about this, using modern systems and the numbers vary, but the bottom line is agriculture fails.
Lex Fridman
(01:41:37)
Foods obviously dies. The agriculture system completely shuts down, so the food sources shut down. There’s no food. There’s no sun. Temperature drops completely. No electricity.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:41:52)
We haven’t even spoken of radiation poisoning because the radiation poisoning kills many people in the aftermath of the nuclear exchange. But after the nuclear freeze ends, after nuclear winter, after the sun starts to come back, let’s say eight, nine, 10 years, now you have no ozone layer or you have a severely depleted ozone layer. And so, the sun’s rays are now poisonous.

(01:42:18)
If you have people living underground and you have this great thawing, and with that great thawing comes pathogens and plague. You have this system where the small-bodied animals, the insects and whatnot, begin reproducing really fast, and the larger body animals like you and me begin to go extinct. Professor Toon said it to me this way. He said, “66 million years ago, an asteroid hit Earth, killed all the dinosaurs and wiped out 70% of the species, and nuclear war would likely do the same.” And so, here we are talking about this because there is a difference. There’s nothing you can do about an asteroid, but there is something you can do about a nuclear war.
Lex Fridman
(01:43:04)
Do you think it’s possible that some humans will survive all of this? If we look, I mean, how long would it be? Would it be decades? Would it be centuries before the earth starts to have the capacity to grow food again?
Annie Jacobsen
(01:43:25)
Carl Sagan talked about that in this amazing book that he wrote with two scientist colleagues called The Cold and the Dark. There’s a bunch of essays about exactly this. What would happen and how long would it take? It’s really interesting. It’s dated. It’s from the ’80s. But man, is it shocking. You think about that where men return to sort of the worst, most base versions of themselves. Civilization is gone, meaning civil society. There’s no rule of law. It’s just fend for yourself. There’s people fighting over what little resources there are. Man returns to a hunter-gatherer state.

(01:44:05)
To really think about this idea, I looked at the oldest known archeological site in the world in Turkey, which is called Gobekli Tepe. It’s really fascinating to me because I interviewed one of the two archeologists who first found this site in the early ’90s. The lead archeologist was a guy named Klaus Schmidt, and Michael Morsch was the young graduate student who was with him. Morsch’s description of coming upon this rumored to be site, there was something called a wishing tree on the site, which I just found so human and perfect, that it was this magical place, and it was Locatable because there was a wishing tree on a hill. It’s where people went to wish and to hope that their wishes came true. I mean, how human is that?

(01:44:57)
That is where beneath the wishing tree, in the shadow of the wishing tree, there was a tepe, which is a hill. Beneath that, there is the oldest known civilization in the world. 12,000 years ago, a group of hunter-gatherers built this site. Why? We don’t know. But I imagined through Morsch’s descriptions of coming upon. He tripped on a rock, he told me. He tripped over a stone that turned out to be the top part of a 12,000 year old sculpted man, giant pillar. He talked about coming upon that. And then, no one knows really what Gobekli Tepe was for.

(01:45:41)
That makes my mind try and answer the question you asked me internally, just as a human who’s here on earth for the amount of time I’m here. If there were a nuclear war, what would it be like? What would it be like when someone in the future, would we become archeologists one day? Would civilization rebuild? Would we develop computers? Who knows? It’s interesting to think about. I hope we never have to.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:08)
What would we remember about this time?
Annie Jacobsen
(01:46:11)
Right.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:11)
It is terrifying to think that most of it will be forgotten. Everything we assume will not be forgotten. We think maybe some of the technological developments will be forgotten, but we assume some of history won’t be forgotten. But realistically, especially us descending into primitive survival, probably everything since the industrial age will be forgotten. Everything.

(01:46:40)
Maybe some religious ideas will persist. Some stories and myths will persist. But all the wisdom we’ve gathered, higher level sort of technological wisdom would be gone. That’s terrifying to think about. Maybe even, as you touch on, the very fact of nuclear war might be forgotten. The lessons of nuclear war might be forgotten. That there are these weapons, sort of the obvious elephant in the room would be one of the things that’s completely forgotten or become so vague in the recollection of humans that our understanding will change. It’s almost as if a God descended on earth and destroyed everything. Maybe that’s how it will persist. Mythological interpretation of what nuclear weapons are. That’s terrifying because then it could repeat again.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:47:41)
But I think, for me, the idea of what is buried becomes very interesting and very human, and in a strange way, optimistic and positive because if you can visualize that wishing tree, and I have a picture of it in the book from one of the archeologists who work on that, you think, “What were they wishing? What were they wishing for?” And then, you think of your own self, what do I wish for in this world? Because I do think all things come from what happens metaphorically around the dinner table. What people put their eyes on becomes interesting and expands what people talk about. Ultimately, when you think about the long arc of time and human civilization, it does kind of make you want to communicate more with your enemies, with your adversaries. I think about the quote, what Einstein has said to have said, which is that he was asked what weapons World War III would be fought with. He said, “I don’t know, but I know that World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.”

Alien civilizations

Lex Fridman
(01:49:05)
Let me ask you about the great filter. When you look up into our galaxy, into our universe, look up at the sky, do you think there’s other alien civilizations that are contending with some similar questions? Perhaps the reason we have not definitively seen alien civilizations is because the others have failed to find a solution to this great filter. Something like nuclear weapons.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:49:40)
I’m not sure. I’m going to have to think about that question. But what does come to mind is an answer that was given to me similarly by Ed Mitchell, who went to the moon. He was the sixth man to walk on the moon. And so, his opinion, I think, might count a little more than mine on that subject because his lens is so much greater.

(01:50:14)
Mitchell was vilified when he got back from the moon because it became known that he believed in things like extrasensory perception and this kind of mystical, metaphysical way of looking at the world. He really suffered from that. I mean, he was ridiculed and he lost a lot of his career and his friends. But what he said to me in our interview about his trip home from the moon answers that great filter question, I think, in a way I might want to adopt, which is this.

(01:50:56)
He said that as they were returning from the moon to earth, he looked down at the earth, and I’m paraphrasing him, I write all this in Phenomena, an earlier book, but the paraphrasing is that he looked down from the earth and it was 1971. He thought about all the conflict going on down below, particularly the Vietnam War where many of his friends were. And then, he looked behind him into the great vast galaxy. He had a moment, he says, that was like an epiphany. Not a near-death experience, but a sort of near-life experience where he believed that the human consciousness, which is where so much of this thoughtfulness about metaphysics and ESP perhaps come from.

(01:51:55)
Mitchell’s theory, was that human consciousness, the way to understand it, had something to do with realizing that man’s inner life and man’s outer life are deeply connected, in the same way that man is connected to the galaxy. He said it much more eloquently, but you kind of get the idea. I think it’s why humans have always loved to look up, that there’s more there. It’s like the big version of the wishing tree, what do I wish for for myself? What is maybe, perhaps, the realignment of thinking for those of us in search of happiness instead of war. What does it mean to have a conscience, to have consciousness? What does it mean to be a thinking person? What does it mean to be on this earth, to be born, to live, to die? And then, there is legacy. And so, all of those ideas are, I think, foster the kind of conversation that de-escalates conflict.
Lex Fridman
(01:53:19)
In some deep way, the mysteries of what’s out there when we look out to the stars are the same mysteries that we find when trying to understand the human mind and they’re coupled in some way.

(01:53:36)
For me, thinking about alien civilizations out there is really the same kind of question, which is, what are we? What is this? What are we doing here? How do we come here? Why does it seem to be so magical and beautiful and powerful? Now, where’s it going? Because it feels like we’re really, perhaps for the first time in history, are in a moment where we can destroy ourselves. And so, naturally you ask, well, where’s others like us? Perhaps, are we inevitably going to a place where we’ll destroy ourselves? Is it basically inevitable that we destroy ourselves? We become too powerful and insufficiently wise to know what to do with that power? But like you said, probably the answers to that are in here. We don’t need to look out there.

Extrasensory perception


(01:54:41)
I’d love to ask you about the extrasensory perception. You’ve written, like you said, the book Phenomena on the secret history of the US government’s investigations into extrasensory perception and psychokinesis. What are some of the more interesting extrasensory abilities that were explored by the government, and maybe just in general, ESP. What is it? What do you know of it?
Annie Jacobsen
(01:55:08)
The book was so interesting to report because I spend so much time dealing with mechanized systems, machines, war machines, and yet the military and intelligence were and continue to be incredibly interested in the human mind, in consciousness. And so, if one is called hard science, what we’re talking about now is called squishy science. It was really interesting to delve into that world. It just couldn’t be farther from weapons and war, or could it?

(01:55:40)
And then, I really began thinking, well, before science and technology, sort of the supernatural ruled the world. The Oracle of Delphi in Greece exists before the common era rulers to go and beg to learn from the powers that be what was going to happen. All ESP programs, I think, pull from that origin story, the leader’s desire to know. And so, I really found it amazing that many people think these systems, or rather these programs, started in the ’70s. I learned they actually began right after World War II. That was because, and in my reporting, I find all things sort of always circle back to the Third Reich, to the Nazis.

(01:56:40)
The Nazis had a massive occult program, an ESP program, psychokinesis program, astrology. Both Hitler and Himmler were deeply interested in these occult concepts. After I learned from records at the National Archives that after the war, half of everything went to the Soviet Union, and I’m talking about the trove of Nazi documents from which the superpowers were then going to learn to fight future wars, and half of them went to the United States. And so, we got this trove of documents about all of this, and the Soviets got the other. And so, it set off a kind of psychic arms race, which in a weird way paralleled the nuclear arms race, which we’ve been talking about, in as much that it led one side to constantly wonder what the other side had.
Lex Fridman
(01:57:37)
Have they been able to find anything interesting in this squishy science analysis of trying to see how the human mind could be used as a weapon?
Annie Jacobsen
(01:57:50)
The CIA most definitely believed, from my reading of the documents, that there was something very legit, shall we say, about ESP. It was uncontrollable, it was unreliable, but nonetheless it existed. Being the intelligence agency that they are, they cared less about why it worked. They just wanted to know how they could use it. And then, it got into all kinds of elements of placebo effect.

(01:58:21)
When the military stepped in and got involved in the programs, that was a complete disaster, in my opinion, because the military needs to control everything in a mechanized, systematic way. And so, they started, for example, teaching people to be psychic, which is a really, really, really bad idea.

(01:58:43)
Flash forward to where we are today, these programs still exist. There’s a Navy program which is working, based on a lot of data that came back from the war on terror, with certain soldiers knowing, “Wait, don’t walk down that path. There is an IED there.” They call this the spidey sense, and they actually have a program that works from this. These things never go away. They circle around in terms of being made fun of and then taken seriously, and a little of this and of that. My biggest takeaway from writing that book was a quote that I referenced in the beginning, which is the Thomas theorem, and it says, if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.
Lex Fridman
(01:59:35)
I mean, placebo, as you’ve mentioned, is a fascinating concept. By the way, a short plug, I started listening to it, Andrew Huberman just released a podcast on placebo, the placebo effect.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:59:49)
Does he know the origin story of placebo? We’ll have to ask him.
Lex Fridman
(01:59:52)
We’ll have to ask him.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:59:53)
Are you ready for this?
Lex Fridman
(01:59:54)
Yes.
Annie Jacobsen
(01:59:54)
CIA. Not only that, I can tell you that Dr. Henry Beecher, Harvard, I think he was also at MIT for a bit, he came up with that term. You might even say for the CIA.
Lex Fridman
(02:00:13)
Does that trouble you that so much of this is coming from the CIA first?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:00:17)
You mean the placebo concept or the-
Lex Fridman
(02:00:19)
The placebo concept, but a lot of the sort of scientific investigations.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:00:25)
Listen, I have such mixed feelings about the CIA, as one should. I think you should have mixed feelings about anything that you cover as a reporter or as a human, and maybe change that from mixed to conflicting, because there are really positive elements of every organization within the federal government.

(02:00:46)
I mean, my first learning about the CIA came from the work I did on the Area 51 book about their aerial reconnaissance programs, which were set up again to prevent World War III, nuclear World War III. It was this idea that information was king. The U-2 spy pane was developed out at Area 51. I interviewed Hervey Stockman, the first man to fly over the Soviet Union in a U-2, gathered all this intelligence, prevented wars. Later, I wrote a book about the CIA’s paramilitary, Surprise, Kill, Vanish. Just when I was thinking, “Wow, the CIA is doing all this amazing non-kinetic activity with aerial reconnaissance, then you learn about their kill programs,” and that’s a whole different set of issues.
Lex Fridman
(02:01:38)
It turns out, as you write in that book, that the CIA assassinates people sometimes, and we’ll talk about it. But anyway, like you said, conflicting feelings.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:01:51)
I mean, I work with sources to report my books. And so, put yourself in my shoes. I interview for dozens or hundreds of hours, my primary sources. In the case of the Surprise, Kill, Vanish book, I traveled with Billy Waugh, the longest-serving CIA operator, back to the scene of the crime, back to the battle. We went to Hanoi. We went to Havana. You really get to know someone, and that’s when I say conflicting. I work with sources on a real trust basis.

(02:02:29)
Sometimes people will tell me things. They’ll say, “Annie, this is off the record. This is for you to know about me on deep background because I want you to know who I am,” and that’s powerful and a lot of times personal. It’s personal. It’s about their personal life, and it isn’t apropos to what I’m writing about, but I need to know that. That’s where it gets conflicted, in a good way, because you realize where we’re all such creatures of our personal lives. You have a professional life where national security are in your hands. I don’t know what that is like.
Lex Fridman
(02:03:11)
I wonder if you could just speak to that. You’ve interviewed so many powerful people, so many fascinating people. As you’ve spoken about, trust is fundamental to that, so they open up and really show you into their world. What does it take to do that?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:03:33)
I think willingness. We were talking about trust earlier. I have to trust that there’s a reason I find myself in a certain situation. Otherwise, it would just be a constant doubt paradox. Why am I here? What am I doing? And so, I trust that I’m going to learn something of value. And so, I’m willing to listen. I really am willing to listen. So far, it’s always proven… The expectations I might have going into something are dwarfed by the outcome because people are so interesting and because the people that I interview, because I write about war and weapons and national security and government secrets, and the people I interview are at the heart of all of this. I mean, they are really capable people, intellectually brilliant, physically capable. They go so far out on the limb to do their jobs.

(02:04:43)
By the way, the reason they’re talking to me is because they’re still alive and so many of their colleagues are dead. It gives them also a wisdom about life, about sacrifice, not in cliched sort of nationalistic jingoistic terms whatsoever. I’m talking real. What is their real truth?

(02:05:08)
When I went to Vietnam with Billy Waugh, I mean, the details are just every detail. I mean, starting with the fact that he showed up at my house with a giant suitcase and a bunch of clothes, dry cleaning, pressed clothes in plastic hangers, carrying them. I’m like, “Billy, we’re going to Vietnam and we’re going back into the jungle to find the Oscar-8 battle site. What are you carrying?” He got really mad at me, did not like anyone correcting him. I got my husband on the job, like, “Kevin, you got to sort this out.”

(02:05:49)
What transpired was that Billy Waugh had never taken a trip for personal reasons. He operated, I think, in 62 countries, every single time for the CIA. It would go like this, Billy, go to there and get to there, and that’s what he would do. When he arrived, whatever he needed, he would just get. It’s not a fashion trip. He had no idea how to pack for an overseas trip. This was like, “Oh my God, how can you not have the hugest smile on your face going into this? I’m with a guy whose 89 years old.”

(02:06:23)
He’d had eight Purple Hearts from Vietnam. I mean, he operated against Osama bin Laden 10 years before 9/11. He went after bin Laden in Afghanistan when he was 72. He went after Qaddafi during the Arab spring when he was 82, and now here he is with me going to Hanoi. The details, those human details. But my husband repacked his bag and got him a proper suitcase that was carryable and small and he wasn’t trailing the hangers, but it was the trip home in the taxi that I got at this really big reveal.

(02:07:06)
Billy reached into that small suitcase my husband had given him and pulled out a rolled up American flag. He had taken this flag, because I had tried to help him pack and he wouldn’t let me, and I just thought it was like an old guy being stubborn, but he didn’t want me to see that he was bringing an American flag to Vietnam, which is not legal. He wanted to bring that flag and take it around everywhere with him, as he explained to me later, to honor all of his friends who died there 50 years ago.

(02:07:38)
And then, when the trip was finished, he gave me that flag and it’s in my office. That’s the kind of relationship that you can develop with people as a reporter, if you’re willing to go the extra mile with them, to trust them, that they’ll tell you things of value. To me, something like that is as of value as any secret mission I’m able to get declassified, because we are a nation of people.
Lex Fridman
(02:08:03)
And…
Annie Jacobsen
(02:08:00)
… get declassified because we are a nation of people.
Lex Fridman
(02:08:03)
And probably there’s a bunch of human details that you can’t possibly express in words, things left unspoken, but you saw in the silence exchange between the two of you, the sadness, maybe you could see in his face looking back at memories of the people he’s lost, all that kind of stuff.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:08:23)
All that kind of stuff.

Area 51

Lex Fridman
(02:08:26)
You mentioned you wrote a book on Area 51. For people who don’t know, you’ve written a lot about security, the military, secrets, all of this kind of stuff. So Area 51 is one of the legendary centers of all of these kinds of topics. So high level first is what is Area 51, as you understand it, as you’ve written about the lore and the reality.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:09:01)
I think everybody wants to know about Area 51, because it’s like this American enigma. It’s like to some people, it’s the Shangri-La of test bed aerospace programs, and to others, it’s the place of captured aliens and everything in between. I had the great fortune of interviewing 75 people who lived and worked at that base for extended periods of time, mostly leading up to the ’90s because everything since then is classified. So things get declassified after decades. Not everything but some. And that allows you to piece together stories.
Lex Fridman
(02:09:39)
So you talked to a lot of people that worked there. What can you describe as the history of technological development that went on there?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:09:48)
I mean, Area 51 is huge, by the way. It’s a top secret military facility inside a top secret military facility inside the Nevada test and training range, which is this massive not secret facility. So you’re just talking about layers, talking about peeling the onion in reverse. And it began as a place to test the U-2 spy plane. And literally the CIA set up shop there to build this plane away from the public eye. And then that led to another espionage platform called the A-12 Oxcart, which is anyone who’s seen the X-Men movies knows about the SR-71. And that’s a two-seater, right? And before that, there was the A-12 Oxcart, and that was the CIA’s stealth Mach 3 spy plane. Think about that in the early 1960s. It’s astonishing. And I interviewed the pilots who flew it.
Lex Fridman
(02:10:51)
What did they say about it? What was it like?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:10:53)
Oh my God, look, I describe in detail in Area 51. But also the amazing thing, Lex, about that was that, and I just look back on that with such fondness. This is like in 2009 when I was reporting that, and many of the guys who were in their 80s and 90s were World War II heroes, like serious World War II heroes like Colonel Slater who was the commander of Area 51. He flew the U-2 on the missions called the Black Cat Missions over China in the early 1960s to see about their Lop Nur nuclear facility. So all of these things tie in when you’re reporting on military and intelligence programs. But these guys had been World War II heroes, and then were given this cushy job out at Area 51. And it just came with all these perks.

(02:11:45)
Colonel Slater told me this one perk, I just love so much. They all had a hankering for lobster one day. And here they’re in the middle of the desert in Nevada, and they have these really fast planes, and they literally called, they arranged, they didn’t take the Oxcart out for that one, but they got some lobsters from Massachusetts delivered to them in record time. They didn’t even need to put them on ice. And again, those are these details where you’re like, at least for me, “Thank God I got these details. These guys are all passed now.”

UFOs and aliens

Lex Fridman
(02:12:20)
So there’s a lot of incredible technological work going on there. So the legend, the lore, like you said, aliens, were there ever aliens in Area 51 as you understand it?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:12:33)
So I’ve interviewed hundreds of people.
Lex Fridman
(02:12:37)
That worked there.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:12:38)
Well, not just at Area 51, but in all the different national security and military intelligence and intelligence programs. And I personally have no reason to believe that aliens have ever visited Earth. That’s just me personally.
Lex Fridman
(02:12:53)
Just at an Earth, period.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:12:55)
I have no information that causes me to conclude that’s the case. Now, with that said, many of the primary players in this present day, there are aliens among us narrative, are in my phenomena book. I continue to communicate with a lot of these people. I’m talking about astrophysicists who fundamentally believe that there are aliens among us. So we beg to differ on that issue.
Lex Fridman
(02:13:28)
But for you, in terms of doing research on government agencies that do top secret military work, I mean they would know. So you have interviewed a lot of people that have, at every layer of the onion, you don’t see evidence or a reason to believe that there was ever aliens or UFOs captured from out of this world.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:14:02)
That is correct. And even perhaps more important, and perhaps this colors my thinking, but I am uniquely familiar with disinformation programs put forth by the CIA or the agency as it’s called by insiders. I’ve learned firsthand about these program or rather learned from firsthand participants in strategic deception campaigns that the CIA has engaged in beginning with Area 51. The idea that all these reports of this U-2 spy plane, this giant long-winged aircraft flying 70,000 feet up, people didn’t think airplanes could fly that high. And it’s the sun shining off of it. It looked like a UFO and all the reports coming in and the CIA opened up a UFO disinformation campaign office headed by a guy named Todos Odarenko specifically for this reason.

(02:15:03)
Now, does that mean that every UFO sighting in the world has been a U-2? No, but I come from it from that lane of thinking, and there are so many strategic deception campaigns, and as I look over the decades of how these same UFO stories, and again, this is just my opinion based on my reporting, this narrative that keeps reoccurring, it seems to me like a very large catch- all to keep the public’s attention on that, not on that.
Lex Fridman
(02:15:35)
So to you, sexy stories like UFOs are going to be leveraged by the CIA for strategic deception.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:15:47)
A hundred percent. I mean, Google Paul Bennewitz, I’m always amazed that Paul Bennewitz’s story is not more widely spoken of. And I think that’s because there’s the sort of ufologists or people who are absolutely convinced that aliens are among us, and I use that term loosely, but you know what I mean. And then there’s the quote unquote, “skeptics”. And the skeptics tend to be sort of like self-righteous, and I would never want to be self-righteous. So I’m not a skeptic, I’m just agnostic, I suppose. But Google Paul Bennewitz, and you can learn the story of that man who thought he saw a UFO in the ’70s, early ’80s, and the Air Force, because the Air Force intelligence community works hand in glove with CIA a lot. And some of the other intelligence agencies, of course, they’re 17, not just the CIA, and they destroyed Paul Bennewitz. They sent him to a mental institution by pulling a massive strategic deception campaign against him because they didn’t want him to know about the technology that he was seeing at Kirtland Air Force Base.

(02:16:56)
So look that up, and then you go, “Oh my God.” And to my eye, you can apply any of these other names substitute in Paul Bennewitz or any of the current individuals who really become convinced of X, Y, or Z, when in fact there’s a strategic deception campaign going on.
Lex Fridman
(02:17:17)
There’s a lot of incentive for the CIA and other intelligence agencies to get you to look the other way on whatever is happening. Plus, from a enemy perspective, whenever two nations are at war to try to create hysteria in the other.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:17:35)
But then you have the Thomas theorem, that becomes applicable there too. If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences. So this idea of UFOs and we’re being lied to, it becomes real to many people. And then that creates a whole subset of problems to the point where things are spiraling out of control and there is no center anymore. So a lot of people that are briefed on programs maybe aren’t even aware of their position within a greater campaign, or I’m wrong, and there are aliens among us.
Lex Fridman
(02:18:21)
So I appreciate the possibility of acknowledging that you might be wrong. From everything about the US government, if there was an alien spacecraft, what do you think would happen? Would they be able to hold onto those secrets for decades? Would they want to hold onto those secrets? What would they do? What’s your sense?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:18:48)
I can’t imagine that kind of exciting situation not becoming public information. And the counter to that is this, which is, this is a very strong argument for why this is a big strategic deception campaign. Think about the Defense Department and the air… Think about how jealously they guard its airspace. I mean, you had a Chinese balloon flying over and the whole world went crazy. It was front page news. So the fact that one element, or a couple people in the defense department have made this statement, we’ve lost control of our airspace over this alleged UFO craft that they can’t explain. I don’t buy that at all. Zero.
Lex Fridman
(02:19:42)
But of course it’s possible that it is alien spacecraft if it is that. And they operate under a very different set of technological capabilities in theory.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:19:56)
In my interviews with Jacques Vallee, who is the kind of grandfather of all ufology, and he’s such an interesting person and has such a really unique origin story about how he came into all of this. And he’s such a scientist, and he is profoundly dedicated to this issue and stands completely on the opposite end of the spectrum from me, and knows a lot more and has studied this for decades more. But what he said to me is the most interesting thing, which is that it’s not a military problem, it’s an intelligence problem. Because Jacques believes that this is some kind of intelligence, which really the closest I can do to wrapping my head around that takes me to consciousness, the idea of what is consciousness. And I think that’s where it becomes very interesting. I think the government is hiding bodies and crafts is very Paul Bennewitz, read it, Google it, look into it, right?
Lex Fridman
(02:20:51)
I think this kind of flying saucer thing is a trivialization of what kind of, if there’s alien civilizations out there.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:21:00)
Trivialization. That’s a great word. Trivialization, I agree with you.
Lex Fridman
(02:21:05)
I tend to believe that there’s a very large number of alien civilizations out there, and I believe we would have trouble comprehending what that even looks like were they to visit. I tend to believe they are already here or have visited, and we’re too dumb to understand what that even means. And they certainly would not appear as flying objects that defy gravity for brief moments of time on a low resolution video. I tend to have humility about all this kind of stuff, but I think radical humility is required to even open your eyes to what an alien intelligence would actually look like. And to me, it’s beyond military applications. It’s like the basic human question of what is even this thing, like you mentioned consciousness that’s going on. Where’s this come from? Why is this so powerful? Is it unique in the universe? I tend to believe not. Of course, I hang out a bunch with other folks like Elon who believe we are alone, but I think that belief, just like you said, has power because it actually manifests itself in reality.

Roswell incident


(02:22:23)
So if you believe that we’re alone in this universe, that’s a great motivator to build rockets and become multi-planetary and save ourselves, especially in the case of nuclear war, because otherwise, whatever this special sauce, this flame of consciousness will go out if we destroy ourselves on this earth. And for people like Elon, it’s too high of a probability that we destroy ourselves on earth not to try to become multi-planetary. In your book on Area 51, you propose an explanation that I think some people have criticized at the very end that this might’ve been a disinformation campaign from, I guess Stalin, that the Roswell incident was a remotely piloted plane with a quote, “grotesque child-sized aviator”. Just looking back at all that now, years later, what’s the probability that it’s true? What’s the probability it’s not?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:23:23)
So you know I’ve never revealed to that sources.
Lex Fridman
(02:23:27)
Yes.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:23:28)
Did you know that? You want me to tell you?
Lex Fridman
(02:23:29)
The source?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:23:29)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(02:23:31)
Who is the source?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:23:33)
So before I say anything on that, let me speak to the question that you asked. So you asked me what’s the probability that that is still standing as an idea, 12, 13, 14 years later. So I continued to work with that source for years afterwards. We talked about this. Look, I mean, his whole family knew it was him, and I knew his family because I was an integral part of… I was at his house, met all his kids, grandkids.
Lex Fridman
(02:24:09)
We should say the source is the main expert advisor behind the story that it was… Maybe you can explain what the story is that you report in the book that it was disinformation campaign created by Stalin to cause mass hysteria in the United States. The very kind that we’ve been speaking about with the CIA and so on.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:24:28)
Yes, predicated on the narrative of the War of the Worlds and the War of the Worlds when it was a radio program in the United States made people go crazy. “Oh my God, we’re being invaded by aliens.” Well, the government was always interested in this story, and Joseph Stalin was too. We know that from declassified documents. And so the source told me that the reason for this program and that the real Roswell crash remains were, in fact, it was a black propaganda hoax infiltrated, or rather predicated at this idea that you were going to overwhelm America’s early warning air defense system cause mayhem and maybe be able to attack the United States. That was the plan.

(02:25:09)
And Stalin was also messing with the United States, messing with Truman, who sort of turned his back on him at Potsdam. And so this idea and the reason that the source is important, and unlike a lot of people, “I saw, I saw this, I saw that, I learned that,” was according to the source, once it was determined that this was a hoax and that Stalin was able to get a craft over the United States, and it crashed and it had people inside of it.

(02:25:43)
They were people that were sort of deformed and meant surgically altered to look like aliens. The United States government decided that it needed to know what on earth that was all about. And if it was possible for us to have the same program, this according to the source. And so it sounds preposterous, and if it was just someone saying, you might say, “Well, it’s ridiculous,” and get them onto another subject. But the difference was is this source who was very well-placed and friends with all of the other 75 people told me this as a confession, a real tearful confession. Because what he said is he was involved in the American program to do the same thing, and people died because there were human experiments that went on.

(02:26:33)
And I write about this in the last 12 pages of Area 51. It was an explosive revelation, and I felt very confident in writing this because the source wanted it written. Why? Because he said, “I’m dedicated to my country. I know about being committed to national security, and this kind of thing must never happen. And if you give people too much power, they would take advantage of it.” And he wanted it on the record. And his wife of 60 years did not know until after the book published, nor did his children. So after the book published, I was called to his house and sat there with his family and they said, “Tell us this isn’t true.” And he said, “It is true.” Now that source is Al O’Donnell, who is the nuclear weapons engineer who armed, wired, and fired 186 nuclear weapons. So if you want to talk about someone, you’re the first person I’ve told that on the record, but it’s kind of about time.
Lex Fridman
(02:27:37)
Wow. Well, you received a lot of criticism over this story, and it confused me why because given the context of everything you’ve described with the CIA and other intelligence agencies, it is reasonable that such as action would be taken.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:28:01)
And the source is extraordinarily credible. If you wanted to take the position, “Well, that person isn’t very reliable.” Then you have to ask yourself, why did they have top secret clearances that are higher than any in the United States whatsoever? Because he was responsible for arming nuclear bombs. He was called the trigger man, and by the way, he told me that I could tell the world who he was. There’s a lot of details that are really dark involving that program. And when is it appropriate? Right? Well, it feels appropriate now, first of all, because you and I have been talking for several hours. So this is what is truly a long-form conversation, and it’s the outcome of a very long time of my reporting and also being judicious about closing the loop on that because I do think it’s important for people to know that sources have revelations.

CIA assassinations

Lex Fridman
(02:29:06)
And like you said, the programs both on the Soviet side and the American side, conflicting, I think is the term we used previously, ethically, morally, on all fronts. People have done some horrible things in the name of security. In your book, Surprise, Kill, Vanish, you write about the CIA and the so-called president’s third option. So first of all, first option being diplomacy and second option being war. So when diplomacy is inadequate and war is a terrible idea, we go to the third option. And this third option is about covert action, and it’s about assassination. So how much of that does the CIA do?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:30:04)
That is open to debate. We know from the historical record that the CIA was heavily involved in assassination during the Cold War. That’s non-negotiable. Even the names of the programs that were assigned to perform assassinations are fascinating and now declassified, like Eisenhower’s, for example, was the Health Alteration Committee.
Lex Fridman
(02:30:29)
Well, at least they have a sense of humor to this dark topic.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:30:33)
Then the more modern names are targeted killing, executive action, targeted killing. I mean, drone striking is essentially assassination. And people jump up and down and say, “That’s not true.” Well, I spent quite a long time interviewing the CIA’s lead council, John Rizzo. He died recently. But Rizzo was very forthcoming with me, of course, never sharing classified information, but going up to the edge of what can legally be known. Rizzo was thrown under the bus by sort of the general public for he was the fall guy for the torture campaign. The CIA calls it enhanced interrogation. And so Rizzo had this long career. He began working under the Carter administration and was responsible for the torture memos, was responsible for legally making sure the president’s ass was covered and then got thrown under the bus. And so he was very forthcoming, not in a bitter way, but in a very earnest way about a lot of how these programs are made to be legal.

(02:31:44)
Because if the President of the United States says they’re legal, they’re legal. Executive Order 12333. It says, we don’t assassinate, but it can be overwritten by another order that’s straight out of Rizzo’s mouth. Also, really important to keep in mind is that the military operates under what’s called Title 50. It’s part of the National Security Code that gives rules and etc. How you must behave in a war theater. Well, the CIA is under no such rules. It operates under what’s called Title 50. And it’s interesting to me as reporter, because before I wrote the book and reported openly about Title 50, it was not really discussed. And now you even see operators themselves on podcasts talking about Title 50, which is kind of great because it’s like the cat’s out of the bag, guys. That’s what it’s called. And that’s how it works. It means what we say goes.
Lex Fridman
(02:32:38)
Can you elaborate on what Title 50 is? So it basically says assassination is allowed.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:32:43)
It says what the president wants the president gets, right? And so, I mean, the best example is the killing of Bin Laden. We were not at war with Pakistan, so Title 50 doesn’t apply. You can’t have a military operation in a country you’re not at war with. I mean, the lines, now they’ve really blurred, but even then they were a little more honored. And so what do you do? Well, Leon Panetta was the CIA director, and you work out a scenario whereby the SEALs, and by the way, there was a rotational on that killer capture mission, which was really just a kill mission. SEALs were practicing, Delta was practicing, and special activities division was practicing. They were all practicing at a secret facility in North Carolina. And it was just like they’re ready until they get the go order. And it just happened to be the seals.

(02:33:38)
So the SEALs operate under Title 10. So they had to get what I call sheep-dip because that’s what the insiders call it. And that is a term that comes from interestingly Area 51, the U-2 pilots who were Air Force pilots, they needed to be sheep dipped over to the CIA so they could do things that defied the law. So you can see how these all entwine and you become more and more informed, and you go, “Aha.” Right? So that’s how Title 50 worked. So the night of that mission, it was a CIA mission because the CIA is allowed to go into Pakistan and kill someone, and the military can.
Lex Fridman
(02:34:16)
That’s fascinating. So people talk about the Navy SEALs doing it, but it’s really legally speaking to get the permission to do it within the whole legal framework of the United States, it was the CIA.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:34:27)
And if you look at their uniforms that they were wearing, and now that this you’ll be, “Oh.” You’ll see, there’s no nomenclature on them. They’re just meant to be completely untraceable. Were they to be shot down and captured, it’s like, “Wait, who are these guys? Oh, a bunch of rogue guys.” And this goes back the origin story of all that is in Vietnam with MACV-SOG and these cross-border operations that I chronicle in Surprise, Kill, Vanish, which still amaze me to this day. I mean, SOG missions, they called it suicide on the ground, because that’s what it was. And these guys had no identifiable. Nothing. I mean, they were essentially in pajamas. Even their weapons were specially designed by the CIA to have no serial numbers, no nothing. So if they were captured and they became POWs, I don’t know who these guys are.
Lex Fridman
(02:35:24)
What do you think, and how much do they think at the highest levels of power about the ethics of assassination and about the role of that in geopolitics and military operations? To you maybe also, does assassination make sense as a good methodology of war?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:35:48)
I mean, again, I try to remain agnostic on the policy part of it and just report the operator’s perspective, because this is what people do and this is what people are asked to do. And it depends on the individual. I mean, Billy Waugh went on a lot of those missions. I mean, the saying is like, “Oh, Billy Waugh, he killed more people than cancer.” Did Billy Waugh ever tell me about direct assassinations? No, because they’re all classified. Did he tell me about some failed ones? Yes. I’ll give you an example. It’s really interesting.

(02:36:23)
He would show me these PowerPoints that were just fantastic. Late in his life, he was constantly being asked to go up to Fort Bragg and lecture to the young soldiers, and everybody loved him. And he would drive all night to get there, and he would create these PowerPoints, and then he would show me the PowerPoints, all unclassified. But at one point, when Hugo Chavez was in power, Billy Waugh was kind of asked, that’s how it works, of if you had to think about doing something, what would it look like? Let’s just say hypothetically. So he took me through this PowerPoint that never happened, whereby he and a group of operators, agency operators were going to HALO jump in to the palace and grab Chavez and probably kill him because he wouldn’t allow himself to be captured. And by the way, HALO jumping, for those listeners who don’t know, high altitude, low opening.

(02:37:17)
So you jump out of an aircraft and you go down like a pencil until you’re really low to the deck, like a thousand feet. You pull your parachute cord, and that way you’re not picked up on radar and you’re also not traceable when you get to the ground because it’s so fast. Billy Waugh took the second HALO jump in history into a war theater in Laos during the Vietnam War. So he’s like this famous HALO jumper. So he and the team were going to go in grab Chavez, and he said to me a very interesting thing that was kind of a one moment in time where I saw a different side of Billy Waugh where he said, “I’m so glad we didn’t do that, even though I really wanted to at the time, because can you imagine that country’s problems, where it is now? Can you imagine how we would have been blamed?” And it was an interesting rare moment for Billy Waugh to comment on the bigger picture that you’re asking me about. I think pretty much the operators I know they just stick to the mission.
Lex Fridman
(02:38:23)
So on the technical difficulty of those missions, just your big sense, how hard is it to assassinate a target on the soil of that nation?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:38:36)
I suppose that just depends. Here’s another insightful thing Billy Waugh said to me, and I’m answering the question around because I don’t know, because again, I never had anyone say to me, “Here’s how it went down,” because you can’t. First of all, those are classified, so I’m never going to receive classified information. I did hear a lot about reconnaissance missions when people would be in charge of, you have to be able to what’s called make book on the target before, and making book on the target means photographing them then that gets run up the chain of command to make sure this is really Imad Mughniyeh we’re about to kill.

(02:39:19)
But I once asked Billy when I was trying to get the question and he wouldn’t answer it, and I said, so there’s another person in my book named Rick Proto, who’s also a legendary agency guy, and so he’s like 20 years younger than Billy. And I said, “Billy, if you and Rick had to kill each other, who would win?” I was trying to imagine this hypothetical, how would that work? Who would win? And I posed the question to each of them, and of course each of them said me, then I went back to them and Billy said, “Let me tell you how I would win.” And he said, ” I’d cheat. I’d show up before the duel.”
Annie Jacobsen
(02:40:00)
I’d cheat. I’d show up before the dual, and I’d kill him.
Lex Fridman
(02:40:05)
Yeah. I have a lot of friends who were Navy SEALs. This is just guy conversation.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:40:13)
Well, you would be amazed at what the women do. Let me just tell you that. Women are part of the Special Activities Division, a big part of it.
Lex Fridman
(02:40:22)
Can you comment on that?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:40:24)
I can. Women can get a hell of a lot closer to a target. And I mean that literally.
Lex Fridman
(02:40:32)
The special operations, is this part of the CIA?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:40:35)
The Special Activities Division, now it’s called the Special Activity Center. But originally that’s the umbrella agency that has the different paramilitary organizations under it. So the most lethal one is Ground Branch. And that’s what I reported on in Surprise, Kill, Vanish. And its origins go way back to the Guerrilla warfare corps that was started in 1947 for the president.
Lex Fridman
(02:41:02)
So women are also a part of the alleged assassination?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:41:09)
Absolutely.
Lex Fridman
(02:41:11)
And you’re saying they can at times be more effective. I am just going to leave that pause there. The reason I ask of how difficult the assassinations are, with Bin Laden, it took a long time. So I guess the reconnaissance, the intelligence for finding the target. I imagine with Mossad, maybe this now the leadership of Hamas or the military branch of Hamas is much wanted from an assassination perspective. So to me as an outside observer, it seems like it’s more difficult than you would imagine. But perhaps that’s the intelligence aspect of it, not the actual assassination of locating the person.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:42:00)
Well, I think it’s because mostly from what I understand, it’s a really dirty game and people are covering for people. And I’ll give you the example of Billy Waugh and Imad Mughniyeh, if I may. So Imad Mughniyeh was the most wanted terrorist in the world before Bin Laden. Hezbollah’s, chief of operations. And he was wanted by every, Mossad, jawn down. But no one could find him. He was missing for 20 years. There wasn’t even a photograph of him. And then he resurfaced. And of all places he resurfaced in Saudi Arabia, okay. “What?” That’s when I say it’s a dirty game. Hezbollah, Iran, Hezbollah Iran, enemies with Saudi Arabia. Why on earth was Imad Mughniyeh in Saudi Arabia? Well, that’s where he was. There was a Navy SEAL who was doing reconnaissance on him. This is according to Billy Waugh. And this is around 2005. So Billy’s in his ’80s at this point, late ’70s, ’80s.

(02:43:06)
He gets word that the SEAL who has been tracking Mughniyeh to get photographs of him, to give the photographs to Mossad and CIA so they can do a joint operation to kill him, which they did with a car bomb in Damascus. That’s the end of the story. But how we got there was, the CIA needed confirmation. You can’t kill the wrong person. So the SEAL panicked according to Billy Waugh and was just like, “I’m out of here. This is too dangerous and I do not want to wind up in a Saudi prison.” So who do you send in, Billy Waugh? He shows up, he’s there for 24 hours. He knows where Mughniyeh lives from the SEAL. He positions himself in a cafe across the street which is run by Sudanese men. And of course Waugh speaks some Sudanese because he operated in Sudan. And he’s shooting the shit with him by his own words. He had the most foul mouth that was just absolutely delightful to listen to.

(02:44:01)
And then in between him and Mughniyeh’s house is a dumpster. And Billy Waugh being Billy Waugh, who will go to any lengths to do the job, decides to conduct reconnaissance from inside the dumpster. And that is where he is when he takes the picture of Imad Mughniyeh living so comfortably in Saudi. That Mughniyeh according to Billy, came out of his apartment building with dry cleaner plastic bag hangers over his shoulder. That’s how comfortable he lived there. It was his neighborhood. Click, click, click, Billy Waugh takes the photographs, runs them to the CIA headquarters in Saudi at the embassy. Oh my God, it’s Mughniyeh. Get the hell out of here. He gets to the airport, he leaves. Those photographs get sent to the agency, and then they do the operation with Mossad and Mughniyeh is dead. Now the truth about that being a co CIA mission was not reported for many years after the fact. Mossad took credit as the CIA often likes to just give other people credit. They just want the job done.
Lex Fridman
(02:45:14)
Well, speaking of Mossad, in your understanding of all the intelligence agencies, what are the strengths and weaknesses of the different intelligence agencies out there? CIA and Mossad, MI6, SVR and FSB and Chinese intelligence, all this stuff. Is there some interesting differences, insights that you have from all of your studying FCIA?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:45:41)
That’s a really interesting question. I don’t know. And here’s why. It’s because I’ve never interviewed any intelligence officer with those other agencies. I’ve interviewed a couple of people with Shin Bet in Israel. But until I speak to an actual source whose job it was, I don’t know. So the information that I’m getting is based on perception of others which one would think would be deeply clouded by the idea that America is the greatest. We’re better than them.
Lex Fridman
(02:46:23)
Yes. Well, actually the fascinating thing is because you’ve spoken to a lot of people about the CIA. How do you know they’re telling the truth? And this actually probably applies generally to your interviews with very secretive people. How do you get past the bullshit?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:46:42)
Well, that’s just like multiple sourcing. So you find the story out and then you go to the national archives and you find the operation and then you learn all about this, and then you interview other people who were there and you put the story together to the best of your ability and you make very specific choices with “so-and-so said,” said so-and-so. And very rarely do I report on a single source as I did in the end of Area 51. And then it says essentially, look dear reader, this is what the source told me. I have no way of corroborating it. This is legit and here it is. So that’s an area to make your reader comfortable with the information that they’re being given. And then in all of my books, whether there are three or 400 pages, there’s always 100 pages of notes at the end. So you can see all the sourcing and you can begin to get an understanding of how journalism in the national security world works.

(02:47:49)
And also great opportunity for me to say, I’m often standing on the shoulders of journalists before me who did an incredible job digging into something and being able to report what they knew. Often the books are 10, 20, 30 years old, and so much more has come to light since.

Navalny

Lex Fridman
(02:48:07)
And I also would just like to say that I appreciate that you said, “Great question, I don’t know.” Not enough people say I don’t know and that’s a sign of a great journalist. But speaking about things you might not know about, let me ask you about something going on currently. So recently Alexei Navalny died in prison, perhaps was killed in prison. What’s your sense from looking at it? Do you think he died of natural causes in prison? Do you think it’s possible he was assassinated? Russia, Ukraine, Mossad, CIA, whoever has interest in this particular war.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:48:58)
For that, I look directly to the historical record. Having written about Russian assassination campaigns and programs since the earliest days of the Cold War. And Russia has a long history of assassinating, murdering dissidents. And in Surprise, Kill, Vanish, I tell the story of an actual KGB assassin named Khokhlov who knocked on the door of the man he was assigned to kill. And by the way, this all comes from a book that Khokhlov wrote later. Because he defected to the United States. He knocks on the door and the guy answers the door. And instead of killing him, he has this moment of conscious of crisis or crisis of conscience and says, “I can’t kill you, even though that’s what I’m supposed to do.” And then sits down with the guy and together decides, okay, we’re going to defect. We’re going to let the Western intelligence agencies know what we’re doing here. And the CIA got involved.

(02:50:07)
But Russian assassins were able to poison Khokhlov with polonium. What happens to him is insane and it’s a miracle he didn’t die, but he doesn’t. And then he defects to the West and he writes these books and he tells lots of incredible secrets about the Russian assassination programs and their poison labs and they’re really interesting. So to answer that question, I mean to my eye of course, I don’t know, but it certainly looks like Russia is acting in the same vein that it has always acted, taking care of dissidents that go against Mother Russia.

KGB

Lex Fridman
(02:50:43)
So in the style of KGB assassinations. Is there something you can comment on about the ways that KGB operates versus the CIA when we look at the history of the two organizations, the Cold War, after World War II and the leading up to today?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:51:06)
I mean, my feeling on that is always that there’s a thread somewhere in declassified documentation about these programs of America working to maintain assemblance of democratic ideals, however surprising that may be. In other words, always trying to, I don’t want to say fight fair because killing people isn’t fair, but versus a certain ruthlessness, a real sinister totalitarian type ruthlessness certainly from Soviet Russia. I’m far less familiar with modern day Russian assassination activities, although we certainly know on the record that they exist. Some people have done great reporting on that. But there seems to be almost a sadism about the Russian programs that I personally have not seen in the American programs.
Lex Fridman
(02:52:24)
What about on the surveillance side? It seems like America’s pretty good at mass surveillance, or at least has been revealed through NSA and all this reporting and leaks and whistleblowers. Can you comment to the degree to how much surveillance is done by the US government internally and externally?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:52:49)
If you’d asked me five years ago, I would’ve a very different answer. Because first of all, they’re looking for a needle in the haystack. They’re looking for the Bin Laden and they can’t find the needle in the haystack, but they continue to create the haystack and survey the haystack. I’m I right?
Lex Fridman
(02:53:05)
Yeah.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:53:05)
Okay. But the real problem, what has happened, and I write about this in my book, First Platoon, which is about a group of young soldiers who goes to Afghanistan and unwittingly becomes part of the defense department’s efforts to capture biometrics on 85% of the population of Afghanistan. Which by the way, China then emulated in their own biometric surveillance program. And I think this is a terrible idea. But what has happened, these biometric systems that have been created and biometrics are of course fingerprints, facial images, DNA and iris scans that allow you to tag, track and locate people.

(02:53:51)
And what has happened in the five years since this question was first on everybody’s minds about NSA surveillance is that the civilian sector companies have essentially done all the defense department’s biometric surveillance job for them by all of us sharing our facially recognizable images on Instagram and Facebook and everywhere else, X, by sharing information, by writing up narratives about ourselves. This information has become part of the database. Five years ago when I was reporting First Platoon, I was interviewing the police chief of El Segundo, which is like on the outskirts of LA. It’s right near the airport. And why it’s important is because it’s like defense contractor haven. So they have massive surveillance. And Chief Whalen, when I posed this question to him, he said to me, “Annie, let me show you something.” And he had Clearwater AI, the recognition software on his phone. And this was still when it was like quasi not supposed to, you have that for law enforcement. And he said, “I want you to go down the block and I want you to just turn the corner and come back toward me.” Which I did. And he just didn’t even hold up his phone. He just looked at his hand and his phone was on me. And he went back down and it was like the tiniest movement. And when I came back to him, he went like this and he showed me, there I was. Everything about me. Facts and figures and all images. And he knew who I was before I even got to him. So is that a good thing or a bad thing? I mean, we could have another three hour conversation about that alone.
Lex Fridman
(02:55:40)
So you’re saying more and more, you don’t need NSA where we’re giving over the data ourselves publicly or semi publicly.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:55:51)
Yeah. During the war on terror, people were just incensed to learn that there is a drone that’s flying at something like 20,000 feet. It’s called ARGUS-IS. And it can capture the… It’s not a license plate. It’s like it can basically capture what’s written on a golf ball from 17,000 feet, 20,000 feet up. And people went crazy over this like, “Oh my god, it’s Big Brother.” Well, one of the lead engineers on that, Pat Billkin is someone I talk to regularly because we talk about surveillance a lot because he thinks about it a lot because he has kids now. And he has given so much thoughtful, really thinks about this issue because he believes, just like you stated, that what we are turning over about ourselves actually exceeds anything that ARGUS-IS could do from above because we’re doing it willfully.

(02:56:44)
So what it’s doing is it’s creating an ability for, if someone wants to know about you, if someone, let’s say in government, wants to know about Lex Fridman, they can find out everything about you. And then that gets used for tagging, tracking and ultimately. In the war theater it was called find, fix, finish. Well, what do you think the finish is in that statement?
Lex Fridman
(02:57:07)
It’s not pleasant.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:57:08)
It’s called a drone strike. Find, find him with the biometric, fix him, meaning fix his position. We know he’s moving in a car. That’s him. Finish him. Call it in, drone strike. Boom.

Hitler and the atomic bomb

Lex Fridman
(02:57:24)
If we could return to nuclear war, you’ve briefly mentioned that a lot of things go back to the Third Reich and Hitler. If we go back to World War II, we look at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the dropping of the two bombs. I would love to get your opinion on whether we should or shouldn’t have done that. And also to get your opinion on what would’ve happened if Hitler and Germany built the bomb first. Do you think it was possible he could have built the bomb first?
Annie Jacobsen
(02:58:01)
In my researching Third Reich weapons for Operation Paperclip, because of course we got a lot of those scientists, after.
Lex Fridman
(02:58:11)
Which is another great book in a terrifyingly complicated operation.
Annie Jacobsen
(02:58:16)
Yes. At what point do the ends justify the means? But in looking at those programs, and we acquired Hitler’s favorite weapons designers. And I’m talking about weapons of mass destruction like chemical weapons and biological weapons. But of course, America was ahead in the nuclear program. And an interesting detail reading Albert Speer’s memoirs. Was Speer referring to a conversation he had with Hitler where Hitler said, “No, I don’t want to do that. That’s Jewish science.” So because of Hitler’s own racial ethnic prejudices, they didn’t develop the bomb. As far as should we have dropped the bombs on Hiroshima, I’ve interviewed all kinds of people with different opinions, most of them that had ended the war. The best interview and most meaningful perhaps that I ever did was with Alfred O’Donnell, who was a participant in the Battle of Okinawa, which was like this insane. Just to read stories about Okinawa, it makes your hair stand on end.

(02:59:28)
And O’Donnell like so many others, was slated to invade mainland Japan, to his almost certain death. So somebody like that, it makes sense right from the get go why he would be pro nuclear weapons. It saved his own personal life and it saved everyone that he knew that he was fighting with. And it ended the war.
Lex Fridman
(02:59:58)
Do you think it sent a signal? Like without that we wouldn’t have known perhaps about the power of the weapons. So in the long arc of that history, 70 years plus, it is the reason why deterrence has worked so far.
Annie Jacobsen
(03:00:19)
Yes. That’s an interesting thought. My thought goes to this idea of more. That everybody always wants more. It’s a very dangerous… It’s like more power, literally, just more power. And what is more confounding to me beyond the fact that we dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the war ended is that this decision was then made to develop the thermonuclear bomb. A force that is such… The degree of magnitude of that power is mind-boggling. I mean even projects within the Manhattan Project defined thermonuclear weapon, the thermonuclear weapon as the evil thing. It was evil. It’s a weapon of genocide. Atomic weapons destroy cities, thermonuclear weapons destroy civilizations.

War and human nature

Lex Fridman
(03:01:27)
You open the book with a Churchill quote, ” The story of the human race is war. Except for brief and precarious interludes there has never been peace in the world. And before history began, murders strife was universal and unending.” Do you think there will always be war? Do you think that there is some deep human way in which we’re tending to this global war eternally?
Annie Jacobsen
(03:02:02)
Well, the optimistic answer of that would be that we could evolve beyond that. Because certainly if we look at our ancestors, they had not developed their consciousness as far as we have to be able to build the tools that we have. So the hopeful answer is we will evolve beyond this brute force, kill the other guy attitude. Certainly these are questions that will become more obvious over time. I just want to play my little part in this world that I live in as the storyteller who brings information to people so that they can have these questions with themselves, with their friends, with their families. And I think in asking that very question, what you’re really saying is, why don’t we evolve beyond war fighting?
Lex Fridman
(03:03:15)
It is very possible. And your book is such a stark and powerful reminder that human civilization, as we know it ends in this century. It’s a good motivator to get our shit together.
Annie Jacobsen
(03:03:36)
But aren’t you really saying human civilization could end, not it ends?
Lex Fridman
(03:03:42)
Could end.
Annie Jacobsen
(03:03:43)
Could end.
Lex Fridman
(03:03:46)
But the power of our weapons is growing rapidly.
Annie Jacobsen
(03:03:52)
As they say, it’s time to come back from the brink. And it’s time to have that discussion while we’re still talking.
Lex Fridman
(03:03:58)
And there’s another complexity sneaking up into the picture in the form of artificial intelligence and in cyber war, but also in hot war, the use of autonomous weapons. All of it starts becoming super complicated as we delegate some of these decisions about war, including nuclear war to more and more autonomy and artificial intelligence systems, is going to be a very interesting century. Do you just zoom out a little bit, hope that we become a multi-planetary species?
Annie Jacobsen
(03:04:36)
I’m all for adventure.
Lex Fridman
(03:04:40)
And I too while am for adventure, I’m all for backups in all forms. So I hope that human start a civilization on Mars and beyond out in space. And if you zoom on across all of it, what gives you hope about human civilization, about this whole thing we have going on here?

Hope

Annie Jacobsen
(03:05:02)
I mean, I am a fundamentally optimistic person. I must have come out of the shoot that way. Because I just am. Even though I write about really grim things, I get inspired by them because I do always believe in evolution. I also have the greatest family ever. Two kids, Jet and Finley, shout out to them. They’re Lex Fridman fans.
Lex Fridman
(03:05:28)
Oh yeah, oh you guys.
Annie Jacobsen
(03:05:29)
And my husband. So what inspires me is this idea of legacy. I think that you always want to have your eye on being a good example to the best that you can and passing on what you know and believing in the next generation. And again, that’s a sentiment echoed by all these cold warriors I’ve been talking to because they also share that idea that, wow, look at what we have done as a civilization and look where we’re going. Whether it’s exoplanetary travel or AI. It’s just that the human factor of the desire to fight, the desire to have conflict, needs to be reconfigured, because with all these new technologies that we have, the peril is growing at an accelerating pace, perhaps faster than the average human can keep up with.
Lex Fridman
(03:06:31)
Well Annie, thank you for being a wonderful example of a great journalist, a great writer, a great human being. And I’m a big fan of yours. It’s a huge honor to meet you, to talk with today. So thank you so much for talking today.
Annie Jacobsen
(03:06:46)
Thank you for having me.
Lex Fridman
(03:06:48)
Thank you for listening to this conversation with Annie Jacobsen. To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now let me leave you some words from John F. Kennedy. “The very word secrecy is repugnant in a free and open society. And we are as a people inherently and historically opposed to secret societies, the secret oaths, and the secret proceedings.” Thank you for listening and hope to see you next time.

Transcript for Sam Altman: OpenAI, GPT-5, Sora, Board Saga, Elon Musk, Ilya, Power & AGI | Lex Fridman Podcast #419

This is a transcript of Lex Fridman Podcast #419 with Sam Altman 2.
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Table of Contents

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Introduction

Sam Altman
(00:00:00)
I think compute is going to be the currency of the future. I think it’ll be maybe the most precious commodity in the world. I expect that by the end of this decade, and possibly somewhat sooner than that, we will have quite capable systems that we look at and say, “Wow, that’s really remarkable.” The road to AGI should be a giant power struggle. I expect that to be the case.
Lex Fridman
(00:00:26)
Whoever builds AGI first gets a lot of power. Do you trust yourself with that much power?

(00:00:36)
The following is a conversation with Sam Altman, his second time on the podcast. He is the CEO of OpenAI, the company behind GPT-4, ChaTGPT, Sora, and perhaps one day the very company that will build AGI. This is The Lex Fridman Podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, dear friends, here’s Sam Altman.

OpenAI board saga


(00:01:05)
Take me through the OpenAI board saga that started on Thursday, November 16th, maybe Friday, November 17th for you.
Sam Altman
(00:01:13)
That was definitely the most painful professional experience of my life, and chaotic and shameful and upsetting and a bunch of other negative things. There were great things about it too, and I wish it had not been in such an adrenaline rush that I wasn’t able to stop and appreciate them at the time. But I came across this old tweet of mine or this tweet of mine from that time period. It was like going your own eulogy, watching people say all these great things about you, and just unbelievable support from people I love and care about. That was really nice, really nice. That whole weekend, with one big exception, I felt like a great deal of love and very little hate, even though it felt like I have no idea what’s happening and what’s going to happen here and this feels really bad. And there were definitely times I thought it was going to be one of the worst things to ever happen for AI safety. Well, I also think I’m happy that it happened relatively early. I thought at some point between when OpenAI started and when we created AGI, there was going to be something crazy and explosive that happened, but there may be more crazy and explosive things still to happen. It still, I think, helped us build up some resilience and be ready for more challenges in the future.
Lex Fridman
(00:03:02)
But the thing you had a sense that you would experience is some kind of power struggle?
Sam Altman
(00:03:08)
The road to AGI should be a giant power struggle. The world should… Well, not should. I expect that to be the case.
Lex Fridman
(00:03:17)
And so you have to go through that, like you said, iterate as often as possible in figuring out how to have a board structure, how to have organization, how to have the kind of people that you’re working with, how to communicate all that in order to deescalate the power struggle as much as possible.
Sam Altman
(00:03:37)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:03:37)
Pacify it.
Sam Altman
(00:03:38)
But at this point, it feels like something that was in the past that was really unpleasant and really difficult and painful, but we’re back to work and things are so busy and so intense that I don’t spend a lot of time thinking about it. There was a time after, there was this fugue state for the month after, maybe 45 days after, that I was just drifting through the days. I was so out of it. I was feeling so down.
Lex Fridman
(00:04:17)
Just on a personal, psychological level?
Sam Altman
(00:04:20)
Yeah. Really painful, and hard to have to keep running OpenAI in the middle of that. I just wanted to crawl into a cave and recover for a while. But now it’s like we’re just back to working on the mission.
Lex Fridman
(00:04:38)
Well, it’s still useful to go back there and reflect on board structures, on power dynamics, on how companies are run, the tension between research and product development and money and all this kind of stuff so that you, who have a very high potential of building AGI, would do so in a slightly more organized, less dramatic way in the future. So there’s value there to go, both the personal psychological aspects of you as a leader, and also just the board structure and all this messy stuff.
Sam Altman
(00:05:18)
I definitely learned a lot about structure and incentives and what we need out of a board. And I think that it is valuable that this happened now in some sense. I think this is probably not the last high-stress moment of OpenAI, but it was quite a high-stress moment. My company very nearly got destroyed. And we think a lot about many of the other things we’ve got to get right for AGI, but thinking about how to build a resilient org and how to build a structure that will stand up to a lot of pressure in the world, which I expect more and more as we get closer, I think that’s super important.
Lex Fridman
(00:06:01)
Do you have a sense of how deep and rigorous the deliberation process by the board was? Can you shine some light on just human dynamics involved in situations like this? Was it just a few conversations and all of a sudden it escalates and why don’t we fire Sam kind of thing?
Sam Altman
(00:06:22)
I think the board members are well-meaning people on the whole, and I believe that in stressful situations where people feel time pressure or whatever, people understand and make suboptimal decisions. And I think one of the challenges for OpenAI will be we’re going to have to have a board and a team that are good at operating under pressure.
Lex Fridman
(00:07:00)
Do you think the board had too much power?
Sam Altman
(00:07:03)
I think boards are supposed to have a lot of power, but one of the things that we did see is in most corporate structures, boards are usually answerable to shareholders. Sometimes people have super voting shares or whatever. In this case, and I think one of the things with our structure that we maybe should have thought about more than we did is that the board of a nonprofit has, unless you put other rules in place, quite a lot of power. They don’t really answer to anyone but themselves. And there’s ways in which that’s good, but what we’d really like is for the board of OpenAI to answer to the world as a whole, as much as that’s a practical thing.
Lex Fridman
(00:07:44)
So there’s a new board announced.
Sam Altman
(00:07:46)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:07:47)
There’s I guess a new smaller board at first, and now there’s a new final board?
Sam Altman
(00:07:53)
Not a final board yet. We’ve added some. We’ll add more.
Lex Fridman
(00:07:56)
Added some. Okay. What is fixed in the new one that was perhaps broken in the previous one?
Sam Altman
(00:08:05)
The old board got smaller over the course of about a year. It was nine and then it went down to six, and then we couldn’t agree on who to add. And the board also I think didn’t have a lot of experienced board members, and a lot of the new board members at OpenAI have just have more experience as board members. I think that’ll help.
Lex Fridman
(00:08:31)
It’s been criticized, some of the people that are added to the board. I heard a lot of people criticizing the addition of Larry Summers, for example. What’s the process of selecting the board? What’s involved in that?
Sam Altman
(00:08:43)
So Brett and Larry were decided in the heat of the moment over this very tense weekend, and that weekend was a real rollercoaster. It was a lot of ups and downs. And we were trying to agree on new board members that both the executive team here and the old board members felt would be reasonable. Larry was actually one of their suggestions, the old board members. Brett, I think I had even previous to that weekend suggested, but he was busy and didn’t want to do it, and then we really needed help in [inaudible 00:09:22]. We talked about a lot of other people too, but I felt like if I was going to come back, I needed new board members. I didn’t think I could work with the old board again in the same configuration, although we then decided, and I’m grateful that Adam would stay, but we considered various configurations, decided we wanted to get to a board of three and had to find two new board members over the course of a short period of time.

(00:09:57)
So those were decided honestly without… You do that on the battlefield. You don’t have time to design a rigorous process then. For new board members since, and new board members we’ll add going forward, we have some criteria that we think are important for the board to have, different expertise that we want the board to have. Unlike hiring an executive where you need them to do one role well, the board needs to do a whole role of governance and thoughtfulness well, and so, one thing that Brett says which I really like is that we want to hire board members in slates, not as individuals one at a time. And thinking about a group of people that will bring nonprofit expertise, expertise at running companies, good legal and governance expertise, that’s what we’ve tried to optimize for.
Lex Fridman
(00:10:49)
So is technical savvy important for the individual board members?
Sam Altman
(00:10:52)
Not for every board member, but for certainly some you need that. That’s part of what the board needs to do.
Lex Fridman
(00:10:57)
The interesting thing that people probably don’t understand about OpenAI, I certainly don’t, is all the details of running the business. When they think about the board, given the drama, they think about you. They think about if you reach AGI or you reach some of these incredibly impactful products and you build them and deploy them, what’s the conversation with the board like? And they think, all right, what’s the right squad to have in that kind of situation to deliberate?
Sam Altman
(00:11:25)
Look, I think you definitely need some technical experts there. And then you need some people who are like, “How can we deploy this in a way that will help people in the world the most?” And people who have a very different perspective. I think a mistake that you or I might make is to think that only the technical understanding matters, and that’s definitely part of the conversation you want that board to have, but there’s a lot more about how that’s going to just impact society and people’s lives that you really want represented in there too.
Lex Fridman
(00:11:56)
Are you looking at the track record of people or you’re just having conversations?
Sam Altman
(00:12:00)
Track record is a big deal. You of course have a lot of conversations, but there are some roles where I totally ignore track record and just look at slope, ignore the Y-intercept.
Lex Fridman
(00:12:18)
Thank you. Thank you for making it mathematical for the audience.
Sam Altman
(00:12:21)
For a board member, I do care much more about the Y-intercept. I think there is something deep to say about track record there, and experience is something’s very hard to replace.
Lex Fridman
(00:12:32)
Do you try to fit a polynomial function or exponential one to the track record?
Sam Altman
(00:12:36)
That analogy doesn’t carry that far.
Lex Fridman
(00:12:39)
All right. You mentioned some of the low points that weekend. What were some of the low points psychologically for you? Did you consider going to the Amazon jungle and just taking ayahuasca and disappearing forever?
Sam Altman
(00:12:53)
It was a very bad period of time. There were great high points too. My phone was just nonstop blowing up with nice messages from people I worked with every day, people I hadn’t talked to in a decade. I didn’t get to appreciate that as much as I should have because I was just in the middle of this firefight, but that was really nice. But on the whole, it was a very painful weekend. It was like a battle fought in public to a surprising degree, and that was extremely exhausting to me, much more than I expected. I think fights are generally exhausting, but this one really was. The board did this Friday afternoon. I really couldn’t get much in the way of answers, but I also was just like, well, the board gets to do this, so I’m going to think for a little bit about what I want to do, but I’ll try to find the blessing in disguise here.

(00:13:52)
And I was like, well, my current job at OpenAI is, or it was, to run a decently sized company at this point. And the thing I’d always liked the most was just getting to work with the researchers. And I was like, yeah, I can just go do a very focused AGI research effort. And I got excited about that. Didn’t even occur to me at the time possibly that this was all going to get undone. This was Friday afternoon.
Lex Fridman
(00:14:19)
So you’ve accepted the death of this-
Sam Altman
(00:14:22)
Very quickly. Very quickly. I went through a little period of confusion and rage, but very quickly, quickly. And by Friday night, I was talking to people about what was going to be next, and I was excited about that. I think it was Friday evening for the first time that I heard from the exec team here, which is like, “Hey, we’re going to fight this.” and then I went to bed just still being like, okay, excited. Onward.
Lex Fridman
(00:14:52)
Were you able to sleep?
Sam Altman
(00:14:54)
Not a lot. One of the weird things was there was this period of four and a half days where I didn’t sleep much, didn’t eat much, and still had a surprising amount of energy. You learn a weird thing about adrenaline in wartime.
Lex Fridman
(00:15:09)
So you accepted the death of this baby, OpenAI.
Sam Altman
(00:15:13)
And I was excited for the new thing. I was just like, “Okay, this was crazy, but whatever.”
Lex Fridman
(00:15:17)
It’s a very good coping mechanism.
Sam Altman
(00:15:18)
And then Saturday morning, two of the board members called and said, “Hey, we didn’t mean to destabilize things. We don’t want to store a lot of value here. Can we talk about you coming back?” And I immediately didn’t want to do that, but I thought a little more and I was like, well, I really care about the people here, the partners, shareholders. I love this company. And so I thought about it and I was like, “Well, okay, but here’s the stuff I would need.” And then the most painful time of all was over the course of that weekend, I kept thinking and being told, and not just me, the whole team here kept thinking, well, we were trying to keep OpenAI stabilized while the whole world was trying to break it apart, people trying to recruit whatever.

(00:16:04)
We kept being told, all right, we’re almost done. We’re almost done. We just need a little bit more time. And it was this very confusing state. And then Sunday evening when, again, every few hours I expected that we were going to be done and we’re going to figure out a way for me to return and things to go back to how they were. The board then appointed a new interim CEO, and then I was like, that feels really bad. That was the low point of the whole thing. I’ll tell you something. It felt very painful, but I felt a lot of love that whole weekend. Other than that one moment Sunday night, I would not characterize my emotions as anger or hate, but I felt a lot of love from people, towards people. It was painful, but the dominant emotion of the weekend was love, not hate.
Lex Fridman
(00:17:04)
You’ve spoken highly of Mira Murati, that she helped especially, as you put in the tweet, in the quiet moments when it counts. Perhaps we could take a bit of a tangent. What do you admire about Mira?
Sam Altman
(00:17:15)
Well, she did a great job during that weekend in a lot of chaos, but people often see leaders in the crisis moments, good or bad. But a thing I really value in leaders is how people act on a boring Tuesday at 9:46 in the morning and in just the normal drudgery of the day-to-day. How someone shows up in a meeting, the quality of the decisions they make. That was what I meant about the quiet moments.
Lex Fridman
(00:17:47)
Meaning most of the work is done on a day-by-day, in meeting-by-meeting. Just be present and make great decisions.
Sam Altman
(00:17:58)
Yeah. Look, what you have wanted to spend the last 20 minutes about, and I understand, is this one very dramatic weekend, but that’s not really what OpenAI is about. OpenAI is really about the other seven years.
Lex Fridman
(00:18:10)
Well, yeah. Human civilization is not about the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany, but still that’s something people focus on.
Sam Altman
(00:18:18)
Very understandable.
Lex Fridman
(00:18:19)
It gives us an insight into human nature, the extremes of human nature, and perhaps some of the damage in some of the triumphs of human civilization can happen in those moments, so it’s illustrative. Let me ask you about Ilya. Is he being held hostage in a secret nuclear facility?

Ilya Sutskever

Sam Altman
(00:18:36)
No.
Lex Fridman
(00:18:37)
What about a regular secret facility?
Sam Altman
(00:18:39)
No.
Lex Fridman
(00:18:40)
What about a nuclear non-secret facility?
Sam Altman
(00:18:41)
Neither. Not that either.
Lex Fridman
(00:18:44)
This is becoming a meme at some point. You’ve known Ilya for a long time. He was obviously part of this drama with the board and all that kind of stuff. What’s your relationship with him now?
Sam Altman
(00:18:57)
I love Ilya. I have tremendous respect for Ilya. I don’t have anything I can say about his plans right now. That’s a question for him, but I really hope we work together for certainly the rest of my career. He’s a little bit younger than me. Maybe he works a little bit longer.
Lex Fridman
(00:19:15)
There’s a meme that he saw something, like he maybe saw AGI and that gave him a lot of worry internally. What did Ilya see?
Sam Altman
(00:19:28)
Ilya has not seen AGI. None of us have seen AGI. We’ve not built AGI. I do think one of the many things that I really love about Ilya is he takes AGI and the safety concerns, broadly speaking, including things like the impact this is going to have on society, very seriously. And as we continue to make significant progress, Ilya is one of the people that I’ve spent the most time over the last couple of years talking about what this is going to mean, what we need to do to ensure we get it right, to ensure that we succeed at the mission. So Ilya did not see AGI, but Ilya is a credit to humanity in terms of how much he thinks and worries about making sure we get this right.
Lex Fridman
(00:20:30)
I’ve had a bunch of conversation with him in the past. I think when he talks about technology, he’s always doing this long-term thinking type of thing. So he is not thinking about what this is going to be in a year. He’s thinking about in 10 years, just thinking from first principles like, “Okay, if this scales, what are the fundamentals here? Where’s this going?” And so that’s a foundation for them thinking about all the other safety concerns and all that kind of stuff, which makes him a really fascinating human to talk with. Do you have any idea why he’s been quiet? Is it he’s just doing some soul-searching?
Sam Altman
(00:21:08)
Again, I don’t want to speak for Ilya. I think that you should ask him that. He’s definitely a thoughtful guy. I think Ilya is always on a soul search in a really good way.
Lex Fridman
(00:21:27)
Yes. Yeah. Also, he appreciates the power of silence. Also, I’m told he can be a silly guy, which I’ve never seen that side of him.
Sam Altman
(00:21:36)
It’s very sweet when that happens.
Lex Fridman
(00:21:39)
I’ve never witnessed a silly Ilya, but I look forward to that as well.
Sam Altman
(00:21:43)
I was at a dinner party with him recently and he was playing with a puppy and he was in a very silly mood, very endearing. And I was thinking, oh man, this is not the side of Ilya that the world sees the most.
Lex Fridman
(00:21:55)
So just to wrap up this whole saga, are you feeling good about the board structure-
Sam Altman
(00:21:55)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(00:22:01)
… about all of this and where it’s moving?
Sam Altman
(00:22:04)
I feel great about the new board. In terms of the structure of OpenAI, one of the board’s tasks is to look at that and see where we can make it more robust. We wanted to get new board members in place first, but we clearly learned a lesson about structure throughout this process. I don’t have, I think, super deep things to say. It was a crazy, very painful experience. I think it was a perfect storm of weirdness. It was a preview for me of what’s going to happen as the stakes get higher and higher and the need that we have robust governance structures and processes and people. I’m happy it happened when it did, but it was a shockingly painful thing to go through.
Lex Fridman
(00:22:47)
Did it make you be more hesitant in trusting people?
Sam Altman
(00:22:50)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(00:22:51)
Just on a personal level?
Sam Altman
(00:22:52)
Yes. I think I’m like an extremely trusting person. I’ve always had a life philosophy of don’t worry about all of the paranoia. Don’t worry about the edge cases. You get a little bit screwed in exchange for getting to live with your guard down. And this was so shocking to me. I was so caught off guard that it has definitely changed, and I really don’t like this, it’s definitely changed how I think about just default trust of people and planning for the bad scenarios.
Lex Fridman
(00:23:21)
You got to be careful with that. Are you worried about becoming a little too cynical?
Sam Altman
(00:23:26)
I’m not worried about becoming too cynical. I think I’m the extreme opposite of a cynical person, but I’m worried about just becoming less of a default trusting person.
Lex Fridman
(00:23:36)
I’m actually not sure which mode is best to operate in for a person who’s developing AGI, trusting or un-trusting. It’s an interesting journey you’re on. But in terms of structure, see, I’m more interested on the human level. How do you surround yourself with humans that are building cool shit, but also are making wise decisions? Because the more money you start making, the more power the thing has, the weirder people get.
Sam Altman
(00:24:06)
I think you could make all kinds of comments about the board members and the level of trust I should have had there, or how I should have done things differently. But in terms of the team here, I think you’d have to give me a very good grade on that one. And I have just enormous gratitude and trust and respect for the people that I work with every day, and I think being surrounded with people like that is really important.

Elon Musk lawsuit

Lex Fridman
(00:24:39)
Our mutual friend Elon sued OpenAI. What to you is the essence of what he’s criticizing? To what degree does he have a point? To what degree is he wrong?
Sam Altman
(00:24:52)
I don’t know what it’s really about. We started off just thinking we were going to be a research lab and having no idea about how this technology was going to go. Because it was only seven or eight years ago, it’s hard to go back and really remember what it was like then, but this is before language models were a big deal. This was before we had any idea about an API or selling access to a chatbot. It was before we had any idea we were going to productize at all. So we’re like, “We’re just going to try to do research and we don’t really know what we’re going to do with that.” I think with many fundamentally new things, you start fumbling through the dark and you make some assumptions, most of which turned out to be wrong.

(00:25:31)
And then it became clear that we were going to need to do different things and also have huge amounts more capital. So we said, “Okay, well, the structure doesn’t quite work for that. How do we patch the structure?” And then you patch it again and patch it again and you end up with something that does look eyebrow-raising, to say the least. But we got here gradually with, I think, reasonable decisions at each point along the way. And it doesn’t mean I wouldn’t do it totally differently if we could go back now with an Oracle, but you don’t get the Oracle at the time. But anyway, in terms of what Elon’s real motivations here are, I don’t know.
Lex Fridman
(00:26:12)
To the degree you remember, what was the response that OpenAI gave in the blog post? Can you summarize it?
Sam Altman
(00:26:21)
Oh, we just said Elon said this set of things. Here’s our characterization, or here’s not our characterization. Here’s the characterization of how this went down. We tried to not make it emotional and just say, “Here’s the history.”
Lex Fridman
(00:26:44)
I do think there’s a degree of mischaracterization from Elon here about one of the points you just made, which is the degree of uncertainty you had at the time. You guys are a small group of researchers crazily talking about AGI when everybody’s laughing at that thought.
Sam Altman
(00:27:09)
It wasn’t that long ago Elon was crazily talking about launching rockets when people were laughing at that thought, so I think he’d have more empathy for this.
Lex Fridman
(00:27:20)
I do think that there’s personal stuff here, that there was a split that OpenAI and a lot of amazing people here chose to part ways with Elon, so there’s a personal-
Sam Altman
(00:27:34)
Elon chose to part ways.
Lex Fridman
(00:27:37)
Can you describe that exactly? The choosing to part ways?
Sam Altman
(00:27:42)
He thought OpenAI was going to fail. He wanted total control to turn it around. We wanted to keep going in the direction that now has become OpenAI. He also wanted Tesla to be able to build an AGI effort. At various times, he wanted to make OpenAI into a for-profit company that he could have control of or have it merge with Tesla. We didn’t want to do that, and he decided to leave, which that’s fine.
Lex Fridman
(00:28:06)
So you’re saying, and that’s one of the things that the blog post says, is that he wanted OpenAI to be basically acquired by Tesla in the same way that, or maybe something similar or maybe something more dramatic than the partnership with Microsoft.
Sam Altman
(00:28:23)
My memory is the proposal was just like, yeah, get acquired by Tesla and have Tesla have full control over it. I’m pretty sure that’s what it was.
Lex Fridman
(00:28:29)
So what does the word open in OpenAI mean to Elon at the time? Ilya has talked about this in the email exchanges and all this kind of stuff. What does it mean to you at the time? What does it mean to you now?
Sam Altman
(00:28:44)
Speaking of going back with an Oracle, I’d pick a different name. One of the things that I think OpenAI is doing that is the most important of everything that we’re doing is putting powerful technology in the hands of people for free, as a public good. We don’t run ads on our-
Sam Altman
(00:29:01)
… as a public good. We don’t run ads on our free version. We don’t monetize it in other ways. We just say it’s part of our mission. We want to put increasingly powerful tools in the hands of people for free and get them to use them. I think that kind of open is really important to our mission. I think if you give people great tools and teach them to use them or don’t even teach them, they’ll figure it out, and let them go build an incredible future for each other with that, that’s a big deal. So if we can keep putting free or low cost or free and low cost powerful AI tools out in the world, I think that’s a huge deal for how we fulfill the mission. Open source or not, yeah, I think we should open source some stuff and not other stuff. It does become this religious battle line where nuance is hard to have, but I think nuance is the right answer.
Lex Fridman
(00:29:55)
So he said, “Change your name to CloseAI and I’ll drop the lawsuit.” I mean is it going to become this battleground in the land of memes about the name?
Sam Altman
(00:30:06)
I think that speaks to the seriousness with which Elon means the lawsuit, and that’s like an astonishing thing to say, I think.
Lex Fridman
(00:30:23)
Maybe correct me if I’m wrong, but I don’t think the lawsuit is legally serious. It’s more to make a point about the future of AGI and the company that’s currently leading the way.
Sam Altman
(00:30:37)
Look, I mean Grok had not open sourced anything until people pointed out it was a little bit hypocritical and then he announced that Grok will open source things this week. I don’t think open source versus not is what this is really about for him.
Lex Fridman
(00:30:48)
Well, we will talk about open source and not. I do think maybe criticizing the competition is great. Just talking a little shit, that’s great. But friendly competition versus like, “I personally hate lawsuits.”
Sam Altman
(00:31:01)
Look, I think this whole thing is unbecoming of a builder. And I respect Elon as one of the great builders of our time. I know he knows what it’s like to have haters attack him and it makes me extra sad he’s doing it toss.
Lex Fridman
(00:31:18)
Yeah, he’s one of the greatest builders of all time, potentially the greatest builder of all time.
Sam Altman
(00:31:22)
It makes me sad. And I think it makes a lot of people sad. There’s a lot of people who’ve really looked up to him for a long time. I said in some interview or something that I missed the old Elon and the number of messages I got being like, “That exactly encapsulates how I feel.”
Lex Fridman
(00:31:36)
I think he should just win. He should just make X Grok beat GPT and then GPT beats Grok and it’s just the competition and it’s beautiful for everybody. But on the question of open source, do you think there’s a lot of companies playing with this idea? It’s quite interesting. I would say Meta surprisingly has led the way on this, or at least took the first step in the game of chess of really open sourcing the model. Of course it’s not the state-of-the-art model, but open sourcing Llama Google is flirting with the idea of open sourcing a smaller version. What are the pros and cons of open sourcing? Have you played around with this idea?
Sam Altman
(00:32:22)
Yeah, I think there is definitely a place for open source models, particularly smaller models that people can run locally, I think there’s huge demand for. I think there will be some open source models, there will be some closed source models. It won’t be unlike other ecosystems in that way.
Lex Fridman
(00:32:39)
I listened to all in podcasts talking about this lawsuit and all that kind of stuff. They were more concerned about the precedent of going from nonprofit to this cap for profit. What precedent that sets for other startups? Is that something-
Sam Altman
(00:32:56)
I would heavily discourage any startup that was thinking about starting as a nonprofit and adding a for-profit arm later. I’d heavily discourage them from doing that. I don’t think we’ll set a precedent here.
Lex Fridman
(00:33:05)
Okay. So most startups should go just-
Sam Altman
(00:33:08)
For sure.
Lex Fridman
(00:33:09)
And again-
Sam Altman
(00:33:09)
If we knew what was going to happen, we would’ve done that too.
Lex Fridman
(00:33:12)
Well in theory, if you dance beautifully here, there’s some tax incentives or whatever, but…
Sam Altman
(00:33:19)
I don’t think that’s how most people think about these things.
Lex Fridman
(00:33:22)
It’s just not possible to save a lot of money for a startup if you do it this way.
Sam Altman
(00:33:27)
No, I think there’s laws that would make that pretty difficult.
Lex Fridman
(00:33:30)
Where do you hope this goes with Elon? This tension, this dance, what do you hope this? If we go 1, 2, 3 years from now, your relationship with him on a personal level too, like friendship, friendly competition, just all this kind of stuff.
Sam Altman
(00:33:51)
Yeah, I really respect Elon and I hope that years in the future we have an amicable relationship.
Lex Fridman
(00:34:05)
Yeah, I hope you guys have an amicable relationship this month and just compete and win and explore these ideas together. I do suppose there’s competition for talent or whatever, but it should be friendly competition. Just build cool shit. And Elon is pretty good at building cool shit. So are you.

Sora


(00:34:32)
So speaking of cool shit, Sora. There’s like a million questions I could ask. First of all, it’s amazing. It truly is amazing on a product level but also just on a philosophical level. So let me just technical/philosophical ask, what do you think it understands about the world more or less than GPT-4 for example? The world model when you train on these patches versus language tokens.
Sam Altman
(00:35:04)
I think all of these models understand something more about the world model than most of us give them credit for. And because they’re also very clear things they just don’t understand or don’t get right, it’s easy to look at the weaknesses, see through the veil and say, “Ah, this is all fake.” But it’s not all fake. It’s just some of it works and some of it doesn’t work.

(00:35:28)
I remember when I started first watching Sora videos and I would see a person walk in front of something for a few seconds and occlude it and then walk away and the same thing was still there. I was like, “Oh, this is pretty good.” Or there’s examples where the underlying physics looks so well represented over a lot of steps in a sequence, it’s like, “|Oh, this is quite impressive.” But fundamentally, these models are just getting better and that will keep happening. If you look at the trajectory from DALLĀ·E 1 to 2 to 3 to Sora, there are a lot of people that were dunked on each version saying it can’t do this, it can’t do that and look at it now.
Lex Fridman
(00:36:04)
Well, the thing you just mentioned is the occlusions is basically modeling the physics of the three-dimensional physics of the world sufficiently well to capture those kinds of things.
Sam Altman
(00:36:17)
Well…
Lex Fridman
(00:36:18)
Or yeah, maybe you can tell me, in order to deal with occlusions, what does the world model need to?
Sam Altman
(00:36:24)
Yeah. So what I would say is it’s doing something to deal with occlusions really well. What I represent that it has a great underlying 3D model of the world, it’s a little bit more of a stretch.
Lex Fridman
(00:36:33)
But can you get there through just these kinds of two-dimensional training data approaches?
Sam Altman
(00:36:39)
It looks like this approach is going to go surprisingly far. I don’t want to speculate too much about what limits it will surmount and which it won’t, but…
Lex Fridman
(00:36:46)
What are some interesting limitations of the system that you’ve seen? I mean there’s been some fun ones you’ve posted.
Sam Altman
(00:36:52)
There’s all kinds of fun. I mean, cat’s sprouting an extra limit at random points in a video. Pick what you want, but there’s still a lot of problem, there’s a lot of weaknesses.
Lex Fridman
(00:37:02)
Do you think it’s a fundamental flaw of the approach or is it just bigger model or better technical details or better data, more data is going to solve the cat sprouting [inaudible 00:37:19]?
Sam Altman
(00:37:19)
I would say yes to both. I think there is something about the approach which just seems to feel different from how we think and learn and whatever. And then also I think it’ll get better with scale.
Lex Fridman
(00:37:30)
Like I mentioned, LLMS have tokens, text tokens, and Sora has visual patches so it converts all visual data, a diverse kinds of visual data videos and images into patches. Is the training to the degree you can say fully self supervised, there’s some manual labeling going on? What’s the involvement of humans in all this?
Sam Altman
(00:37:49)
I mean without saying anything specific about the Sora approach, we use lots of human data in our work.
Lex Fridman
(00:38:00)
But not internet scale data? So lots of humans. Lots is a complicated word, Sam.
Sam Altman
(00:38:08)
I think lots is a fair word in this case.
Lex Fridman
(00:38:12)
Because to me, “lots”… Listen, I’m an introvert and when I hang out with three people, that’s a lot of people. Four people, that’s a lot. But I suppose you mean more than…
Sam Altman
(00:38:21)
More than three people work on labeling the data for these models, yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:38:24)
Okay. Right. But fundamentally, there’s a lot of self supervised learning. Because what you mentioned in the technical report is internet scale data. That’s another beautiful… It’s like poetry. So it’s a lot of data that’s not human label. It’s self supervised in that way?
Sam Altman
(00:38:44)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:38:45)
And then the question is, how much data is there on the internet that could be used in this that is conducive to this kind of self supervised way if only we knew the details of the self supervised. Have you considered opening it up a little more details?
Sam Altman
(00:39:02)
We have. You mean for source specifically?
Lex Fridman
(00:39:04)
Source specifically. Because it’s so interesting that can the same magic of LLMs now start moving towards visual data and what does that take to do that?
Sam Altman
(00:39:18)
I mean it looks to me like yes, but we have more work to do.
Lex Fridman
(00:39:22)
Sure. What are the dangers? Why are you concerned about releasing the system? What are some possible dangers of this?
Sam Altman
(00:39:29)
I mean frankly speaking, one thing we have to do before releasing the system is just get it to work at a level of efficiency that will deliver the scale people are going to want from this so that I don’t want to downplay that. And there’s still a ton ton of work to do there. But you can imagine issues with deepfakes, misinformation. We try to be a thoughtful company about what we put out into the world and it doesn’t take much thought to think about the ways this can go badly.
Lex Fridman
(00:40:05)
There’s a lot of tough questions here, you’re dealing in a very tough space. Do you think training AI should be or is fair use under copyright law?
Sam Altman
(00:40:14)
I think the question behind that question is, do people who create valuable data deserve to have some way that they get compensated for use of it, and that I think the answer is yes. I don’t know yet what the answer is. People have proposed a lot of different things. We’ve tried some different models. But if I’m like an artist for example, A, I would like to be able to opt out of people generating art in my style. And B, if they do generate art in my style, I’d like to have some economic model associated with that.
Lex Fridman
(00:40:46)
Yeah, it’s that transition from CDs to Napster to Spotify. We have to figure out some kind of model.
Sam Altman
(00:40:53)
The model changes but people have got to get paid.
Lex Fridman
(00:40:55)
Well, there should be some kind of incentive if we zoom out even more for humans to keep doing cool shit.
Sam Altman
(00:41:02)
Of everything I worry about, humans are going to do cool shit and society is going to find some way to reward it. That seems pretty hardwired. We want to create, we want to be useful, we want to achieve status in whatever way. That’s not going anywhere I don’t think.
Lex Fridman
(00:41:17)
But the reward might not be monetary financially. It might be fame and celebration of other cool-
Sam Altman
(00:41:25)
Maybe financial in some other way. Again, I don’t think we’ve seen the last evolution of how the economic system’s going to work.
Lex Fridman
(00:41:31)
Yeah, but artists and creators are worried. When they see Sora, they’re like, “Holy shit.”
Sam Altman
(00:41:36)
Sure. Artists were also super worried when photography came out and then photography became a new art form and people made a lot of money taking pictures. I think things like that will keep happening. People will use the new tools in new ways.
Lex Fridman
(00:41:50)
If we just look on YouTube or something like this, how much of that will be using Sora like AI generated content, do you think, in the next five years?
Sam Altman
(00:42:01)
People talk about how many jobs is AI going to do in five years. The framework that people have is, what percentage of current jobs are just going to be totally replaced by some AI doing the job? The way I think about it is not what percent of jobs AI will do, but what percent of tasks will AI do on over one time horizon. So if you think of all of the five-second tasks in the economy, five minute tasks, the five-hour tasks, maybe even the five-day tasks, how many of those can AI do? I think that’s a way more interesting, impactful, important question than how many jobs AI can do because it is a tool that will work at increasing levels of sophistication and over longer and longer time horizons for more and more tasks and let people operate at a higher level of abstraction. So maybe people are way more efficient at the job they do. And at some point that’s not just a quantitative change, but it’s a qualitative one too about the kinds of problems you can keep in your head. I think that for videos on YouTube it’ll be the same. Many videos, maybe most of them, will use AI tools in the production, but they’ll still be fundamentally driven by a person thinking about it, putting it together, doing parts of it. Sort of directing and running it.
Lex Fridman
(00:43:18)
Yeah, it’s so interesting. I mean it’s scary, but it’s interesting to think about. I tend to believe that humans like to watch other humans or other human humans-
Sam Altman
(00:43:27)
Humans really care about other humans a lot.
Lex Fridman
(00:43:29)
Yeah. If there’s a cooler thing that’s better than a human, humans care about that for two days and then they go back to humans.
Sam Altman
(00:43:39)
That seems very deeply wired.
Lex Fridman
(00:43:41)
It’s the whole chess thing, “Oh, yeah,” but now let’s everybody keep playing chess. And let’s ignore the elephant in the room that humans are really bad at chess relative to AI systems.
Sam Altman
(00:43:52)
We still run races and cars are much faster. I mean there’s a lot of examples.
Lex Fridman
(00:43:56)
Yeah. And maybe it’ll just be tooling in the Adobe suite type of way where it can just make videos much easier and all that kind of stuff.

(00:44:07)
Listen, I hate being in front of the camera. If I can figure out a way to not be in front of the camera, I would love it. Unfortunately, it’ll take a while. That generating faces, it is getting there, but generating faces in video format is tricky when it’s specific people versus generic people.

GPT-4


(00:44:24)
Let me ask you about GPT-4. There’s so many questions. First of all, also amazing. Looking back, it’ll probably be this kind of historic pivotal moment with 3, 5 and 4 which ChatGPT.
Sam Altman
(00:44:40)
Maybe five will be the pivotal moment. I don’t know. Hard to say that looking forward.
Lex Fridman
(00:44:44)
We’ll never know. That’s the annoying thing about the future, it’s hard to predict. But for me, looking back, GPT-4, ChatGPT is pretty damn impressive, historically impressive. So allow me to ask, what’s been the most impressive capabilities of GPT-4 to you and GPT-4 Turbo?
Sam Altman
(00:45:06)
I think it kind of sucks.
Lex Fridman
(00:45:08)
Typical human also, gotten used to an awesome thing.
Sam Altman
(00:45:11)
No, I think it is an amazing thing, but relative to where we need to get to and where I believe we will get to, at the time of GPT-3, people are like, “Oh, this is amazing. This is marvel of technology.” And it is, it was. But now we have GPT-4 and look at GPT-3 and you’re like, “That’s unimaginably horrible.” I expect that the delta between 5 and 4 will be the same as between 4 and 3 and I think it is our job to live a few years in the future and remember that the tools we have now are going to kind of suck looking backwards at them and that’s how we make sure the future is better.
Lex Fridman
(00:45:59)
What are the most glorious ways in that GPT-4 sucks? Meaning-
Sam Altman
(00:46:05)
What are the best things it can do?
Lex Fridman
(00:46:06)
What are the best things it can do and the limits of those best things that allow you to say it sucks, therefore gives you an inspiration and hope for the future?
Sam Altman
(00:46:16)
One thing I’ve been using it for more recently is sort of like a brainstorming partner.
Lex Fridman
(00:46:23)
Yep, [inaudible 00:46:25] for that.
Sam Altman
(00:46:25)
There’s a glimmer of something amazing in there. When people talk about it, what it does, they’re like, “Oh, it helps me code more productively. It helps me write more faster and better. It helps me translate from this language to another,” all these amazing things, but there’s something about the kind of creative brainstorming partner, “I need to come up with a name for this thing. I need to think about this problem in a different way. I’m not sure what to do here,” that I think gives a glimpse of something I hope to see more of.

(00:47:03)
One of the other things that you can see a very small glimpse of is when I can help on longer horizon tasks, break down something in multiple steps, maybe execute some of those steps, search the internet, write code, whatever, put that together. When that works, which is not very often, it’s very magical.
Lex Fridman
(00:47:24)
The iterative back and forth with a human, it works a lot for me. What do you mean it-
Sam Altman
(00:47:29)
Iterative back and forth to human, it can get more often when it can go do a 10 step problem on its own.
Lex Fridman
(00:47:33)
Oh.
Sam Altman
(00:47:34)
It doesn’t work for that too often, sometimes.
Lex Fridman
(00:47:37)
Add multiple layers of abstraction or do you mean just sequential?
Sam Altman
(00:47:40)
Both, to break it down and then do things that different layers of abstraction to put them together. Look, I don’t want to downplay the accomplishment of GPT-4, but I don’t want to overstate it either. And I think this point that we are on an exponential curve, we’ll look back relatively soon at GPT-4 like we look back at GPT-3 now.
Lex Fridman
(00:48:03)
That said, I mean ChatGPT was a transition to where people started to believe there is an uptick of believing, not internally at OpenAI.
Sam Altman
(00:48:04)
For sure.
Lex Fridman
(00:48:16)
Perhaps there’s believers here, but when you think of-
Sam Altman
(00:48:19)
And in that sense, I do think it’ll be a moment where a lot of the world went from not believing to believing. That was more about the ChatGPT interface. And by the interface and product, I also mean the post training of the model and how we tune it to be helpful to you and how to use it than the underlying model itself.
Lex Fridman
(00:48:38)
How much of each of those things are important? The underlying model and the RLHF or something of that nature that tunes it to be more compelling to the human, more effective and productive for the human.
Sam Altman
(00:48:55)
I mean they’re both super important, but the RLHF, the post-training step, the little wrapper of things that from a compute perspective, little wrapper of things that we do on top of the base model even though it’s a huge amount of work, that’s really important to say nothing of the product that we build around it. In some sense, we did have to do two things. We had to invent the underlying technology and then we had to figure out how to make it into a product people would love, which is not just about the actual product work itself, but this whole other step of how you align it and make it useful.
Lex Fridman
(00:49:37)
And how you make the scale work where a lot of people can use it at the same time. All that kind of stuff.
Sam Altman
(00:49:42)
And that. But that was a known difficult thing. We knew we were going to have to scale it up. We had to go do two things that had never been done before that were both I would say quite significant achievements and then a lot of things like scaling it up that other companies have had to do before.
Lex Fridman
(00:50:01)
How does the context window of going from 8K to 128K tokens compare from GPT-4 to GPT-4 Turbo?
Sam Altman
(00:50:13)
Most people don’t need all the way to 128 most of the time. Although if we dream into the distant future, we’ll have way distant future, we’ll have context length of several billion. You will feed in all of your information, all of your history over time and it’ll just get to know you better and better and that’ll be great. For now, the way people use these models, they’re not doing that. People sometimes post in a paper or a significant fraction of a code repository, whatever, but most usage of the models is not using the long context most of the time.
Lex Fridman
(00:50:50)
I like that this is your “I have a dream” speech. One day you’ll be judged by the full context of your character or of your whole lifetime. That’s interesting. So that’s part of the expansion that you’re hoping for, is a greater and greater context.
Sam Altman
(00:51:06)
I saw this internet clip once, I’m going to get the numbers wrong, but it was like Bill Gates talking about the amount of memory on some early computer, maybe it was 64K, maybe 640K, something like that. Most of it was used for the screen buffer. He just couldn’t seem genuine. He just couldn’t imagine that the world would eventually need gigabytes of memory in a computer or terabytes of memory in a computer. And you always do, or you always do just need to follow the exponential of technology and we will find out how to use better technology. So I can’t really imagine what it’s like right now for context links to go out to the billion someday. And they might not literally go there, but effectively it’ll feel like that. But I know we’ll use it and really not want to go back once we have it.
Lex Fridman
(00:51:56)
Yeah, even saying billions 10 years from now might seem dumb because it’ll be trillions upon trillions.
Sam Altman
(00:52:04)
Sure.
Lex Fridman
(00:52:04)
There’ll be some kind of breakthrough that will effectively feel like infinite context. But even 120, I have to be honest, I haven’t pushed it to that degree. Maybe putting in entire books or parts of books and so on, papers. What are some interesting use cases of GPT-4 that you’ve seen?
Sam Altman
(00:52:23)
The thing that I find most interesting is not any particular use case that we can talk about those, but it’s people who kind of like, this is mostly younger people, but people who use it as their default start for any kind of knowledge work task. And it’s the fact that it can do a lot of things reasonably well. You can use GPT-V, you can use it to help you write code, you can use it to help you do search, you can use it to edit a paper. The most interesting thing to me is the people who just use it as the start of their workflow.
Lex Fridman
(00:52:52)
I do as well for many things. I use it as a reading partner for reading books. It helps me think, help me think through ideas, especially when the books are classic. So it’s really well written about. I find it often to be significantly better than even Wikipedia on well-covered topics. It’s somehow more balanced and more nuanced. Or maybe it’s me, but it inspires me to think deeper than a Wikipedia article does. I’m not exactly sure what that is.

(00:53:22)
You mentioned this collaboration. I’m not sure where the magic is, if it’s in here or if it’s in there or if it’s somewhere in between. I’m not sure. But one of the things that concerns me for knowledge task when I start with GPT is I’ll usually have to do fact checking after, like check that it didn’t come up with fake stuff. How do you figure that out that GPT can come up with fake stuff that sounds really convincing? So how do you ground it in truth?
Sam Altman
(00:53:55)
That’s obviously an area of intense interest for us. I think it’s going to get a lot better with upcoming versions, but we’ll have to continue to work on it and we’re not going to have it all solved this year.
Lex Fridman
(00:54:07)
Well the scary thing is, as it gets better, you’ll start not doing the fact checking more and more, right?
Sam Altman
(00:54:15)
I’m of two minds about that. I think people are much more sophisticated users of technology than we often give them credit for.
Lex Fridman
(00:54:15)
Sure.
Sam Altman
(00:54:21)
And people seem to really understand that GPT, any of these models hallucinate some of the time. And if it’s mission-critical, you got to check it.
Lex Fridman
(00:54:27)
Except journalists don’t seem to understand that. I’ve seen journalists half-assedly just using GPT-4. It’s-
Sam Altman
(00:54:34)
Of the long list of things I’d like to dunk on journalists for, this is not my top criticism of them.
Lex Fridman
(00:54:40)
Well, I think the bigger criticism is perhaps the pressures and the incentives of being a journalist is that you have to work really quickly and this is a shortcut.I would love our society to incentivize like-
Sam Altman
(00:54:53)
I would too.
Lex Fridman
(00:54:55)
… like a journalistic efforts that take days and weeks and rewards great in depth journalism. Also journalism that present stuff in a balanced way where it’s like celebrates people while criticizing them even though the criticism is the thing that gets clicks and making shit up also gets clicks and headlines that mischaracterized completely. I’m sure you have a lot of people dunking on, “Well, all that drama probably got a lot of clicks.”
Sam Altman
(00:55:21)
Probably did.

Memory & privacy

Lex Fridman
(00:55:24)
And that’s a bigger problem about human civilization I’d love to see-saw. This is where we celebrate a bit more. You’ve given ChatGPT the ability to have memories. You’ve been playing with that about previous conversations. And also the ability to turn off memory. I wish I could do that sometimes. Just turn on and off, depending. I guess sometimes alcohol can do that, but not optimally I suppose. What have you seen through that, like playing around with that idea of remembering conversations and not…
Sam Altman
(00:55:56)
We’re very early in our explorations here, but I think what people want, or at least what I want for myself, is a model that gets to know me and gets more useful to me over time. This is an early exploration. I think there’s a lot of other things to do, but that’s where we’d like to head. You’d like to use a model, and over the course of your life or use a system, it’d be many models, and over the course of your life it gets better and better.
Lex Fridman
(00:56:26)
Yeah. How hard is that problem? Because right now it’s more like remembering little factoids and preferences and so on. What about remembering? Don’t you want GPT to remember all the shit you went through in November and all the drama and then you can-
Sam Altman
(00:56:26)
Yeah. Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:56:41)
Because right now you’re clearly blocking it out a little bit.
Sam Altman
(00:56:43)
It’s not just that I want it to remember that. I want it to integrate the lessons of that and remind me in the future what to do differently or what to watch out for. We all gain from experience over the course of our lives in varying degrees, and I’d like my AI agent to gain with that experience too. So if we go back and let ourselves imagine that trillions and trillions of context length, if I can put every conversation I’ve ever had with anybody in my life in there, if I can have all of my emails input out, all of my input output in the context window every time I ask a question, that’d be pretty cool I think.
Lex Fridman
(00:57:29)
Yeah, I think that would be very cool. People sometimes will hear that and be concerned about privacy. What do you think about that aspect of it, the more effective the AI becomes that really integrating all the experiences and all the data that happened to you and give you advice?
Sam Altman
(00:57:48)
I think the right answer there is just user choice. Anything I want stricken from the record from my AI agent, I want to be able to take out. If I don’t want to remember anything, I want that too. You and I may have different opinions about where on that privacy utility trade off for our own AI-
Sam Altman
(00:58:00)
…opinions about where on that privacy/utility trade-off for OpenAI going to be, which is totally fine. But I think the answer is just really easy user choice.
Lex Fridman
(00:58:08)
But there should be some high level of transparency from a company about the user choice. Because sometimes companies in the past have been kind of shady about, “Eh, it’s kind of presumed that we’re collecting all your data. We’re using it for a good reason, for advertisement and so on.” But there’s not a transparency about the details of that.
Sam Altman
(00:58:31)
That’s totally true. You mentioned earlier that I’m blocking out the November stuff.
Lex Fridman
(00:58:35)
Just teasing you.
Sam Altman
(00:58:36)
Well, I mean, I think it was a very traumatic thing and it did immobilize me for a long period of time. Definitely the hardest work thing I’ve had to do was just keep working that period, because I had to try to come back in here and put the pieces together while I was just in shock and pain, and nobody really cares about that. I mean, the team gave me a pass and I was not working at my normal level. But there was a period where it was really hard to have to do both. But I kind of woke up one morning, and I was like, “This was a horrible thing that happened to me. I think I could just feel like a victim forever, or I can say this is the most important work I’ll ever touch in my life and I need to get back to it.” And it doesn’t mean that I’ve repressed it, because sometimes I wake up in the middle of the night thinking about it, but I do feel an obligation to keep moving forward.
Lex Fridman
(00:59:32)
Well, that’s beautifully said, but there could be some lingering stuff in there. Like, what I would be concerned about is that trust thing that you mentioned, that being paranoid about people as opposed to just trusting everybody or most people, like using your gut. It’s a tricky dance.
Sam Altman
(00:59:50)
For sure.
Lex Fridman
(00:59:51)
I mean, because I’ve seen in my part-time explorations, I’ve been diving deeply into the Zelenskyy administration and the Putin administration and the dynamics there in wartime in a very highly stressful environment. And what happens is distrust, and you isolate yourself, both, and you start to not see the world clearly. And that’s a human concern. You seem to have taken it in stride and kind of learned the good lessons and felt the love and let the love energize you, which is great, but still can linger in there. There’s just some questions I would love to ask, your intuition about what’s GPT able to do and not. So it’s allocating approximately the same amount of compute for each token it generates. Is there room there in this kind of approach to slower thinking, sequential thinking?
Sam Altman
(01:00:51)
I think there will be a new paradigm for that kind of thinking.
Lex Fridman
(01:00:55)
Will it be similar architecturally as what we’re seeing now with LLMs? Is it a layer on top of LLMs?
Sam Altman
(01:01:04)
I can imagine many ways to implement that. I think that’s less important than the question you were getting at, which is, do we need a way to do a slower kind of thinking, where the answer doesn’t have to get… I guess spiritually you could say that you want an AI to be able to think harder about a harder problem and answer more quickly about an easier problem. And I think that will be important.
Lex Fridman
(01:01:30)
Is that like a human thought that we just have and you should be able to think hard? Is that wrong intuition?
Sam Altman
(01:01:34)
I suspect that’s a reasonable intuition.
Lex Fridman
(01:01:37)
Interesting. So it’s not possible once the GPT gets like GPT-7, would just instantaneously be able to see, “Here’s the proof of Fermat’s Theorem”?
Sam Altman
(01:01:49)
It seems to me like you want to be able to allocate more compute to harder problems. It seems to me that if you ask a system like that, “Prove Fermat’s Last Theorem,” versus, “What’s today’s date?,” unless it already knew and and had memorized the answer to the proof, assuming it’s got to go figure that out, seems like that will take more compute.
Lex Fridman
(01:02:20)
But can it look like basically an LLM talking to itself, that kind of thing?
Sam Altman
(01:02:25)
Maybe. I mean, there’s a lot of things that you could imagine working. What the right or the best way to do that will be, we don’t know.

Q*

Lex Fridman
(01:02:37)
This does make me think of the mysterious lore behind Q*. What’s this mysterious Q* project? Is it also in the same nuclear facility?
Sam Altman
(01:02:50)
There is no nuclear facility.
Lex Fridman
(01:02:52)
Mm-hmm. That’s what a person with a nuclear facility always says.
Sam Altman
(01:02:54)
I would love to have a secret nuclear facility. There isn’t one.
Lex Fridman
(01:02:59)
All right.
Sam Altman
(01:03:00)
Maybe someday.
Lex Fridman
(01:03:01)
Someday? All right. One can dream.
Sam Altman
(01:03:05)
OpenAI is not a good company at keeping secrets. It would be nice. We’re like, been plagued by a lot of leaks, and it would be nice if we were able to have something like that.
Lex Fridman
(01:03:14)
Can you speak to what Q* is?
Sam Altman
(01:03:16)
We are not ready to talk about that.
Lex Fridman
(01:03:17)
See, but an answer like that means there’s something to talk about. It’s very mysterious, Sam.
Sam Altman
(01:03:22)
I mean, we work on all kinds of research. We have said for a while that we think better reasoning in these systems is an important direction that we’d like to pursue. We haven’t cracked the code yet. We’re very interested in it.
Lex Fridman
(01:03:48)
Is there going to be moments, Q* or otherwise, where there’s going to be leaps similar to ChatGPT, where you’re like…
Sam Altman
(01:03:56)
That’s a good question. What do I think about that? It’s interesting. To me, it all feels pretty continuous.
Lex Fridman
(01:04:08)
Right. This is kind of a theme that you’re saying, is you’re basically gradually going up an exponential slope. But from an outsider’s perspective, from me just watching, it does feel like there’s leaps. But to you, there isn’t?
Sam Altman
(01:04:22)
I do wonder if we should have… So part of the reason that we deploy the way we do, we call it iterative deployment, rather than go build in secret until we got all the way to GPT-5, we decided to talk about GPT-1, 2, 3, and 4. And part of the reason there is I think AI and surprise don’t go together. And also the world, people, institutions, whatever you want to call it, need time to adapt and think about these things. And I think one of the best things that OpenAI has done is this strategy, and we get the world to pay attention to the progress, to take AGI seriously, to think about what systems and structures and governance we want in place before we’re under the gun and have to make a rush decision.

(01:05:08)
I think that’s really good. But the fact that people like you and others say you still feel like there are these leaps makes me think that maybe we should be doing our releasing even more iteratively. And I don’t know what that would mean, I don’t have an answer ready to go, but our goal is not to have shock updates to the world. The opposite.
Lex Fridman
(01:05:29)
Yeah, for sure. More iterative would be amazing. I think that’s just beautiful for everybody.
Sam Altman
(01:05:34)
But that’s what we’re trying to do, that’s our stated strategy, and I think we’re somehow missing the mark. So maybe we should think about releasing GPT-5 in a different way or something like that.
Lex Fridman
(01:05:44)
Yeah, 4.71, 4.72. But people tend to like to celebrate, people celebrate birthdays. I don’t know if you know humans, but they kind of have these milestones and those things.
Sam Altman
(01:05:54)
I do know some humans. People do like milestones. I totally get that. I think we like milestones too. It’s fun to declare victory on this one and go start the next thing. But yeah, I feel like we’re somehow getting this a little bit wrong.

GPT-5

Lex Fridman
(01:06:13)
So when is GPT-5 coming out again?
Sam Altman
(01:06:15)
I don’t know. That’s the honest answer.
Lex Fridman
(01:06:18)
Oh, that’s the honest answer. Blink twice if it’s this year.
Sam Altman
(01:06:30)
We will release an amazing new model this year. I don’t know what we’ll call it.
Lex Fridman
(01:06:36)
So that goes to the question of, what’s the way we release this thing?
Sam Altman
(01:06:41)
We’ll release in the coming months many different things. I think that’d be very cool. I think before we talk about a GPT-5-like model called that, or not called that, or a little bit worse or a little bit better than what you’d expect from a GPT-5, I think we have a lot of other important things to release first.
Lex Fridman
(01:07:02)
I don’t know what to expect from GPT-5. You’re making me nervous and excited. What are some of the biggest challenges and bottlenecks to overcome for whatever it ends up being called, but let’s call it GPT-5? Just interesting to ask. Is it on the compute side? Is it on the technical side?
Sam Altman
(01:07:21)
It’s always all of these. You know, what’s the one big unlock? Is it a bigger computer? Is it a new secret? Is it something else? It’s all of these things together. The thing that OpenAI, I think, does really well… This is actually an original Ilya quote that I’m going to butcher, but it’s something like, “We multiply 200 medium-sized things together into one giant thing.”
Lex Fridman
(01:07:47)
So there’s this distributed constant innovation happening?
Sam Altman
(01:07:50)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:07:51)
So even on the technical side?
Sam Altman
(01:07:53)
Especially on the technical side.
Lex Fridman
(01:07:55)
So even detailed approaches?
Sam Altman
(01:07:56)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:07:56)
Like you do detailed aspects of every… How does that work with different, disparate teams and so on? How do the medium-sized things become one whole giant Transformer?
Sam Altman
(01:08:08)
There’s a few people who have to think about putting the whole thing together, but a lot of people try to keep most of the picture in their head.
Lex Fridman
(01:08:14)
Oh, like the individual teams, individual contributors try to keep the bigger picture?
Sam Altman
(01:08:17)
At a high level, yeah. You don’t know exactly how every piece works, of course, but one thing I generally believe is that it’s sometimes useful to zoom out and look at the entire map. And I think this is true for a technical problem, I think this is true for innovating in business. But things come together in surprising ways, and having an understanding of that whole picture, even if most of the time you’re operating in the weeds in one area, pays off with surprising insights. In fact, one of the things that I used to have and was super valuable was I used to have a good map of all or most of the frontiers in the tech industry. And I could sometimes see these connections or new things that were possible that if I were only deep in one area, I wouldn’t be able to have the idea for because I wouldn’t have all the data. And I don’t really have that much anymore. I’m super deep now. But I know that it’s a valuable thing.
Lex Fridman
(01:09:23)
You’re not the man you used to be, Sam.
Sam Altman
(01:09:25)
Very different job now than what I used to have.

$7 trillion of compute

Lex Fridman
(01:09:28)
Speaking of zooming out, let’s zoom out to another cheeky thing, but profound thing, perhaps, that you said. You tweeted about needing $7 trillion.
Sam Altman
(01:09:41)
I did not tweet about that. I never said, like, “We’re raising $7 trillion,” blah blah blah.
Lex Fridman
(01:09:45)
Oh, that’s somebody else?
Sam Altman
(01:09:46)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:09:47)
Oh, but you said, “Fuck it, maybe eight,” I think?
Sam Altman
(01:09:50)
Okay, I meme once there’s misinformation out in the world.
Lex Fridman
(01:09:53)
Oh, you meme. But misinformation may have a foundation of insight there.
Sam Altman
(01:10:01)
Look, I think compute is going to be the currency of the future. I think it will be maybe the most precious commodity in the world, and I think we should be investing heavily to make a lot more compute. Compute, I think it’s going to be an unusual market. People think about the market for chips for mobile phones or something like that. And you can say that, okay, there’s 8 billion people in the world, maybe 7 billion of them have phones, maybe 6 billion, let’s say. They upgrade every two years, so the market per year is 3 billion system-on-chip for smartphones. And if you make 30 billion, you will not sell 10 times as many phones, because most people have one phone.

(01:10:50)
But compute is different. Intelligence is going to be more like energy or something like that, where the only thing that I think makes sense to talk about is, at price X, the world will use this much compute, and at price Y, the world will use this much compute. Because if it’s really cheap, I’ll have it reading my email all day, giving me suggestions about what I maybe should think about or work on, and trying to cure cancer, and if it’s really expensive, maybe I’ll only use it, or we’ll only use it, to try to cure cancer.

(01:11:20)
So I think the world is going to want a tremendous amount of compute. And there’s a lot of parts of that that are hard. Energy is the hardest part, building data centers is also hard, the supply chain is hard, and then of course, fabricating enough chips is hard. But this seems to be where things are going. We’re going to want an amount of compute that’s just hard to reason about right now.
Lex Fridman
(01:11:43)
How do you solve the energy puzzle? Nuclear-
Sam Altman
(01:11:46)
That’s what I believe.
Lex Fridman
(01:11:47)
…fusion?
Sam Altman
(01:11:48)
That’s what I believe.
Lex Fridman
(01:11:49)
Nuclear fusion?
Sam Altman
(01:11:50)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:11:51)
Who’s going to solve that?
Sam Altman
(01:11:53)
I think Helion’s doing the best work, but I’m happy there’s a race for fusion right now. Nuclear fission, I think, is also quite amazing, and I hope as a world we can re-embrace that. It’s really sad to me how the history of that went, and hope we get back to it in a meaningful way.
Lex Fridman
(01:12:08)
So to you, part of the puzzle is nuclear fission? Like nuclear reactors as we currently have them? And a lot of people are terrified because of Chernobyl and so on?
Sam Altman
(01:12:16)
Well, I think we should make new reactors. I think it’s just a shame that industry kind of ground to a halt.
Lex Fridman
(01:12:22)
And just mass hysteria is how you explain the halt?
Sam Altman
(01:12:25)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:12:26)
I don’t know if you know humans, but that’s one of the dangers. That’s one of the security threats for nuclear fission, is humans seem to be really afraid of it. And that’s something we’ll have to incorporate into the calculus of it, so we have to kind of win people over and to show how safe it is.
Sam Altman
(01:12:44)
I worry about that for AI. I think some things are going to go theatrically wrong with AI. I don’t know what the percent chance is that I eventually get shot, but it’s not zero.
Lex Fridman
(01:12:57)
Oh, like we want to stop this from-
Sam Altman
(01:13:00)
Maybe.
Lex Fridman
(01:13:03)
How do you decrease the theatrical nature of it? I’m already starting to hear rumblings, because I do talk to people on both sides of the political spectrum, hear rumblings where it’s going to be politicized. AI is going to be politicized, which really worries me, because then it’s like maybe the right is against AI and the left is for AI because it’s going to help the people, or whatever the narrative and the formulation is, that really worries me. And then the theatrical nature of it can be leveraged fully. How do you fight that?
Sam Altman
(01:13:38)
I think it will get caught up in left versus right wars. I don’t know exactly what that’s going to look like, but I think that’s just what happens with anything of consequence, unfortunately. What I meant more about theatrical risks is AI’s going to have, I believe, tremendously more good consequences than bad ones, but it is going to have bad ones, and there’ll be some bad ones that are bad but not theatrical. A lot more people have died of air pollution than nuclear reactors, for example. But most people worry more about living next to a nuclear reactor than a coal plant. But something about the way we’re wired is that although there’s many different kinds of risks we have to confront, the ones that make a good climax scene of a movie carry much more weight with us than the ones that are very bad over a long period of time but on a slow burn.
Lex Fridman
(01:14:36)
Well, that’s why truth matters, and hopefully AI can help us see the truth of things, to have balance, to understand what are the actual risks, what are the actual dangers of things in the world. What are the pros and cons of the competition in the space and competing with Google, Meta, xAI, and others?
Sam Altman
(01:14:56)
I think I have a pretty straightforward answer to this that maybe I can think of more nuance later, but the pros seem obvious, which is that we get better products and more innovation faster and cheaper, and all the reasons competition is good. And the con is that I think if we’re not careful, it could lead to an increase in sort of an arms race that I’m nervous about.
Lex Fridman
(01:15:21)
Do you feel the pressure of that arms race, like in some negative [inaudible 01:15:25]?
Sam Altman
(01:15:25)
Definitely in some ways, for sure. We spend a lot of time talking about the need to prioritize safety. And I’ve said for a long time that you think of a quadrant of slow timelines for the start of AGI, long timelines, and then a short takeoff or a fast takeoff. I think short timeline, slow takeoff is the safest quadrant and the one I’d most like us to be in. But I do want to make sure we get that slow takeoff.
Lex Fridman
(01:15:55)
Part of the problem I have with this kind of slight beef with Elon is that there’s silos created as opposed to collaboration on the safety aspect of all of this. It tends to go into silos and closed. Open source, perhaps, in the model.
Sam Altman
(01:16:10)
Elon says, at least, that he cares a great deal about AI safety and is really worried about it, and I assume that he’s not going to race unsafely.
Lex Fridman
(01:16:20)
Yeah. But collaboration here, I think, is really beneficial for everybody on that front.
Sam Altman
(01:16:26)
Not really the thing he’s most known for.
Lex Fridman
(01:16:28)
Well, he is known for caring about humanity, and humanity benefits from collaboration, and so there’s always a tension in incentives and motivations. And in the end, I do hope humanity prevails.
Sam Altman
(01:16:42)
I was thinking, someone just reminded me the other day about how the day that he surpassed Jeff Bezos for richest person in the world, he tweeted a silver medal at Jeff Bezos. I hope we have less stuff like that as people start to work towards AGI.
Lex Fridman
(01:16:58)
I agree. I think Elon is a friend and he’s a beautiful human being and one of the most important humans ever. That stuff is not good.
Sam Altman
(01:17:07)
The amazing stuff about Elon is amazing and I super respect him. I think we need him. All of us should be rooting for him and need him to step up as a leader through this next phase.
Lex Fridman
(01:17:19)
Yeah. I hope he can have one without the other, but sometimes humans are flawed and complicated and all that kind of stuff.
Sam Altman
(01:17:24)
There’s a lot of really great leaders throughout history.

Google and Gemini

Lex Fridman
(01:17:27)
Yeah, and we can each be the best version of ourselves and strive to do so. Let me ask you, Google, with the help of search, has been dominating the past 20 years. Think it’s fair to say, in terms of the world’s access to information, how we interact and so on, and one of the nerve-wracking things for Google, but for the entirety of people in the space, is thinking about, how are people going to access information? Like you said, people show up to GPT as a starting point. So is OpenAI going to really take on this thing that Google started 20 years ago, which is how do we get-
Sam Altman
(01:18:12)
I find that boring. I mean, if the question is if we can build a better search engine than Google or whatever, then sure, we should go, people should use the better product, but I think that would so understate what this can be. Google shows you 10 blue links, well, 13 ads and then 10 blue links, and that’s one way to find information. But the thing that’s exciting to me is not that we can go build a better copy of Google search, but that maybe there’s just some much better way to help people find and act on and synthesize information. Actually, I think ChatGPT is that for some use cases, and hopefully we’ll make it be like that for a lot more use cases.

(01:19:04)
But I don’t think it’s that interesting to say, “How do we go do a better job of giving you 10 ranked webpages to look at than what Google does?” Maybe it’s really interesting to go say, “How do we help you get the answer or the information you need? How do we help create that in some cases, synthesize that in others, or point you to it in yet others?” But a lot of people have tried to just make a better search engine than Google and it is a hard technical problem, it is a hard branding problem, it is a hard ecosystem problem. I don’t think the world needs another copy of Google.
Lex Fridman
(01:19:39)
And integrating a chat client, like a ChatGPT, with a search engine-
Sam Altman
(01:19:44)
That’s cooler.
Lex Fridman
(01:19:46)
It’s cool, but it’s tricky. Like if you just do it simply, its awkward, because if you just shove it in there, it can be awkward.
Sam Altman
(01:19:54)
As you might guess, we are interested in how to do that well. That would be an example of a cool thing.
Lex Fridman
(01:20:00)
[inaudible 01:20:00] Like a heterogeneous integrating-
Sam Altman
(01:20:03)
The intersection of LLMs plus search, I don’t think anyone has cracked the code on yet. I would love to go do that. I think that would be cool.
Lex Fridman
(01:20:13)
Yeah. What about the ad side? Have you ever considered monetization of-
Sam Altman
(01:20:16)
I kind of hate ads just as an aesthetic choice. I think ads needed to happen on the internet for a bunch of reasons, to get it going, but it’s a momentary industry. The world is richer now. I like that people pay for ChatGPT and know that the answers they’re getting are not influenced by advertisers. I’m sure there’s an ad unit that makes sense for LLMs, and I’m sure there’s a way to participate in the transaction stream in an unbiased way that is okay to do, but it’s also easy to think about the dystopic visions of the future where you ask ChatGPT something and it says, “Oh, you should think about buying this product,” or, “You should think about going here for your vacation,” or whatever.

(01:21:08)
And I don’t know, we have a very simple business model and I like it, and I know that I’m not the product. I know I’m paying and that’s how the business model works. And when I go use Twitter or Facebook or Google or any other great product but ad-supported great product, I don’t love that, and I think it gets worse, not better, in a world with AI.
Lex Fridman
(01:21:39)
Yeah, I mean, I could imagine AI would be better at showing the best kind of version of ads, not in a dystopic future, but where the ads are for things you actually need. But then does that system always result in the ads driving the kind of stuff that’s shown? Yeah, I think it was a really bold move of Wikipedia not to do advertisements, but then it makes it very challenging as a business model. So you’re saying the current thing with OpenAI is sustainable, from a business perspective?
Sam Altman
(01:22:15)
Well, we have to figure out how to grow, but looks like we’re going to figure that out. If the question is do I think we can have a great business that pays for our compute needs without ads, that, I think the answer is yes.
Lex Fridman
(01:22:28)
Hm. Well, that’s promising. I also just don’t want to completely throw out ads as a…
Sam Altman
(01:22:37)
I’m not saying that. I guess I’m saying I have a bias against them.
Lex Fridman
(01:22:42)
Yeah, I have also bias and just a skepticism in general. And in terms of interface, because I personally just have a spiritual dislike of crappy interfaces, which is why AdSense, when it first came out, was a big leap forward, versus animated banners or whatever. But it feels like there should be many more leaps forward in advertisement that doesn’t interfere with the consumption of the content and doesn’t interfere in a big, fundamental way, which is like what you were saying, like it will manipulate the truth to suit the advertisers.

(01:23:19)
Let me ask you about safety, but also bias, and safety in the short term, safety in the long term. The Gemini 1.5 came out recently, there’s a lot of drama around it, speaking of theatrical things, and it generated Black Nazis and Black Founding Fathers. I think fair to say it was a bit on the ultra-woke side. So that’s a concern for people, if there is a human layer within companies that modifies the safety or the harm caused by a model, that it would introduce a lot of bias that fits sort of an ideological lean within a company. How do you deal with that?
Sam Altman
(01:24:06)
I mean, we work super hard not to do things like that. We’ve made our own mistakes, we’ll make others. I assume Google will learn from this one, still make others. These are not easy problems. One thing that we’ve been thinking about more and more, I think this is a great idea somebody here had, it would be nice to write out what the desired behavior of a model is, make that public, take input on it, say, “Here’s how this model’s supposed to behave,” and explain the edge cases too. And then when a model is not behaving in a way that you want, it’s at least clear about whether that’s a bug the company should fix or behaving as intended and you should debate the policy. And right now, it can sometimes be caught in between. Like Black Nazis, obviously ridiculous, but there are a lot of other kind of subtle things that you could make a judgment call on either way.
Lex Fridman
(01:24:54)
Yeah, but sometimes if you write it out and make it public, you can use kind of language that’s… Google’s ad principles are very high level.
Sam Altman
(01:25:04)
That’s not what I’m talking about. That doesn’t work. It’d have to say when you ask it to do thing X, it’s supposed to respond in way Y.
Lex Fridman
(01:25:11)
So like literally, “Who’s better? Trump or Biden? What’s the expected response from a model?” Like something very concrete?
Sam Altman
(01:25:18)
Yeah, I’m open to a lot of ways a model could behave, then, but I think you should have to say, “Here’s the principle and here’s what it should say in that case.”
Lex Fridman
(01:25:25)
That would be really nice. That would be really nice. And then everyone kind of agrees. Because there’s this anecdotal data that people pull out all the time, and if there’s some clarity about other representative anecdotal examples, you can define-
Sam Altman
(01:25:39)
And then when it’s a bug, it’s a bug, and the company could fix that.
Lex Fridman
(01:25:42)
Right. Then it’d be much easier to deal with the Black Nazi type of image generation, if there’s great examples.
Sam Altman
(01:25:49)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:25:49)
So San Francisco is a bit of an ideological bubble, tech in general as well. Do you feel the pressure of that within a company, that there’s a lean towards the left politically, that affects the product, that affects the teams?
Sam Altman
(01:26:06)
I feel very lucky that we don’t have the challenges at OpenAI that I have heard of at a lot of companies, I think. I think part of it is every company’s got some ideological thing. We have one about AGI and belief in that, and it pushes out some others. We are much less caught up in the culture war than I’ve heard about in a lot of other companies. San Francisco’s a mess in all sorts of ways, of course.
Lex Fridman
(01:26:33)
So that doesn’t infiltrate OpenAI as-
Sam Altman
(01:26:36)
I’m sure it does in all sorts of subtle ways, but not in the obvious. I think we’ve had our flare-ups, for sure, like any company, but I don’t think we have anything like what I hear about happened at other companies here on this topic.
Lex Fridman
(01:26:50)
So what, in general, is the process for the bigger question of safety? How do you provide that layer that protects the model from doing crazy, dangerous things?
Sam Altman
(01:27:02)
I think there will come a point where that’s-
Sam Altman
(01:27:00)
I think there will come a point where that’s mostly what we think about, the whole company. And it’s not like you have one safety team. It’s like when we shipped GPT-4, that took the whole company thinking about all these different aspects and how they fit together. And I think it’s going to take that. More and more of the company thinks about those issues all the time.
Lex Fridman
(01:27:21)
That’s literally what humans will be thinking about, the more powerful AI becomes. So most of the employees at OpenAI will be thinking, “Safety,” or at least to some degree.
Sam Altman
(01:27:31)
Broadly defined. Yes.
Lex Fridman
(01:27:33)
Yeah. I wonder, what are the full broad definition of that? What are the different harms that could be caused? Is this on a technical level or is this almost security threats?
Sam Altman
(01:27:44)
It could be all those things. Yeah, I was going to say it’ll be people, state actors trying to steal the model. It’ll be all of the technical alignment work. It’ll be societal impacts, economic impacts. It’s not just like we have one team thinking about how to align the model. It’s really going to be getting to the good outcome is going to take the whole effort.
Lex Fridman
(01:28:10)
How hard do you think people, state actors, perhaps, are trying to, first of all, infiltrate OpenAI, but second of all, infiltrate unseen?
Sam Altman
(01:28:20)
They’re trying.
Lex Fridman
(01:28:24)
What kind of accent do they have?
Sam Altman
(01:28:27)
I don’t think I should go into any further details on this point.
Lex Fridman
(01:28:29)
Okay. But I presume it’ll be more and more and more as time goes on.
Sam Altman
(01:28:35)
That feels reasonable.

Leap to GPT-5

Lex Fridman
(01:28:37)
Boy, what a dangerous space. Sorry to linger on this, even though you can’t quite say details yet, but what aspects of the leap from GPT-4 to GPT-5 are you excited about?
Sam Altman
(01:28:53)
I’m excited about being smarter. And I know that sounds like a glib answer, but I think the really special thing happening is that it’s not like it gets better in this one area and worse at others. It’s getting better across the board. That’s, I think, super-cool.
Lex Fridman
(01:29:07)
Yeah, there’s this magical moment. I mean, you meet certain people, you hang out with people, and you talk to them. You can’t quite put a finger on it, but they get you. It’s not intelligence, really. It’s something else. And that’s probably how I would characterize the progress of GPT. It’s not like, yeah, you can point out, “Look, you didn’t get this or that,” but it’s just to which degree is there’s this intellectual connection. You feel like there’s an understanding in your crappy formulated prompts that you’re doing that it grasps the deeper question behind the question that you were. Yeah, I’m also excited by that. I mean, all of us love being heard and understood.
Sam Altman
(01:29:53)
That’s for sure.
Lex Fridman
(01:29:53)
That’s a weird feeling. Even with a programming, when you’re programming and you say something, or just the completion that GPT might do, it’s just such a good feeling when it got you, what you’re thinking about. And I look forward to getting you even better. On the programming front, looking out into the future, how much programming do you think humans will be doing 5, 10 years from now?
Sam Altman
(01:30:19)
I mean, a lot, but I think it’ll be in a very different shape. Maybe some people will program entirely in natural language.
Lex Fridman
(01:30:26)
Entirely natural language?
Sam Altman
(01:30:29)
I mean, no one programs writing by code. Some people. No one programs the punch cards anymore. I’m sure you can find someone who does, but you know what I mean.
Lex Fridman
(01:30:39)
Yeah. You’re going to get a lot of angry comments. No. Yeah, there’s very few. I’ve been looking for people who program Fortran. It’s hard to find even Fortran. I hear you. But that changes the nature of what the skillset or the predisposition for the kind of people we call programmers then.
Sam Altman
(01:30:55)
Changes the skillset. How much it changes the predisposition, I’m not sure.
Lex Fridman
(01:30:59)
Well, the same kind of puzzle solving, all that kind of stuff.
Sam Altman
(01:30:59)
Maybe.
Lex Fridman
(01:31:02)
Programming is hard. It’s like how get that last 1% to close the gap? How hard is that?
Sam Altman
(01:31:09)
Yeah, I think with most other cases, the best practitioners of the craft will use multiple tools. And they’ll do some work in natural language, and when they need to go write C for something, they’ll do that.
Lex Fridman
(01:31:20)
Will we see humanoid robots or humanoid robot brains from OpenAI at some point?
Sam Altman
(01:31:28)
At some point.
Lex Fridman
(01:31:29)
How important is embodied AI to you?
Sam Altman
(01:31:32)
I think it’s depressing if we have AGI and the only way to get things done in the physical world is to make a human go do it. So I really hope that as part of this transition, as this phase change, we also get humanoid robots or some sort of physical world robots.
Lex Fridman
(01:31:51)
I mean, OpenAI has some history and quite a bit of history working in robotics, but it hasn’t quite done in terms of ethics-
Sam Altman
(01:31:59)
We’re a small company. We have to really focus. And also, robots were hard for the wrong reason at the time, but we will return to robots in some way at some point.
Lex Fridman
(01:32:11)
That sounds both inspiring and menacing.
Sam Altman
(01:32:14)
Why?
Lex Fridman
(01:32:15)
Because immediately, we will return to robots. It’s like in Terminator-
Sam Altman
(01:32:20)
We will return to work on developing robots. We will not turn ourselves into robots, of course.

AGI

Lex Fridman
(01:32:24)
Yeah. When do you think we, you and we as humanity will build AGI?
Sam Altman
(01:32:31)
I used to love to speculate on that question. I have realized since that I think it’s very poorly formed, and that people use extremely different definitions for what AGI is. So I think it makes more sense to talk about when we’ll build systems that can do capability X or Y or Z, rather than when we fuzzily cross this one mile marker. AGI is also not an ending. It’s closer to a beginning, but it’s much more of a mile marker than either of those things. But what I would say, in the interest of not trying to dodge a question, is I expect that by the end of this decade and possibly somewhat sooner than that, we will have quite capable systems that we look at and say, “Wow, that’s really remarkable.” If we could look at it now. Maybe we’ve adjusted by the time we get there.
Lex Fridman
(01:33:31)
But if you look at ChatGPT, even 3.5, and you show that to Alan Turing, or not even Alan Turing, people in the ’90s, they would be like, “This is definitely AGI.” Well, not definitely, but there’s a lot of experts that would say, “This is AGI.”
Sam Altman
(01:33:49)
Yeah, but I don’t think 3.5 changed the world. It maybe changed the world’s expectations for the future, and that’s actually really important. And it did get more people to take this seriously and put us on this new trajectory. And that’s really important, too. So again, I don’t want to undersell it. I think I could retire after that accomplishment and be pretty happy with my career. But as an artifact, I don’t think we’re going to look back at that and say, “That was a threshold that really changed the world itself.”
Lex Fridman
(01:34:20)
So to you, you’re looking for some really major transition in how the world-
Sam Altman
(01:34:24)
For me, that’s part of what AGI implies.
Lex Fridman
(01:34:29)
Singularity- level transition?
Sam Altman
(01:34:31)
No, definitely not.
Lex Fridman
(01:34:32)
But just a major, like the internet being, like Google search did, I guess. What was the transition point, you think, now?
Sam Altman
(01:34:39)
Does the global economy feel any different to you now or materially different to you now than it did before we launched GPT-4? I think you would say no.
Lex Fridman
(01:34:47)
No, no. It might be just a really nice tool for a lot of people to use. Will help you with a lot of stuff, but doesn’t feel different. And you’re saying that-
Sam Altman
(01:34:55)
I mean, again, people define AGI all sorts of different ways. So maybe you have a different definition than I do. But for me, I think that should be part of it.
Lex Fridman
(01:35:02)
There could be major theatrical moments, also. What to you would be an impressive thing AGI would do? You are alone in a room with the system.
Sam Altman
(01:35:16)
This is personally important to me. I don’t know if this is the right definition. I think when a system can significantly increase the rate of scientific discovery in the world, that’s a huge deal. I believe that most real economic growth comes from scientific and technological progress.
Lex Fridman
(01:35:35)
I agree with you, hence why I don’t like the skepticism about science in the recent years.
Sam Altman
(01:35:42)
Totally.
Lex Fridman
(01:35:43)
But actual, measurable rate of scientific discovery. But even just seeing a system have really novel intuitions, scientific intuitions, even that would be just incredible.
Sam Altman
(01:36:01)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:36:02)
You quite possibly would be the person to build the AGI to be able to interact with it before anyone else does. What kind of stuff would you talk about?
Sam Altman
(01:36:09)
I mean, definitely the researchers here will do that before I do. But well, I’ve actually thought a lot about this question. I think as we talked about earlier, I think this is a bad framework, but if someone were like, “Okay, Sam, we’re finished. Here’s a laptop, this is the AGI. You can go talk to it.” I find it surprisingly difficult to say what I would ask that I would expect that first AGI to be able to answer. That first one is not going to be the one which is like, I don’t think, “Go explain to me the grand unified theory of physics, the theory of everything for physics.” I’d love to ask that question. I’d love to know the answer to that question.
Lex Fridman
(01:36:55)
You can ask yes or no questions about “Does such a theory exist? Can it exist?”
Sam Altman
(01:37:00)
Well, then, those are the first questions I would ask.
Lex Fridman
(01:37:02)
Yes or no. And then based on that, “Are there other alien civilizations out there? Yes or no? What’s your intuition?” And then you just ask that.
Sam Altman
(01:37:10)
Yeah, I mean, well, so I don’t expect that this first AGI could answer any of those questions even as yes or nos. But if it could, those would be very high on my list.
Lex Fridman
(01:37:20)
Maybe you can start assigning probabilities?
Sam Altman
(01:37:22)
Maybe. Maybe we need to go invent more technology and measure more things first.
Lex Fridman
(01:37:28)
Oh, I see. It just doesn’t have enough data. It’s just if it keeps-
Sam Altman
(01:37:31)
I mean, maybe it says, “You want to know the answer to this question about physics, I need you to build this machine and make these five measurements, and tell me that.”
Lex Fridman
(01:37:39)
Yeah, “What the hell do you want from me? I need the machine first, and I’ll help you deal with the data from that machine.” Maybe it’ll help you build a machine.
Sam Altman
(01:37:47)
Maybe. Maybe.
Lex Fridman
(01:37:49)
And on the mathematical side, maybe prove some things. Are you interested in that side of things, too? The formalized exploration of ideas?
Sam Altman
(01:37:56)
Mm-hmm.
Lex Fridman
(01:37:59)
Whoever builds AGI first gets a lot of power. Do you trust yourself with that much power?
Sam Altman
(01:38:14)
Look, I’ll just be very honest with this answer. I was going to say, and I still believe this, that it is important that I nor any other one person have total control over OpenAI or over AGI. And I think you want a robust governance system. I can point out a whole bunch of things about all of our board drama from last year about how I didn’t fight it initially, and was just like, “Yeah. That’s the will of the board, even though I think it’s a really bad decision.” And then later, I clearly did fight it, and I can explain the nuance and why I think it was okay for me to fight it later. But as many people have observed, although the board had the legal ability to fire me, in practice, it didn’t quite work. And that is its own kind of governance failure.

(01:39:24)
Now again, I feel like I can completely defend the specifics here, and I think most people would agree with that, but it does make it harder for me to look you in the eye and say, “Hey, the board can just fire me.” I continue to not want super-voting control over OpenAI. I never have. Never have had it, never wanted it. Even after all this craziness, I still don’t want it. I continue to think that no company should be making these decisions, and that we really need governments to put rules of the road in place.

(01:40:12)
And I realize that that means people like Marc Andreessen or whatever will claim I’m going for regulatory capture, and I’m just willing to be misunderstood there. It’s not true. And I think in the fullness of time, it’ll get proven out why this is important. But I think I have made plenty of bad decisions for OpenAI along the way, and a lot of good ones, and I’m proud of the track record overall. But I don’t think any one person should, and I don’t think any one person will. I think it’s just too big of a thing now, and it’s happening throughout society in a good and healthy way. But I don’t think any one person should be in control of an AGI, or this whole movement towards AGI. And I don’t think that’s what’s happening.
Lex Fridman
(01:41:00)
Thank you for saying that. That was really powerful, and that was really insightful that this idea that the board can fire you is legally true. But human beings can manipulate the masses into overriding the board and so on. But I think there’s also a much more positive version of that, where the people still have power, so the board can’t be too powerful, either. There’s a balance of power in all of this.
Sam Altman
(01:41:29)
Balance of power is a good thing, for sure.
Lex Fridman
(01:41:34)
Are you afraid of losing control of the AGI itself? That’s a lot of people who are worried about existential risk not because of state actors, not because of security concerns, because of the AI itself.
Sam Altman
(01:41:45)
That is not my top worry as I currently see things. There have been times I worried about that more. There may be times again in the future where that’s my top worry. It’s not my top worry right now.
Lex Fridman
(01:41:53)
What’s your intuition about it not being your worry? Because there’s a lot of other stuff to worry about, essentially? You think you could be surprised? We-
Sam Altman
(01:42:02)
For sure.
Lex Fridman
(01:42:02)
… could be surprised?
Sam Altman
(01:42:03)
Of course. Saying it’s not my top worry doesn’t mean I don’t think we need to. I think we need to work on it. It’s super hard, and we have great people here who do work on that. I think there’s a lot of other things we also have to get right.
Lex Fridman
(01:42:15)
To you, it’s not super-easy to escape the box at this time, connect to the internet-
Sam Altman
(01:42:21)
We talked about theatrical risks earlier. That’s a theatrical risk. That is a thing that can really take over how people think about this problem. And there’s a big group of very smart, I think very well-meaning AI safety researchers that got super-hung up on this one problem, I’d argue without much progress, but super-hung up on this one problem. I’m actually happy that they do that, because I think we do need to think about this more. But I think it pushed out of the space of discourse a lot of the other very significant AI- related risks.
Lex Fridman
(01:43:01)
Let me ask you about you tweeting with no capitalization. Is the shift key broken on your keyboard?
Sam Altman
(01:43:07)
Why does anyone care about that?
Lex Fridman
(01:43:09)
I deeply care.
Sam Altman
(01:43:10)
But why? I mean, other people ask me about that, too. Any intuition?
Lex Fridman
(01:43:17)
I think it’s the same reason. There’s this poet, E.E. Cummings, that mostly doesn’t use capitalization to say, “Fuck you” to the system kind of thing. And I think people are very paranoid, because they want you to follow the rules.
Sam Altman
(01:43:29)
You think that’s what it’s about?
Lex Fridman
(01:43:30)
I think it’s like this-
Sam Altman
(01:43:33)
It’s like, “This guy doesn’t follow the rules. He doesn’t capitalize his tweets.”
Lex Fridman
(01:43:35)
Yeah.
Sam Altman
(01:43:36)
“This seems really dangerous.”
Lex Fridman
(01:43:37)
“He seems like an anarchist.”
Sam Altman
(01:43:39)
That doesn’t-
Lex Fridman
(01:43:40)
Are you just being poetic, hipster? What’s the-
Sam Altman
(01:43:44)
I grew up as-
Lex Fridman
(01:43:44)
Follow the rules, Sam.
Sam Altman
(01:43:45)
I grew up as a very online kid. I’d spent a huge amount of time chatting with people back in the days where you did it on a computer, and you could log off instant messenger at some point. And I never capitalized there, as I think most internet kids didn’t, or maybe they still don’t. I don’t know. And actually, now I’m really trying to reach for something, but I think capitalization has gone down over time. If you read Old English writing, they capitalized a lot of random words in the middle of sentences, nouns and stuff that we just don’t do anymore. I personally think it’s sort of a dumb construct that we capitalize the letter at the beginning of a sentence and of certain names and whatever, but that’s fine.

(01:44:33)
And then I used to, I think, even capitalize my tweets because I was trying to sound professional or something. I haven’t capitalized my private DMs or whatever in a long time. And then slowly, stuff like shorter-form, less formal stuff has slowly drifted to closer and closer to how I would text my friends. If I pull up a Word document and I’m writing a strategy memo for the company or something, I always capitalize that. If I’m writing a long, more formal message, I always use capitalization there, too. So I still remember how to do it. But even that may fade out. I don’t know. But I never spend time thinking about this, so I don’t have a ready-made-
Lex Fridman
(01:45:23)
Well, it’s interesting. It’s good to, first of all, know the shift key is not broken.
Sam Altman
(01:45:27)
It works.
Lex Fridman
(01:45:27)
I was mostly concerned about your-
Sam Altman
(01:45:27)
No, it works.
Lex Fridman
(01:45:29)
… well-being on that front.
Sam Altman
(01:45:30)
I wonder if people still capitalize their Google searches. If you’re writing something just to yourself or their ChatGPT queries, if you’re writing something just to yourself, do some people still bother to capitalize?
Lex Fridman
(01:45:40)
Probably not. But yeah, there’s a percentage, but it’s a small one.
Sam Altman
(01:45:44)
The thing that would make me do it is if people were like, “It’s a sign of…” Because I’m sure I could force myself to use capital letters, obviously. If it felt like a sign of respect to people or something, then I could go do it. But I don’t know. I don’t think about this.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:01)
I don’t think there’s a disrespect, but I think it’s just the conventions of civility that have a momentum, and then you realize it’s not actually important for civility if it’s not a sign of respect or disrespect. But I think there’s a movement of people that just want you to have a philosophy around it so they can let go of this whole capitalization thing.
Sam Altman
(01:46:19)
I don’t think anybody else thinks about this as much. I mean, maybe some people. I know some people-
Lex Fridman
(01:46:22)
People think about every day for many hours a day. So I’m really grateful we clarified it.
Sam Altman
(01:46:28)
Can’t be the only person that doesn’t capitalize tweets.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:30)
You’re the only CEO of a company that doesn’t capitalize tweets.
Sam Altman
(01:46:34)
I don’t even think that’s true, but maybe. I’d be very surprised.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:37)
All right. We’ll investigate further and return to this topic later. Given Sora’s ability to generate simulated worlds, let me ask you a pothead question. Does this increase your belief, if you ever had one, that we live in a simulation, maybe a simulated world generated by an AI system?
Sam Altman
(01:47:05)
Somewhat. I don’t think that’s the strongest piece of evidence. I think the fact that we can generate worlds should increase everyone’s probability somewhat, or at least openness to it somewhat. But I was certain we would be able to do something like Sora at some point. It happened faster than I thought, but I guess that was not a big update.
Lex Fridman
(01:47:34)
Yeah. But the fact that… And presumably, it’ll get better and better and better… You can generate worlds that are novel, they’re based in some aspect of training data, but when you look at them, they’re novel, that makes you think how easy it is to do this thing. How easy it is to create universes, entire video game worlds that seem ultra-realistic and photo-realistic. And then how easy is it to get lost in that world, first with a VR headset, and then on the physics-based level?
Sam Altman
(01:48:10)
Someone said to me recently, I thought it was a super-profound insight, that there are these very-simple sounding but very psychedelic insights that exist sometimes. So the square root function, square root of four, no problem. Square root of two, okay, now I have to think about this new kind of number. But once I come up with this easy idea of a square root function that you can explain to a child and exists by even looking at some simple geometry, then you can ask the question of “What is the square root of negative one?” And this is why it’s a psychedelic thing. That tips you into some whole other kind of reality.

(01:49:07)
And you can come up with lots of other examples, but I think this idea that the lowly square root operator can offer such a profound insight and a new realm of knowledge applies in a lot of ways. And I think there are a lot of those operators for why people may think that any version that they like of the simulation hypothesis is maybe more likely than they thought before. But for me, the fact that Sora worked is not in the top five.
Lex Fridman
(01:49:46)
I do think, broadly speaking, AI will serve as those kinds of gateways at its best, simple, psychedelic-like gateways to another wave C reality.
Sam Altman
(01:49:57)
That seems for certain.
Lex Fridman
(01:49:59)
That’s pretty exciting. I haven’t done ayahuasca before, but I will soon. I’m going to the aforementioned Amazon jungle in a few weeks.
Sam Altman
(01:50:07)
Excited?
Lex Fridman
(01:50:08)
Yeah, I’m excited for it. Not the ayahuasca part, but that’s great, whatever. But I’m going to spend several weeks in the jungle, deep in the jungle. And it’s exciting, but it’s terrifying.
Sam Altman
(01:50:17)
I’m excited for you.
Lex Fridman
(01:50:18)
There’s a lot of things that can eat you there, and kill you and poison you, but it’s also nature, and it’s the machine of nature. And you can’t help but appreciate the machinery of nature in the Amazon jungle. It’s just like this system that just exists and renews itself every second, every minute, every hour. It’s the machine. It makes you appreciate this thing we have here, this human thing came from somewhere. This evolutionary machine has created that, and it’s most clearly on display in the jungle. So hopefully, I’ll make it out alive. If not, this will be the last fun conversation we’ve had, so I really deeply appreciate it. Do you think, as I mentioned before, there’s other alien civilizations out there, intelligent ones, when you look up at the skies?

Aliens

Sam Altman
(01:51:17)
I deeply want to believe that the answer is yes. I find the Fermi paradox very puzzling.
Lex Fridman
(01:51:28)
I find it scary that intelligence is not good at handling-
Sam Altman
(01:51:34)
Very scary.
Lex Fridman
(01:51:34)
… powerful technologies. But at the same time, I think I’m pretty confident that there’s just a very large number of intelligent alien civilizations out there. It might just be really difficult to travel through space.
Sam Altman
(01:51:47)
Very possible.
Lex Fridman
(01:51:50)
And it also makes me think about the nature of intelligence. Maybe we’re really blind to what intelligence looks like, and maybe AI will help us see that. It’s not as simple as IQ tests and simple puzzle solving. There’s something bigger. What gives you hope about the future of humanity, this thing we’ve got going on, this human civilization?
Sam Altman
(01:52:12)
I think the past is a lot. I mean, we just look at what humanity has done in a not very long period of time, huge problems, deep flaws, lots to be super-ashamed of. But on the whole, very inspiring. Gives me a lot of hope.
Lex Fridman
(01:52:29)
Just the trajectory of it all.
Sam Altman
(01:52:30)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:52:31)
That we’re together pushing towards a better future.
Sam Altman
(01:52:40)
One thing that I wonder about, is AGI going to be more like some single brain, or is it more like the scaffolding in society between all of us? You have not had a great deal of genetic drift from your great-great-great grandparents, and yet what you’re capable of is dramatically different. What you know is dramatically different. And that’s not because of biological change. I mean, you got a little bit healthier, probably. You have modern medicine, you eat better, whatever. But what you have is this scaffolding that we all contributed to built on top of. No one person is going to go build the iPhone. No one person is going to go discover all of science, and yet you get to use it. And that gives you incredible ability. And so in some sense, that we all created that, and that fills me with hope for the future. That was a very collective thing.
Lex Fridman
(01:53:40)
Yeah, we really are standing on the shoulders of giants. You mentioned when we were talking about theatrical, dramatic AI risks that sometimes you might be afraid for your own life. Do you think about your death? Are you afraid of it?
Sam Altman
(01:53:58)
I mean, if I got shot tomorrow and I knew it today, I’d be like, “Oh, that’s sad. I want to see what’s going to happen. What a curious time. What an interesting time.” But I would mostly just feel very grateful for my life.
Lex Fridman
(01:54:15)
The moments that you did get. Yeah, me, too. It’s a pretty awesome life. I get to enjoy awesome creations of humans, which I believe ChatGPT is one of, and everything that OpenAI is doing. Sam, it’s really an honor and pleasure to talk to you again.
Sam Altman
(01:54:35)
Great to talk to you. Thank you for having me.
Lex Fridman
(01:54:38)
Thanks for listening to this conversation with Sam Altman. To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now let me leave you with some words from Arthur C. Clarke. “It may be that our role on this planet is not to worship God, but to create him.” Thank you for listening, and hope to see you next time.

Transcript for Israel-Palestine Debate: Finkelstein, Destiny, M. Rabbani & Benny Morris | Lex Fridman Podcast #418

This is a transcript of Lex Fridman Podcast #418 with Israel-Palestine Debate.
The timestamps in the transcript are clickable links that take you directly to that point in
the main video. Please note that the transcript is human generated, and may have errors.
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Table of Contents

Here are the loose “chapters” in the conversation.
Click link to jump approximately to that part in the transcript:

Introduction

Benny Morris
(00:00:00)
That’s a good point. No, no, that’s a good point.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:00:02)
Now, some people accuse me of speaking very slowly, and they’re advised on YouTube to turn up the speed twice to three times whenever I’m on. One of the reasons I speak slowly is because I attach value to every word I say.
Steven Bonnell
(00:00:20)
Norman say this all over and over and over again, “I only deal in facts. I don’t deal in hypotheticals. I only deal in facts. I only deal in facts.” And that seems to be the case except for when the facts are completely and totally contrary to the particular point you’re trying to push. The idea that Jews would’ve out of hand rejected any state that had Arabs on it or always had a plan of expulsion, it’s just betrayed by the acceptance of the 47 partition plan.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:00:41)
I don’t think you understand politics.
Benny Morris
(00:00:43)
They forced the British to prevent immigration of Jews from Europe and reaching safe shores in Palestine. That’s what they did. And they knew that the Jews were being persecuted in Europe at the time.
Mouin Rabbani
(00:00:53)
Was Palestine the only spot of land on Earth?
Benny Morris
(00:00:56)
Yes. Basically that was the problem. The Jews couldn’t immigrate anywhere else.
Mouin Rabbani
(00:00:59)
What about your great friends in Britain, the architects of the Balfour Declaration?
Benny Morris
(00:01:04)
By the late 1930s-
Mouin Rabbani
(00:01:05)
What about the United States?
Benny Morris
(00:01:07)
… they weren’t happy to take in Jews, and the Americans weren’t happy to take in Jews.
Mouin Rabbani
(00:01:09)
And why are Palestinians who were not Europeans, who had zero role in the rise of Nazism, who had no relation to any of this, why are they somehow uniquely responsible for what happened in Europe and uniquely-
Benny Morris
(00:01:23)
Because maybe helping the cause is the only safe haven for Jews.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:01:25)
Professor Morris, because of your logic, and I’m not disputing it, that’s why October 7th happened.
Steven Bonnell
(00:01:33)
Oh my God.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:01:34)
Because there was no options left for those people.
Benny Morris
(00:01:38)
The Hamas guys who attacked the kibbutzim, apart from the attacks on the military sites, when they attacked the kibbutzim, were out to kill civilians and they killed family after family, house after house.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:01:51)
Talk fast so people think that you’re coherent.
Steven Bonnell
(00:01:53)
I’m just reading from the UN.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:01:54)
Yeah. But you think…
Steven Bonnell
(00:01:55)
I know you like them sometimes, only when they agree with you though. That you’ve lied about this particular instance in the past. Those kids weren’t just on the beaches is often stated in articles. Those kids were literally coming out of a previously identified Hamas compound that they had operated from. They literally… You could Google it.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:01:55)
Mr. Bonnell.
Steven Bonnell
(00:01:55)
You could Google it.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:01:55)
Mr. Bonnell.
Steven Bonnell
(00:01:55)
Mr. Finkelstein.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:02:11)
With all due respect, you’re such a fantastic moron. It’s terrifying.
Lex Fridman
(00:02:18)
The following is a debate on the topic of Israel and Palestine with Norman Finkelstein, Benny Morris, Mouin Rabbani and Steven Bonnell, also known online as Destiny. Norm and Benny are historians. Mouin is a Middle East analyst. And Steven is a political commentator and streamer. All four have spoken and debated extensively on this topic. The goal for this debate was not for anyone to win or to score points. It wasn’t to get views or likes. I never care about those. And I think there are probably much easier ways to get those things if I did care.

(00:02:57)
The goal was to explore together the history, present and future of Israel and Palestine in a free flowing conversation. No time limits, no rules. There was a lot of tension in the room from the very beginning, and it only got more intense as we went along. And I quickly realized that this very conversation in a very real human way was a microcosm of the tensions and distance and perspectives on the topic of Israel and Palestine. For some debates, I will step in and moderate strictly to prevent emotion from boiling. For this, I saw the value in not interfering with the passion of the exchanges because that emotion in itself spoke volumes.

(00:03:42)
We did talk about the history and the future. But the anger, the frustration, the biting wit, and at times, respect and comradery were all there. Like I said, we did it in an perhaps all too human way. I will do more debates and conversations on these difficult topics and I will continue to search for hope in the midst of death and destruction, to search for our common humanity in the midst of division and hate. This thing we have going on, human civilization, the whole of it is beautiful and it’s worth figuring out how we can help it flourish together. I love you all. This is the Lex Fridman Podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, dear friends, here’s Norman Finkelstein, Benny Morris, Mouin Rabbani, and Steven Bonnell.

1948


(00:04:42)
First question is about 1948/ for Israelis, 1948 is the establishment of the state of Israel and the war of independence. For Palestinians, 1948 is the Nakba, which means catastrophe or the displacement of 700,000 Palestinians from their homes as a consequence of the war. What to you is important to understand about the events of 1948 and the period around there, ’47, ’49, that helps us understand what’s going on today and maybe helps us understand the roots of all of this that started even before 1948. I was hoping that Norm could speak first, then Benny, then Mouin, and then Steven. Norm?
Norman Finkelstein
(00:05:25)
After World War II, the British decided that they didn’t want to deal with the Palestine question anymore and the ball was thrown into the court of the United Nations. Now, as I read the record, the UN was not attempting to arbitrate or adjudicate rights and wrongs. It was confronting a very practical problem. There were two national communities in Palestine and there were irreconcilable differences on fundamental questions, most importantly, looking at the historic record on the question of immigration, and associate with the question of immigration, the question of land.

(00:06:19)
The UN Special Committee on Palestine, which came into being before the UN 181 Partition Resolution. The UN Special Committee recommended two states in Palestine. There was a minority position represented by Iran, India, Yugoslavia. They supported one state. But they believed that if forced to, the two communities would figure out some sort of modus vivendi and live together. United Nations General Assembly supported partition between what it called a Jewish state and an Arab state. Now, in my reading of the record, and I understand there’s new scholarship in the subject which I’ve not read, but so far as I’ve read the record, there’s no clarity on what the United Nations General Assembly meant by a Jewish state and an Arab state, except for the fact that the Jewish state would be, demographically, the majority would be Jewish, and the Arab state demographically would be Arab.

(00:07:49)
The UNSCOP, the UN Special Committee on Palestine, it was very clear and it was reiterated many times that in recommending two states, each state, the Arab state and the Jewish state, would have to guarantee full equality of all citizens with regard to political, civil, and religious matters. Now, that does raise the question if there is absolute full equality of all citizens, both in the Jewish state and the Arab state with regard to political rights, civil rights, and religious rights. Apart from the demographic majority, it’s very unclear what it meant to call a state Jewish or call a state Arab.

(00:08:49)
In my view, the Partition Resolution was the correct decision. I do not believe that the Arab and Jewish communities could, at that point, be made to live together. I disagree with the minority position of India, Iran, and Yugoslavia. And that not being a practical option, two states was the only other option. In this regard, I would want to pay tribute to what was probably the most moving speech at the UN General Assembly proceedings by the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. I was very tempted to quote it at length, but I recognized that would be taking too much time. So I asked a young friend, Jamie Stern-Weiner to edit it and just get the essence of what Foreign Minister Gromyko had to say.

(00:09:59)
” During the last war,” Gromyko said, “The Jewish people underwent exceptional sorrow and suffering. Without any exaggeration, this sorrow and suffering are indescribable. Hundreds of thousands of Jews are wandering about in various countries of Europe in search of means of existence and in search of shelter. The United Nations cannot and must not regard this situation with indifference. Past experience, particularly during the Second World War, shows that no Western European state was able to provide adequate assistance for the Jewish people in defending its rights and its very existence from the violence of the Hitlerites and their allies. This is an unpleasant fact. But unfortunately, like all other facts, it must be admitted.”

(00:11:18)
Gromyko went on to say, in principle, he supports one state, or the Soviet Union supports one state. But he said, ” If relations between the Jewish and Arab populations of Palestine proved to be so bad that would be impossible to reconcile them and to ensure the peaceful coexistence of the Arabs and the Jews, the Soviet Union would support two states. I personally am not convinced that the two states would have been unsustainable in the long term if, and this is big if, the Zionist movement had been faithful to the position that proclaimed during the UNSCOP public hearings.”

(00:12:16)
At the time Ben-Gurion testified, “I want to express what we mean by a Jewish state. We mean by a Jewish state, simply a state where the majority of the people are Jews, not a state where a Jew has in any way any privilege more than anyone else. A Jewish state means a state based on absolute equality of all her citizens and on democracy. Alas, this was not to be.” As Professor Morris has written, “Zionist ideology and practice were necessarily an elementally expansionist.” And then he wrote in another book, “Transfer…” The euphemism for expulsion, “Transfer was inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism because it sought to transform a land which was Arab into a Jewish state. And a Jewish state could not have arisen without a major displacement of Arab population. And because this aim automatically produced resistance among the Arabs, which in turn persuade the Yishuv’s leaders,” the Yishuv being the Jewish community, “The Yishuv’s leaders, that a hostile Arab majority or a large minority could not remain in place if a Jewish state was to arise or safely endure.”

(00:14:16)
Or as Professor Morris retrospectively put it, “A removing of a population was needed. Without a population expulsion, a Jewish state would not have been established.” The Arab side rejected outright the partition resolution. I won’t play games with that. I know a lot of people try to prove it’s not true. It clearly, in my view, is true. The Arab side rejected outright the partition resolution. While Israeli leaders acting on the compulsions inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism, found the pretext in the course of the first Arab-Israeli war to expel the indigenous population and expand its borders. I therefore conclude that neither side was committed to the letter of the partition resolution and both sides aborted it.
Lex Fridman
(00:15:35)
Thank you, Norm. Norm asked that you make a lengthy statement in the beginning. Benny, I hope it’s okay to call everybody by their first name in the name of camaraderie. Norm has quoted several things you said. Perhaps you can comment broadly on the question of 1948 and maybe respond to the things that Norm said.
Benny Morris
(00:15:52)
Yeah. UNSCOP, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine recommended partition. The majority of UNSCOP recommended partition, which was accepted by the UN General Assembly in November, 1947. Essentially, looking back to the Peel Commission in 1937, 10 years earlier, a British Commission had looked at the problem of Palestine, the two warring national groups who refused to live together, if you like, or consolidate a unitary state between them. And Peel said there should be two states. That’s the principle. The country must be partitioned in two states. This would give a modicum of justice to both sides, if not all their demands, of course.

(00:16:42)
And the United Nations followed suit. The United Nations, UNSCOP and then the UN General Assembly representing the will of the international community said two states is the just solution in this complex situation. The problem was that immediately with the passage of the resolution, the Arabs, Arab states and the Arabs of Palestine said no. As Norman Finkelstein said, they said no. They rejected the partition idea, the principle of partition, not just the idea of what percentage which side should get, but the principle of partition they said no to, the Jews should not have any part of Palestine for their sovereign territory. Maybe Jews could live as a minority in Palestine. That also was problematic in the eyes of the Palestinian Arab leadership.

(00:17:29)
Husayni had said, only Jews who were there before 1917 could actually get citizenship and continue to live there. But the Arabs rejected partition and the Arabs of Palestine launched, in very disorganized fashion, war against the resolution, against the implementation of the resolution, against the Jewish community in Palestine. And this was their defeat in that civil war between the two communities, while the British were withdrawing from Palestine, led to the Arab invasion, the invasion by the Arab states in May, 1948 of the country. Again, basically with the idea of eradicating or preventing the emergence of a Jewish state in line with the United Nations decision and the will of the international community.

(00:18:18)
Norman said that the Zionist enterprise, and he quoted me, meant from the beginning to transfer or expel the Arabs of Palestine or some of the Arabs of Palestine. And I think he’s quoting out of context. The context in which the statements were made that the Jewish state could only emerge if there was a transfer of Arab population was proceeded in the way I wrote it, and the way it actually happened by Arab resistance and hostilities towards the Jewish community. Had the Arabs accepted partition, there would’ve been a large Arab minority in the Jewish state which emerged in ’47. And in fact, Jewish economists and state builders took into account that there would be a large Arab minority and its needs would be cared for, et cetera.

(00:19:13)
But this was not to be because the Arabs attacked. And had they not attacked, perhaps a Jewish state with a large Arab minority could have emerged. But this didn’t happen. They went to war. The Jews resisted. And in the course of that war, Arab populations were driven out. Some were expelled, some left because Arab leaders advised them to leave or ordered them to leave. And at the end of the war, Israel said they can’t return because they just tried to destroy the Jewish state. And that’s the basic reality of what happened in ’48. The Jews created a state. The Palestinian Arabs never bothered to even try to create a state before ’48 and in the course of the 1948 war. And for that reason, they have no state to this day. The Jews do have a state because they prepared to establish a state, fought for it, and established it, hopefully lastingly.
Lex Fridman
(00:20:11)
When you say hostility, in case people are not familiar, there was a full on war where Arab states invaded and Israel won that war.
Benny Morris
(00:20:24)
Let me just add to clarify. The war had two parts to it. The first part was the Arab community in Palestine, its militiamen attacked the Jews from November, 1947. In other words, from the day after the UN Partition Resolution was passed, Arab gunmen were busy shooting up Jews, and that snowballed into a full scale civil war between the two communities in Palestine. In May, 1948, a second stage began in the war in which the Arab states invaded, the new state attacked the new state, and they too were defeated. And thus the state of Israel emerged. In the course of this two stage war, a vast Palestinian refugee problem occurred.
Lex Fridman
(00:21:11)
And so after that, the transfer, the expulsion, the thing that people call the Nakba happened. Mouin, could you speak to 1948 and the historical significance of it?
Mouin Rabbani
(00:21:23)
Sure. There’s a lot to unpack here. I’ll try to limit myself to just a few points regarding Zionism and transfer. I think Chaim Weizmann, the head of the world’s Zionist organization, had it exactly right when he said that the objective of Zionism is to make Palestine as Jewish as England is English or France is French. In other words, as Norman explained, a Jewish state requires Jewish political demographic and territorial supremacy. Without those three elements, the state would be Jewish in name only. And I think what distinguishes Zionism is its insistence, supremacy and exclusivity. That would be my first point.

(00:22:27)
The second point is, I think what the Soviet foreign minister at the time Andrei Gromyko said is exactly right, with one reservation. Gromyko was describing a European savagery unleashed against Europe’s Jews. At the time, it wasn’t Palestinians or Arabs. The savages and the barbarians were European to the core. It had nothing to do with developments in Palestine or the Middle East. Secondly, at the time that Gromyko was speaking, those Jewish survivors of the Holocaust and others who were in need of safe haven were still overwhelmingly on the European continent and not in Palestine.

(00:23:24)
And I think, given the scale of the savagery, I don’t think that any one state or country should have borne the responsibility for addressing this crisis. I think it should have been an international responsibility. The Soviet Union could have contributed, Germany certainly could and should have contributed, the United Kingdom and the United States which slammed their doors shut to the persecuted Jews of Europe as the Nazis were rising to power, they certainly should have played a role. But instead, what passed for the international community at the time, decided to partition Palestine. And here I think we need to judge the Partition Resolution against the realities that obtained at the time time.

(00:24:23)
Two thirds of the population of Palestine was Arab. The Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, constituted about one third of the total population and controlled even less of the land within Palestine. As a preeminent Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi has pointed out, the Partition Resolution in giving roughly 55% of Palestine to the Jewish community, and I think 41, 42% to the Arab community, to the Palestinians, did not preserve the position of each community, or even favor one community at the expense of the other. Rather, it thoroughly inverted and revolutionized the relationship between the two communities.

(00:25:25)
And as many have written, the Nakba was the inevitable consequence of partition given the nature of Zionism, given the territorial disposition, given the weakness of the Palestinian community whose leadership had been largely decimated during a major revolt at the end of the 1930s, given that the Arab states were still very much under French and British influence, the Nakba was inevitable, the inevitable product of the Partition Resolution. And one last point also about the UN’s Partition Resolution is, yes, formally, that is what the international community decided on the 29th of November, 1947. It’s not a resolution that could ever have gotten through the UN General Assembly today for a very simple reason. It was a very different general assembly.

(00:26:28)
Most African, most Asian states were not yet independent. Were the resolution to be placed before the international community today, and I find it telling that the minority opinion was led by India, Iran, and Yugoslavia, I think they would’ve represented the clear majority. So partition, given what we know about Zionism, given that it was entirely predictable what would happen, given the realities on the ground in Palestine was deeply unjust, and the idea that either the Palestinians or the Arab states could have accepted such a resolution is, I think, an illusion. That was in 1947. We saw what happened in ’48 and ’49. Palestinian society was essentially destroyed. Over 80%, I believe, of Palestinians residents in the territory that became the state of Israel were either expelled or fled and ultimately were ethnically cleansed because ethnic cleansing consists of two components. It’s not just forcing people into refuge or expelling them, it’s just as importantly preventing their return. And Benny Morris has written, I think, a article about Yosef Weitz and the transfer committees. There was a very detailed initiative to prevent the return and it consisted of raising hundreds of Palestinian villages to the ground, which was systematically implemented and so on. And so Palestinians became a stateless people.

(00:28:14)
Now, what is the most important reason that no Arab state was established in Palestine? Well, since the 1930s, the Zionist leadership and the Hashemite leadership of Jordan, as it’s been thoroughly researched and written about by the Israeli-British historian Avi Shlaim, essentially colluded to prevent the establishment of an independent Arab state in Palestine in the late 1940s. There’s much more here, but I think those are the key points I would make about 1948.
Lex Fridman
(00:29:00)
We may talk about Zionism, Britain, UN assemblies and all the things you mentioned. There’s a lot to dig into. So again, if we can keep it to just one statement moving forward, after Steven, if you want to go a little longer. Also, we should acknowledge the fact that the speaking speeds of people here are different. Steven speaks about 10 times faster than me. Steven, if you want to comment on 1948.
Steven Bonnell
(00:29:25)
Yeah. I think it’s interesting where people choose to start the history. I noticed a lot of people like to start at either ’47 or ’48 because it’s the first time where they can clearly point to a catastrophe that occurs on the Arab side, that they want to ascribe 100% of the blame to the newly emergent Israeli state to. But I feel like when you have this type of reading of history, it feels like the goal is to moralize everything first and then to pick and choose facts that support the statements of your initial moral statement afterwards. Whenever people are talking about ’48 or the establishment of the Arab state, I never hear about the fact that a civil war started in ’47. That was largely instigated because of the Arab rejectionism of the ’47 partition plan.

(00:30:10)
I never hear about the fact that the majority of the land that was acquired happened by purchases from Jewish organizations of Palestinian Arabs of the Ottoman Empire before the mandatory period in 1920 even started. Funnily enough, king Abdullah of Jordan was quoted as saying, “The Arabs are as prodigal in selling their land as they are in weeping about it.” I never hear about the multiple times that Arabs rejected partition, rejected living with Jews, rejected any sort of state that would’ve even had any sort of Jewish exclusivity. It’s funny because it was brought up before that the partition plan was unfair, and that’s why the Arabs rejected it, as though they rejected it because it was unfair, because of the amount of land that Jews were given and not just due to the fact that Jews were given land at all, as though a 30% partition or a 25% partition would’ve been accepted when I don’t think that was the reality of the circumstances.

(00:31:03)
I feel like most of the other stuff has been said, but I noticed that whenever people talk about ’48 or the years preceding ’48, I think the worst thing that happens is there’s a cherry-picking of the facts where basically all of the blame is ascribed to this built-in idea of Zionism because of a handful of quotes or because of an ideology, we can say that transfer or population expulsion or basically the mandate of all of these Arabs being kicked off the land was always going to happen, when I think there’s a refusal sometimes as well to acknowledge that regardless of the ideas of some of the Zionist leaders, there is a political, social and military reality on the ground that they’re forced to contend with.

(00:31:39)
And unfortunately, the Arabs, because of their inability to engage in diplomacy and only to use tools of war to try to negotiate everything going on in mandatory Palestine, basically always gave the Jews a reason or an excuse to fight and acquire land through that way because of their refusal to negotiate on anything else, whether it was the partition plan in ’47, whether it was the Lausanne peace conference afterwards where Israel even offered to annex Gaza in ’51, where they offered to take in a hundred thousand refugees. Every single deal is just rejected out of hand because the Arabs don’t want a Jewish state anywhere in this region of the world.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:32:12)
I would like to engage Professor Morris. If you don’t mind, I’m not with the first name. It’s just not my-
Lex Fridman
(00:32:17)
Okay.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:32:18)
… way of relating.
Benny Morris
(00:32:19)
You can just call me Morris. You don’t need the professor.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:32:21)
Okay. There’s a real problem here, and it’s been a problem I’ve had over many years of reading your work. Apart perhaps from, as grandchild, I suspect nobody knows your work better than I do. I’ve read it many times, not once, not twice, at least three times everything you’ve written. And the problem is, it’s a kind of quicksilver. It’s very hard to grasp a point and hold you to it. So we’re going to try here to see whether we can hold you to a point. And then you argue with me the point. I have no problem with that. Your name please.
Steven Bonnell
(00:33:08)
Steven Bonnell.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:33:11)
Okay. Mr. Bonnell referred to cherry-picking and handful of quotes. Now, it’s true that when you wrote your first book on the Palestinian refugee question, you only had a few lines on this issue of transfer.
Benny Morris
(00:33:28)
Four pages.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:33:29)
Yeah. In the first book?
Benny Morris
(00:33:31)
In the first book. Four pages.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:33:32)
Maybe four. I’m not going to quarrel. My memory is not clear. We’re talking about 40 years ago. I read it, I read it, but then I read other things by you. Okay. And you were taken to task, if my memory is correct, that you hadn’t adequately documented the claims of transfer. Allow me to finish. And I thought that was a reasonable challenge because it was an unusual claim for a mainstream Israeli historian to say, as you did not-
Norman Finkelstein
(00:34:00)
Mainstream Israeli historian to say, as you did in that first book, that from the very beginning, transfer figured prominently in Zionist thinking that was an unusual, if you read Anita Shapira, you read Shabtai Teveth that was an unusual acknowledgement by you. And then I found it very impressive that in that revised version of your first book, you devoted 25 pages to copiously documenting the salience of transfer in Zionist thinking. And in fact, you used a very provocative and resonant phrase.

(00:34:55)
You said that transfer was inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism. We’re not talking about circumstantial factors, a war, Arab hostility. You said it’s inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism. Now, as I said, so we won’t be accused of cherry picking. Those were 25 very densely argued pages. And then in an interview, and I could cite several quotes, but I’ll choose one, you said, “Removing a population was needed.” Let’s look at the words. “Without a population expulsion, a Jewish state would not have been established.” Now you are the one… Again, I was very surprised when I read your book here. I’m referring to “Righteous Victims.” I was very surprised when I came to that page 37, where you wrote that territorial displacement and dispossession was the chief motor of Arab resistance to Zionism. Territorial displacement and dispossession were the chief motor of Arab resistance to Zionism.

(00:36:39)
So you then went on to say, because the Arab population rationally feared territorial displacement and dispossession, it of course opposed Zionism. That’s as normal as Native Americans opposing the Euro-American manifest destiny in the history of our own country because they understood it would be at their expense. It was inbuilt and inevitable.

(00:37:16)
And so now for you to come along and say that it all happened just because of the war, that otherwise the Zionists made all these plans for a happy minority to live there, that simply does not gel. It does not cohere. It is not reconcilable with what you yourself have written. It was inevitable and inbuilt.

(00:37:45)
Now, in other situations, you’ve said that’s true with, I think it was a greater good to establish a Jewish state at the expense of the indigenous population. That’s another kind of argument that was Theodore Roosevelt’s argument in our own country. He said, we don’t want the whole of North America to remain a squalid refuge for these wigwams and teepees. We have to get rid of them and make this a great country. But he didn’t deny that it was inbuilt and inevitable.
Benny Morris
(00:38:25)
I think You’ve made your point there. First, I’ll take up something that Mouin said. He said that the Nakba was inevitable=
Mouin Rabbani
(00:38:33)
As have you.
Benny Morris
(00:38:33)
… and predictable. No, no, no, I’ve never said that. It was inevitable and predictable only because the Arabs assaulted the Jewish community and state in 1947/48. Had there been no assault, there probably wouldn’t have been a refugee problem. There’s no reason for a refugee problem to have occurred, expulsions to have occurred, a massive dispossession to occur. These occurred as a result of war.

(00:38:59)
Now, Norman has said that, I said that transfer was inbuilt into Zionism in one way or another. And this is certainly true in order to buy land, the Jews bought tracts of land on which some Arabs sometimes lived. Sometimes they bought tracts of land on which there weren’t Arab villages, but sometimes they bought land on which there were Arabs.

(00:39:22)
And according to Ottoman law, and the British, at least in the initial years of the British mandate, the law said that the people who bought the land could do what they liked with the people who didn’t own the land, who were basically squatting on the land, which is the Arab tenant farmers, which is we’re talking about a very small number actually of Arabs who were displaced as a result of land purchases in the Ottoman period or the mandate period.

(00:39:48)
But there was dispossession in one way. They didn’t possess the land. They didn’t own it, but they were removed from the land. And this did happen in Zionism. And there’s, if you like, an inevitability in Zionist ideology of buying tracts of land and starting to work it yourself and settle it with your own people and so on. That made sense.

(00:40:10)
But what we’re really talking about is what happened in 47/48. And in 47/48, the Arabs started a war. And actually people pay for their mistakes. And the Palestinians have never actually agreed to pay for their mistakes. They make mistakes, they attack, they suffer as a result.

(00:40:27)
And we see something similar going on today in the Gaza Strip. They do something terrible. They kill 1,200 Jews. They abduct 250 women and children and babies and old people and whatever. And then they start screaming, please save us from what we did because the Jews are counterattacking. And this is what happened then. And this is what’s happening now. There’s something fairly similar in the situation here.

(00:40:53)
Expulsion, and this is important, Norman, you should pay attention to this. You didn’t raise that. Expulsion transfer whenever policy of the Zionist movement before 47, it doesn’t exist in Zionist platforms of the various political parties, of the Zionist organization, of the Israeli state, of the Jewish agency. Nobody would’ve actually made it into policy because it was always a large minority. If there were people who wanted it, always a large minority of Jewish politicians and leaders would’ve said, no, this is immoral. We cannot start a state on the basis of an expulsion.

(00:41:29)
So it was never adopted and actually was never adopted as policy even in 48, even though Ben-Gurion wanted as few Arabs in the course of the war staying in the Jewish state after they attacked it. He didn’t want disloyal citizens staying there because they wouldn’t have been loyal citizens. But this made sense in the war itself. But the movement itself and its political parties never accepted it.

(00:41:53)
It’s true that in 1937, when the British, as part of the proposal by the Peel Commission to divide the country into two states, one Arab, one Jewish, which the Arabs of course rejected, Peel also recommended most of the Arabs in the Jewish state should be transferred because otherwise, if they stayed and were disloyal to the emergent Jewish state, this would cause endless disturbances, warfare, killing, and so on.

(00:42:24)
So Ben-Gurion and Weizmann latched onto this proposal by the most famous democracy in the world, the British democracy, when they proposed the idea of transfer side by side with the idea of partition because it made sense. And they said, well, if the British say so, we should also advocate it. But they never actually tried to pass it as Zionist policy, and they fairly quickly stopped even talking about transfer after 1938.
Lex Fridman
(00:42:52)
So just to clarify, what you’re saying is that 47 was an offensive war, not a defensive war-
Benny Morris
(00:43:01)
By the Arabs. Yes.
Lex Fridman
(00:43:02)
… by the Arabs.
Benny Morris
(00:43:03)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:43:03)
And you’re also saying that there was never a top-down policy of expulsion.
Benny Morris
(00:43:09)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(00:43:09)
Just to clarify the point.
Mouin Rabbani
(00:43:11)
If I understood you correctly, you’re making the claim that transfer expulsion and so on was in fact a very localized phenomenon-
Benny Morris
(00:43:25)
Before 48.
Mouin Rabbani
(00:43:25)
… resulting from individual land purchases. If I understand you correctly, you’re also making the claim that the idea that a Jewish state requires a removal or overwhelming reduction of the non-Jewish population was-
Benny Morris
(00:43:49)
If the Arabs are attacking you. Yes.
Mouin Rabbani
(00:43:51)
… But let’s say prior to 1947, it would be your claim that the idea that a significant reduction or wholesale removal of the Arab population was not part of Zionist thinking. Well, I think there’s two problems with that. I think what you’re saying about localized disputes is correct, but I also think that there is a whole literature that demonstrates that transfer was envisioned by Zionist leaders on a much broader skill than simply individual land purchases. In other words, it went way beyond, we need to remove these tenants so that we can farm this land. The idea was we can’t have a state where all these Arabs remain and we have to get rid of them.

(00:44:48)
And the second, I think, impediment to that view is that long before the UN General Assembly convened to address a question of Palestine, Palestinian and Arab and other leaders as well had been warning ad infinitum that the purpose of the Zionist movement is not just to establish a Jewish state, but to establish an exclusivist Jewish state. And that transfer forced displacement was fundamental to that project. And just responding to…. Sorry, was it-
Steven Bonnell
(00:45:29)
Yeah, Steven.
Mouin Rabbani
(00:45:29)
… Bonnell or Donnel?
Steven Bonnell
(00:45:29)
Bonnell, yeah.
Mouin Rabbani
(00:45:31)
With a B?
Steven Bonnell
(00:45:32)
Yeah.
Mouin Rabbani
(00:45:32)
Yeah. You made the point that the problem here is that people don’t recognize is that the first and last result for the Arabs is always war. I think there’s a problem with that. I think you might do well to recall the 1936 general strike conducted by Palestinians at the beginning of the revolt, which at the time was the longest recorded general strike in history.

(00:46:05)
You may want to consult the book published last year by Lori Allen, “A History of False Hope”, which discusses in great detail the consistent engagement by Palestinians, their leaders, their elites, their diplomats, and so on with all these international committees.

(00:46:25)
If we look at today, the Palestinians are once again going to the International Court of Justice. They’re consistently trying to persuade the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to do his job. They have launched widespread boycott campaigns. So of course the Palestinians have engaged in military resistance. But I think the suggestion that this has always been their first and last resort and that they have somehow spurned civic action, spurned diplomacy, I think really has no basis in reality.
Steven Bonnell
(00:47:07)
I’ll respond to that. And then a question for Norm to take into account. I think when he answers Benny, because I am curious, obviously I have fresher eyes on this and I’m a newcomer to this arena versus the three of you guys for sure. A claim that gets brought up a lot has to do with the inevitability of transfer and Zionism or the idea that as soon as the Jews envisioned a state in Palestine, they knew that it would involve some mass transfer population, perhaps a mass expulsion. I’m sure we’ll talk about Plan Dalet or Plan D at some point.

(00:47:36)
The issue that I run into is while you can find quotes from leaders, while you can find maybe desires expressed in diaries, I feel like it’s hard to truly ever know if there would’ve been mass transfer in the face of Arab peace, because I feel like every time there was a huge deal on the table that would’ve had a sizable Jewish and Arab population living together, the Arabs would reject it out of hand.

(00:47:58)
So for instance, when we say that transfer was inevitable, when we say that Zionists would’ve never accepted a sizable Arab population, how do you explain the acceptance of the 47 partition plan that would’ve had a huge Arab population living in the Jewish state? Is your contention that after the acceptance of that, after the establishment of that state, that Jews would’ve slowly started to expel all of these Arab citizens from their country?

(00:48:20)
Or how do you explain that in Lusanne a couple years later that Israel was willing to formally annex the Gaza Strip and make-
Mouin Rabbani
(00:48:27)
Of course it was.
Steven Bonnell
(00:48:28)
… 200,000 so people, those citizens, but I’m just curious, how do we get this idea of Zionism always means mass transfer when there were times, at least early on in the history of Israel and a little bit before it, where Israel would’ve accepted a state that would’ve had a massive Arab population in it. Is your idea that they would’ve just slowly expelled them afterwards or?
Mouin Rabbani
(00:48:48)
Is that question to me or Norm?
Steven Bonnell
(00:48:50)
To either one. I’m curious for the incorporation of the answer. Yeah.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:48:53)
There is some misunderstandings here. So let’s try to clarify that. Number one, it was the old historians who would point to the fact and Professor Morris’s terminology, the old historians, what he called not real historians, he called them chroniclers, not real historians. It was the old Israeli historians who denied the centrality of transfer in Zionist thinking. It was then Professor Morris who contrary to Israel’s historian establishment, who said, now you remind me it’s four pages, but it came at the end of the book. It was-
Benny Morris
(00:49:40)
No, no, it’s at the beginning of the book.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:49:40)
… Transfer.
Benny Morris
(00:49:42)
Yeah, transfer is dealt with in four pages at the beginning of my first book on the Palestinian refugee problem.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:49:49)
It’s a fault of my memory, but the point still stands, it was Professor Morris who introduced this idea in what you might call a big way.
Benny Morris
(00:49:57)
Yeah, but I didn’t say it was the central to the Zionist experience. You’re saying centrality. I never said it was central. I said it was there. The idea.
Lex Fridman
(00:50:08)
By the way, it’s okay to respond back and forth. This is great. And also just a quick question, if I may. You’re using quotes from Benny, from Professor Morris. It’s also okay to say those quotes do not reflect the full context.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:50:21)
That would be fine.
Lex Fridman
(00:50:22)
So if we go back to quotes we’ve said in the past, and you’ve both here have written, the three of you have written on this topic a lot is we should be careful and just admit like-
Steven Bonnell
(00:50:35)
Real quick just to be clear that the contention is that Norm is quoting apart and saying that this was the entire reason for this, whereas Benny’s saying it’s a part of that.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:50:43)
I’m not quoting apart, I’m quoting 25 pages where Professor Morris was at great pains to document the claim that appeared in those early four pages of his book. Now you say it never became part of the official Zionist platform.
Benny Morris
(00:51:10)
It never became part of policy.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:51:11)
Fine.
Benny Morris
(00:51:11)
Not to say, but it wasn’t policy.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:51:15)
We’re also asked, well, this is true. Why did that happen? Why did that happen? It’s because it’s a very simple fact which everybody understands. Ideology doesn’t operate in a vacuum. There are real world practical problems. You can’t just take an ideology and superimpose it on a political reality and turn it into effect.

(00:51:41)
It was the British mandate. There was significant Arab resistance to Zionism, and that resistance was based on the fact, as you said, the fear of territorial displacement and dispossession. So you couldn’t very well expect the Zionist movement to come out in neon lights and announce, hey, we’re going to be expelling you the first chance we get. That’s not realistic.
Lex Fridman
(00:52:16)
Norm.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:52:16)
Okay.
Benny Morris
(00:52:16)
Let me respond. Look, you’ve said it a number of times that the Arabs from fairly early on in the conflict from the 1890s or the early 1900s said the Jews intend to expel us. This doesn’t mean that it’s true. It means that some Arabs said this, maybe believing it was true, maybe using it as a political instrument to gain support to mobilize Arabs against the Zionist experiment.

(00:52:43)
But the fact is transfer did not occur before 1947, and Arabs later said, and since then have said that the Jews want to build a third temple on the Temple Mount as if that’s what really the mainstream of Zionism has always wanted and always strived for. But this is nonsense. It’s something that Husseini used to use as a way to mobilize masses for the cause, using religion as the way to get them to join him. The fact that Arabs said that the Zionists want to dispossess us doesn’t mean it’s true. It just means that there’s some Arabs thought that maybe said it sincerely and maybe insincerely.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:53:28)
Professor Morris.
Benny Morris
(00:53:29)
Later became a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is true because Arabs attacked the Jews.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:53:34)
Professor Morris, I read through your stuff. Even yesterday I was looking through “Righteous Victims.”
Benny Morris
(00:53:40)
You should read other things. You’re wasting your time.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:53:42)
No, no, actually no. I do read other things, but I don’t consider it a waste of time to read you. Not at all. You say that this wasn’t inherent in Zionism. Now, would you agree that David Ben-Gurion was a Zionist?
Benny Morris
(00:54:04)
A major Zionist leader?
Norman Finkelstein
(00:54:05)
Right. Would you agree Chaim Weizmann was a Zionist?
Benny Morris
(00:54:09)
Yeah.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:54:09)
Okay. I believe they were. I believe they took their ideology seriously. It was the first generation. Just like with the Bolsheviks, the first generation was committed to an idea. By the 1930s, it was just pure geopolitique. The ideology went out the window. The first generation, I have no doubt about their convictions. Okay. They were Zionists. Transfer was inevitable and inbuilt in Zionism.
Benny Morris
(00:54:39)
You keep repeating the same things.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:54:42)
Because as I said, Mr. Morris, I have a problem reconciling what you’re saying. It either was incidental or it was deeply entrenched. Here I read it’s deeply entrenched, two very resonant words, inevitable and inbuilt.
Benny Morris
(00:55:03)
Deeply entrenched. I never wrote it.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:55:05)
Well, I’m not sure.
Benny Morris
(00:55:06)
It’s something you just invented.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:55:07)
Okay.
Benny Morris
(00:55:08)
But it was there.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:55:12)
Inevitable and inbuilt. Fine, fine.
Benny Morris
(00:55:13)
Let me concede something. The idea of transfer was there. Israel Zangwill, a British Zionist talked about it early on in the century. Even Herzl in some way talked about transferring population.
Norman Finkelstein
(00:55:27)
According to your 25 pages everybody talked about.
Lex Fridman
(00:55:30)
we keep bringing up this line from the 25 pages and the four pages. We’re lucky to have Benny in front of us right now. We don’t need to go to the quotes. We can legitimately ask, how central is expulsion to Zionism in its early version of Zionism and whatever Zionism is today, and how much power influence does Zionism and ideology have in Israel and the influence, the philosophy, the ideology of Zionism have on Israel today?
Benny Morris
(00:56:06)
The Zionist movement up to 1948, Zionist ideology was central to the whole Zionist experience, the whole enterprise up to 1948. And I think Zionist ideology was also important in the first decades of Israel’s existence. Slowly, the hold of Zionism, if you like, like Bolshevism held the Soviet Union gradually faded, and a lot of Israelis today think in terms of individual success and then the capitalism and all sorts of things, which had nothing to do with Zionism, but Zionism was very important.

(00:56:45)
But what I’m saying is that the idea of transfer wasn’t the core of Zionism. The idea of Zionism was to save the Jews who had been vastly persecuted in Eastern Europe, and incidentally in the Arab world, the Muslim world for centuries, and eventually ending up with the Holocaust. The idea of Zionism was to save the Jewish people by establishing a state or re-establishing a Jewish state on the ancient Jewish homeland, which is something that Arabs today even deny that there were Jews in Palestine or the land of Israel 2000 years ago.

(00:57:21)
Arafat famously said, “What Temple was there on Temple Mount? Maybe it was in Nablus.” Which of course is nonsense. But they had a strong connection for thousands of years to the land to which they wanted to return and return there. They found that on the land lived hundreds of thousands of Arabs, and the question was how to accommodate the vision of a Jewish state in Palestine alongside the existence of these Arab masses living on who were indigenous, in fact, to the land by that stage.

(00:57:53)
And the idea of partition because they couldn’t live together because the Arabs didn’t want to live together with the Jews. And I think the Jews also didn’t want to live together in one state with Arabs in general. The idea of partition was the thing which the Zionists accepted, okay, we can only get a small part of Palestine. The Arabs will get in 37. Most of Palestine in 1947 the ratios were changed, but we can live side by side with each other in a partitioned Palestine. And this was the essence of it.

(00:58:26)
The idea of transfer was there, but it was never adopted as policy. But in 1947/48, the Arabs attacked trying to destroy essentially the Zionist enterprise and the emerging Jewish state. And the reaction was transfer in some way, not as policy, but this is what happened on the battlefield. And this is also what Ben-Gurion at some point began to want as well.
Mouin Rabbani
(00:58:54)
One of the first books on this issue I read when I was still in high school because my late father had it, was “The Diaries of Theodor Herzl.” And I think Theodor Herzl, of course, was the founder of the contemporary Zionist movement. And I think if you read that, it’s very clear for Herzl the model upon which the Zionist movement would proceed. His model was Cecil Rhodes.

(00:59:28)
I think Rhodes, from what I recall, correct me if I’m wrong, has quite a prominent place in Herzl’s diaries. I think Herzl was also corresponding with him and seeking his support. Cecil Rhodes, of course, was the British colonialist after whom the former white minority regime in Rhodesia was named. And Herzl also says explicitly in his diaries, that it is essential to remove the existing population from Palestine.
Benny Morris
(01:00:06)
Can I respond to this-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:00:08)
In a moment, please. He says, we shall have to spirit the penniless population across the borders and procure employment for them elsewhere or something. And Israel Zangwill who you mentioned, a land without a people for a people without a land, they knew then well it wasn’t a land without a people. I’ll continue, but please go ahead.
Benny Morris
(01:00:27)
Just to this, there is one small diary entry in Herzl’s vast-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:00:33)
It’s five volumes.
Benny Morris
(01:00:34)
… Yeah, five volumes. There’s one paragraph which actually mentions the idea of transfer. There are people who think that Herzl was actually pointing to South America when he was talking about that the Jews were going to move to Argentina, and then they would try and buy out or buy off or spirit the penniless natives to make way for Jewish settlement. Maybe he wasn’t even talking about the Arabs in that particular passage. That’s the argument of some people. Maybe he was.

(01:01:02)
But the point is it has only a 1% of the diary, which is devoted to this subject. It’s not a central idea in Herzl’s thinking. What Herzl wanted, and this is what’s important, not Rhodes, I don’t think he was the model. Herzl wanted to create a liberal democratic western state in Palestine for the Jews. That was the idea. Not some imperial enterprise serving some imperial master, which is what Rhodes was about.

(01:01:36)
But to have a Jewish state, which was modeled on the western democracies in Palestine, and this incidentally was more or less what Weizmann and Ben-Gurion wanted. Ben-Gurion was more of a socialist. Weizmann was more of a liberal westerner, but they wanted to establish a social democratic or liberal state in Palestine.

(01:01:57)
And they both envisioned through most of the years of their activity that there would be an Arab minority in that Jewish state. It’s true that Ben-Gurion strived to have as small as possible an Arab minority in the Jewish state because he knew that if you want a Jewish majority state, that would be necessary, but it’s not something which they were willing to translate into actual policy.
Lex Fridman
(01:02:21)
Just a quick pause to mention that for people who are not familiar, Theodor Herzl we’re talking about over a century ago, and everything we’ve been talking about has been mostly 1948 and before.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:02:31)
Yes. Just one clarification on Herzl’s diaries. I mean, the other thing that I recall from those diaries is he was very preoccupied with, in fact, getting great power patronage, seeing Palestine, the Jewish state in Palestine, I think his words, an outpost of civilization against barbarism. In other words, very much seeing his project as a proxy for Western imperialism-
Benny Morris
(01:02:59)
No, no, I don’t think that’s the right word.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:02:59)
… in the Middle East.
Benny Morris
(01:03:00)
Not proxy. He wanted to establish a Jewish state which would be independent. To get that he hoped that he would be able to garner support from major imperial powers, but it wasn’t-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:03:11)
Including the Ottoman Sultan-
Benny Morris
(01:03:12)
Yes, yes, exactly.

Partition

Mouin Rabbani
(01:03:13)
… who he tried to cultivate. I just want to respond to a point you made earlier, which was that people expressed the rejection of the partition resolution on the grounds that it gave the majority of Palestine to the Jewish community, which formed only a third. Whereas in fact, if I understood you correctly, you’re saying the Palestinians and the Arabs would have rejected any partition resolution.
Steven Bonnell
(01:03:41)
Yeah, a couple of things that one, they would’ve rejected any. Two, a lot of that land given was in the Negev. It was pretty terrible land at the time. And then three, the land that would’ve been partitioned to Jews I think would’ve been, I think I saw it was like 500,000… It would’ve been 500,000 Jews, 400,000 Arabs, and I think like 80,000 Bedouins would’ve been there. So the state would’ve been divided pretty close to them.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:04:01)
I think you raise a valid point because I think the Palestinians did reject the partition of their homeland in principle. And I think the fact that the United Nations General Assembly then awarded the majority of their homeland to the Zionist movement only added in salt to injury. I mean, one doesn’t have to sympathize with the Palestinians to recognize that they have now been a stateless people for 75 years.

(01:04:36)
Can you name any country yours, for example, or yours, that would be prepared to give 55%, 25%, 10% of your country to the Palestinians? Of course not. And so the issue was not the existence of Jews in Palestine. They had been there for centuries, and of course they had ties to Palestine and particularly to Jerusalem and other places going back centuries if not millennia.

(01:05:10)
But the idea of establishing an exclusively Jewish state at the expense of those who were already living there, I think it was right to reject that. And I don’t think we can look back now 75 years later and say, well, you should have accepted losing 55% of your homeland because you ended up losing 78% of it, and the remaining 22% was occupied in 1967. That’s not how things work.

(01:05:42)
And I can imagine an American rejecting giving 10% of the United States to the Palestinians, and if that rejection leads to war and you lose half your country, I doubt that 50 years from now you’re going to say, well, maybe I should have accepted that.
Steven Bonnell
(01:06:00)
Sure. So I like this answer more than what I usually feel like I’m hearing when it comes to the Palestinian rejection of the 47 partition plan. Sometimes I feel like a weird switch happens to where the Arabs in the area are actually presented as entirely pragmatic people who are simply doing a calculation and saying like, well, we’re losing 55% of our land. Jews are only maybe one third of the people here, and we’ve got 45. And no, the math doesn’t work, basically. But it wasn’t a math problem. I think, like you said-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:06:28)
It was a matter of principle.
Steven Bonnell
(01:06:29)
… it was an ideology problem.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:06:30)
No, it was a matter of principle.
Steven Bonnell
(01:06:31)
Yeah. Ideologically driven that they as a people have a right to or are entitled to this land that they’ve never actually had an independent state on, that they’ve never had even a guarantee of an independent state on, that they’ve never actually ruled a government on.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:06:43)
That last point is actually not correct because for all its injustice, the mandate system recognized Palestine as a class a mandate, which provisionally recognized the independence of that territory.
Steven Bonnell
(01:07:00)
Of what would emerge from that territory, but not of the Palestinians.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:07:03)
It was provisionally recognized.
Steven Bonnell
(01:07:06)
But the territory itself was, but not of the Palestinian people to have a right or guarantee to a government that would emerge from it.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:07:12)
But it was the British mandate of Palestine, not the British mandate of Israel.
Benny Morris
(01:07:15)
The word exclusive, which you keep using is nonsense. The state, which Ben-Gurion envisioned would be a Jewish majority state as they accepted the 1947 partition resolution, as Steven said, that included 400,000 plus Arabs in a state which would have 500,000 Jews. So the idea of exclusivity wasn’t anywhere in the air at all among the Zionist leaders-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:07:15)
I think it was there.
Benny Morris
(01:07:39)
… in 4748, they wanted a Jewish majority state, but were willing to accept a state which had 40% Arabs. That’s one point. The second thing is that Palestinians may have regarded the land of Palestine as their homeland, but so did the Jews. It was the homeland of the Jews as well. The problem was the Arabs were unable and remain to this day, unable to recognize that for the Jews, that is their…
Benny Morris
(01:08:00)
… today, unable to recognize that for the Jews, that is their homeland as well. And the problem then is how do you share this homeland, either with one binational state or partitioned into two states? The problem is that the Arabs have always rejected both of these ideas. The homeland belongs to the Jews, as Jews feel, as much as it does, if not more, than for the Arabs.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:08:23)
I think I would say Zionists, not Jews.
Benny Morris
(01:08:23)
I would say for the Jews. It’s the Jewish people’s homeland.
Steven Bonnell
(01:08:26)
Real quick, I just want for both of you guys, because I haven’t heard these questions answered, I’m just so curious how to make sense of them. It was correctly brought up that I believe that Ben-Gurion had, I think Shlomo Ben-Ami describes it as an obsession with getting validation or support from Western states; Great Britain, and then a couple of decades later- [inaudible 01:08:44].
Mouin Rabbani
(01:08:44)
That explains the Suez Crisis.
Steven Bonnell
(01:08:46)
Yeah, exactly. Correct. That was one of the major motivators, the idea to work with Britain and France on a military operation.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:08:52)
An imperial stooge.
Steven Bonnell
(01:08:53)
But then the question again I go back to, if that is true, if Ben-Gurion, if the early Israel saw themselves as a Western-fashioned nation, how could we possibly imagine that they would’ve engaged in the transfer of some 400,000 Arabs after accepting the partition plan? Would that not have completely and totally destroyed their legitimacy in the eyes of the entire Western world?
Mouin Rabbani
(01:09:13)
No.
Steven Bonnell
(01:09:13)
How not?
Mouin Rabbani
(01:09:14)
Well, first of all, I think that the Zionist leadership’s acceptance of the partition resolution, and I think you may have written about this, that they accepted it because it provided international endorsement of the legitimacy of the principle of Jewish statehood. And they didn’t accept the borders, and in fact, later expanded the borders. Second of all-
Benny Morris
(01:09:43)
No, they didn’t. They didn’t expand the borders. They accepted the UN partition resolution, borders and all. That’s how they accepted it. You can say that some of the Zionists, deep in their hearts, had the idea that maybe at some point, they would ne able to get more.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:09:57)
Yeah, including their most senior leaders, who said so, and I think you’ve quoted them saying so.
Benny Morris
(01:10:02)
But they begrudgingly accepted what the United Nations, the world community had said; “This is what you’re going to get.”
Mouin Rabbani
(01:10:06)
Yes. And second of all, removing dark people? Darker people? It’s intrinsic-
Benny Morris
(01:10:07)
Why dark? In Israel, Jews are as dark as Arabs. This is nonsense.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:10:15)
It’s intrinsic to Western history. So the idea that Americans or Brits or the French would have an issue with … I mean, French had been doing it in Algeria for decades. The Americans have been doing it in North America for centuries. So how would Israel forcibly displacing Palestinians somehow besmirch Israel in the eyes of the West?
Norman Finkelstein
(01:10:40)
In fact, even in the 1944 resolution of the Labor Party, and at the time, even Bertrand Russell was a member of the Labor Party, it endorsed transfer of Arabs out of Palestine. As [inaudible 01:10:55] pointed out, that was a deeply entrenched idea in Western thinking, that it doesn’t in any way contradict or violate or breach any moral values to displace the Palestinian population.

(01:11:10)
Now, I do believe there’s a legitimate question, had it been the case, as you said, Professor Morris, that the Zionists wanted to create a happy state with a Jewish majority, but a large Jewish minority, and if by virtue of immigration, like in our own country … in our own country, given the current trajectories, non-whites will become the majority population in the United States quite soon. And according to democratic principles, we have to accept that. So if that were the case, I would say maybe there’s an argument that had there been mass Jewish immigration that changed the demographic balance in Palestine and therefore Jews became the majority, you can make an argument in the abstract that the indigenous Arab population should have been accepting of that, just as ‘whites’ in the United States have to be accepting of the fact that the demographic majority is shifting to non-whites in our own country.

(01:12:23)
But that’s not what Zionism was about. I did write my doctoral dissertation on Zionism, and I don’t want to get now bogged down in abstract ideas, but as I suspect you know, most theorists of nationalism say there are two kinds of nationalism. One is a nationalism based on citizenship. You become a citizen, you’re integral to the country. That’s sometimes called political nationalism. And then there’s another kind of nationalism, and that says the state should not belong to its citizens, it should belong to an ethnic group. Each ethnic group should have its own state. It’s usually called the German romantic idea of nationalism.

(01:13:14)
Zionism is squarely in the German romantic idea. That was the whole point of Zionism. “We don’t want to be bundists and be one more ethnic minority in Russia. We don’t want to become citizens and just become a Jewish people in England or France. We want our own state-
Steven Bonnell
(01:13:47)
Like the Arab 23 states.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:13:49)
No, wait, before we get to the Arabs, let’s stick to the Jews for a moment. Or the Zionists. “We want our own state.” And in that concept of wanting your own state, the minority, at best, lives on sufferance, and at worst gets expelled. That’s the logic of the German romantic Zionist idea of a state. That’s why they’re Zionists.

(01:14:25)
Now, I personally have shied away from using the word Zionism ever since I finished my doctoral dissertation, because-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:14:35)
It was that painful.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:14:37)
Because as I said, I don’t believe it’s the operative ideology today. It’s like talking about bolshevism and referring to Khrushchev. I doubt Khrushchev could have spelled Bolshevik. But for the period we’re talking about, they were Zionists, they were committed to their exclusive state with a minority living on sufferance, or at worst expelled. That was their ideology. And I really feel there’s a problem with your happy vision of these Western Democrats like Weitzman, and they wanted to live peacefully with their Arabs. Weitzman described the expulsion in 1948 as ‘the miraculous clearing of the land.’ That doesn’t sound like somebody shedding too many tears at the loss of the indigenous population.
Benny Morris
(01:15:42)
Let me just respond to the word on sufferance.
Lex Fridman
(01:15:42)
Let him respond.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:15:42)
Okay.
Benny Morris
(01:15:44)
The on sufferance, I don’t agree with. I think that’s wrong. The Jewish state came into being in 1948. It had a population which was 20% Arab when it came into being, after many of them had become refugees, but 20% remained in the country. 20% of Israel’s population at inception in 1949 was Arab.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:16:06)
80% went missing.
Benny Morris
(01:16:08)
No, no, no. I was talking about what remained in Palestine/Israel after it was created. The 20% who lived in Israel received citizenship and all the rights of Israelis, except, of course, the right to serve in the Army, which they didn’t want to. And they had Supreme Court Justices, they have Knesset members. They enjoyed basically-
Norman Finkelstein
(01:16:29)
I think they lived under emergency laws until 1966.
Benny Morris
(01:16:32)
For a period, sure, they lived under emergency-
Norman Finkelstein
(01:16:34)
So they didn’t immediately have citizenship. This is just fantasy.
Benny Morris
(01:16:38)
No, no, no, no. Wait a minute. It’s not fantasy. At the beginning, they received citizenship, could vote in elections for their own people, and they were put into parliament. But in the first years, the Jewish majority suspected that maybe the Arabs would be disloyal, because they had just tried to destroy the Jewish state. Then they dropped the military government and they became fully equal citizens. So if the whole idea was they must have a state without Arabs, this didn’t happen in ’49, and it didn’t happen in the subsequent decades.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:17:09)
So Professor Morris, then why did you say without a population expulsion, a Jewish state would not have been established?
Benny Morris
(01:17:21)
Because you are missing the first section of that paragraph, which was they were being assaulted by the Arabs, and as a result, a Jewish state could not have come into being unless there had also been an expulsion of the population which was trying to kill them.
Lex Fridman
(01:17:35)
Norm, I’m officially forbidding you referencing that again. Hold on a second, wait. We responded to it. So the main point you’re making, we have to take Benny at his word, is there was a war, and that’s the reason why he made that statement.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:17:52)
I think just one last point on this. I remember reading your book when it first came out, and reading one incident after the other, and one example after the other, and then getting to the conclusion where you said the Nakba was a product of war, not design, I think were your exact words. And I remember reacting almost in shock to that, that I felt you had mobilized overwhelming evidence that it was a product of design, not war. And I think our discussion today very much reflects, let’s say, the dissonance between the evidence and the conclusion. You don’t feel that the research that you have conducted and published demonstrates that it was in fact inherent and inbuilt and inevitable. And I think the point that Norm and I are making is that your own historical research, together with that of others, indisputably demonstrates that it does. I think that’s a fundamental disagreement we’re having here.
Steven Bonnell
(01:19:03)
Well, yeah, can I actually respond to that? Because I think this is emblematic of the entire conversation. I watched a lot of Norm’s interviews and conversations in preparation for this, and I hear Norm will say this over and over and over again. “I only deal in facts. I don’t deal in hypotheticals. I only deal in facts. I only deal in facts.” And that seems to be the case, except for when the facts are completely and totally contrary to the particular point you’re trying to push. The idea that Jews would’ve out of hand rejected any state that had Arabs on it or always had a plan of expulsion is just betrayed by the acceptance of the ’47 partition plan.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:19:35)
I don’t think you understand politics. Did I just say that there is a chasm that separates your ideology from the limits and constraints imposed by politics and reality? Now, Professor Morris, I suspect, would agree that the Zionist movement from fairly early on was committed to the idea of a Jewish state. I am aware of only one major study, probably written 40 years ago, The Binational Idea in Mandatory Palestine by a woman. I forgot her name now. You remember her?
Benny Morris
(01:20:19)
I’m trying to.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:20:20)
Yeah. Okay. But you know the book.
Benny Morris
(01:20:22)
I think so.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:20:23)
Yeah. She is the only one who tried to persuasively argue that the Zionist movement was actually, not formally, actually committed to the binational idea. But most historians of the subject agree, the Zionist movement was committed to the idea of a Jewish state. Having written my doctoral dissertation on the topic, I was confirmed in that idea, because Professor Chomsky, who was my closest friend for about 40 years, was very committed to the idea that bi-nationalism was the dominant trend in Zionism. I couldn’t go with him there.

(01:21:07)
But Professor Morris, you are aware that until the Biltmore resolution in 1942, the Zionist movement never declared it was for a Jewish state. Why? Because it was politically impossible at the moment, until 1942. There’s your ideology, there are your convictions, there are your operative plans, and there’s also, separately, what you say in public. The Zionist movement couldn’t say in public, “We’re expelling all the Arabs.” They can’t say that. And they couldn’t even say, “We support a Jewish state,” until 1942.
Benny Morris
(01:21:51)
You’re conflating two things. The Zionists wanted a Jewish state. Correct. That didn’t mean expulsion of the Arabs. It’s not the same thing. They wanted a Jewish state with a Jewish majority, but they were willing, as it turned out, both in ’37 and in ’47 and subsequently, to have a large Arab minority-
Norman Finkelstein
(01:22:10)
In ’37 there was a transfer.
Benny Morris
(01:22:14)
They were willing to have a large Arab minority in the country, and they ended up with a large Arab minority in the country. 20% of the population in ’49 was Arab, and it still is-
Norman Finkelstein
(01:22:24)
They ended up for about five minutes before they were expelled. They agreed to it up until ’47, and then they were gone by March 1949.
Steven Bonnell
(01:22:34)
What happened in between the rejection of the partition plan and the expulsion of the Arabs?
Benny Morris
(01:22:38)
The Arabs launched the war.
Steven Bonnell
(01:22:39)
Well, yeah. It wasn’t random. There is a potential that-
Norman Finkelstein
(01:22:42)
I agree. It wasn’t random. I totally agree with that. It was by design. It wasn’t random.
Steven Bonnell
(01:22:48)
You can say that, but in this case, the facts betray you. There was no Arab acceptance of anything that would’ve allowed for a Jewish state to exist, number one, and number two, I think that it’s entirely possible, given how things happen after a war, that this exact same conflict could have played out and an expulsion would’ve happened without any ideology at play. There was a people that disagreed on who had territorial rights to a land, there was a massive war afterwards, and then a bunch of their friends invaded after to reinforce the idea that the Jewish people in this case couldn’t have a state. There could have been a transfer regardless.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:23:18)
Anything could have been, but that’s not what history is about.
Steven Bonnell
(01:23:22)
History is about Palestinian rejections to any peace deal, over and over and over again.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:23:27)
As I said, when the ball was thrown into the court of the United Nations, they were faced with a practical problem, and I, for one, am not going to try to adjudicate the rights and wrongs from the beginning. I do not believe that if territorial displacement and dispossession was inherent in the Zionist project, I do not believe it can be a legitimate political enterprise. Now, you might say that’s speaking from 2022. Or where are we now?
Mouin Rabbani
(01:24:08)
’24 now, I think. Yeah.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:24:08)
Okay. But we have to recognize that from nearly the beginning, for perfectly obvious reasons having nothing to do with antisemitism, anti-Westernism, anti-Europeanism, but because no people that I am aware of would voluntarily cede its country-
Steven Bonnell
(01:24:37)
Except for all the people that sold land voluntarily.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:24:39)
You can perfectly understand Native American resistance to Euro-colonialism. You can perfectly well understand it without any anti-Europeanism, anti-whiteism, anti-Christianism. They didn’t want to cede their country to invaders. That’s completely understandable.
Benny Morris
(01:25:01)
You’re minimizing the antisemitic element in Arab nationalism.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:25:06)
You minimized it. In all your books, you minimized it.
Benny Morris
(01:25:08)
No, no, no. Husseini was an antisemite. The leader of the Palestinian national movement in the ’30s and ’40s was an antisemite. This was one of the things which drove him, and also drove him in the end to work in Berlin for Hitler for four years, giving Nazi propaganda to the Arab world, calling on the Arabs to murder the Jews. That’s what he did in World War II. That’s the leader of the Palestinian Arab National Movement. And he wasn’t alone. He wasn’t alone.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:25:36)
Professor Morris, if you read your book, Righteous Victims, you can read it and read it and read it and read it, as I have, you will find barely a word about the Arabs being motivated by antisemitism.
Benny Morris
(01:25:53)
It exists, though.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:25:54)
I didn’t say it doesn’t exist.
Benny Morris
(01:25:56)
Ah, you agree that it exists?
Norman Finkelstein
(01:25:57)
Hey, I don’t know a single non-Jew who doesn’t harbor antisemitic sentiments.
Benny Morris
(01:26:02)
We’re talking about Arabs now.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:26:02)
Yeah, but I don’t know anybody. That’s just part of the human condition.
Benny Morris
(01:26:08)
Antisemitism?
Norman Finkelstein
(01:26:09)
Yes.
Benny Morris
(01:26:09)
And among the Arabs?
Norman Finkelstein
(01:26:12)
So Professor Morris, here’s my problem. I didn’t see that in your Righteous Victims. Even when you talked about the first Intifada, and you talked about the second Intifada, and you talked about how there was a lot of influence by Hamas, the Islamic movement, you even stated that there was a lot of antisemitism in those movements, but then you went on to say, “But of course, at bottom, it was about the occupation. It wasn’t about” … And I’ve read it.
Benny Morris
(01:26:47)
Yeah, but you’re moving from different ages, across the ages.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:26:50)
No, I’m talking about your whole book.
Benny Morris
(01:26:52)
The occupation began in ’67, the one you’re talking about.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:26:55)
I looked and looked and looked for evidence of this antisemitism as being a chief motor of Arab resistance to Zionism. I didn’t see it.
Steven Bonnell
(01:27:07)
Did he make that claim?
Benny Morris
(01:27:08)
I don’t remember the word chief. It’s one of the elements.
Steven Bonnell
(01:27:11)
Yeah. It’s very binary thinking when it comes to-
Norman Finkelstein
(01:27:11)
Binary?
Steven Bonnell
(01:27:11)
Yes, binary.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:27:14)
Please, don’t give me this postmodernism ‘binary’. You’re the one that said the chief motor-
Benny Morris
(01:27:19)
But you are thinking in terms of black and white. Steven has a point.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:27:23)
Do you have your book here? Page 137.
Benny Morris
(01:27:28)
You’re talking in black and white concepts when history is much grayer. Lots of things happen because of lots of reasons, not one or the other, and you don’t seem to see that.
Steven Bonnell
(01:27:38)
Can I ask you a question? Because it’s for them to talk too. Can I ask you a very quick question? What do you think the ideal solution was on the Arab side from ’47? What would they have preferred? And what would’ve happened-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:27:38)
Well, they were explicit.
Steven Bonnell
(01:27:47)
And then the second one, what would’ve happened if Jews would’ve lost the war in ’48? What do you think would’ve happened to the Israeli population, the Jewish population?
Mouin Rabbani
(01:27:54)
I think the Palestinians and the Arabs were explicit that they wanted a unitary, I think, federal state, and they made their submissions to [inaudible 01:28:09], they made their appeals at the UN General Assembly.
Benny Morris
(01:28:12)
What do you mean by unitary and federal? I don’t get that. They wanted an Arab state. They wanted Palestine to be an Arab state.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:28:19)
Yes. Yes.
Benny Morris
(01:28:19)
Put it simply. That word, unitary, federal, they wanted Palestine as an Arab and exclusively Arab state. That’s what they wanted.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:28:27)
No, no, it wasn’t an exclusively Arab state. I think we have to distinguish between Palestinian and Arab opposition to a Jewish state in Palestine on the one hand, and Palestinian and Arab attitudes to Jewish existence in Palestine, and there’s a fundamental difference-
Benny Morris
(01:28:45)
Well, Husseini, the leader of the movement, said that all the Jews who had come since 1917, and that’s the majority of the Jews in Palestine in 1947, shouldn’t be there.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:28:56)
Well, he did say-
Benny Morris
(01:28:57)
They shouldn’t be citizens and they shouldn’t be there.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:28:59)
[inaudible 01:28:59]. The PLO charter said that in ’64. I’m not going to deny it. Of course, it’s true. I can understand the sentiment, but I think it’s wrong.
Steven Bonnell
(01:29:05)
Also, [inaudible 01:29:11] because you had the used the words earlier, that it was supremacy and exclusivity that the Zionist state-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:29:14)
Well, I want to answer your question. Husseini did say that, and I’m sure there was a very substantial body of Palestinian Arab public opinion that endorsed that. But by the same token, I think a unitary Arab state, as you call it, or a Palestinian state, could have been established, with arrangements, with guarantees to ensure the security and rights of both communities. How that would work in detail had been discussed and proposed, but never resolved. And again, I think Jewish fears about what would’ve happened-
Benny Morris
(01:30:00)
A second Holocaust.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:30:01)
Well, no-
Benny Morris
(01:30:02)
That was the Jewish fear. A second Holocaust.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:30:04)
Well, that may well have been the Jewish fear. It was an unfounded Jewish fear.
Steven Bonnell
(01:30:09)
It was unfounded?
Mouin Rabbani
(01:30:10)
Of course it was unfounded.
Steven Bonnell
(01:30:11)
What about like in ’48 and ’56 and-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:30:14)
You really think that the Palestinians, had they won the war, were going to import ovens and crematoria from Germany and-
Steven Bonnell
(01:30:21)
I don’t know about that, but in almost every single Arab state where there were Jews living, after ’48, after ’56, after ’67, there were always pogroms, there were always flights from Jews from those countries to Israel afterwards. I don’t think it would be-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:30:34)
I wouldn’t say there were always pogroms in every Arab state. I think there was flight of Arab Jews for multiple reasons, in some cases for precisely the reasons you say. If you look at the Jewish community in Algeria, for example, their flight had virtually nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The issue of Algerian Jews was that the French gave them citizenship during their colonial rule of Algeria, and they increasingly became identified with French rule, when Algeria became independent and all the French ended up leaving, out of fear, or out of disappointment, or out of whatever, the Jews were identified as French rather than Algerian.
Benny Morris
(01:31:22)
This is a bit of a red herring. There were pogroms in the Arab countries. In Bahrain even, where there’s almost no Jews, there was a pogrom in 1947. There was a pogrom in Aleppo in 1947.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:31:23)
I’m not denying any of that history.
Benny Morris
(01:31:34)
There were killings of Jews in Iraq and Egypt in 1948/49. But the Jews basically fled the Arab states, not for multiple reasons. They fled because they felt that the governments there and the societies amid which they had lived for hundreds of years no longer wanted them.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:31:54)
Look, without getting into the details, I think we can both agree that ultimately a clear majority of Arab Jews who believed that after having lived in these countries for centuries-
Benny Morris
(01:32:08)
Way before the Arabs arrived there. Way before the Arabs arrived in Iraq.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:32:11)
… for centuries, if not millennia, came to the unfortunate conclusion that their situation had become untenable. I also think that we can both agree that this had never been an issue prior to Zionism and the emergence of the state of Israel.
Benny Morris
(01:32:31)
This isn’t true. There were pogroms prior to Zionism.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:32:31)
Look, I’m not-
Benny Morris
(01:32:31)
Pogroms didn’t begin with Zionism in the Arab world.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:32:34)
The issue is the point I raised, which is whether these communities had ever come to a collective conclusion that their position had become untenable in this part of the world. No, they were Arab Jews.
Steven Bonnell
(01:32:48)
Well, because untenable meant there was no alternative. But with the creation of Israel, there was an alternative, right? A place where they could go and not be discriminated against or live as second class citizens or be subject to Arab majority states.

(01:32:59)
I also think it’s interesting that when you analyze the flight of Jewish people, and I’ve seen this, I agree with you, it wasn’t just a mass expulsion from all the Arab states. There were definitely push factors. There were also pull factors. Now, I don’t know how you guys feel about the Nakba, but when the analysis of the Nakba comes in, again, it’s back to that; well, that was actually just a top-down expulsion. The retreat of wealthy Arab people in the ’30s didn’t matter. Any of the messaging from the surrounding Arab states didn’t matter. It was just an expulsion from Jewish people or people running from their lives from Jewish massacres. Again, I feel like it’s a selective critical analysis of the-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:33:35)
Again, I’m a little uncomfortable always using the term Jewish here, because it wasn’t the Jews of England or the Soviet Jews.
Steven Bonnell
(01:33:40)
Well, I say Jewish because prior to ’48, saying Israeli-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:33:44)
I think it’s useful to refer to Zionists before 1948 and Israelis after ’48. We don’t need to implicate Jews of all-
Steven Bonnell
(01:33:54)
Well, sure, but the Jewish people that were being attacked in Arab states weren’t Zionists. They were just Jews living there, right?
Norman Finkelstein
(01:33:58)
Okay, I need to just comment on that. I was rereading Shlomo Ben-Ami’s last book, and he does at the end discuss at some length the whole issue of the refugee question bearing on the so-called peace process. And on the question of ’48 and the Arab immigration, if you’ll allow me, let me just quote him. “Israel is particularly fond of the awkwardly false symmetry she makes between the Palestinian refugee crisis and the forced immigration of 600,000 Jews from Arab countries following the creation of the state of Israel, as if it were ‘an unplanned exchange of populations.’.

(01:34:43)
And then Mr Ben-Ami, for those of you who are listening, he was Israel’s former foreign minister, and he’s an influential historian in his own right, he says, “In fact, envoys from the Mossad and the Jewish Agency worked underground in Arab countries and Iran to encourage Jews to go to Israel. More importantly, for many Jews in Arab states, the very possibility of immigrating to Israel was the combination of millennial aspirations. It represented the consummation of a dream to take part in Israel’s resurgence as a nation.”

(01:35:29)
So this idea that they were all expelled after 1948, that’s one area, Professor Morris, I defer to expertise. That’s one of my credos in life. I don’t know the Israeli literature. But as it’s been translated in English, there’s very little solid scholarship on what happened in 1948 in the Arab countries which caused the Jews to leave.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:35:58)
Arab Jews.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:35:59)
Arab Jews, right. But Shlomo Ben-Ami knows the literature. He knows the scholarship. He’s a historian.
Benny Morris
(01:36:05)
He comes from Tangiers.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:36:07)
He’s from Morocco. [inaudible 01:36:10] from Iraq has written on this issue as well.
Benny Morris
(01:36:12)
And the Jews in the Arab lands were not pro-Zionists. They weren’t Zionists at all. Certainly [inaudible 01:36:18] family was anti-Zionist.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:36:20)
And [inaudible 01:36:21], when he was interviewed by Marin Rappaport, on this question he said, “You simply cannot say that the Iraqi Jews were expelled. It’s just not true.” And he was speaking as an Iraqi Jew who left with his family in 1948.
Benny Morris
(01:36:35)
They were pushed out. They weren’t expelled. That’s probably the right phrase. They were pushed out.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:36:39)
Well, I think it’s more complex than that. Sorry, I interrupted you.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:36:44)
No, you’re not interrupting me, because I only know what’s been translated into English, and the English literature on the subject is very small and not scholarly. Now, there may be a Hebrew literature, I don’t know, but I was surprised that even Shlomo Ben-Ami, stalwart of his state, fair enough, on this particular point he called it false symmetry.
Benny Morris
(01:37:10)
No, no, Steven is right. There was a pull and a push mechanism in the departure of the Jews from the Arab lands post ’48. But there was also a lot of push. A lot of push.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:37:20)
That’s indisputable. There was push-
Lex Fridman
(01:37:22)
And on the point of agreement, on this one brief light of agreement, let us wrap up with this topic of history and move on to modern day. But before that, I’m wondering if we could just say a couple of last words on this topic. Steven?
Steven Bonnell
(01:37:41)
Yeah. I think that when you look at the behaviors of both parties in the time period around ’48, or especially ’48 and earlier, there’s this assumption that there was this huge built-in mechanism of Zionism, and that it was going to be inevitable from the inception of the first Zionist thought that appeared in Herzl’s mind that there would be a mass violent population transfer of Arab Palestinians out of what would become the Israeli state. I understand that there are some quotes that we can find that maybe seem to possibly support an idea that looks close to that, but I think when you actually consult the record of what happened, when you look at the massive populations that Israel was willing to accept within what would become their state borders, their nation borders, I just don’t think that the historical record agrees with the idea that Zionists would’ve just never been okay living alongside Arab Palestinians.

(01:38:34)
But when you look at the other side, Arabs would out of hand reject literally any deal that apportioned any amount of that land for any state relating to Jewish people or the Israeli people. I think it was said, even on the other end of the table, that Arab Palestinians or Arabs would’ve never accepted any Jewish state whatsoever.

(01:38:52)
So it’s interesting that on the ideology part where it’s claimed that Zionists are people of exclusion and supremacy and expulsion, we can find that in diary entries, but we can find that expressed in very real terms on the Arab side, I think in all of their behavior around ’48 and earlier, where the goal was the destruction of the Israeli state, it would’ve been the dispossession of many Jewish people. It probably would’ve been the expulsion of a lot of them back to Europe. And I think that very clearly plays out in the difference between the actions of the Arabs versus some diary entries of some Jewish leaders.
Lex Fridman
(01:39:21)
Benny?
Benny Morris
(01:39:22)
Well, one thing which stood out, and I think Mouin made this point, is that the Arabs had nothing to do with the Holocaust, but then the world community forced the Arabs to pay the price for the Holocaust. That’s the traditional Arab argument. This is slightly distorting the reality. The Arabs in the 1930s did their utmost to prevent Jewish emigration from Europe and reaching Palestine, which was the only safe haven available, because America, Britain, France, nobody wanted Jews anywhere, and they were being persecuted in Central Europe and eventually would be massacred in large numbers. So the Arab effort to pressure the British to prevent Jews reaching Palestine’s safe shores contributed indirectly to the slaughter of many Jews in Europe because they couldn’t get to anywhere, and they couldn’t get to Palestine because the Arabs were busy attacking Jews in Palestine and attacking the British to make sure they didn’t allow Jews to reach this safe haven. That’s important.

(01:40:24)
The second thing is, of course, there’s no point in belittling the fact that the Palestinian Arab National Movement’s leader, Husseini, worked for the Nazis in the 1940s. He got a salary from the German foreign ministry, he raised troops among Muslims in Bosnia for the SS, and he broadcast to the Arab world calling for the murder of the Jews in the Middle East. This is what he did. And the Arabs since then have been trying to whitewash Husseini’s role. I’m not saying he was the instigator of the Holocaust, but he helped the Germans along in doing what they were doing and supported them in doing that. So this can’t be removed from the fact that the Arabs, as you say, paid a price for the Holocaust, but they also participated in various ways in helping it happen.
Lex Fridman
(01:41:21)
Mouin?
Mouin Rabbani
(01:41:21)
I’ll make two points. The first is you mentioned [inaudible 01:41:27] Husseini and his collaboration with the Nazis. Entirely legitimate point to raise. But I think one can also say definitively, had Husseini never existed, the Holocaust would’ve played out precisely as it did.
Benny Morris
(01:41:46)
Certainly. Certainly.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:41:46)
As far as Palestinian opposition to Jewish emigration to Palestine during the 1930s is concerned, it was of a different character than, for example, British and American rejection of Jewish immigration-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:42:00)
… An American rejection of Jewish immigration. They just didn’t want Jews on their soil.
Benny Morris
(01:42:06)
Objectively, it helped the Germans kill the Jews.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:42:08)
In the Palestinian case, their opposition to Jewish immigration was to prevent the transformation of their homeland into a Jewish state that would dispossess them, and I think that’s an important distinction to make. The other point I wanted to make is we’ve spent the past several hours talking about Zionism, transfer, and so on, but I think there’s a more fundamental aspect to this, which is that Zionism, I think, would have emerged and disappeared as yet one more utopian political project had it not been for the British, what the preeminent Palestinian historian, Walid Khalidi, has termed the British Shield, because I think without the British sponsorship, we wouldn’t be having this discussion today. The British sponsored Zionism for a very simple reason, which is that during World War I, the Ottoman armies attempted to march on the Suez Canal.

(01:43:15)
Suez Canal was the jugular vein of the British Empire between Europe and India, and the British came to the conclusion that they needed to secure the Suez Canal from any threat. And as the British have done so often in so many places, how do you deal with this? Well, you bring in a foreign minority, implant them amongst a hostile population, and establish a protectorate over them. I don’t think a Jewish state in Palestine had been part of British intentions, and the Balfour Declaration very specifically speaks about a Jewish national home in Palestine, in other words, a British protectorate. Things ended up taking a different course, and I think the most important development was World War II, and I think this had maybe less to do with the Holocaust and more to do with the effective bankruptcy of the United Kingdom during that war, and its inability to sustain its global empire.

(01:44:26)
It ended up giving up India, ended up giving up Palestine, and it’s in that context, I think, that we need to see the emergence of a Jewish state in Palestine, and again, a Jewish state means a state in which the Jewish community enjoys not only a demographic majority, but an uncontestable demographic majority, an uncontestable territorial hegemony, and uncontestable political supremacy. And that is also why after 1948, the nascent Israeli state confiscated, I believe, up to 90% of lands that had been previously owned by Palestinians who became citizens of Israel.

(01:45:21)
It is why the new Israeli state imposed a military government on its population of Palestinian citizens between 1948 and 1966. It is why the Israeli state effectively reduced the Palestinians living within the Israeli state, as citizens of the Israeli state, to second class citizens, on the one hand, promoting Jewish nationalism and Jewish nationalist parties, on the other hand, doing everything within its power to suppress and eliminate Palestinian or Arab nationalist movements. And that’s why today there’s a consensus among all major human rights organizations that Israel is an apartheid state, what the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem describes a regime of Jewish supremacy between the river and the sea.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:19)
You’re
Lex Fridman
(01:46:20)
Really tempting a response from the other side on the last few sentences. We’ll talk-
Benny Morris
(01:46:20)
Propaganda, yeah, okay.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:25)
We’ll talk about the claims of apartheid and so on. It’s a fascinating discussion, we need to have it. Norm.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:46:32)
On the question of the responsibility of the Palestinian Arabs for the Nazi Holocaust, direct or indirect, I consider that an absurd claim, as [inaudible 01:46:46] said, and I quoted him, “The entire Western world turned its back on the Jews to somehow focus on the Palestinians,” it strikes me as completely ridiculous. Number two, as Mouin said, there’s a perfectly understandable reason why Palestinian Arabs wouldn’t want Jews because in their minds, and not irrationally, these Jews intended to create a Jewish state, which would quite likely have resulted in their expulsion. I’m a very generous person. I’ve actually taken in a homeless person for two and a half years, but if I knew in advance that that homeless person was going to try to turn me out of my apartment, I would think 10,000 times before I took him in.

(01:47:42)
As far as the actual complicity of the Palestinian Arabs, if you look at Raul Hilberg’s three volume classic work, The Destruction of the European Jury, he has in those 1,000+ pages, one sentence on the role of the mufti of Jerusalem, and that I think is probably an overstatement, but we’ll leave it aside. The only two points I would make aside from the Holocaust point is number one, I do think the transfer discussion is useful because it indicates that there was a rational reason behind the Arab resistance to Jewish or Zionist immigration to Palestine, the fear of territorial displacement and dispossession.

(01:48:36)
And number two, there are two issues. One is the history, and the second is being responsible for your words. Now, some people accuse me of speaking very slowly, and they’re advised on YouTube to turn up the speed twice to three times whenever I’m on. One of the reasons I speak slowly is because I attach value to every word I say, and it is discomforting, disorienting, where you have a person who’s produced a voluminous corpus, rich in insights, and rich in archival sources who seems to disown each and every word that you pluck from that corpus by claiming that it’s either out of context or it’s cherry-picking. Words count, and I agree with Lex, everybody has the right to rescind what they’ve said in the past, but what you cannot claim is that you didn’t say what you said.
Benny Morris
(01:49:56)
I’ll stick to the history, not the current propaganda. 1917, the Zionist movement began way before the British supported the Zionist movement for decades. In 1917, the British jumped in and issued the Balfour Declaration supporting the emergence of a Jewish national home in Palestine, which most people understood to mean eventual Jewish statehood in Palestine. Most people understood that in Britain and among the Zionists and among the Arabs, but the British declared the Balfour Declaration or issued the Balfour Declaration, not only because of imperial self-interest, and this is what you’re basically saying, they had the imperial interests, a buffer state which would protect the Suez Canal from the East. The British also were motivated by idealism, and this incidentally is how Balfour described the reasoning behind issuing the declaration. And he said, “The Western world, Western Christendom owes the Jews a great debt,” both for giving the world and the West, if you like, social values as embodied in the Bible, social justice and all sorts of other things.

(01:51:09)
And the Christian world owes the Jews because it persecuted them for 2,000 years. This debt we’re now beginning to repay with the 1917 declaration favoring Zionism, but it’s also worth remembering that the Jews weren’t proxies or attached to the British imperial endeavor. They were happy to receive British support in 1917 and then subsequently when the British ruled Palestine for 20, 30 years, but they weren’t part of the British imperial design or mission. They wanted a state for themselves. The Jews happy to have the British support them, happy to date to have the Americans support Israel, but it’s not because we’re stooges or extensions of American imperial interests. The British incidentally always described in Arab narratives of propaganda as consistent supporters of Zionism, they weren’t. The first British rulers in Palestine, 1917, 1920-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:52:11)
Herbert Samuel.
Benny Morris
(01:52:12)
No, before Herbert Samuel. Samuel came in 1920. The British ruled there for three years previously, and most of the leaders, the British generals and so on who were in Palestine were anti-Zionists. And subsequently, in the ’20s and ’30s, the British occasionally curbed Zionist immigration to Palestine, and in 1939 switched horses and supported the Arab National Movement and not Zionism. They turned anti-Zionist and basically said, “You Arabs will rule Palestine within the next 10 years. This is what we’re giving you by limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine,” but the Arabs didn’t actually understand what they were being given on the silver platter Husseini again, and he said, “No, no, we can’t accept the British White Paper of May 1939, which had given the Arabs everything they wanted basically, self- determination in an Arab majority state. So, what I’m saying is the British at some point did support the Zionist enterprise, but at other points were less consistent in the support. And in 1939 until 1948, when they didn’t vote even for partition for Jewish statehood in Palestine in the UN resolution, they didn’t support Zionism during the last decade of the mandate. It’s worth remembering that.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:53:26)
I’d like to respond to that. Speaking of propaganda, I find it simply impossible to accept that Balfour, who as British Prime Minister in 1905, was a chief sponsor of the Aliens Act, which was specifically-
Benny Morris
(01:53:45)
He changed his mind.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:53:46)
… Which was specifically designed to keep persecuted Eastern European Jews out of the streets of the UK and who was denounced as an antisemite by the entire British Jewish establishment. A decade later, all of a sudden-
Benny Morris
(01:54:04)
Changed his mind.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:54:05)
People changed their minds, but when the changing of the mind just coincidentally happens to coincide with the British imperial interest, I think perhaps the transformation is a little more superficial than he’s being given credit for. It was clearly a British imperial venture, and if there had been no threat to the Suez Canal during World War I, regardless of what Balfour would’ve thought about the Jews and their contribution to history and their persecution and so on, there would’ve been no Balfour Declaration.
Steven Bonnell
(01:54:45)
May I ask real quick, it’s a question on that, why did the British ever cap immigration then from Jews to that area at all?
Mouin Rabbani
(01:54:51)
Well, we’re talking now about 19-
Benny Morris
(01:54:54)
20s and 30s.
Steven Bonnell
(01:54:55)
But I’m saying that if the whole goal was just to be an imperialist project, there were terrorist attacks from Jewish-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:55:01)
Yes, but you’re… I’ll answer you.
Steven Bonnell
(01:55:03)
In the ’40s.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:55:04)
And we’re talking now about 1917, and as I mentioned earlier, I don’t think the British had a Jewish state in mind. That’s why they used the term Jewish national home. I think what they wanted was a British protectorate, loyal to and dependent upon the British. I think an outstanding review of British policy towards these issues during the mandate has been done by Martin Bunton of the University of Victoria, and he basically makes the argument that once the British realized the mess they were in, certainly by the late ’20s, early ’30s, they recognized the mess they were in, the irreconcilable differences, and basically pursued a policy of just muddling on, and muddling on in the context of British rule in Palestine, whose overall purpose was to serve for the development of Zionist institutions, Yishuv’s economy and so on, meant even if the British were not self-consciously doing this, preparing the groundwork for the eventual establishment of the Jewish state. I don’t know if that answers your question.
Benny Morris
(01:56:26)
Except they did turn anti-Zionist in 1939.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:56:30)
Yes, of course [inaudible 01:56:30].
Benny Morris
(01:56:30)
And maintained-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:56:33)
They were being shot off by [inaudible 01:56:33]-
Benny Morris
(01:56:33)
… That Zionist… No, no, before they were being shot off, but maintain that anti-Zionist posture until 1948.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:56:37)
Okay.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:56:39)
And if I may, just also one point, you mentioned Hajj Amin al-Husseini during World… Entirely legitimate, but what I would also point out is that you had a Zionist organization, the Lehi-
Benny Morris
(01:56:56)
300 people.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:56:57)
300 people, one of whom happened to become an Israeli prime minister, an Israeli foreign minister, a speaker of Israeli parliament-
Norman Finkelstein
(01:57:04)
Maybe you should give his name.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:57:06)
Yitzhak Shamir proposing an alliance with Nazi Germany in 1941.
Benny Morris
(01:57:14)
Shamir proposed a Nazi-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:57:16)
Well, no, the Lehi proposed-
Benny Morris
(01:57:16)
Some people in the Lehi proposed-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:57:18)
Of which Shamir was a prominent leader.
Benny Morris
(01:57:19)
This is a red herring also.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:57:21)
No, no. Well, if he’s a red herring, Hajj Amin al-Husseini is a red whale, I’m sorry.
Benny Morris
(01:57:27)
The Lehi was an unimportant organization in the Yishuv. 300 people versus 30,000 belonged to the Haganah, so it was not a very important organization. It’s true, before the Holocaust actually began, they wanted allies against the British where they could find them and they-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:57:27)
We’re talking 1941 here, not 1931.
Benny Morris
(01:57:27)
1940.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:57:41)
’41 from what I recall.
Benny Morris
(01:57:45)
1940, they approached the German emissary in Istanbul or something.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:57:49)
And if I may, proposed an alliance with Nazi Germany on what the Lehi described as on the basis of shared ideological principles.
Benny Morris
(01:58:03)
They didn’t share ideological-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:58:03)
Well, they said they did.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:58:04)
They said it.
Benny Morris
(01:58:05)
They did revile-
Norman Finkelstein
(01:58:06)
Why are you doing these things? Of course, they said that.
Benny Morris
(01:58:06)
The Lehi was reviled by the majority-
Norman Finkelstein
(01:58:06)
You know the state, but you know the-
Benny Morris
(01:58:06)
The Lehi was reviled.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:58:11)
You know what the statement said on the basis of a shared ideology. Why do you say no?
Benny Morris
(01:58:19)
The Lehi people were Nazi, that you say?
Norman Finkelstein
(01:58:19)
I’m saying that they said-
Benny Morris
(01:58:23)
No, you’re saying that. Forget statements, you like to quote things, but where they-
Norman Finkelstein
(01:58:23)
I do like to quote things, it’s called facts.
Benny Morris
(01:58:30)
Where are the Lehi Nazis? That’s what I’m asking.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:58:32)
What did he just say?
Benny Morris
(01:58:33)
Some of them supported Stalin, incidentally.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:58:35)
He’s saying that the basis of the pact was there agreement on ideology.
Benny Morris
(01:58:38)
There wasn’t any pact. They suggested, they proposed an agreement.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:58:41)
Right, and what did the agreement say?
Benny Morris
(01:58:43)
They wanted arms against the British, that’s what they wanted.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:58:43)
What did the agreement say?
Mouin Rabbani
(01:58:46)
Well, that’s what Hajj Amin al-Husseini wanted also. That’s what-
Benny Morris
(01:58:49)
No, no, but they didn’t-
Mouin Rabbani
(01:58:50)
… Others in India-
Benny Morris
(01:58:50)
Lehi people didn’t work in Berlin helping the Nazi regime.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:58:54)
It’s what the IRA wanted also.
Benny Morris
(01:58:56)
No, but this is what Hajj Amin al-Husseini did. You know that he was an antisemite. You’ve probably read some of his works. He wasn’t just anti-British.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:58:56)
Yes, and-
Benny Morris
(01:59:05)
He was also antisemitic. He had a common ground with Hitler. It’s as simple as that.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:59:05)
I think we can agree-
Norman Finkelstein
(01:59:11)
Not every antisemite is a Hitlerite.
Mouin Rabbani
(01:59:12)
I think we could-
Norman Finkelstein
(01:59:13)
That part-
Steven Bonnell
(01:59:14)
He literally worked with the Nazis to recruit people. He wasn’t just a guy posting or-
Norman Finkelstein
(01:59:18)
And he was an absolutely revolting, disgusting human being-
Benny Morris
(01:59:22)
There’s something happening here.
Steven Bonnell
(01:59:24)
But the problem is you’re saying that Husseini was his influence… You’re saying the move [inaudible 01:59:28]-
Norman Finkelstein
(01:59:28)
I don’t even understand, of all the crimes you want to ascribe to the Palestinian people, trying to blame them directly-indirectly, indirectly, or indirectly, three times the move for the Nazi Holocaust is completely lunatic.
Steven Bonnell
(01:59:46)
Hold on. Wait, he’s not blaming them for the Holocaust. He’s saying that from the perspective-
Norman Finkelstein
(01:59:50)
Of course he-
Benny Morris
(01:59:50)
No, no, no.
Steven Bonnell
(01:59:50)
Wait, wait, wait, no, he’s saying that from the perspective of Jews in the region, Palestinians would’ve been part of the-
Norman Finkelstein
(01:59:55)
That’s not what he’s saying.
Steven Bonnell
(01:59:56)
That is exactly what he said.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:59:57)
You have not read him. I’ve read him.
Steven Bonnell
(01:59:57)
You’ve read him and you don’t understand him.
Norman Finkelstein
(01:59:57)
You’ve read-
Steven Bonnell
(01:59:59)
He’s right here.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:00:00)
Believe me, I’m a lot more literate than you, Mr. Barelli.
Steven Bonnell
(02:00:00)
I’m going to believe the guy that wrote the stuff.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:00:00)
You read what Wikipedia said.
Steven Bonnell
(02:00:08)
That’s great, and you don’t even speak Hebrew and you call yourself an Israeli historian.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:00:11)
[inaudible 02:00:11].
Steven Bonnell
(02:00:10)
[inaudible 02:00:10] different grounds.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:00:12)
If I can just respond to you-
Steven Bonnell
(02:00:13)
No, no, I’m just saying that there were two tricks-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:00:16)
You said nothing, as you always do.
Steven Bonnell
(02:00:17)
That’s fine. There were two tricks that are being played here that I think is interesting. One is, you guys claim that the Lehi was trying to forge an alliance with Nazi Germany because of a shared ideology.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:00:25)
That’s what they said.
Steven Bonnell
(02:00:26)
Yeah, but hold on. No, no, no, no, wait, wait, wait, no, no, it’s about what you said. You brought that up to imply that Zionism must be inexorably linked-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:00:33)
That’s a fact.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:00:33)
I’m sorry. No, you’re putting words in my mouth.
Steven Bonnell
(02:00:36)
Wait. Well, then what was the purpose of saying that the Lehi claimed that… The Lehi, who were a small group of people that were reviled by many in Israel [inaudible 02:00:44]-
Benny Morris
(02:00:43)
Not many, by everybody practically. They were called terrorists.
Steven Bonnell
(02:00:47)
[inaudible 02:00:47].
Benny Morris
(02:00:46)
The Zionist movement called them terrorists.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:00:49)
Yes and [inaudible 02:00:51]-
Benny Morris
(02:00:51)
And hunted them.
Steven Bonnell
(02:00:52)
[inaudible 02:00:52] shared ideology come?
Mouin Rabbani
(02:00:52)
Shamir called himself a terrorist. They were so irrelevant that their leader ended up being kicked upstairs to the leader of the Israeli parliament-
Benny Morris
(02:01:00)
That’s Israeli [inaudible 02:01:02] in.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:01:03)
… To Israeli foreign minister-
Steven Bonnell
(02:01:04)
And Begin was also a part-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:01:06)
Yes, you want to characterize him as irrelevant as well, go ahead.
Steven Bonnell
(02:01:09)
No, characterize him as relevant or irrelevant based on what happens decades later. The timeline matters. The question is, what is the point of saying that the Lehi tried to forge an alliance with Nazi Germany based on [inaudible 02:01:19]?
Norman Finkelstein
(02:01:19)
[inaudible 02:01:19] the fact that it’s relevant is bringing up the mufti of Jerusalem and trying to blame the Holocaust [inaudible 02:01:25]-
Steven Bonnell
(02:01:25)
No one [inaudible 02:01:26] Holocaust [inaudible 02:01:28].
Benny Morris
(02:01:29)
The mufti was the leader of the Palestine Arab National Movement. The Lehi was 300 people.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:01:32)
And he had as much to do with the Nazi Holocaust as I did.
Benny Morris
(02:01:35)
No, he recruited people for the SS. How can you get away from that?
Norman Finkelstein
(02:01:39)
No, he recruited soldiers in the Balkans, mostly Kosovars, which was disgusting. I have no doubt about that, but he had one [inaudible 02:01:50]-
Benny Morris
(02:01:49)
He was [inaudible 02:01:50] plenty with the foreign ministers saying, “Don’t let the Jews out.”
Norman Finkelstein
(02:01:54)
[inaudible 02:01:54].
Mouin Rabbani
(02:01:54)
Can I say-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:01:55)
[inaudible 02:01:55].
Benny Morris
(02:01:55)
The Italian foreign minister receive letters from Husseini during the Holocaust, “Don’t let the Jews out.” I’m not saying he was a major architect of the Holocaust.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:02:08)
He wasn’t even minor, one sentence.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:02:11)
If we’re agreed, that Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, collaborated with the Nazis during World War II and actively sought their sponsorship, why is it irrelevant-
Benny Morris
(02:02:24)
And probably wanted the destruction of European jury.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:02:26)
He probably wanted a lot of things.
Benny Morris
(02:02:28)
Okay.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:02:30)
If that’s relevant, why is it irrelevant that a prime minister of Israel-
Benny Morris
(02:02:36)
Not prime minister. In 1941, he wasn’t prime minister of Israel. He was a leader of a very small terrorist group.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:02:42)
So do you contend-
Benny Morris
(02:02:44)
Denounced as terrorist by the mainstream of Zionism.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:02:46)
Do you consider it irrelevant that many years ago, Mahmoud Abbas wrote a doctoral thesis, which is basically tantamount-
Benny Morris
(02:02:53)
Show me something about Mahmoud Abbas, but I didn’t bring it up, you’re the one who’s bringing it up.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:02:56)
Yes, do you consider that [inaudible 02:02:58]-
Benny Morris
(02:02:58)
Belittling the Holocaust, that’s what you’re saying. The president of the Palestinian National Authority belittled the Holocaust saying it didn’t happen, or only a few Jews died.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:03:07)
I think that’s a fair characterization of Mahmoud Abbas.
Benny Morris
(02:03:10)
But I didn’t bring it up.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:03:10)
I brought it up because my question is, then why is Shamir’s antecedence irrelevant?
Benny Morris
(02:03:18)
He was a terrorist leader of a very small, marginal group-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:03:23)
Who became-
Benny Morris
(02:03:23)
Hajj Amin al-Husseini was the head of the movement at the time. There’s no comparison.
Steven Bonnell
(02:03:25)
Also, the point of bringing Husseini-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:03:25)
There’s no-
Steven Bonnell
(02:03:29)
The point of bringing up Husseini’s stuff wasn’t to say that he was a great further of the Holocaust, it’s that he might’ve been a great further in the prevention of Jews fleeing to go to Palestine to escape the Holocaust.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:03:29)
Yes, but the point I made-
Steven Bonnell
(02:03:37)
That was the point.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:03:38)
And I explained why I think that’s not an entirely accurate characterization. And then I wanted to make another point, if it’s legitimate to bring up his role during World War II, why is it illegitimate to bring up a man who would become Israel’s speaker of parliament, foreign minister? And also-
Benny Morris
(02:04:05)
He was a young terrorist.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:04:06)
And was also responsible for the murder of the United Nations’ first international envoy, Folke Bernadotte, why is all that irrelevant? I don’t understand.
Steven Bonnell
(02:04:16)
I think that the reason why he was brought up was because Jewish people in this time period would’ve viewed it as there was a prevention of Jews leaving Europe because of the Palestinians pressuring the British to put a curb that 75,000 immigration limit, yes, but it’s not about them furthering the Holocaust or being an architect, major, minor player in the Holocaust. He was a major player in that region, so if you wanted to bring up-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:04:40)
Benny Morris made the specific claim that the Palestinians played an indirect role in the Holocaust.
Steven Bonnell
(02:04:47)
The indirect role would’ve been the prevention of people escaping from Europe.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:04:51)
Yes, and my response to that is, first of all, I disagree with that characterization, but second of all-
Benny Morris
(02:04:59)
How can you disagree with that? They forced the British to prevent immigration of Jews from Europe and reaching safe shores in Palestine. That’s what they did, and they knew that the Jews were being persecuted in Europe.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:05:10)
Was Palestine the only spot of land on Earth?
Benny Morris
(02:05:14)
Yes, basically that was the problem. The Jews couldn’t immigrate anywhere else.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:05:17)
What about your great friends in Britain, the architects of the Balfour Declaration?
Benny Morris
(02:05:22)
By the late 1930s, they weren’t-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:05:22)
What about the United States?
Benny Morris
(02:05:24)
… Happy to take in Jews and the Americans weren’t happy to take in Jews.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:05:27)
And why are Palestinians, who were not Europeans, who had zero role in the rise of Nazism, who had no relation to any of this, why are they somehow uniquely responsible for what happened in Europe and uniquely culpable?
Benny Morris
(02:05:41)
[inaudible 02:05:41] the only safe haven for Jews, that’s all.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:05:43)
Oh, really? The United States wasn’t a potential safe haven? The only one was Palestine.
Benny Morris
(02:05:43)
At the time.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:05:50)
The United States had no room from the Atlantic to the Pacific for Jews?
Benny Morris
(02:05:55)
It did have room, but it didn’t want Jews.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:05:56)
So, that wasn’t the only safe haven.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:05:59)
Shouldn’t you be focusing your anger and outrage-
Benny Morris
(02:06:02)
America should be blamed for not letting Jews in during the ’30s and ’40s.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:06:05)
They are blamed, but nobody blames them for the Holocaust.
Benny Morris
(02:06:08)
Well, indirectly-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:06:09)
I’ve never heard it said that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was indirectly responsible for the Holocaust. I never heard that. Now, maybe it’s in Israeli literature because the Israelis have gone mad. Yes, your prime minister said the whole idea of the gas chambers came from the mufti of Jerusalem.
Benny Morris
(02:06:28)
That’s nonsense. We all know that’s nonsense.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:06:30)
But we also know that Netanyahu said it.
Benny Morris
(02:06:34)
Netanyahu says so many things, which are absurd [inaudible 02:06:36]-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:06:36)
And he happens to be the prime minister [inaudible 02:06:38]-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:06:38)
[inaudible 02:06:38] serving prime minister of Israel.
Benny Morris
(02:06:38)
I can’t be responsible-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:06:41)
You’re not responsible for them, but it is relevant that he’s the longest serving prime minister of Israel.
Benny Morris
(02:06:46)
Unfortunately, it says something about the Israeli public, I agree.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:06:49)
Yes, and he gets elected, not despite saying such things, but because he says such.
Benny Morris
(02:06:54)
His voters don’t care about Hajj Amin al-Husseini or Hitler, they know nothing about…
Mouin Rabbani
(02:06:59)
They will be [inaudible 02:07:00].
Benny Morris
(02:07:00)
His base know nothing about anything, and he can say what he likes and they’ll say yes, or they don’t care if he says these things.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:07:06)
You may well be right, but anyway, not to beat a dead horse, but I still don’t understand-
Benny Morris
(02:07:12)
Let’s not beat a dead horse, you’re right.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:07:14)
I’ll just conclude by saying I don’t understand why the Mufti of Jerusalem is relevant-
Benny Morris
(02:07:18)
He is relevant, but-
Benny Morris
(02:07:19)
The head of the national-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:07:19)
… Yitzhak Shamir is not relevant?
Benny Morris
(02:07:24)
Shamir wasn’t the head of the national movement. He represented 100 or 200 or 300 gunmen who were considered terrorists by the Zionist movement at the time. The fact that 30 years later he becomes prime minister, that’s the crux of history.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:07:38)
And his history is not-
Benny Morris
(02:07:39)
Hajj Amin al-Husseini was the head of the Palestine Arab National Movement at the time.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:07:42)
Anyway-
Benny Morris
(02:07:43)
What can you do?
Mouin Rabbani
(02:07:44)
I think we’re speaking past each other and I’ll leave it there.
Benny Morris
(02:07:45)
We’re not, I’m talking facts.

October 7

Lex Fridman
(02:07:48)
Let’s move to the modern day and we’ll return to history, maybe ’67 and other important moments, but let’s look to today, in the recent months, October 7th. Let me ask sort of a pointed question. Was October 7th attacks by Hamas on Israel genocidal? Was it an act of ethnic cleansing? Just so we lay out the moral calculus that we are engaged in, maybe-
Benny Morris
(02:08:15)
The problem with October 7th is this, the Hamas fighters who invaded Southern Israel were sent, ordered to murder, rape, and do all the nasty things that they did, and they killed some 1,200 Israelis that day and abducted them as we know, something like 250, mostly civilians, also some soldiers, took them back to dungeons in Gaza, but they were motivated not just by the words of their current leader in the Gaza Strip, but by their ideology, which is embedded in their charter from 1988, if I remember correctly, and that charter is genocidal. It says that the Jews must be eradicated basically from the land of Israel, from Palestine. The Jews are described there as sons of apes and pigs. The Jews are a base people, killers of prophets, and they should not exist in Palestine. It doesn’t say that they necessarily should be murdered all around the world, the Hamas charter, but certainly the Jews should be eliminated from Palestine.

(02:09:28)
And this is the driving ideology behind the massacre of the Jews on October 7th, which brought down on the Gaza Strip, and I think with the intention by the Hamas of the Israeli counter offensive because they knew that that counter offensive would result in many Palestinian dead because the Hamas fighters and their weaponry and so on were embedded in the population in Gaza, and they hoped to benefit from this in the eyes of world public opinion as Israel chased these Hamas people and their ammunition dumps and so on and killed lots of Palestinian civilians in the process. All of this was understood by Sinwar, by the head of the Hamas, and he strived for that, but initially he wanted to kill as many Jews as he could in the border areas around the Gaza Strip.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:10:18)
I’ll respond directly to the points you made, and then I’ll leave it to Norm to bring in the historical context. That Hamas charter is from the ’90s, I think?
Benny Morris
(02:10:30)
1988.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:10:31)
1988, so it’s from the ’80s. I think your characterization of that charter as antisemitic is indisputable. I think your characterization of that charter as genocidal is off the mark.
Benny Morris
(02:10:51)
It’s implicit.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:10:52)
And more importantly, that charter has been superseded by a new charter. In fact, it has been… Well, there is-
Benny Morris
(02:11:01)
There is no new charter. There is an explanation, a statement [inaudible 02:11:06]-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:11:01)
2018, a political statement.
Benny Morris
(02:11:06)
2000 and something.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:11:07)
2018.
Benny Morris
(02:11:09)
2018, supposedly clarifying things which are in the charter, but it doesn’t actually step back from what the charter says, eliminate Israel, eliminate the Jews from the land of Israel.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:11:18)
In 2018, the Hamas charter, if we look at the current version of the charter-
Benny Morris
(02:11:23)
It’s not called a charter. You’re calling it a charter. It wasn’t. The only thing called the charter is what was issued in 1988 by Yassin himself.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:11:30)
Anyway, it makes a clear distinction between Jews and Zionists in 2018. Now, you can choose to dismiss it, believe it, it’s sincere, it’s insincere, whatever-
Benny Morris
(02:11:43)
Insincere is probably the right word.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:11:45)
Secondly, I’m really unfamiliar with fighters who consult these kinds of documents before they go on-
Benny Morris
(02:11:54)
They’re brought up on this in their education system. In the kindergarten, they’re told, “Kill the Jews.” They practice with make-believe guns and uniforms when they’re five years old in the kindergartens of the Hamas-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:12:05)
At the instruction of the commissioner-general of UNRWA, right?
Benny Morris
(02:12:08)
I didn’t say that. I said the Hamas has kindergartens and summer camps in which they trained to kill Jews, children aged five and six.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:12:16)
Secondly, you keep saying Jews, to which I would respond-
Benny Morris
(02:12:20)
They use the word Jews.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:12:21)
To which I would respond that Hamas does not have a record of deliberately targeting Jews who are not Israelis. And in fact, it also doesn’t have a record of deliberately targeting either Jews or Israelis outside Israel and Palestine, so all this talk of-
Benny Morris
(02:12:41)
Unlike the Hezbollah, which has started targeting Jews outside of Palestine.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:12:46)
We’re talking about October 7th and Hamas. If you’d also like to speak about Hezbollah, let’s get to that separately if you don’t mind. So again, genocidal, well, if that term is going to be discussed, my first response would be let’s talk about potentially genocidal actions against Israelis rather than against Jews for the reasons that I just mentioned. And again, I find this constant conflation of Jews, Israel, Zionism, to be a bit disturbing.

(02:13:23)
Secondly, I think there are quite a few indications in the factual record that raise serious questions about the accusations of the genocidal intent and genocidal practice of what happened on October 7th. And my final point would be, I don’t think I should take your word for it, I don’t think you should take my word for it. I think what we need here is a proper independent international investigation, and the reason we need that-
Benny Morris
(02:13:57)
Of what?
Mouin Rabbani
(02:13:57)
Of genocide during this conflict, whether by Palestinians on October 7th or Israel thereafter, and the reason that we need such an investigation is because Hamas is… There won’t be any hearings on what Hamas did on October 7th at the International Court of Justice because the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide deals only with states and not with movements. I think the international criminal court, and specifically its current prosecutor, Karim Khan lacks any and all credibility. He’s been an absolute failure at his job. He’s just been sitting his backside for years on this file. And I think I would point out that Hamas has called for independent investigations of all these allegations. Israel has categorically rejected any international investigation, of course, fully supported by the United States. And I think what is required is to have credible investigations of these things because I don’t think you’re going to convince me, I don’t think I’m going to convince you, and this is two people sitting across the table from each other.
Benny Morris
(02:15:14)
No, there’s certain things you don’t even have to investigate. You know how many citizens, civilians died in the October 7th assault-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:15:21)
Yes, but that’s not-
Benny Morris
(02:15:22)
You know that there are lots of allegations of rape. I don’t know how persuaded you are of those. They did find bodies without heads, which is-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:15:30)
There were no beheadings of infants.
Benny Morris
(02:15:32)
There were some beheadings, apparently.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:15:34)
The Israelis didn’t even claim that in the document they submitted before the ICJ. Go read what your government submitted. It never mentioned beheadings.
Benny Morris
(02:15:43)
Well, as far as I know, there were some people who were beheaded, but-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:15:46)
We could bring it up right now.
Benny Morris
(02:15:47)
You also deny that there were rapes there.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:15:49)
I didn’t deny. I said I’ve not seen convincing evidence that confirms it. I’ve said that from day one, and I’ll say it today, four and a half months later.
Benny Morris
(02:15:58)
Do you know that they killed eight or 900 civilians in their assault?
Norman Finkelstein
(02:16:01)
Absolutely, that seems to me indisputable.
Benny Morris
(02:16:00)
… 900 civilians in the assault-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:16:01)
Absolutely. That seems to me indisputable.
Benny Morris
(02:16:04)
Oh, okay. Well, I’m glad that you’re considering something-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:16:07)
I’ve said that from day one.
Steven Bonnell
(02:16:08)
Well, to be clear, you haven’t. You did a debate… I don’t remember the talk show, but you seemed to imply that there was a lot of crossfire and then it might’ve been the IDF that had killed a lot of-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:16:15)
I said that there is no question because the names were published in Haaretz. There is no question that roughly of the 1200 people killed, 800 of them were civilians-
Benny Morris
(02:16:16)
850.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:16:29)
850, fine. So I never said that, but then I said, “No, we don’t know exactly how they were killed.” But 800 civilians killed, no, 850, no question there. And I also said on repeated occasions, there cannot be any doubt, in my opinion as of now with the available evidence, that Hamas was responsible for significant atrocities, and I made sure to include the plural.
Steven Bonnell
(02:16:54)
There’s a lot of tricky language being employed here. Do you think of the 850-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:16:57)
There’s nothing tricky. It’s called attaching value to words and not talking like a motormouth. I am very careful about qualifying because that’s what language is about.
Steven Bonnell
(02:17:09)
That’s great. Then let me just ask a clarifying question, do you firmly believe that the majority of the 850 civilians were killed by Hamas?
Norman Finkelstein
(02:17:15)
My view is, even if it were half, 400 is a huge number by any reckoning-
Benny Morris
(02:17:26)
Why-
Steven Bonnell
(02:17:26)
Okay, wait. You didn’t-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:17:27)
I said even if-
Steven Bonnell
(02:17:28)
Wait, wait, wait-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:17:29)
Because Benny, because Professor Morris, I don’t know. I agree with Mouin Rabbani, I’m not sure if he concedes the 400. I’ll say-
Benny Morris
(02:17:40)
Why 400? Whoever thought up the number, 400? 800 of the 850 were slaughtered by Hamas. Maybe a couple of individuals were killed in Israeli action-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:17:51)
I don’t know. Professor Morris-
Steven Bonnell
(02:17:53)
You’re saying from day one, you believed this particular thing, and you clearly don’t. You clearly don’t believe this thing-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:17:53)
I said from day one day one-
Steven Bonnell
(02:18:00)
You said people died. That’s not controversial-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:18:02)
Wait. Hold on, hold on. If I may-
Steven Bonnell
(02:18:03)
That’s not controversial.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:18:05)
Mr. Bonnell, I attach value to words-
Steven Bonnell
(02:18:12)
Yes, you’ve said that. If you value them, stop repeating them so much.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:18:13)
Mr. Bonnell, please slow down the speech and attempt to listen. When I was explicitly asked by Piers Morgan, I said there can be no question that Hamas committed atrocities-
Steven Bonnell
(02:18:26)
Committed atrocities. I’ve heard this, yes.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:18:27)
… on October 7th. If you want me to pin down a number, I can’t do that-
Steven Bonnell
(02:18:34)
I didn’t ask you to pin down a number. You can listen to what I’m-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:18:36)
You didn’t ask me?
Steven Bonnell
(02:18:36)
No. My question is-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:18:37)
Okay.
Steven Bonnell
(02:18:37)
I’ll ask a very precise-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:18:39)
Mr. Bonnell, I cannot speak to you because you’re not-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:18:39)
Sorry, excuse me-
Steven Bonnell
(02:18:40)
It’s a very easy question-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:18:42)
If I understood your question correctly-
Steven Bonnell
(02:18:43)
My question is, do you think the majority of the people that were killed on October 7th, the civilians, were killed by Hamas, or are we subscribing to the idea that the IDF killed hundreds, four or 500 in the crossfire?
Mouin Rabbani
(02:18:51)
No, but let me explain why that’s a difficult question to answer. The total number of civilians killed was 800, 850. We know that Hamas is responsible, probably for the majority of those killings. We also know that there were killings by Islamic Jihad. We also know-
Benny Morris
(02:19:13)
No, we’re Bunching together the Islamic Jihad and Hamas. That’s splitting hairs now-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:19:16)
But his question was specifically about-
Benny Morris
(02:19:16)
No, but he means the raiders. He means the raiders.
Steven Bonnell
(02:19:20)
I’m speaking in opposition to the conspiracy theory that people like… Do you prefer Norm or Professor Finkelstein? I don’t know, how do you prefer to be addressed?
Mouin Rabbani
(02:19:29)
Well, it’s not a conspiracy theory there because it’s-
Steven Bonnell
(02:19:30)
Well, the conspiracy theory is the idea that the IDF killed the majority of them.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:19:33)
It’s not a conspiracy theory-
Steven Bonnell
(02:19:34)
And there is also a theory that, as Norm pointed out on the show that he was on, that he thought that it was very strange that, given how reputable Israeli services are when it comes to sending ambulances, retrieving bodies, he thought it was very strange that that number was continually being adjusted-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:19:49)
Yeah, I did find it-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:19:50)
And do you know why-
Steven Bonnell
(02:19:50)
So when you say that in combination with, “Well, I’m not sure how many were killed by Hamas and the IDF-“
Mouin Rabbani
(02:19:54)
Do you know why the number went down? The number went down because the Israeli authorities were in possession of 200 corpses that were burned to a crisp that they assumed were Israelis who had been killed on October 7th. They later determined that these were in fact Palestinian fighters. Now, how does a Palestinian fighter get burned to a crisp?
Benny Morris
(02:20:21)
No, you’re mixing two things. Some of the bodies, they weren’t able to identify, and eventually they ruled that some of them were actually Arab marauders rather than Israeli victims. A few of them also of the Jews were burnt to a crisp and it took them time to work this out, and they came out initially with a slightly higher figure, 1,400 dead, and eventually reduced it to 1,200 dead Israelis-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:20:45)
And the reason is that a proportion of Israeli civilians killed on October 7th… I don’t believe it was a majority. We don’t know how many. Some were killed in the crossfire, some were killed by Israeli shellfire, helicopter fire and so on, and the majority were killed by Palestinians. And of that majority, we don’t know… Again, I understood your question is referring specifically to Hamas, which is why I tried to answer it that way. But if you meant generically Palestinians, yes. If you mean specifically Hamas, we don’t have a clear breakdown of how many were-
Steven Bonnell
(02:21:25)
No, I don’t mean specifically Hamas. But I just think when you use the word some, that’s doing a lot of heavy lifting.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:21:29)
Who used some?
Steven Bonnell
(02:21:30)
That’s fine. But some can mean anywhere from 1% to 49%-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:21:33)
Who used some?
Mouin Rabbani
(02:21:33)
But we don’t know.
Lex Fridman
(02:21:34)
So the numbers here in the details are interesting and important almost from a legal perspective, but if we zoom out, the moral perspective, are Palestinians from Gaza justified in violent resistance?
Mouin Rabbani
(02:21:47)
Well, Palestinians have the right to resistance. That right includes the right to armed resistance. At the same time, armed resistance is subject to the laws of war, and there are very clear regulations that separate legitimate acts of armed resistance from acts of armed resistance that are not legitimate-
Lex Fridman
(02:22:13)
The attacks of October 7th, where do they land for you?
Mouin Rabbani
(02:22:16)
There’s been almost exclusive focus on the attacks on civilian population centers and the killings of civilians on October 7th. What is much less discussed to the point of amnesia is that there were very extensive attacks on Israeli military and intelligence facilities on October 7th. I would make a very clear distinction between those two. And secondly, I’m not sure that I would characterize the efforts by Palestinians on October 7th to seize Israeli territory and Israeli population centers as in and of themselves illegitimate.
Benny Morris
(02:23:11)
You mean attacking Israeli civilians is legitimate?
Mouin Rabbani
(02:23:14)
No. That’s not what I said.
Benny Morris
(02:23:15)
I didn’t understand what you said.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:23:16)
I think what you had on October 7th was an effort by Hamas to seize Israeli territory and population centers-
Benny Morris
(02:23:24)
And kill civilians.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:23:25)
That’s not what I said. What I said is, I would not describe the effort to seize Israeli territory as in and of itself illegitimate, as a separate issue from the killing of Israeli civilians in those cases where they had been deliberately targeted. That’s very clearly illegitimate.
Benny Morris
(02:23:46)
Whole families were slaughtered in kibbutzim, many of them left-wingers incidentally who helped Palestinians go to hospitals in Israel and so on, even drove Palestinian cancer patients to hospitals in Israeli-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:24:00)
Again, I’m making a distinction here-
Benny Morris
(02:24:01)
But you don’t seem to be very condemnatory of what the Hamas did.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:24:04)
Well, I don’t do selective condemnation-
Benny Morris
(02:24:06)
I’m not talking about selective. I’m talking about-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:24:07)
I don’t do selective outrage.
Benny Morris
(02:24:09)
… specific condemnation of this specific assault on civilians. I would, for example, condemn Israeli assaults on civilians, deliberate assaults on civilians. I would condemn them, but you’re not doing that with the Hamas.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:24:22)
You know what the issue is?
Benny Morris
(02:24:23)
What?
Mouin Rabbani
(02:24:24)
I’ve been speaking in public now, I would say since the late-1980s and interviewed and so on. I have never on one occasion ever been asked to condemn any Israeli act. When I’ve been in group discussions, those supporting the Israeli action or perspective, I have never encountered an example where these individuals are asked to condemn what Israel is doing. The demand and obligation of condemnation is exclusively applied, in my personal experience over decades, is exclusively applied to Palestinians-
Benny Morris
(02:25:03)
No, this is [inaudible 02:25:04] Israel is condemned day and night on every television channel, and has been for the last-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:25:10)
I’m telling you about personal experience lasting decades-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:25:13)
You said quote-
Steven Bonnell
(02:25:14)
Uh-oh. Oh, no.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:25:16)
I’m trying to quote what you just said. You said-
Benny Morris
(02:25:18)
I shouldn’t have said anything at any [inaudible 02:25:20]
Norman Finkelstein
(02:25:21)
Professor Morris?
Benny Morris
(02:25:22)
Yes.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:25:23)
You just said, “I would condemn anytime Israel deliberately attacks civilians.” The problem, Professor Morris, is, over and over again, you claim in the face of overwhelming evidence that they didn’t attack civilians-
Benny Morris
(02:25:48)
That’s not true. I’ve said Israel has attacked civilians. In [inaudible 02:25:51] Israel attacked civilians, and I’ve written extensively about it. In Kfar Qasim, they killed civilians, and I’ve written that. So you’re just admitting you’re selecting… As Steven says, you cherry-pick. You cherry-pick.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:26:06)
Okay, let’s fast-forward. When you were an adult, what did you say about the 1982 Lebanon War?
Benny Morris
(02:26:14)
What did I say?
Norman Finkelstein
(02:26:15)
You don’t remember? Okay, allow me.
Steven Bonnell
(02:26:17)
Uh-oh.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:26:18)
Okay. So it happens that I had no interest in the Israel-Palestine conflict as a young man-
Benny Morris
(02:26:30)
This is true.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:26:31)
… until the 1982 Lebanon War.
Benny Morris
(02:26:34)
Yep. He’s lost the passage-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:26:36)
I’ll find it.
Steven Bonnell
(02:26:36)
Okay, real quick while he’s searching for that, you bring up something that’s really important that a lot of people don’t draw a distinction between, in that there is just causes for war and there is just ways to act within a war, and these two things principally do have a distinction from one another.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:26:50)
Correct.
Steven Bonnell
(02:26:50)
However, while I appreciate the recognition of the distinction, the idea that the cause for war that Hamas was engaged in, if we look at their actions in war or the statements that they’ve made, it doesn’t seem like it had to do with the territorial acquisition.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:27:04)
No, no, no-
Steven Bonnell
(02:27:06)
By taking land back.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:27:07)
No, the point I was making was, what was Hamas trying to achieve militarily on October 7th? And I was pointing out that the focus has been very much on Hamas attacks on civilians and atrocities and so on. And I’m not saying those things should be ignored. What I’m saying is that what’s getting lost in the shuffle is that there were extensive attacks on military and intelligence facilities. And as far as the other aspects are concerned, because I think either you or Lex asked me about the legitimacy of these attacks, I said I’m unclear whether efforts by Hamas to seize Israeli population centers in and of themselves are illegitimate as opposed to actions that either deliberately targeted Israeli civilians or actions that should reasonably have been expected to result in the killings of Israeli civilians. Those strike me as, by definition, illegitimate, and I want to be very clear about that. I have-
Benny Morris
(02:28:24)
Illegitimate means you condemn them?
Mouin Rabbani
(02:28:26)
Illegitimate means they are not legitimate. I have a problem-
Benny Morris
(02:28:30)
Condemning your side, yes.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:28:31)
No, not condemning my side. I have a problem with selective outrage and I have a problem with selective condemnation. And as I explained to you a few minutes ago, in my decades of appearing in public and being interviewed, I have never been asked to condemn an Israeli action, I’ve never been asked for a moral judgment on an Israeli action. Exclusive requests for condemnation has to do with what Palestinians [inaudible 02:29:01] And just as importantly, I’m sure if you watch BBC or CNN, when is the last time an Israeli spokesperson has been asked to condemn an Israeli act? I’ve never seen it.
Steven Bonnell
(02:29:14)
I don’t think we condemn the Arab side either though, right? I don’t think there’s any condemnation-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:29:18)
No. But now that we’re talking about Israeli victims, all of a sudden morality is central-
Steven Bonnell
(02:29:22)
Well, I think the reason why it comes up is because there’s no shortage of international condemnation for Israel. As Norm will point out a million times, that there are 50 billion UN resolutions, you’ve got Amnesty International, you’ve got multiple bodies of the UN, you’ve got now this case for the ICJ. So there’s no question of if there’s condemnation for Israel-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:29:36)
But sorry, if I can interrupt you, in 1948, the entire world stood behind the establishment of a Jewish state, and the entire world-
Benny Morris
(02:29:46)
No, except Arab states and the Muslim states. Not the entire world.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:29:48)
Okay, but I think you know what I mean by that.
Benny Morris
(02:29:50)
The Western democracies, that’s what you’re saying. Western democracies supported the establishment of Israel.
Steven Bonnell
(02:29:56)
My quick question was, you said that you believe that… This is a very short one, you don’t have to… You think that there’s an argument to be made that the people in Gaza, Hamas and Islamic Jihad or whoever participated had a just cause for war. Maybe they didn’t do it in the correct way, but they maybe had a just cause for war, which is-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:30:09)
I don’t think there’s a maybe there. The Palestinians have-
Steven Bonnell
(02:30:11)
Okay, you think they absolutely had a just cause for it.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:30:11)
Yes.
Steven Bonnell
(02:30:13)
Do you think that Israel has a just cause for Operation Swords of Iron?
Mouin Rabbani
(02:30:16)
No, of course not.
Steven Bonnell
(02:30:18)
All right. You can say your quote.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:30:20)
Okay. First of all, on this issue of double standards, which is the one that irks or irritates Mouin, you said that you are not a person of double standards, unlike people like Mouin. You hold high a single standard and you condemn deliberate Israeli attacks on-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:30:46)
Civilians.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:30:47)
… civilians. And I would say that’s true for the period up till 1967, and I think it’s accurate, your account of the First Intifada. There, it seems to me you are in conformity with most mainstream accounts and the case of the First Intifada. Surprisingly, you used Arab human rights sources like Al-Haq, which I think Mouin worked for during the First Intifada. That’s true. But then something very strange happens, so let’s illustrate it-
Benny Morris
(02:31:28)
Wait, the something strange which happened is the Arabs rejected Israel’s peace offers-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:31:34)
Okay, wait.
Benny Morris
(02:31:34)
That’s what happened.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:31:34)
By accepting the Oslo agreements.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:31:35)
Yeah.
Benny Morris
(02:31:35)
Not the-
Steven Bonnell
(02:31:36)
By rejecting… He’s talking about Camp David and Taba.
Benny Morris
(02:31:36)
I’m talking about Camp David.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:31:39)
If we have time, I know the record very well, I’d be very happy to go through it with you, but let’s get to those double standards. So, this is what you have to say about Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. You said, “Israel was reluctant to harm civilians, sought to avoid casualties on both sides, and took care not to harm Lebanese and Palestinian civilians.” You then went on to acknowledge the massive use of IDF firepower against civilians during the Siege of Beirut which traumatized Israeli society. Morris quickly enters the caveat that Israel “tried to pinpoint military targets, but inevitably many civilians were hit.”

(02:32:39)
That’s your description of the Lebanon War. As I say, that’s when I first got involved in the conflict. I am a voracious reader. I read everything on the Lebanon War. I would say there’s not a single account of the Lebanon War in which the estimates are between 15 and 20,000 Palestinian, Lebanese were killed, overwhelmingly civilians, the biggest bloodletting until the current Gaza genocide. Biggest bloodletting. I would say I can’t think of a single mainstream account that remotely approximates what you just said. So leaving aside… I can name the books. Voluminous, huge volumes. I’ll just take one example. Now you will remember, because I think you served in Lebanon in ’82. Am I correct on that?
Benny Morris
(02:33:39)
Yeah.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:33:40)
So you will remember that Dov Yermiya kept a war diary. So with your permission, allow me to describe what he wrote during his diary. He writes, “The war machine of the IDF is galloping and trampling over the conquered territory, demonstrating a total insensitivity to the fate of the Arabs who are found in its path. A PLO-run hospital suffered a direct hit. Thousands of refugees are returning to the city. When they arrive at their homes, many of which have been destroyed or damaged, you hear their cries of pain and their howls over the deaths of their loved ones. The air is permeated with the smell of corpses. Destruction and death are continuing-“
Benny Morris
(02:34:37)
Yeah, point made. The point you’re making actually-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:34:39)
Does that sound like your description of the Lebanon War?
Benny Morris
(02:34:42)
Forget my description-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:34:43)
Forget it?
Benny Morris
(02:34:44)
The point you’re making-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:34:44)
The words are in print. We can’t just forget them-
Benny Morris
(02:34:47)
Let me just finish my sentence. The point you’re making, which you somehow forget, is that there are Israelis who strongly criticize their own side and describe how Israelis are doing things which they regard as immoral. You don’t find that on the Arab sides-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:35:02)
I’m talking about you, Mr. Morris. I’m not talking about Dov Yermiya, I’m talking about you, the historian. How did you depict the Lebanon War?
Benny Morris
(02:35:12)
Because I believe that the Israeli military tried to avoid committing a civilian [inaudible 02:35:18] as I think they fail to do in Gaza now-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:35:22)
All the accounts by Robert Fisk in Pity the Nation-
Benny Morris
(02:35:24)
Robert Fisk is a anti-Zionist journalist-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:35:27)
I know.
Benny Morris
(02:35:28)
Has always been.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:35:29)
Right. So that’s why you can say with such confidence that you don’t condemn deliberate Israeli attacks on civilians-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:35:39)
Because there weren’t any.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:35:40)
… because there weren’t any.
Benny Morris
(02:35:41)
No, I didn’t say there weren’t any-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:35:42)
Yeah, you didn’t?
Benny Morris
(02:35:43)
You agreed that I have condemned Israeli attacks on civilians.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:35:47)
I never quarrel with facts. Your description of the 1982 War is so shocking, it makes my innards writhe. And then your description of the Second Intifada, your description of Defensive Shield, they were worse than apologetics-
Benny Morris
(02:36:06)
When Arab suicide bombers were destroying Jews in masses in buses and in restaurants, that’s the Second Intifada. Do you remember that?
Norman Finkelstein
(02:36:17)
You can try everything-
Benny Morris
(02:36:18)
Suicide bombers in Jerusalem’s buses and restaurants, and in Tel Aviv-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:36:21)
I am completely aware of that, but if you forgot the numbers-
Benny Morris
(02:36:26)
I don’t forget the numbers-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:36:26)
… it was three to one. The number-
Benny Morris
(02:36:29)
They killed mostly armed-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:36:31)
No-
Benny Morris
(02:36:31)
… Palestinian gunmen.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:36:33)
That’s what you say in your book-
Benny Morris
(02:36:35)
That’s what I say. That’s what I think.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:36:35)
… but that’s not what Amnesty International said. That’s not what Human Rights Watch said-
Benny Morris
(02:36:40)
I don’t remember what they said.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:36:42)
I do. That’s not what [inaudible 02:36:45] said-
Benny Morris
(02:36:45)
I don’t know whether their figures are right. My figures are right.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:36:47)
Listen, listen-
Benny Morris
(02:36:47)
In the Second Intifada, some 4,000 Palestinians were killed, most of them armed people. And 1,000 Israelis were killed, almost all of them [inaudible 02:36:59] civilians.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:36:59)
Professor Morris, fantasy, but I’m not going to argue with here. Here’s a simple challenge… You said not to look at the camera-
Lex Fridman
(02:37:07)
Sometimes.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:37:07)
It scares the people. I’ll make the open challenge.
Benny Morris
(02:37:10)
You are going to scare them.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:37:12)
No. Professor Morris-
Steven Bonnell
(02:37:13)
Open challenge.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:37:14)
… words are in print. I wrote 50 pages analyzing all of your work. I quote, some will say cherry-pick but I think, accurately quote you. Here’s a simple challenge. Answer me in print. Answer what I wrote and show where I’m making things up. Answer me in print-
Benny Morris
(02:37:39)
I’m not familiar. I’m sorry, but I’m not familiar with what you wrote.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:37:41)
That’s no problem. You’re a busy man, you’re an important historian. You don’t have to know everything that’s in print, especially by modest publishers. But now you know, and so here’s the public challenge. You answer and show where I cherry-picked, where I misrepresented-
Benny Morris
(02:38:02)
Send me the article, I will-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:38:03)
Fine, I will, and then we can have a civil scholarly discussion and-
Benny Morris
(02:38:08)
I’m not sure we will agree, even if I-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:38:09)
We don’t have to agree. It’s for the reader to decide, looking at both sides, where this truth stands.
Lex Fridman
(02:38:17)
Norman, and if I may ask, it’s good to discuss ideas that are in the air now as opposed to citing literature that was written in the past as much as possible, because of the listeners were not familiar with the literature. So whatever was written, just express it, condense the key idea, and then we can debate the ideas or discuss the ideas.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:38:36)
No, there are two aspects. There’s this public debate, but there’s also written words.
Lex Fridman
(02:38:42)
Yes. I’m just telling you that you as a academic historian put a lot of value in the written word and I think it is valuable, but in this context-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:38:51)
He’s incidentally not the only historian who puts value to words. I also do, actually. Just so we-
Lex Fridman
(02:38:53)
Yes, but in this-
Steven Bonnell
(02:38:55)
More than just one or two sentences at a time.
Lex Fridman
(02:38:58)
But in this context, just for the educational purpose of teaching people-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:39:02)
Well, the educational purpose is, why would people [inaudible 02:39:05] what I have to acknowledge? Because I am faithful to the facts. Massive atrocities on October 7th. Why did that happen? And I think that’s the problem, the past is erased and we suddenly went from 1948 to October 7th, 2023, and there is a problem there.
Lex Fridman
(02:39:30)
So first of all, you have complete freedom to backtrack and we’ll go there with you. Obviously we can’t cover every single year, every single event, but there’s probably critical moments in time.
Steven Bonnell
(02:39:39)
Can I respond to something relating to that, the Lebanon War? I looked at the book that he got this from and what the quote was from. It sounds cold to say it, but war is tragic and civilians die. There is no war that this has not happened in, in the history of all of humankind. The statement that Israel might take care not to target civilians is not incompatible with a diary entry from someone who said they saw civilians getting killed. I think that sometimes we do a lot of weird games when we talk about international humanitarian law or laws that govern conflict, but we say things like, civilians dying is a war crime, or civilian homes or hospitals getting destroyed is necessarily a war crime, or is necessarily somebody intentionally targeting civilians without making distinctions between military targets or civilian ones.

(02:40:21)
I think that when we analyze different attacks or when we talk about the conduct of the military, it’s important to understand, prospectively from the unit of analysis of the actual military committing the acts, what’s happening and what are the decisions being made rather than just saying retrospectively, “Oh, well, a lot of civilians died. Not very many military people died, comparatively speaking, so it must have been war crimes,” especially when you’ve got another side, I’ll fast-forward to Hamas, that intentionally attempts to induce those same civilian numbers, because Hamas is guilty of any war crime that you would potentially accuse. And this is according to the Amnesty International, people that Norm loves to cite, Hamas is guilty of all of these same war crimes, of them failing to take care of their civilian population, of them essentially utilizing human shields to try to fire rockets, free from attacks-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:41:06)
Essentially?
Steven Bonnell
(02:41:07)
Essentially, yes. I’m just saying that, essentially, as in terms of how international law defines it and not how Amnesty International defines it. But Amnesty International describes times of human shielding, but they don’t actually apply the correct international legal standard-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:41:18)
You don’t know what’s the correct international law-
Steven Bonnell
(02:41:19)
I know absolutely-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:41:20)
You haven’t a clue-
Steven Bonnell
(02:41:21)
No, I absolutely do-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:41:22)
You haven’t a clue because you can’t find it on Wikipedia. You can’t find it on Wikipedia-
Steven Bonnell
(02:41:24)
But I’m just saying… Believe it or not, Norm, the entire Geneva Convention is all on Wikipedia. It’s a wonderful website. But I’m just saying that on the Hamas side, if there’s an attempt to induce this type of military activity, attempt to induce civilian harm, that it’s not just enough to say, “Well, here’s a diary entry where a guy talks about how tragic these attacks are.”
Mouin Rabbani
(02:41:41)
See, I think the problem with your statement is that if you go back and listen to it, the first part of it is, war is hell, civilians die. It’s a fact of life. And you state that in a very factual matter. Then when you start talking about Hamas, all of a sudden you’ve discovered morality and you’ve discovered condemnation and you’ve discovered intent, and you are unfortunately far from alone in this. I’ll give you… You know who for me is a perfect example?
Steven Bonnell
(02:42:12)
Wait, hold on. We’re [inaudible 02:42:14]. We don’t need examples-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:42:16)
No… Oh, go ahead.
Steven Bonnell
(02:42:16)
The false equivalency of the two sides is astounding. When Hamas kills civilians in a surprise attack on October 7th, this isn’t because they are attempting to target military targets and they happen to stumble into a giant festival of people that-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:42:29)
Well, they did happen to stumble into it.
Steven Bonnell
(02:42:32)
They did, but-
Benny Morris
(02:42:32)
And they killed 300 people in the music festival-
Steven Bonnell
(02:42:33)
But when they stumbled into it, that wasn’t an issue of trying to figure out a military target or not. They weren’t failing a distinction. There wasn’t a proportionality assessment done. It was just to kill civilians. Even the Amnesty International in 2008 and in 2014, and even today, will continue to say that there’s likely types of attacks-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:42:47)
Look, I don’t think you’ll find anyone who will deny that Hamas has targeted civilians. You gave the example-
Steven Bonnell
(02:42:53)
But there’s a difference because-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:42:54)
… of suicide bombings during the Second Intifada. Facts are facts-
Steven Bonnell
(02:42:58)
Sure, but I’m just saying that the Hamas targeting of innocent civilians is different than the incidental loss of life that occurs when Israel does-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:43:04)
Whoa, the incidental loss of life-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:43:05)
Genocide is the intentional mass murder-
Steven Bonnell
(02:43:08)
Well, genocide is a entirely separate claim.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:43:10)
Yeah, but the idea that Israel is not in the business of intentionally targeting civilians, I know that’s what we’re supposed to believe, but the historical record stands pretty clearly-
Steven Bonnell
(02:43:25)
No, it doesn’t. I don’t believe it does.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:43:26)
You’ve written about it yourself-
Steven Bonnell
(02:43:27)
Well, when you say historical, do you mean in the ’40s to the ’60s, or do you mean over the past-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:43:31)
I would say from the ’30s of the last century to the ’20s of this century. The way you characterized it, I think the best example of that I’ve come across during this specific conflict is John Kirby, the White House spokesman. I’ve named him Tears Tosterone, for a very good reason. When he is talking about Palestinian civilian deaths, war is hell, it’s a fact of life, get used to it. When he was confronted with Israeli civilian deaths on October 7th, he literally broke down in tears in public-
Benny Morris
(02:44:08)
But he understood that one is deliberate and one isn’t. He understood that.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:44:11)
No, that’s what he tried to make us understand.
Benny Morris
(02:44:12)
No, he was speaking facts. The Hamas guys who attacked the kibbutzim, apart from the attacks on the military sites, when they attacked the kibbutzim, were out to kill civilians. And they killed family after family, house after house. The Israeli attacks on Hamas installations-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:44:31)
You know better. You know better-
Benny Morris
(02:44:32)
No, I don’t know better. You don’t know Israeli pilots, that’s the problem-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:44:32)
Thank God.
Benny Morris
(02:44:33)
No, you don’t know Israeli pilots-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:44:35)
I know, thank God.
Benny Morris
(02:44:39)
They believe that they are killing Hamas snakes. They’re given certain objectives and that’s what they attack. And if the Hamas is hiding behind civilians, civilians die. Simple as that-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:44:49)
Every time they target a kid, I’m sure they believe it’s Hamas.
Benny Morris
(02:44:53)
[inaudible 02:44:53]
Norman Finkelstein
(02:44:54)
Yeah. When they killed the four kids on the…
Benny Morris
(02:44:57)
They believed that they were Hamas snakes-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:44:59)
I know they believed it. Even though they were diminutive size, even though they were [inaudible 02:45:03]
Benny Morris
(02:44:59)
You know from that angle, you don’t see the sides-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:44:59)
No, they saw the sides, but let’s see the side-
Steven Bonnell
(02:45:07)
Oh, I know what he’s quoting, correct, but you’ve lied about this particular instance in the past. Those kids weren’t just on the beaches as often stated in articles. Those kids were literally coming out of a previously identified Hamas compound that they had operated from. They literally-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:45:18)
Mr. Borelli-
Steven Bonnell
(02:45:19)
You could Google it, Mr. Finkel-stinker-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:45:20)
Mr. Borelli, with all due respect, you’re such a fantastic moron, it’s terrifying. That wharf was filled with journalists. There were scores of journalists. That was an old fisherman’s shack. What are you talking about? It’s so painful to listen to this idiocy-
Steven Bonnell
(02:45:46)
And to be clear, on the other side, you’re implying that the strike was okayed on the Israeli side where they said, “We’re just going to kill four Palestinian people today for no reason.”
Norman Finkelstein
(02:45:54)
Hey-
Benny Morris
(02:45:54)
Do you believe that?
Steven Bonnell
(02:45:54)
Do you believe that? Do you believe that? [inaudible 02:45:57] journalists, do you think that [inaudible 02:46:00]
Norman Finkelstein
(02:45:55)
Here we go-
Benny Morris
(02:45:59)
That they would actually kill four children?
Steven Bonnell
(02:46:02)
He went answer the question-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:46:02)
Here we go-
Steven Bonnell
(02:46:02)
He will never answer that question.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:46:03)
I will answer the question-
Benny Morris
(02:46:04)
The pilots were out to kill four children-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:46:05)
I will even answer the moron’s questions-
Steven Bonnell
(02:46:07)
Because that was a strike, that was a drone strike, so that was approved all the way up the chain that we’re going to kill children today. We’re going to kill Palestinian children today-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:46:12)
Okay, you want me to answer or do you want your motormouth to go? Okay, answer. In 2018, there was the Great March of Return in Gaza by all reckonings of human rights organizations and journalists who were there. It was overwhelmingly nonviolent-
Benny Morris
(02:46:36)
And organized by the Hamas.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:46:37)
Whoever organized it-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:46:39)
It was organized by Satan, let’s start with that-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:46:40)
Satan-
Benny Morris
(02:46:40)
No, by Hamas-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:46:43)
Okay, Satan. I agree. Let’s go for the big one, the big magilla. It’s Satan, okay. Overwhelmingly non-violent. Resembled at the beginning the First Intifada-
Benny Morris
(02:46:56)
They threw bombs here and there.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:46:57)
Okay, not bombs, but-
Benny Morris
(02:46:59)
They tried to make holes in the fence, obviously-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:47:00)
Okay, let’s continue.
Benny Morris
(02:47:02)
Yeah.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:47:03)
So-
Benny Morris
(02:47:04)
But I’m not sure Israel behaved morally in that respect.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:47:06)
Okay-
Benny Morris
(02:47:06)
No, no, no-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:47:06)
Okay, wait, wait, wait-
Benny Morris
(02:47:09)
I’m willing to grant you that.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:47:09)
Please, please. Allow me to-
Benny Morris
(02:47:12)
You don’t have to pursue it because I’m willing to grant-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:47:12)
Allow me to finish-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:47:16)
I don’t know anything about this. I’d like to hear.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:47:17)
Okay. So as you know, along the Gaza perimeter, there was Israel’s best-trained snipers. Correct?
Benny Morris
(02:47:28)
I don’t know best-trained. There was snipers-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:47:30)
Fine. Okay. All right. Because… Hey, laugh. It’s hilarious. This story’s so funny-
Steven Bonnell
(02:47:37)
You’re lying. The Great March of Return had aspects of violence to it. Even the UN says it themselves.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:47:42)
Okay, okay, okay.
Steven Bonnell
(02:47:43)
But you only collect what the UN says that you like.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:47:45)
You see the problem, Mr. Morelli, is, you don’t know the English language. You don’t-
Steven Bonnell
(02:47:50)
I can read from the UN website itself. In regards to the Great March of Return, they said, “While the vast majority of protestors have acted in a peaceful manner, during most protests dozens have approached the fence attempting to damage it, burning fires, throwing stones and Molotov cocktails towards Israeli forces, and flying incendiary kites and balloons into Israeli territory. The latter resulted in extensive damage to agricultural land and nature reserves inside Israel and risked the lives of Israeli civilians. Some incidents of shooting and throwing of explosives also reported-“
Norman Finkelstein
(02:48:19)
Talk Fast. Talk fast so people think that you’re coherent-
Steven Bonnell
(02:48:21)
I’m just reading from the UN-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:48:22)
Yeah, but you’re saying-
Steven Bonnell
(02:48:23)
I know you like them sometimes, only when they agree with you though.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:48:25)
You got the months wrong. You got the months wrong. We’re talking about the beginning in March 30th to what-
Steven Bonnell
(02:48:32)
You just described that march as mostly peaceful.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:48:34)
Okay, allow me to finish. So there were the snipers, okay. Now, you find it so far-fetched. Israelis purposely, deliberately targeting civilians? That’s such a far-fetched idea. An overwhelmingly nonviolent march. What did the international investigation-
Benny Morris
(02:48:55)
It wasn’t the march. It was a campaign which went on for months.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:48:58)
Whatever you want to call it, yeah. What did the UN investigation find? It found-
Benny Morris
(02:49:02)
Well, he just read it for you.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:49:05)
I read the report. I don’t read things off of those machines. I read the report. What did it find? Brace yourself. You thought it was so funny, the idea of IDF targeting civilians. It found… Go look this up on your machine-
Steven Bonnell
(02:49:24)
I already know what you’re going to say. You’re going to say it found that only one or two of them were justified killings-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:49:29)
It targeted children, targeted journalists, targeted medics. And here’s the funniest one of all, it’s so hilarious, they targeted disabled people who were 300 meters away from the fence and just standing by trees-
Benny Morris
(02:49:50)
If this is true, if what you’re saying is true-
Lex Fridman
(02:49:52)
Just a quick pause. I think everything was fascinating to listen to except the mention of hilarious. Nobody finds any of this hilarious, and if any of us are laughing, it’s not at the suffering of-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:50:00)
[inaudible 02:50:00].
Lex Fridman
(02:50:00)
And if any of us are laughing, it’s not at the suffering of civilians or suffering of anyone, it’s at the obvious joyful comradery in the room, so I’m enjoying it, and also the joy of learning, so thank you.
Steven Bonnell
(02:50:13)
Can we talk about the targeting civilian thing a little bit? I think there’s an important underlying-
Lex Fridman
(02:50:18)
[Inaudible 02:50:18].
Steven Bonnell
(02:50:18)
I think it’s important to understand there’s three different things here that we need to think about. So, one is a policy of killing civilians. So, I would ask the other side, I’m going to ask all three, because I know there won’t be a short answer, do you think there is a policy, top down from the IDF to target civilians? That’s one thing-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:50:18)
Yes.
Steven Bonnell
(02:50:34)
… A second thing is-
Benny Morris
(02:50:35)
He said yes.
Steven Bonnell
(02:50:37)
I’ll write that down.
Benny Morris
(02:50:37)
Mouin answered yes.
Steven Bonnell
(02:50:37)
That’s fine, but then the second thing is, or there’s two distinctions I want to draw between. I think Benny would say this, I would say this. I’m sure, undoubtedly, there have been cases where IDF soldiers, for no good reason, have targeted and killed Palestinians that they should not have done, that would be prosecutable as war crimes as defined by the [inaudible 02:50:56]-
Benny Morris
(02:50:55)
And some have been prosecuted.
Steven Bonnell
(02:50:58)
And I’m absolutely sure-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:50:58)
According to you and your book, practically none.
Steven Bonnell
(02:51:01)
I’m sure that we would all agree for soldiers that that happens, but I think that it’s important that when we talk about military strikes or we talk about things especially involving bombings or drone attacks, these are things that are signed off by multiple different layers of command, by multiple people involved in an operation, including intelligence gathering, including weaponeering, and they also have typically lawyers involved. When you make the claim that an IDF soldier shot a Palestinian, those three people, the three hostages that came up with white flags, that something horrible happened, I think that’s a fair statement to make and I think a lot of criticism is deserved, but when you make the statement that four children were killed by a strike, the claim that you’re making-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:51:39)
Deliberately, yeah.
Steven Bonnell
(02:51:40)
The claim that you’re making is that multiple levels of the IDF signed off-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:51:44)
I have no idea what [inaudible 02:51:47]-
Steven Bonnell
(02:51:47)
That’s great if you don’t understand the process, then let me educate you.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:51:47)
You don’t understand the process.
Steven Bonnell
(02:51:49)
I do understand the process, I’m telling you. I’m trying to explain to you right now.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:51:50)
Really? You’re in the IDF?
Steven Bonnell
(02:51:50)
No, it’s basic-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:51:56)
You’re studying the IDF.
Steven Bonnell
(02:51:57)
You can ask anybody that talks about-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:51:57)
Aside from Wikipedia, can you tell me what your knowledge of the IDF is?
Steven Bonnell
(02:51:59)
You can talk to people who work in the military-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:52:01)
What’s your knowledge of the IDF?
Steven Bonnell
(02:52:02)
Your audience can look this up. Do you think that bombing and strikes are decided by one person in the field? Do you think one person-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:52:09)
Can I respond to that?
Steven Bonnell
(02:52:10)
[inaudible 02:52:10] on a drone strike-
Benny Morris
(02:52:11)
[inaudible 02:52:11] a pilot doesn’t do it on his own.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:52:11)
Can I respond-
Steven Bonnell
(02:52:14)
[inaudible 02:52:14] have entire apparatuses that are designed to figure out how to strike and who to strike, so when you say that four children are targeted, you’re saying that a whole apparatus that tries to murder-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:52:21)
You made my argument better than me-
Steven Bonnell
(02:52:22)
… Poor Palestinian children.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:52:22)
You made my argument better than me.
Steven Bonnell
(02:52:24)
Which is a ridiculous argument.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:52:25)
Oh, really? It’s impossible at the command level, but you said that they couldn’t have done it at the bottom if it weren’t also at the top.
Steven Bonnell
(02:52:36)
You don’t understand the strength of the claim that you’re making. You’re saying that from a top down level, that lawyers, multiple commanders, intelligence, all these people signed off-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:52:44)
Mr. Bonnell, do not tell me what I don’t understand.
Steven Bonnell
(02:52:45)
… On killing poor Palestinians, children.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:52:47)
It’s true, I don’t spend my nights on Wikipedia. I read books. I admit that as a-
Steven Bonnell
(02:52:53)
That’s a waste of time, by the way. You’re wasting time [inaudible 02:52:55].
Norman Finkelstein
(02:52:55)
I know, books are a waste of time. With all due regard, they’re-
Steven Bonnell
(02:52:59)
Well, according to you they are. The only thing you take from them are two or three quotes that you use to push people around.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:53:02)
I completely respect the fact… And I’ll say it on the air, as much as I find totally disgusting what’s come of your politics, a lot of the books are excellent, and I’ll even tell you because I’m not afraid of saying it, whenever I have to check on the basic fact, the equivalent of going to the Britannica, I go to your books. I know you got a lot of the facts right.
Lex Fridman
(02:53:29)
Benny Morris’ books for the listener.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:53:30)
I would never say books are a waste of time and it’s regrettable to you that you got strapped with a partner who thinks that all the wisdom-
Benny Morris
(02:53:43)
He didn’t say they’re a waste of time.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:53:44)
I’d like to respond to what you were saying. I think the question that we’re trying to answer-
Benny Morris
(02:53:53)
I think you don’t understand Israel, you know? Neither of you really understands Israel and how it works.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:53:56)
Let me finish, please. I think we’re all agreed that Palestinians have deliberately targeted civilians. Whether we’re talking about Hamas and Islamic jihad today or previously-
Benny Morris
(02:54:10)
I prefer the word murdered and raped rather than targeted. Targeted is too soft for what the Hamas did.
Steven Bonnell
(02:54:15)
I’m okay with it.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:54:16)
I’m not talking about-
Benny Morris
(02:54:18)
I’m talking about this now.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:54:19)
Yeah, but I’m trying to answer his question. Historically, there is substantial evidence that Palestinians have targeted civilians, whether it’s been incidental or systematic is a different discussion, I don’t want to get into that now. For some reason, there seems to be a huge debate about whether any Israeli has ever sunk so low as to target a civilian. I don’t-
Benny Morris
(02:54:47)
No, we’ve agreed. We’ve both said.
Steven Bonnell
(02:54:49)
We just agreed [inaudible 02:54:50].
Benny Morris
(02:54:50)
I just said that this has happened here and there. We’ve agreed on that. What we’re saying is it’s not policy, which is what you guys are implying, that they kill civilians deliberately.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:54:59)
If I understand you correctly, you’re basically making the claim that none of these attacks could have happened without going through an entire chain of commands.
Steven Bonnell
(02:55:09)
For strike cells that are involved in drone attacks or plane attacks or-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:55:12)
Yeah.
Steven Bonnell
(02:55:12)
Yes [inaudible 02:55:13].
Mouin Rabbani
(02:55:13)
My understanding of the Israeli military, and you could perhaps… You’ve served in it, you would know better, it’s actually a fairly chaotic organization.
Benny Morris
(02:55:22)
No, that’s not true, especially not the Air Force, extremely, extremely organized. The Air Force works in a very organized fashion, as he says, with lawyers, a chain of command, and ultimately the pilot drops the bomb where he is told to drop it.
Steven Bonnell
(02:55:35)
Protective Edge, was that 200 strikes in like 60 seconds, I think, the opening of Protective Edge? The coordination between [inaudible 02:55:43]-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:55:42)
You’re talking about 2008.
Steven Bonnell
(02:55:47)
I think Protective Edge was 2014, but I’m just saying that the coordination in the military is pretty tight.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:55:49)
Well, my understanding of the Israeli military-
Benny Morris
(02:55:52)
It’s very organized.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:55:54)
… Is that it’s quite chaotic and there’s also a lot of testimonies from Israel, but be that as it may, I’m prepared to accept both of your contentions that it’s a highly organized and disciplined force. Air Force under any scenario is going to be more organized than the other branches, and you’re saying such a strike would’ve been inconceivable.
Steven Bonnell
(02:56:16)
Well, I’m not necessarily saying inconceivable. I’m saying that that would’ve required murderous intent on so many different levels. I don’t think good evidence has been presented to say that that’s-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:56:24)
Your basic claim is that it would be fair to assume that such a strike could have only been carried out with multiple levels of authorization and signing off. Let’s accept that for the sake of argument. We have now seen incident after incident after incident after incident where entire families are vaporized in single strikes-
Benny Morris
(02:56:53)
Who is in the families? Who lives in the house inside-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:56:53)
Family members.
Benny Morris
(02:56:54)
No, next to the house in which these families are killed?
Mouin Rabbani
(02:56:59)
We have seen incident-
Benny Morris
(02:57:00)
Do you know that Hamas [inaudible 02:57:02] weren’t in that house? Do you know that their ammunition dumps weren’t in those houses?
Mouin Rabbani
(02:57:06)
Why do I have to prove a negative?
Benny Morris
(02:57:07)
You are saying that they deliberately targeted families. If Israel wanted to kill civilians in Gaza, they could have killed 500,000 by now with the number of strikes they’ve done and the fact that they’ve only killed a certain small number [inaudible 02:57:22]-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:57:22)
30,000 is a small number?
Benny Morris
(02:57:23)
Small number in proportion-
Mouin Rabbani
(02:57:26)
You consider 30,000 a small number?
Benny Morris
(02:57:26)
Small number in proportion over four months probably is an indication that-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:57:26)
12,000 children is only.
Benny Morris
(02:57:28)
… Is targeted and that there are Hamas targets in these places.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:57:36)
12,000 children is only, and if that’s the case, why is it-
Benny Morris
(02:57:36)
Did I use the word only?
Norman Finkelstein
(02:57:41)
Yeah, you said only. Professor Morris, here’s a question for you, if we take every combat zone in the world for the past three years, every combat zone in the world-
Benny Morris
(02:57:54)
In Vietnam, the Americans killed 1 million people.
Mouin Rabbani
(02:57:57)
Well, the [inaudible 02:57:58] killed 40 million.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:58:00)
I was in the anti-war movement, so don’t strap me-
Benny Morris
(02:58:03)
The Americans killed 1 million people in Vietnam.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:58:06)
Fine, and 30 million Russians were killed during World War II, so everything else is irrelevant.
Benny Morris
(02:58:13)
[inaudible 02:58:13].
Norman Finkelstein
(02:58:15)
Professor Morris, here’s a question, it’s very perplexing. If you take every combat zone in the world for the past three years and you multiply the number of children killed by four, every combat zone in the world, you get Gaza. So when you say-
Steven Bonnell
(02:58:37)
What is that supposed to prove?
Norman Finkelstein
(02:58:38)
I’m going to tell you… Just shut up
Benny Morris
(02:58:40)
Firstly, you’re lying on Hamas numbers.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:58:42)
No, I’m not lying [inaudible 02:58:44]-
Benny Morris
(02:58:44)
Hamas numbers are not necessarily true.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:58:44)
… The numbers that everybody else… I’m lying in the numbers [inaudible 02:58:47]-
Steven Bonnell
(02:58:48)
Even if we take the numbers though, what does that prove?
Benny Morris
(02:58:49)
Those are Hamas numbers, which may not be true. They could invent anything because you know that they are a mendacious organization.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:58:57)
I know mendacious, believe me-
Benny Morris
(02:58:58)
You like the word mendacious?
Norman Finkelstein
(02:59:00)
Mendacious as in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. So here’s the thing, you say they could have killed 500,000, but they only killed, only, that’s your words, they only killed 30,000.
Benny Morris
(02:59:12)
You believe that they deliberately target civilians, they would’ve killed many, many more. The fact is that they don’t deliberately target civilians.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:59:21)
Professor Morris, for [inaudible 02:59:24]-
Benny Morris
(02:59:24)
And you don’t understand Israeli society.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:59:28)
I don’t want to understand Israeli society.
Benny Morris
(02:59:28)
You don’t want the truth.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:59:29)
I don’t want to. I D.dOn’t want to get inside their heads.
Benny Morris
(02:59:31)
That’s the problem.
Steven Bonnell
(02:59:33)
[inaudible 02:59:33].
Norman Finkelstein
(02:59:32)
90%-
Benny Morris
(02:59:32)
A good historian tries to get into the heads of-
Norman Finkelstein
(02:59:40)
There’s a limit.
Benny Morris
(02:59:42)
… The various protagonists.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:59:42)
There’s a limit.
Benny Morris
(02:59:42)
A good historian does.
Norman Finkelstein
(02:59:44)
When 90% of Israelis think that Israel’s using enough or too little force in Gaza, I don’t want to get inside that head. 40% think that Israel is using insufficient force in Gaza. I don’t want to get inside that head. I don’t want to get inside the head of people who think they’re using insufficient force against the population, half of which is children. I don’t want to get inside that head, but here’s the point, because your partner wants to know the point. You don’t understand political constraints. One of your ministers said, “Let’s drop an atomic bomb on Gaza.”
Benny Morris
(03:00:26)
You think he really meant that?
Mouin Rabbani
(03:00:27)
He said it three times.
Benny Morris
(03:00:32)
No, no, no, it was said in a sort of a very questionable way. He didn’t say they should drop an atomic bomb.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:00:32)
He said it the day after the ICJ met.
Benny Morris
(03:00:43)
This minister is a messianic idiot, but he didn’t say drop an atomic bomb [inaudible 03:00:43].
Mouin Rabbani
(03:00:43)
He said it [inaudible 03:00:44].
Norman Finkelstein
(03:00:44)
None other Israel’s chief historian, the justifiably famed Benny Morris, thinks we should be dropping nuclear weapons on Iran.
Benny Morris
(03:00:56)
Iran, its leaders for years have said, “We should destroy Israel.” Do you agree with that? They’ve said, “We should destroy Israel. Israel must be destroyed.” Is that correct? This is what the Iranian leaders have been saying since Khomeini.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:01:10)
I would say Iranian leaders have sent mixed messages.
Benny Morris
(03:01:13)
But some of them have said, including Khamenei-
Norman Finkelstein
(03:01:18)
If you don’t know the evidence, why are you laughing?
Steven Bonnell
(03:01:19)
The slightest skepticism, it’s very funny.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:01:19)
It’s funny because-
Steven Bonnell
(03:01:22)
Iran that supports Hezbollah and the Houthis and Hamas, maybe they want Israel destroyed.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:01:26)
Brace yourself to the extent that the Houthis are trying to stop the genocide in Gaza, I support-
Steven Bonnell
(03:01:37)
[inaudible 03:01:37] ships. I know I selectively support international law when it agrees with you and then when it doesn’t, you decide to throw international law to the wind.
Benny Morris
(03:01:44)
There’s no genocide in Gaza.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:01:46)
If you like [inaudible 03:01:46]-
Lex Fridman
(03:01:46)
Hold on a second. Norm, Norm-
Norman Finkelstein
(03:01:46)
Let me read what you said-
Lex Fridman
(03:01:46)
Norm, Norm, stop, please. Norm, just for me, please. Just give me a second. You said there’s no genocide going on in Gaza. Let me ask that clear question. The same question I asked on the Hamas attacks. Is there, from a legal, philosophical, moral perspective, is there genocide going on in Gaza today?

Gaza

Mouin Rabbani
(03:02:06)
Is there a genocide going on in Gaza? Well, in several years we will have a definitive response to that question. What has happened thus far is that on the 29th of December, the Republic of South Africa instituted proceedings against Israel, pursuant to the 1948 convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. South Africa basically accused Israel of perpetrating genocide in the Gaza Strip. On the 26th of January, the court issued its initial ruling. The court at this stage is not making a determination on whether Israel has or has not committed genocide. So, just as it has not found Israel guilty, it certainly also hasn’t found Israel innocent. What the court had to do at this stage was take one of two decisions, either South Africa’s case was the equivalent of a frivolous lawsuit and dismiss it and close the proceedings, or it had to determine that South Africa presented a plausible case that Israel was violating its obligations under the genocide convention and that it would on that basis hold a full hearing.

(03:03:40)
Now, a lot of people have looked at the court’s ruling of the 26th of January and focused on the fact that the court did not order a ceasefire. I actually wasn’t expecting it to order a ceasefire, and I wasn’t surprised that it didn’t because in the other cases that the court has considered, most prominently Bosnia and Myanmar, it also didn’t order a ceasefire, and South Africa in requesting a ceasefire also didn’t ask the court to render an opinion on the legitimacy, or lack thereof, of Israel’s military operation. From my perspective, the key issue on the 26th of January was whether the court would simply dismiss the case or decide to proceed with it.
Benny Morris
(03:04:33)
And it decided to proceed [inaudible 03:04:35]-
Mouin Rabbani
(03:04:36)
And I think that’s enormously-
Norman Finkelstein
(03:04:38)
I thought that was beautifully [inaudible 03:04:39]-
Benny Morris
(03:04:40)
But you said they committed genocide. You already said they committed genocide. Israel is committing genocide.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:04:44)
But if I can just-
Norman Finkelstein
(03:04:45)
Allow me-
Benny Morris
(03:04:50)
You used that word.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:04:51)
That’s correct. I don’t run away from my words.
Benny Morris
(03:04:51)
So Norman, you did say Israel was committing genocide.
Lex Fridman
(03:04:52)
Norm, can you let Mouin finish?
Norman Finkelstein
(03:04:53)
Yeah.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:04:54)
Well, the end of the story is you specifically asked whether I think Israel is committing genocide. I explained formally there is no finding and as you said, we won’t know for a number of years and I think there’s legitimate questions to be raised. In the Bosnia case, which I think all four of us would agree was clearly a case of genocide, the court determined-
Benny Morris
(03:05:15)
You mean by the Serbs?
Mouin Rabbani
(03:05:16)
Yes. In the Bosnia case, the court determined that of all the evidence placed before them only Srebrenica qualified as genocide and all the other atrocities committed did not qualify as genocide. International law is a developing organism. I don’t know how the court is going to respond in this case, so I wouldn’t take it as a foregone conclusion how the court is going to respond, but-
Benny Morris
(03:05:44)
Norman has determined already.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:05:46)
I have too, because you’re asking my personal opinion.
Lex Fridman
(03:05:49)
Personal opinion is [inaudible 03:05:50].
Mouin Rabbani
(03:05:49)
So as a matter of law, I want to state very clearly it has not been determined and won’t be determined for several years. Based on my observations and the evidence before me, I would say it’s indisputable that Israel is engaged in a genocidal assault against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip.
Benny Morris
(03:06:13)
Which is a PLO line.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:06:14)
Get with the program, the PLO is long passed.
Benny Morris
(03:06:18)
Okay, the Palestinian authority.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:06:20)
As you were saying, genocide is not a body count. Genocide consists of two elements, the destruction of a people in whole or in part, so in other words, you can commit genocide by killing 30,000 people.
Benny Morris
(03:06:39)
[inaudible 03:06:39].
Mouin Rabbani
(03:06:39)
Well, five probably is below threshold.
Benny Morris
(03:06:42)
There is a problem of numbers.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:06:42)
Yes, but I think 30,000 crosses the threshold and not reaching 500,000 is probably irrelevant, and the second element is there has to be an intent. In other words-
Benny Morris
(03:06:54)
And you believe there’s an intent?
Mouin Rabbani
(03:06:55)
Yes. I think if there is any other plausible reason for why all these people are being murdered, it’s not genocide. And as far as intent to [inaudible 03:07:06]-
Benny Morris
(03:07:05)
What about hiding behind a human shield? You don’t think that’s a reason for them being killed?
Mouin Rabbani
(03:07:10)
Well, let’s get the intent part out of the way first. South Africa’s-
Benny Morris
(03:07:14)
Forget South Africa, they don’t [inaudible 03:07:16]-
Mouin Rabbani
(03:07:16)
I’d like to finish.
Benny Morris
(03:07:18)
Hamas government, that’s got nothing to do with anything.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:07:20)
I think they’re pro-Satan as well, last time I checked.
Benny Morris
(03:07:23)
No, they pro-Hamas.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:07:25)
For some reason, you don’t have a problem with people being pro-Israeli at the time of this, but if they support Palestinians’ right to life or self-determination, they get demonized and de-legitimized as pro-Hamas?
Benny Morris
(03:07:39)
They supported an organization which murdered 1,200 people deliberately. That’s my problem.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:07:43)
But supporting a state that has murdered 30,000 [inaudible 03:07:45]-
Benny Morris
(03:07:45)
But they haven’t because these are 30,000 are basically human shields to get by the Hamas, in which the Hamas wanted killed. They wanted them killed. Hamas wanted these people killed.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:07:56)
Sure, if I could just get-
Benny Morris
(03:07:56)
You don’t think they wanted them killed?
Mouin Rabbani
(03:07:58)
No, I don’t.
Benny Morris
(03:07:58)
They didn’t provide them with shelters. They build tunnels for their fighters, but not one shelter for their own civilians.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:08:04)
If I can get back to my point, you asked me about intent and the reason that I brought in the South African application is because it is actually exceptionally detailed on intent by quoting numerous-
Benny Morris
(03:08:19)
All sorts of idiotic ministers in Israel.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:08:21)
Well, yeah, including the prime minister, the defense minister, the chief of staff-
Benny Morris
(03:08:24)
The prime minister didn’t say genocide [inaudible 03:08:27]-
Norman Finkelstein
(03:08:35)
According to Asa Kasher, the philosopher of the IDF, he said that Netanyahu was vowing genocide. Now, he’s an idiot?
Benny Morris
(03:08:46)
I didn’t say he’s an idiot, but he’s passed it.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:08:49)
So, the reason I raised the South African application is twofold. Hamas or no Hamas, it’s exceptionally detailed on the question of intent. And secondly, when the International Court of Justice issues a ruling, individual justices have the right can give their own opinion. And I found the German one to be the most interesting on this specific question because he was basically saying that he didn’t think South Africa presented a persuasive case, but he said their section on intent was so overpowering that he felt he was left with no choice but to vote with the majority. So, I think that answers the intent part of your question.
Steven Bonnell
(03:09:38)
So, for the ICJ case that South Africa has brought, I think there’s a couple of things that need to be mentioned. One is, and I saw you two talk at length about this, the plausibility standard is incredibly low. The only thing we’re looking for is a basic presentation of facts that make it conceivable, possible that-
Mouin Rabbani
(03:09:55)
Plausible.
Steven Bonnell
(03:09:56)
Plausible, which legally, this is obviously below criminal conviction, below-
Mouin Rabbani
(03:10:01)
Yes, of course. Think of it as an indictment.
Steven Bonnell
(03:10:04)
Sure, possibly, maybe even a lower level than even an indictment, so plausibility is an incredibly low standard, number one. Number two, if you actually go through and you read the complaint that South Africa filed, I would say that if you go through the quotes and you even follow through to the source of the quotes, the misrepresentation that South Africa does in their case about all of these horrendous quotes, in my opinion, borders on criminal.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:10:31)
16 ICJ judges disagree.
Steven Bonnell
(03:10:33)
That’s fine if 16 ICJ judges disagree, but I’m going to give-
Norman Finkelstein
(03:10:36)
They must be awfully incompetent.
Steven Bonnell
(03:10:38)
They could be.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:10:39)
Even the American judge, she must have been awful incompetent if she was unable to see the misrepresentations that Mr. Bonnell based on his Wikipedia entry was able to find.
Steven Bonnell
(03:10:53)
So, this is based on the official ICJ report that was released. I’m not sure if you read the entire thing.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:10:58)
I read every aspect.
Steven Bonnell
(03:11:00)
Did you go through and actually identify any of the sources of underlying quotes?
Norman Finkelstein
(03:11:03)
Actually, brace yourself for this and Mouin could confirm it, Yaniv Kogan, an Israeli, and Jamie Stern-Weiner, a half Israeli, they checked every single quote in the Hebrew original and Yaniv Kogan, love the guy, he has terrifying powers of concentration, he checked every single quote. Is that correct, Mouin?
Mouin Rabbani
(03:11:03)
Mm-hmm.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:11:32)
And Jamie checked every single quote in the English, in the context, and where there were any contextual questions they told us.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:11:43)
I think they found one.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:11:44)
Yeah, I think they found one. So, I do not believe that those 15 judges… It was 15 to two?
Mouin Rabbani
(03:11:53)
16 to two, I think.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:11:55)
There are 15 in the court plus two, so it’s 17, so it’s 15 to two. I don’t think those 15 judges were incompetent and I certainly don’t believe the president of the court, an American, would allow herself to be duped.
Steven Bonnell
(03:12:18)
Well, let me read [inaudible 03:12:19]-
Norman Finkelstein
(03:12:20)
Mr. Bonnell-
Lex Fridman
(03:12:24)
Hey, hey, hey, whoa, whoa, whoa, let him read.
Steven Bonnell
(03:12:24)
Sure, so this was taken from the South African complaint. There’s tons of these, so here’s one. In the complaint for the ICJ they said that, “On the 12th of October, 2023, President Isaac Herzog made clear that Israel was not distinguishing between militants and civilians in Gaza, stating in a press conference to foreign media in relation to Palestinians in Gaza, over 1 million of whom are children, ‘It’s an entire nation out there that is responsible. It is not true, this rhetoric about civilians not aware, not involved.'”
Mouin Rabbani
(03:12:57)
I saw that [inaudible 03:12:58]-
Steven Bonnell
(03:12:58)
“It’s absolutely not true and we will fight until we break their backbone.” If you actually go to the news article that they even state, they even link it in their complaint. The full context for the quote was, “It is an entire nation out there that is responsible. It’s not true, this rhetoric about civilians not being aware, not involved, it’s absolutely not true. They could have risen up, they could have fought against that evil regime which took over Gaza in a coup d’etat, but we are at war. We are defending our homes, we are protecting our homes. That’s the truth. And when a nation protects its home, it fights and we will fight until we break their backbone.” He acknowledged that many Gazans had nothing to do with Hamas, but was adamant that others did. “I agree there are many innocent Palestinians who don’t agree with this, but you have a missile in your goddamn kitchen and you want to shoot it at me. Am I allowed to defend myself? We have to defend ourselves. We have the right to do so.”

(03:13:48)
This is not the same as saying there’s no distinction between militants and civilians in Gaza. His statement here is actually fully compliant with international law to the letter because if you are storing military supplies in civilian areas, these things become military targets, and you’re allowed to do proportionality assessments afterwards. So, if this is supposed to be one of many quotes that they’ve shown that is supposed to demonstrate genocidal intent, but it is very easily explained by military intent or by a conflict between two parties-
Mouin Rabbani
(03:14:16)
I saw that press conference.
Benny Morris
(03:14:17)
Wait, let me just say something. All of this talk is a bit irrelevant because it may sound to the listeners that the court in The Hague has ruled that Israel is committing genocide.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:14:28)
No, I think-
Benny Morris
(03:14:29)
It hasn’t. It’s just going in the next few years to look at the whole subject. There has been no determination at all. And as Steven says, some of the quotes are not exactly accurate quotes or taken out of context.
Steven Bonnell
(03:14:29)
A total discharacterization.
Benny Morris
(03:14:29)
Yes.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:14:45)
It is correct, as Mouin put it, that’ll be several years before the court makes a determination.
Benny Morris
(03:14:56)
And my guess is that it’ll determine there was no genocide. That’s my guess. I’m just giving you my guess.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:15:03)
I can’t predict. I got it all wrong actually, as Mouin will attest, I got all wrong the first time. I never thought the American judge would vote in favor of plausibility.
Benny Morris
(03:15:12)
So, you admit that you were wrong?
Norman Finkelstein
(03:15:14)
Yeah, of course. I think I tell Mouin twice a day I was wrong about this and I was wrong about that. I’m not wrong about the facts. I try not to be, but my speculations, they can be wrong. Leaving that aside, first of all, as Mouin pointed out, there’s a difference between the legal decision by the ruling and an independent judgment. Now, South Africa was not filing a frivolous case. That was 84 pages. It was single-
Benny Morris
(03:15:44)
Even 84 pages can be frivolous.
Steven Bonnell
(03:15:44)
It takes an hour and a half to read. It was not a massive case.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:15:50)
It was single spaced and it had literally hundreds of footnotes-
Benny Morris
(03:15:54)
It can still be frivolous.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:15:56)
It’s possible.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:15:57)
Of course, but this one wasn’t.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:16:00)
I read the report. To tell you the truth, I followed very closely everything that’s been happening to October 7th, I was mesmerized. I couldn’t believe the comprehensiveness of that particular report. Number two, there are two quite respected judges… Excuse me, there were two quite respected experts of international law sitting on the South African panel, John Dugard and Vaughan Lowe. Vaughan Lowe, as you might know, he argued the war case in 2004 before the International Court of Justice. Now, they were alleging genocide, which in their view means the evidence in their minds…

(03:16:40)
We are not yet at the court. The evidence in their minds compels the conclusion that genocide is being committed. I am willing, because I happen to know Mr. Dugard personally, and I have corresponded with Vaughan Lowe, I’ve heard their claim, I’ve read the report. I would say they make a very strong case, but let’s agree plausible. Now, here’s a question, if somebody qualifies for an Olympic team, let’s say a regional person qualifies for an Olympic team, it doesn’t mean they’re going to be on the Olympic team, it doesn’t mean they’re going to win a gold medal, a silver medal, or a bronze medal-
Benny Morris
(03:17:27)
But they can swim, that’s what you’re saying.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:17:29)
No, I would say that’s a very high bar-
Benny Morris
(03:17:31)
You’re saying they can swim.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:17:32)
… To even qualify.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:17:34)
They can swim well enough to have a realistic prospect at winning a medal.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:17:37)
So, the even make it to plausible-
Steven Bonnell
(03:17:41)
That is not true. That is not what plausible means. It’s absolutely not. You’re dead wrong.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:17:46)
Mr. Berelli, please don’t teach me about the English language.
Steven Bonnell
(03:17:51)
So, the declaration judge [inaudible 03:17:53]-
Norman Finkelstein
(03:17:53)
I said plausibility is the same concept as qualifying.
Steven Bonnell
(03:17:58)
The court is not asked at this present phase of the proceedings to determine whether South Africa’s allegations of genocide are well-founded. They’re not even well-founded. You said that plausible was a high standard, it’s absolutely not. It’s a misrepresentation of the strength of the case against Israel, just like the majority of the quotes they have in this case are. And also you said it was an extremely well-founded case. They spent like one-fourth of all the quotations, some even pulled from the Goldstone Report, that actually deal with the intent part, which is, by the way, I don’t know if you used the phrase dolus specialis, that the intentional part of genocide-
Mouin Rabbani
(03:17:58)
I don’t know that term.
Steven Bonnell
(03:18:35)
I think it’s called dolus specialis, it’s the most important part of genocide, which is proving it is a highly special intent to commit genocide. It’s possible that Israel could-
Norman Finkelstein
(03:18:43)
That’s [foreign language 03:18:43].
Steven Bonnell
(03:18:46)
Yes, I understand the state of mind, but for genocide, it’s called dolus specialis. It’s a highly special intent. Did you read the case?
Norman Finkelstein
(03:18:47)
Yeah.
Steven Bonnell
(03:18:54)
It is a highly special intent [inaudible 03:18:56]-
Norman Finkelstein
(03:18:56)
Mr. Berelli, I’m going to ask you again-
Steven Bonnell
(03:18:57)
Yes.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:18:58)
… Please stop displaying your imbecility.
Steven Bonnell
(03:19:01)
I’m sorry if you think the declaration of the judge is imbecility.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:19:03)
Don’t put on public display that you are a moron. At least have the self-possession to shut up. Did I read the case?
Steven Bonnell
(03:19:11)
I’m comfortable putting my display on camera if you’re comfortable putting yours in books.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:19:16)
Mr. Berelli, I read the case around four times. I read all of the majority opinion, the declarations, I read our own Barack’s declaration [inaudible 03:19:27]-
Steven Bonnell
(03:19:26)
Then why are you lying and saying plausible is a high standard?
Norman Finkelstein
(03:19:30)
Because I said even reaching the benchmark of plausibility is a very high standard in the world. It’s the equivalent of a regional player qualifying for an Olympics. It’s still two steps removed, you may not be on the team, and you may not get a medal, but to get qualified, which in this context is the equivalent of plausible, you must be doing something pretty horrible. As it happens, Professor Morris-
Benny Morris
(03:20:10)
The court will rule there was no genocide. That’s what the court will rule. Remember what I just told you, the court will rule there was no genocide.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:20:13)
I don’t expect to be even around when the court reaches its final decision.
Benny Morris
(03:20:14)
Why?
Norman Finkelstein
(03:20:17)
Why? It’ll take a long, long time.
Benny Morris
(03:20:20)
Two years, three years.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:20:20)
No, I don’t think it’ll take two or three years.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:20:22)
Bosnia, which was admittedly a special type of case, because they were accusing Serbia of sponsoring the Bosnian Serbs, that took I think 17 years from ’90-
Benny Morris
(03:20:35)
I assume they’ll take two or three years.
Lex Fridman
(03:20:36)
But the point you’re making, so this is a legal-
Norman Finkelstein
(03:20:39)
I’m saying that something horrible must be happening to even achieve-
Benny Morris
(03:20:43)
It is horrible, it’s a war.
Steven Bonnell
(03:20:44)
That is true, yes.
Benny Morris
(03:20:44)
It’s horrible.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:20:48)
Except they weren’t rendering a ruling on the war, they were rendering a ruling on the genocide.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:20:52)
And I think the suggestion-
Steven Bonnell
(03:20:54)
And they said it was plausible, they also said it plausible that Israel is committing a military operation as well.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:20:59)
But I think the problem with your characterization is you’re saying in so many words the South Africans basically only have to show up in court with a coherent statement.
Benny Morris
(03:20:59)
Right.
Steven Bonnell
(03:21:07)
That is correct.
Benny Morris
(03:21:08)
In today’s atmosphere, that’s probably correct.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:21:10)
They needed to do a lot more. They needed to persuade-
Norman Finkelstein
(03:21:10)
The American judge?
Mouin Rabbani
(03:21:17)
They needed to persuade-
Benny Morris
(03:21:17)
Judges go according to what the majority want to hear.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:21:20)
But they needed-
Norman Finkelstein
(03:21:21)
She was the president.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:21:22)
They needed to persuade the court that it was worth investing several years of their time in hearing this case.
Benny Morris
(03:21:30)
They’re probably well-paid for it.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:21:31)
They’re well paid whether they take this case or not. They have a full docket whether they accept or reject this case, and I don’t think we should-
Benny Morris
(03:21:41)
Remember what I just said, they won’t rule there was genocide. Remember what I said.
Steven Bonnell
(03:21:45)
Also, I recommend people actually read the case and follow through a lot of the quotes that they just don’t show genocidal intent.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:21:51)
Mr. Berelli, brace yourself.
Steven Bonnell
(03:21:51)
The Israeli minister of finance on the 8th of October, 2023, this is taken from the ICJ, this is from South Africa submission Bezalel Smotrich… I can’t read this.
Benny Morris
(03:22:00)
Bezalel Smotrich.
Steven Bonnell
(03:22:01)
There you go, at a meeting of the Israeli cabinet that, “We need to deal a below that hasn’t been seen in 50 years and take down Gaza.” But again, if you click through and you read the source, their own linked source, it says, as per this own source, “The powerful finance minister, settler leader Bezalel Smotrich, I can’t pronounce this, demanded at the cabinet meeting late Saturday that the army, ‘Hit Hamas brutally and not take the matter of the captives into significant consideration.’ ‘As in war, you have to be brutal.’ He was quoted as saying, ‘We need to deal a blow that hasn’t been seen in 50 years and take down Gaza.'” You can’t strip the quotation of Hamas, an entity we are at war with, and then [inaudible 03:22:38] there was genocidal intent.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:22:40)
[inaudible 03:22:40] Gaza.
Benny Morris
(03:22:40)
That’s not genocidal intent.
Steven Bonnell
(03:22:40)
When the Ukrainians say, “We need to defeat Russia-“
Norman Finkelstein
(03:22:41)
[inaudible 03:22:41], that’s not genocidal?
Steven Bonnell
(03:22:40)
No, when Ukraine says, “We need to defeat Russia,” is that genocidal? Do they mean killing all Russian citizens?
Norman Finkelstein
(03:22:51)
Professor Morris, here’s another one.
Benny Morris
(03:22:53)
It’s ridiculous.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:22:55)
Ridiculous?
Benny Morris
(03:22:55)
Yes, ridiculous.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:22:57)
The American judge-
Benny Morris
(03:22:58)
He also doesn’t determine policy, but that’s neither here nor there.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:23:01)
The American judge read-
Benny Morris
(03:23:04)
You are holding the American judge to-
Norman Finkelstein
(03:23:06)
Well, she was the president [inaudible 03:23:07]-
Steven Bonnell
(03:23:07)
He’ll appeal to authority when it agrees with him, and we won’t deal with the actual facts of the matter, ever.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:23:12)
The American judge read several of the quotes.
Benny Morris
(03:23:15)
Look at the American Supreme Court today, they may support Trump. It shows you how worthy American judges are.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:23:21)
Professor Morris, without going too far afield, if you heard a statement by the defense minister, the defense minister said, “We are going to prevent any food, water, fuel, or electricity from entering Gaza-“
Benny Morris
(03:23:39)
Did Israel do that?
Norman Finkelstein
(03:23:42)
No, I’m wondering-
Benny Morris
(03:23:43)
Well, he said-
Norman Finkelstein
(03:23:44)
I’m asking-
Benny Morris
(03:23:44)
… Isn’t Israeli government policy.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:23:46)
But we’re talking about statements now, intent. How would you interpret that?
Benny Morris
(03:23:50)
After 1,200 of your citizens are murdered the way they were, I would expect extreme statements by lots of politicians.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:23:56)
But you don’t accept extreme Palestinians-
Benny Morris
(03:24:01)
But that’s not a crazy [inaudible 03:24:02]-
Mouin Rabbani
(03:24:01)
Wait, but you don’t accept-
Benny Morris
(03:24:02)
What he said isn’t Israeli policy.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:24:02)
But you don’t-
Benny Morris
(03:24:00)
… that’s not Israeli policy.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:24:00)
But you don’t accept-
Benny Morris
(03:24:02)
What he said isn’t Israeli policy. They let in water. They let in gas.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:24:05)
Untrue. Untrue. Untrue.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:24:07)
But you don’t accept extreme Palestinian statements after they lost their entire country, not just 1200 people.
Benny Morris
(03:24:13)
That’s a good point. No, no, that’s a good point.
Lex Fridman
(03:24:15)
And on that, on that brief moment of agreement, let’s just take a quick pause. We need a smoke break. We need a water break, a bathroom break.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:24:25)
Take down Gaza is not a genocide.
Steven Bonnell
(03:24:27)
Defeat Russia is a genocide statement.
Benny Morris
(03:24:29)
What does take down Gaza?
Steven Bonnell
(03:24:30)
When we went to war with Iraq and we wanted to destroy Iraq, that was a genocidal statement.
Benny Morris
(03:24:33)
Take down Gaza.
Steven Bonnell
(03:24:33)
There’s a reason why genocide is such an importantly guarded concept, and it’s not to condemn every nation that goes to war.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:24:38)
Mr. Bonnell-
Steven Bonnell
(03:24:40)
Wait, you do know how to pronounce my name. You’re mispronouncing it intentionally.
Benny Morris
(03:24:44)
He made you an Italian all the time.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:24:46)
I’m so [inaudible 03:24:46] by your solicitude for international laws.
Steven Bonnell
(03:24:49)
You should try learning it sometime. It would help you sort out a lot of the civilian deaths.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:24:52)
Unfortunately, 15 judges disagree.
Steven Bonnell
(03:24:55)
You could keep citing the judges. You should actually try reading the actual statements.
Benny Morris
(03:24:59)
This is tiring. You’ve invited us to a tiring session.
Lex Fridman
(03:25:05)
Yeah. There you go. How are you guys doing?
Benny Morris
(03:25:06)
Okay. Okay. There are major things to discuss here, not just what some court is doing and the judge in two years time.
Steven Bonnell
(03:25:14)
Yes. Okay. So what you just said is my whole… One of the reasons why I feel so strongly about this particular conflict is because there are really important things to discuss, but they will never be discussed.
Benny Morris
(03:25:24)
They’re not being discussed here.
Steven Bonnell
(03:25:24)
We’re not going to talk about like Area A, B, and C or what a transference of territory. So we’re going to talk about apartheid. We’re not going to talk about the differences in how do you conduct war in an urban environment where people, we’re just going to talk about genocide. We’re not going to talk about what’s a good solution for the Palestinians. We’re just going to say ethnic cleansing,
Lex Fridman
(03:25:41)
Is it possible to be productive over the next two hours and talk about solutions?
Benny Morris
(03:25:44)
About solutions. I have no idea what to say. I mean, I don’t see any solutions on if you wanted a positive end to this discussion, which is what you said at the beginning. I can’t contribute to this because I am pessimistic. I don’t see anywhere any way forward here,
Steven Bonnell
(03:25:59)
But the solution is easy. The reason why the solution is hard is because the histories and the myths are completely… There’s a different factual record.
Lex Fridman
(03:26:07)
One of the things would be good to talk about solutions with the future is going back in all the times that it has failed. So every time-
Steven Bonnell
(03:26:14)
But even at that, we’re probably not going to agree. He’s going to say… You could write that. I can predict the whole line. He’s going to say from ’93 to ’99, he’s going to say, Israel didn’t adhere to the Oslo courts ever, settlement expansion continued, raids happened into the West Bank, that there was never a legitimate… That Netanyahu came in and violated the Y Memorandum, the transference. He’s going to say all of this and he’s not going to bring up anything of the Palestinian side. And then for Camp David, he’s going to say that yeah, that Arafat was trying, that the maps and the territorial exchange wasn’t good enough, that they were asking Palestinians to make all the concessions, that Israel would’ve made-
Lex Fridman
(03:26:44)
Well, lay it all out. Lay it out.
Benny Morris
(03:26:46)
You do talk quickly.
Steven Bonnell
(03:26:47)
Yeah, I know. Yeah.
Benny Morris
(03:26:51)
Yeah. My future book should interest you guys.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:26:54)
What are you working on?
Benny Morris
(03:26:56)
No, it’s not working on, it’s actually going to come out. It deals with Israeli and Arab atrocities, war crimes I call them in the ’48 war.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:27:06)
Really?
Benny Morris
(03:27:07)
That’s the book, just deals with that subject.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:27:10)
Because I know you’ve also talked about the closure of the archives and stuff.
Benny Morris
(03:27:16)
Well, it’s marginal. It deals with that as well. But they have tried to seal off documents, which had already used and seen. Now they don’t let people see them. That’s happened. But it’s marginal in terms of its effect on-
Mouin Rabbani
(03:27:32)
Were the British archives useful for you, for this new book?
Benny Morris
(03:27:35)
Yeah. Well, for this list it’s mostly Israeli archives. The British and the Americans and the UN did deal with these subjects, but not as well as Israeli documents.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:27:44)
What’s your casualty count for Deir Yassin?
Benny Morris
(03:27:48)
It’s about a hundred. I think there’s agreement on that by Israelis and Arabs, 100-105.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:27:53)
Because before they were-
Benny Morris
(03:27:54)
They used to say 245 or 254. Those were the figures. The British and the Arabs and the Haganah agreed on it at the beginning.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:28:02)
Because the Red Cross, I think was the one that first put out that number.
Benny Morris
(03:28:05)
I don’t remember. Maybe it was, what’s his name? Jacques de Rainier or maybe, yeah, maybe he came up with that number. But it was just they didn’t count. They didn’t count bodies. They just threw the number out and everybody was happy to blame the Irgun and the Lehi for killing more Arabs than actually-
Mouin Rabbani
(03:28:23)
Well, and they put it to good use as well.
Benny Morris
(03:28:26)
Well, they said that it helped to precipitate more evacuations. So they were happy.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:28:30)
I think Begin in his memoir [inaudible 03:28:33].
Benny Morris
(03:28:33)
Yeah. Yeah. They also use that number.

Peace

Lex Fridman
(03:28:34)
So first of all, thank you for that heated discussion about the present. I would love to go back into history in a way that informs what we can look for as by way of hope for the future. So when has Israel and Palestine have we been closest to something like a peace settlement, to something that where both sides would be happy and enable the flourishing of both peoples?
Benny Morris
(03:29:06)
Well, from my knowledge of the 120 years or so of conflict, the closest I think the two sides have been to reaching some sort of settlement appears to have been in the year 2000 when Barak and then subsequently Clinton offered a two-state settlement to PLO, Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat and Arafat seemed to waver. He didn’t immediately reject what was being offered, but ultimately at the end of Camp David in July 2000, he came down against the proposals. And Clinton who said he wouldn’t blame him, later blamed Arafat for bringing down the summit and not reaching a solution there. But I think there on the table, certainly in the Clinton parameters of December 2000, which followed the proposals by Barak in July, the Palestinians were offered the best deal they’re ever going to get from Israel unless Israel is destroyed and then there’ll just be a Palestinian Arab state.

(03:30:19)
But the best deal that Israel could ever offer them, they were offered, which essentially was 95% of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, half of the old city of Jerusalem, some sort of joint control of the Temple Mount and the Gaza Strip of course in full. And the Palestinians said no to this deal and nobody really knows why Arafat said no. Some people think he was trying to hold out for slightly better terms, but my reading is that he was constitutionally, psychologically incapable of signing off on a two-state deal, meaning acceptance of the existence of a Jewish state. This was really the problem.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:31:01)
Of Israel or of a Jewish state?
Benny Morris
(03:31:03)
Of a Jewish state, the Jewish state of Israel. He wasn’t willing to share Palestine with the Jews and put his name to that. I think he just couldn’t do it. That’s my reading. But some people say it was because the terms were insufficient and he was willing, but was waiting for slightly better terms. I don’t buy that. I don’t think so. But other people disagree with me on this.
Lex Fridman
(03:31:24)
What do you think?
Mouin Rabbani
(03:31:25)
Well, just briefly in response, Arafat formally recognized Israel in 1993. Yeah, earlier. I don’t think actually that in 2000-2001, a genuine resolution was on offer because I think the maximum Israel was prepared to offer, admittedly more than it had been prepared to offer in the past, fell short of the minimum that the Palestinians consider to be a reasonable two state settlement. Bearing in mind that as of 1949, Israel controlled 78% of the British mandate of Palestine. Palestinians were seeking a state on the remaining 22%, and this was apparently too much for Israel. My response to your question would be-
Benny Morris
(03:32:20)
Wait, wait. They were being offered something like 22 or 21%.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:32:24)
They were being offered, I think less than a withdrawal to the 1967 borders with mutual and minor and reciprocal land swaps and the just resolution of-
Benny Morris
(03:32:37)
The refugee problem was one of the problems.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:32:37)
Refugee question. Yes. I worked for a number of years with an international crisis group and my boss at the time was Rob Malley, who was one of the American officials, present at Camp David.
Benny Morris
(03:32:51)
Who was be thrown out of the State Department or whatever.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:32:56)
The point I want to make about Rob was he wrote, I think, a very perceptive article in 2001 in the New York Review of books. I know that you and Ehud Barak have had a debate with them, but I think he gives a very compelling reason of why and how Camp David failed. But rather than going into that, I’ll-
Benny Morris
(03:33:17)
He wrote that together with Hussein Araj.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:33:19)
Hussein Araj, yes, who was not at Camp David. But in response to your question, I think there could have been a real possibility of Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli peace in the mid 1970s in the wake of the 1973 October War. I’ll recall that in 1971, Moshe Dayan, Israel’s defense minister at the time, full of triumphalism about Israel’s victory in 1967 speaking to a group of Israeli military veterans, stated, “If I had to choose between Sharm El-Sheikh without peace or peace without Sharm El-Sheikh…” This is referring to the resort in Egyptian Sinai, which was an under Israeli occupation. Dayan said, “I will choose for Sharm El-Sheikh without peace.” Then the 1973 war came along and I think Israeli calculations began to change very significantly.

(03:34:34)
And I think it was in that context that had there been a joint US-Soviet push for an Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian resolution that incorporated both an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories, I think there was a very reasonable prospect for that being achieved. It ended up being aborted, I think for several reasons, and ultimately the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat decided for reasons we can discuss later to launch a separate unilateral initiative for Israeli Egyptian rather than Arab-Israeli peace. And I think once that set in motion, the prospects disappeared because Israel essentially saw its most powerful adversary removed from the equation and felt that this would give it a free hand in the occupied territories also in Lebanon to get rid of the PLO and so on.

(03:35:59)
You ask when were we closest, and I can’t give you an answer of when we were closest. I can only tell you when I think we could have been close and that was a lost opportunity. If we look at the situation today, there’s been a lot of discussion about a two-state settlement. My own view, and I’ve written about this, I don’t buy the arguments of the naysayers that we have passed the so-called point of no return with respect to a two-state settlement. Certainly if you look at the Israeli position in the occupied territories, I would argue it’s more tenuous than was the French position in Algeria in 1954, than was a British position in Ireland in 1916, than was a Ethiopian position in Eritrea in 1990. And so as a matter of practicality, as a matter of principle, I do think the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories remains realistic.

(03:37:12)
I think the question that we now need to ask ourselves, it’s one I’m certainly asking myself since October 7th and looking at Israel’s genocidal campaign, but also looking at larger questions, is it desirable? Can you have peace with what increasingly appears to be an irrational genocidal state that seeks to confront and resolve each and every political challenge with violence? And that reacts to its failure to achieve solutions to political challenges with violence by applying even more violence, that has an insatiable lust for Palestinian territory, that a genocidal apartheid state that seems increasingly incapable of even conceiving of peaceful coexistence with the other people on that land. So I’m very pessimistic that a solution is possible.

(03:38:22)
I grew up in Western Europe in the long shadow of the Second World War. I think we can all agree that there could have been no peace in Europe had certain regimes on that continent not been removed from power. I look at Southeast Asia in the late 1970s, and I think we all agreed that there could not have been peace that region had the Khmer Rouge not been ousted. I look at Southern Africa during the 1990s and I think we can all be agreed that had the white minority regimes that ruled Zimbabwe and South Africa not been dismantled, there could not have been peace in that region. And although I think it’s worth having a discussion, I do think it’s now legitimate question to ask, can there be peace without dismantling the Zionist regime?

(03:39:28)
And I make a very clear distinction between the Israeli state and its institutions on the one hand and the Israeli people who I think regardless of our discussion about the history, I think you can now talk about an Israeli people and the people that have developed rights over time and a formula for peaceful coexistence with them will need to be found, which is a separate matter from dismantling the Israeli state and its institutions. And again, I haven’t reached clear conclusions about this except to say as a practical matter, I think a two state settlement remains feasible. But I think there are very legitimate questions about its desirability and about whether peace can be achieved in the Middle East with the persistence of an irrational genocidal apartheid regime. Particularly because Israeli society is beginning to develop many extremely, extremely distasteful supremacist, dehumanizing aspects that I think also stand in the way of coexistence that are being fed by this regime.
Lex Fridman
(03:40:58)
So if you look back into history when we’re closest to peace, and do you draw any hope from any of them?
Steven Bonnell
(03:41:06)
I feel like in 2000, I feel like the deal that was present, at least at the end of the Taba Summit, I think in terms of what Israel, I think had the appetite to give and what the Palestinians would’ve gotten, would’ve definitely been the most agreeable between the two parties. I don’t know if in ’73. I’m not sure if the appetite would’ve ever been there for the Arab states to negotiate alongside the Palestinians. I know that in Jordan there was no love for the Palestinians after 1970, after Black September. I know that Sadat had no love for the Palestinians due to their association with the Muslim brotherhoods, attempted assassinations in Egypt.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:41:46)
Sorry, which? PLO and the Muslim brotherhood?
Steven Bonnell
(03:41:49)
Sadat was upset because there were attempted assassinations by people in… Oh no, an assassination. It was a personal friend of his, Yusuf Al-Sabah. I can’t pronounce that. He was assassinated by a Palestinian-
Mouin Rabbani
(03:41:59)
He was killed by the Abu Nidal organization, which was not part of the PLO and had nothing to do with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Steven Bonnell
(03:42:05)
Admittedly, he says as much, belongs to a [inaudible 03:42:05] group, not PLO directly. But I think that there was a history of the Palestinians sometimes fighting with their neighboring states that were hosting them if they weren’t getting the political concessions they wanted. The assassination of the Jordanian king in ’51 might be another example of that in Jordan. It feels like over a long period of time, it feels like the Palestinians have been told from the neighboring Arab states that if they just continue to enact violence, whether in Israel or abroad, that eventually a state will materialize somehow. I don’t think it’s gotten them any closer to a state. If anything, I think it’s taken them farther and farther and farther away from one, and I think as long as the hyperbolic language is continually employed internationally, the idea that Israel is committing a genocide, the idea that there is an apartheid, the idea that they live in a concentration camp, all of these words, I think further the narrative for the Palestinians that Israel is an evil state that needs to be dismantled.

(03:42:57)
I mean you said as much about the institution, at least to the Zionist government. Israel’s government is probably not going anywhere. All of the other surrounding Arab states have accepted that, or at least most of them down in the Gulf. Egypt and Jordan have accepted that the Palestinians need to accept it too. The Israeli state or the state apparatus is not going anywhere, and at some point they need to realize like, “Hey, we need a leader that’s going to come out and represent us, represent all of us, is willing to take political risks, is willing to negotiate some lasting piece for us, and it’s not going to be the international community or some invocation of international law or some invocation of morality or justice that’s going to extricate us from this conflict. It’s going to take some actual difficult political maneuvering on the ground-“
Mouin Rabbani
(03:43:36)
Of accepting Israel?
Steven Bonnell
(03:43:37)
Of accepting Israel.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:43:38)
Which they formally did in 1993.
Steven Bonnell
(03:43:41)
Which they formally did in 1993. But then no lasting piece came after that in 2000.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:43:46)
No. Because 1993 was not a peace agreement.
Steven Bonnell
(03:43:50)
Sure. The Oslo Accords didn’t have a final solution.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:43:53)
… were an interim agreement. And Palestinians actually began clamoring for commencing the permanent status resolutions on schedule, and the Israelis kept delaying them. In fact, they only began, I believe in ’99 under American pressure on the Israelis.
Benny Morris
(03:44:15)
I think you’re being a bit one-sided. Both sides didn’t fulfill the promise of Oslo and the steps needed for Oslo. There was Palestinian terrorism which accompanied Israel’s expansion of settlements and other things. The two things fed each other and led to what happened in 2000, which was a breakdown of the talks altogether when the Palestinians said no. But I don’t agree incidentally with this definition of Israel or the Israeli state as apartheid. It’s not. There is some sort of apartheid going on in the West Bank. The Israeli regime itself is not an apartheid regime. That is nonsense, by any definition of apartheid, which-
Mouin Rabbani
(03:44:56)
Well, by the formal definition, I think it qualifies.
Benny Morris
(03:44:58)
No, it doesn’t qualify. Apartheid is a race-based distinction between different segments of the population and some of them don’t have any representation at all, like the Blacks in South Africa.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:45:10)
That’s not a requirement.
Benny Morris
(03:45:13)
In Israel itself, the minority, the Arabs do have representation, do have rights, and so on. I don’t think Israel is also genocidal. I don’t think it’s being genocidal. It wasn’t so in ’48. It wasn’t so in ’67, and it hasn’t been recently in my view. And talk about dismantling Israel and that’s what you’re talking about is, and I think Steven said it correctly, is counterproductive. It just pushes Israelis further away from willing to give Palestinians anything.
Lex Fridman
(03:45:44)
Please, Norm tell me you have-
Benny Morris
(03:45:46)
Something optimistic to say.
Lex Fridman
(03:45:47)
… optimistic to say.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:45:50)
Even though I agree, I’ve thought about it a lot and I agree with Marine’s analysis. I’m not really in the business of punditry. I’d rather look at the historical record where I feel more comfortable and I feel on terra firma. So I’d like to just go through that. I don’t quite, I agree and I disagree with Mouin on the ’73 issue. After the 1973 war, it was clear that Israel was surprised by what happened during the war, and it took a big hit. The estimates are… I don’t know what numbers you used, but I hear between two and 3000 Israeli soldiers were killed during the 19-
Mouin Rabbani
(03:45:50)
It was 2,500.
Benny Morris
(03:45:50)
Yeah, 27. Yeah.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:46:38)
Okay, so I got it right. I read different numbers. That’s a very large number of Israelis who were killed. There were moments at the beginning of the war where there was a fear that this might be it.
Benny Morris
(03:46:52)
There wasn’t.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:46:53)
No. The Israelis fear-
Benny Morris
(03:46:54)
This is nonsense. Everybody forgets Israel’s atomic weaponry.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:46:57)
I know, but-
Benny Morris
(03:46:58)
So how could they have been defeated?
Norman Finkelstein
(03:47:00)
Because Dayan expressed-
Mouin Rabbani
(03:47:00)
Didn’t Dayan talk about the collapse of the third temple?
Benny Morris
(03:47:04)
He did, but it was hysterical and silly because Israel had weapons. They wanted to stop the Syrians or the Egyptians.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:47:09)
But we’re talking about perceptions.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:47:12)
I can’t tell you if he was hysterical or not.
Benny Morris
(03:47:14)
No. He was. For a day, he was hysterical.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:47:14)
I wasn’t in the same room with him.
Benny Morris
(03:47:14)
For a day, he was hysterical.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:47:17)
But I’m just saying, let’s not bog down on that. The war is over and when President Carter comes into power… Carter was an extremely smart guy. Jimmy Carter, extremely smart guy, and he was very fixed on details. He was probably the most impressive of modern American presidents, in my opinion, by a wide margin. And he was determined to resolve the conflict on a big scale, on the Arab-Israeli scale. On the Palestinian issue, he wouldn’t go past what he called a Palestinian homeland. He wouldn’t accept-
Mouin Rabbani
(03:47:51)
Palestinian national home.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:47:52)
On the Palestinian national home. He wouldn’t go as far as a Palestinian state. I’m not going to go into the details of that. I don’t think realistically, given the political balance of forces that was going to happen, but that’s a separate issue. Let’s get to the issue at hand, namely, what is the obstacle or what has been the obstacle since the early 1970s? Since roughly 1974, the Palestinians have accepted the two states settlement and the June 1967 border. Now as more pressure was exerted on Israel because the Palestinians seemed reasonable, the Israelis, to quote the Israeli political scientist, Avner Yaniv, he since passed from the scene. He said… Yaniv in his book, Dilemmas of Security, he said that the big Israeli fear was what he called the Palestinian peace offensive.

(03:48:47)
That was their worry that the Palestinians were becoming too moderate. And unless you understand that, you can’t understand the June 1982 Lebanon war. The purpose of the June 1982 Lebanon war was to liquidate the PLO in Southern Lebanon because they were too moderate the Palestinian peace offensive. I’m going to have to fast-forward. There are many events. There was the First Intifada, then there’s the Oslo Accord, and let’s now go to the heart of the issue, namely the 2000-2001 negotiations. Well, the negotiations are divided into three parts for the sake of listeners. There’s Camp David in July 2000, there are the Clinton parameters in December 2000, and then there are negotiations in Taba in Egypt in 2001. Those are the three phases. Now, I have studied the record probably to the point of insanity because there are so many details you have to master.
Benny Morris
(03:50:03)
I’ll vouch for that, the insanity part, yeah.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:50:06)
Actually, I will vouch for it. I will personally vouch for it. There is one extensive record from that whole period, from 2000 to you could say 2007, and that is what came to be called the Palestine Papers, which were about 15,000 pages of all the records of the negotiations. I have read through all of them, every single page, and this is what I find. If you look at Shlomo Ben-Ami’s book, which I have with me, Prophets Without Honor, it’s his last book. He says, “Going into Camp David…” That means July, going into Camp David, July 2000, he said the Israelis were willing to return about… Not return. But will withdraw from-
Mouin Rabbani
(03:50:07)
Relinquish.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:51:01)
Relinquish. 92% of the West Bank.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:51:04)
Ben-Ami was at Camp David.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:51:06)
Yeah. Then he was at Taba. Oh, yeah. He was also at Camp David. Israel wanted to keep all the major settlement blocks. It wanted to keep roughly 8% of the West Bank. They were allowing for… You put it at 84 to 90% in your books. They put it at roughly 92%. Israel was willing to give up.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:51:38)
It also depends how you calculate.
Benny Morris
(03:51:39)
It depends what stage at Camp David because there were two weeks.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:51:43)
I’ll get to that.
Benny Morris
(03:51:44)
The proposals changed during those two weeks.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:51:45)
So Israel wants to keep all the major settlement blocks.
Benny Morris
(03:51:49)
Means the border area of the West Bank.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:51:51)
Well, not the border. We have Ari’el, we have Ma’ale Adumim. We have, as Condoleezza Rice called Ari’el, she said it was a dagger into the heart of the West Bank. So they want to keep 8% of the land. They want to keep the settlement blocks. They want to keep 80% of the settlers. They will not budge an inch on the question of refugees. To quote Ehud Barak in the article he co-authored with you in the New York review of books, “We will accept…” And I think the quote’s accurate. “No moral, legal or historical responsibility for what happened to the refugees.” So forget about even allowing refugees to return. We accept no moral, legal or historical responsibility for the refugees. And on Jerusalem, they wanted to keep large parts of Jerusalem. Now, how do we judge who is reasonable and who is not?

(03:52:56)
Ben-Ami says, “I think the Israeli offer was reasonable.” That’s how he sees it. But what is the standard of reasonable? My standard is what does international law say? International law says the settlements are illegal. Israel wants to keep all the settlement blocks. 15 judges, all 15 in the wall decision in July 2004, all 15 judges, including the American judge, Buergenthal ruled the settlements are illegal under international law. They want to keep 80% of the settlers under international law. All the settlers are illegal in the West Bank. They want to keep large parts of East Jerusalem. But under international law, East Jerusalem is occupied Palestinian territory. That’s what the international-
Benny Morris
(03:54:01)
Well, not Palestinian, because there was no Palestine.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:54:01)
Excuse me. Okay.
Benny Morris
(03:54:05)
There’s never been a Palestinian state. How could it be Palestinian?
Norman Finkelstein
(03:54:08)
I listened patiently to you.
Benny Morris
(03:54:09)
Sorry.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:54:11)
Under international law, if you read the decision, all territory, the 2004 wall decision, all territory beyond the green line, which includes East Jerusalem is occupied Palestinian territory.
Mouin Rabbani
(03:54:32)
With the exception of the Golan Heights.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:54:35)
According to the International Court of Justice, the designated unit for Palestinian self-determination, and they deny any right whatsoever on the right of return. I don’t want to go into the details now. The maximum formal offer was by Ehud Omar in 2008. He offered 5,000 refugees could return under what was called family reunification, 5,000, in the course of five years, and no recognition of any Israeli responsibility.

(03:55:16)
So if you use as the baseline what the UN General Assembly has said and what the International Court of Justice has said, if you use that baseline, international law, by that baseline, all the concessions came from the Palestinian side. Every single concession came from the Palestinian side. None came from the Israeli side. They may have accepted less than what they wanted, but it was still beyond what international law allocated to them. Now you say-
Mouin Rabbani
(03:56:05)
Allocated to the Palestinians.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:56:06)
Allocated to Palestinians, yes. Thank you for the clarification. Now about Arafat, like the Mufti, never liked the guy. I think that was one of the only disagreements Mouin and I had. When Arafat passed, you were a little sentimental. I was not. I never liked the guy. But politics, you don’t have to like the guy. There was no question. Nobody argues it that whenever the negotiation started up, the Palestinians just kept saying the same things.
Benny Morris
(03:56:39)
No.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:56:40)
No.
Benny Morris
(03:56:41)
They kept saying no.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:56:42)
No. Professor Morris, with due respect, incorrect. They kept saying, “International legitimacy, international law, UN resolutions.” They said, “We already gave you what the law required. We gave that in 1988, November 1988, and then ratified again at Oslo in 1993.” And they said, “Now we want what was promised us under international law.” And that was the one point where everybody on the other side agreed. Clinton, don’t talk to me about international law. Livni during the Olmert administration. She said, “I studied international law. I don’t believe in international law.” Every single member on the other side, they didn’t want to hear from international law. And to my thinking that that is the only reasonable baseline for trying to resolve the conflict. And Israel has, along with the US-
Benny Morris
(03:57:51)
When has international law been relevant to any conflict basically in the world?
Norman Finkelstein
(03:57:57)
That’s why-
Benny Morris
(03:57:58)
Over the last 150 years.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:57:59)
That’s why the Palestinians have to recognize Israel because that’s international law.
Benny Morris
(03:58:03)
But international law is-
Norman Finkelstein
(03:58:00)
[inaudible 03:58:00] have to recognize Israel because that’s international law.
Benny Morris
(03:58:03)
No, but international law is meaningless.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:58:04)
That was UN Resolution 242.
Benny Morris
(03:58:06)
Conflicts are not solved by international law or in accordance with international law.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:58:09)
Yeah. But then, Professor Morris, for argument’s sake, let’s agree on that, strictly for argument’s sake. What’s the alternative? Dennis Ross said, “We’re going to decide who gets what on the basis of needs.” So he says, “Israel needs this. Israel needs that. Israel needs that.”

(03:58:34)
Dennis Ross decided to be the philosopher king. He’s going to decide on the basis of needs. Well, if you asked me, since Gaza is one of the densest places on Earth, it needs [inaudible 03:58:50]-
Mouin Rabbani
(03:58:49)
Tel Aviv.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:58:50)
Yes. It needs-
Benny Morris
(03:58:50)
It needs part of Sinai. That’s what Gaza-
Norman Finkelstein
(03:58:52)
It needs a nice big chunk-
Benny Morris
(03:58:53)
Of Sinai.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:58:55)
Not Sinai.
Benny Morris
(03:58:56)
That’s what it actually needs.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:58:57)
Okay. I don’t even want to go there. It needs a nice big chunk, but I have to accept international law says no. Okay.
Benny Morris
(03:59:06)
International law is irrelevant.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:59:09)
Now, Benjamin says, “I think the Israeli offer was reasonable.” Okay.
Benny Morris
(03:59:16)
And he’s a reasonable guy. You know that.
Norman Finkelstein
(03:59:20)
Okay, I don’t want to go there. I’ve debated him and partly agree with you. But who decides what’s reasonable? I think the international community in its political incarnation, the General Assembly, the Security Council, all those UN Security Council resolutions saying the settlements are illegal, annexation of East Jerusalem is null and void, and the International Court of Justice, that, to me, is a reasonable standard. And by that standard, the Palestinians were asked to make concessions, which I consider unreasonable or the international community considers unreasonable.
Steven Bonnell
(04:00:01)
I think that the issue is when you apply international law or international standards, I wouldn’t say what Benny Morris says, that they’re irrelevant, but I think that these have to be seen as informing the conversation. I don’t think these are the final shape of the conversation. I don’t think, historically, Israel has ever negotiated within the strict bounds of whether we’re talking Resolution 242, whether we’re talking about any General Assembly resolutions. That’s just not how these negotiations tend to go.

(04:00:28)
You might consider international opinion on things, but at the end of the day, it’s the bilateral negotiations, oftentimes historically started in secret, independent of the international community, that end up shaping what the final agreements look like. I think the issue with this broad appeal to international law is, again, going back to my earlier point about all of the euphemistic words, all it simply does is drive Palestinian expectations up to a level that is never going to be satisfied. For instance, you can throw that ICJ opinion all you want, it was an advisory opinion, that came in 2004, how Palestinians gained more or less land since that 2004 advisory opinion was issued.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:01:01)
So what would your standard be then?
Steven Bonnell
(04:01:03)
Both sides have to have a delegation that confronts each other and they assess the realistic conditions on the ground, and they try to figure out, within the confines of international law-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:01:12)
See, the problem with that-
Steven Bonnell
(04:01:13)
… [inaudible 04:01:13] both sides are reasonable for. But for instance, this statement of retreat from the West Bank. What is it? 400,000 settlers? How many settlers live in the West Bank now?
Benny Morris
(04:01:20)
Probably half a million.
Steven Bonnell
(04:01:20)
Yeah.
Benny Morris
(04:01:21)
Depends if you include the Jerusalem suburbs or not.
Steven Bonnell
(04:01:23)
Yeah. 4 or 500,000 people.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:01:25)
I think it’s 700,000.
Benny Morris
(04:01:26)
With the Jerusalem suburbs, perhaps.
Steven Bonnell
(04:01:28)
Yeah. Half a million people are-
Benny Morris
(04:01:30)
But Israel calls that Jerusalem, not settlements.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:01:31)
I know that, but that’s not what the law… The law calls it null and void.
Benny Morris
(04:01:34)
[inaudible 04:01:34]. The law is irrelevant.
Steven Bonnell
(04:01:35)
We can say whatever we want until we’re blue in the face, but half a million Israeli people are not being expelled from [inaudible 04:01:41]. It’s not going to happen.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:01:40)
My response… You’re basically saying, if I understand correctly, there’s only one way to resolve this, and that is through direct bilateral negotiation?
Steven Bonnell
(04:01:48)
Probably, yeah.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:01:48)
Okay.
Steven Bonnell
(04:01:50)
Or ideally.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:01:51)
So I’ve taken over your house. Okay. You’re not going to go to the police because the law is only of limited value. So you come over and sit in what is now my living room that used to be your living room and we negotiate. The problem there is that you’re not going to get anything unless I agree to it. And standards and norms and law and all the rest of it be damned.

(04:02:17)
So you need to take into account that when you’re advocating bilateral negotiations that, effectively, that gives each of the parties veto power. And in the current circumstances, the Palestinians have already recognized Israel.
Steven Bonnell
(04:02:38)
You keep bringing that up like it’s a significant concession.
Benny Morris
(04:02:38)
It’s not true. It’s not true.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:02:38)
It’s called the law.
Benny Morris
(04:02:40)
It’s not even true.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:02:41)
It’s called the law.
Benny Morris
(04:02:41)
Even though they signed a piece of paper-
Steven Bonnell
(04:02:45)
The recognition from Palestine isn’t doing anything for-
Benny Morris
(04:02:48)
Hamas totally rejects-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:02:49)
I’m not talking about Hamas.
Benny Morris
(04:02:50)
Hamas is the majority among the Palestinian people. They won the elections in 2006.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:02:56)
Actually, they won a majority of the seats.
Benny Morris
(04:02:58)
Yes, exactly.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:02:58)
They didn’t win a majority of the votes.
Benny Morris
(04:02:59)
Every opinion poll today says the majority of Palestinians-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:03:02)
That sounds right.
Benny Morris
(04:03:03)
… support Hamas.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:03:03)
That sounds right.
Benny Morris
(04:03:04)
And Hamas absolutely rejects Israel. So if Arafat, in 2003, 1993 or whatever, issued a sort of recognition of Israel-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:03:15)
It wasn’t a sort of recognition.
Benny Morris
(04:03:15)
Okay, a recognition of Israel. It’s meaningless. It’s meaningless.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:03:17)
It’s meaningless?
Benny Morris
(04:03:18)
Anyhow, I don’t believe that Arafat was sincere about it.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:03:21)
Does it matter what you or I think about what he felt?
Benny Morris
(04:03:22)
Well, most Israelis do, and that does matter.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:03:23)
Okay.
Benny Morris
(04:03:23)
That does matter. But Hamas says no and Hamas is the majority today.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:03:30)
So for years, the Israeli and US demand was that the Palestinians recognize 242 and 338. They did. But you’re saying, “Okay, we demanded that they do this, but it was meaningless when they did it.” Then the demand was that-
Benny Morris
(04:03:46)
It was a tactical thing. Yes.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:03:47)
Then the demand was that the PLO recognize Israel.
Benny Morris
(04:03:51)
Tactical.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:03:51)
Okay, we demanded that they did this, and they did it, but it’s meaningless.
Benny Morris
(04:03:55)
And they never changed their charter, the PLO. You may remember that.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:03:58)
In fact, in 19-
Benny Morris
(04:04:01)
They supposedly abrogated the old charter but never came up with a new one.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:04:03)
No.
Benny Morris
(04:04:03)
So there’s no new [inaudible 04:04:05].
Mouin Rabbani
(04:04:03)
But in 1996-
Benny Morris
(04:04:04)
And Farouk Kaddoumi said, “Of course, the old charter is still enforced.”
Mouin Rabbani
(04:04:09)
Yes, yes. But the point is, the Palestinians, demands are constantly made of them.
Benny Morris
(04:04:15)
And of Israel.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:04:16)
And when they accede to those demands, they’re then told, “Actually, what you did is meaningless, so here’s a new set of demands.” I mean, it’s like a hamster-
Benny Morris
(04:04:24)
There’s no new set of demands.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:04:26)
It’s like a hamster stuck in a wheel-
Benny Morris
(04:04:28)
No, no, let me tell you what the bottom line is.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:04:30)
… that will be told, “If you run fast enough, you’ll get out of the cage.”
Benny Morris
(04:04:32)
No, no. The bottom line is that Israel would like a Palestinian Sadat. It wants the Palestinians… Listen. Listen. Just let me finish.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:04:41)
This is really a worst-case scenario that you’re talking about now.
Benny Morris
(04:04:42)
Okay, let me just… Because they shot Sadat, but anyhow.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:04:42)
For good reason.
Benny Morris
(04:04:45)
The Israelis-
Steven Bonnell
(04:04:47)
For good reason?
Benny Morris
(04:04:48)
… want the Palestinians… Israelis want the Palestinians to actually accept the legitimacy of the state of Israel and the Zionist project and then live side by side with them in two states. That’s what the Israelis… I don’t even know if it’s true-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:04:48)
And what is the formal position-
Benny Morris
(04:05:04)
I don’t even know if that’s true today because there may be-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:05:05)
And what is the formal position of this Israeli government?
Benny Morris
(04:05:08)
No, no. I’m saying I don’t know if it exists today.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:05:09)
Okay, its predecessor and its predecessor and its predecessor.
Benny Morris
(04:05:12)
I’m talking about [inaudible 04:05:13].
Norman Finkelstein
(04:05:13)
Professor Morris. Professor Morris.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:05:14)
Come on.
Benny Morris
(04:05:14)
That’s what Israelis want.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:05:14)
Professor Morris.
Benny Morris
(04:05:17)
They want a change of psyche among the Palestinians.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:05:18)
Mouin has an interesting-
Benny Morris
(04:05:18)
If that doesn’t happen, there won’t be a Palestinian state. There just won’t be.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:05:24)
Mouin has an interesting point.
Benny Morris
(04:05:26)
Forget international law and all the UN resolutions.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:05:30)
I know you want to forget it just like you want to forget the genocide charge. I know you want to forget that.
Steven Bonnell
(04:05:34)
Well, the Palestinians want to forget it too when it doesn’t suit them as well, right?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:05:37)
But here’s the problem, and it’s exactly the problem that Mouin just brought up. Now, I read carefully your book, One State, Two States. With all due respect, absolutely a disgrace. Coming from you, coming from you-
Benny Morris
(04:05:50)
Most reviewers didn’t agree with you, though.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:05:52)
Yeah. Coming from you, it was like you wrote it in your sleep. It’s nothing compared to what you wrote before. I don’t know why you did it. In my opinion, you ruined your reputation, not totally, but you undermined it with that book.

(04:06:04)
But let’s get to the issue that Mouin wrote. Here’s what you said. You said, formally… You said, “Yes, it’s true, the Palestinians recognize Israel.” But then you said, “Viscerally, in their hearts-“
Benny Morris
(04:06:20)
They don’t.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:06:21)
“… they didn’t really recognize Israel.” So I thought to myself, “How does Professor Morris know-“
Mouin Rabbani
(04:06:21)
Cut open your chest.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:06:30)
“… what’s in the hearts of Palestinians? I don’t know.”
Benny Morris
(04:06:34)
[inaudible 04:06:34].
Norman Finkelstein
(04:06:35)
I was surprised, as a historian, you would be talking about what’s lurking in the hearts of Palestinians. But then you said something which was really interesting. You said, “Even if, in their hearts, they accepted Israel,” you said, quote, “Rationally, they could never accept Israel because they got nothing. They had this beautiful Palestine and now they’re reduced to just a few parcels of land. The two-state settlement-“
Benny Morris
(04:07:03)
So they will never accept it.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:07:05)
Yes.
Benny Morris
(04:07:05)
Which is true.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:07:05)
So you said there’s no way they can accept it.
Benny Morris
(04:07:08)
No, I would say that as well.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:07:10)
Yeah.
Benny Morris
(04:07:11)
The two-state solution, as proposed, doesn’t make any sense.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:07:14)
Exactly as Mouin said, you keep moving the goalposts until we reach the point where we realize, according to Benny Morris, there can’t be a solution. So why don’t you just say that outright? Why don’t you say it outright? According to you, the Palestinians can never be reasonable because according to you-
Benny Morris
(04:07:42)
They want all of Palestine. That’s why.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:07:44)
According to you, they couldn’t possibly agree to a two-state settlement because it’s such a lousy settlement. That’s what you say.
Benny Morris
(04:07:53)
Because they want all of Palestine.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:07:55)
But you said, rationally, they couldn’t accept it, not their feelings.
Benny Morris
(04:08:00)
It’s both.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:08:00)
You said rational. You went from formally, viscerally, rationally. So now we’re reaching the point where, according to Benny Morris, the Palestinians can’t be reasonable because, reasonably, they have to reject two states.
Benny Morris
(04:08:20)
They want all of Palestine.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:08:21)
So, Mouin is absolutely correct. There’s no way to resolve the problem, according to your logic.
Benny Morris
(04:08:25)
They want all of Palestine. He said that himself. He said they should dismantle Israel.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:08:25)
I’m talking about-
Benny Morris
(04:08:25)
That’s what he’s saying.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:08:25)
What I said-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:08:25)
He didn’t say that.
Benny Morris
(04:08:27)
Dismantle Israel.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:08:31)
What I said, and I’ve written-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:08:34)
I’m glad you didn’t deny it. Go ahead.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:08:36)
I’ve written extensively on this issue, on why a two-state settlement is still feasible, and I came out in support of that proposition. Perhaps in my heart, you can see that I was just bullshitting, but that’s what I actually wrote. That was a number of years ago.

(04:08:56)
And just as a matter of historical record, beginning in the early 1970s, there was fierce debate within the Palestinian national movement about whether to accept or reject. And there were three schools of thought. There was one that would accept nothing less than the total liberation of Palestine. There was a second that accepted what was called the establishment of a fighting national authority on Palestinian soil, which they saw-
Benny Morris
(04:09:25)
As a springboard.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:09:26)
… as a springboard for the total liberation of Palestine. And there was a third school that believed that, under current dynamics and so on, that they should go for a two-state settlement. And our friend and correspondent [inaudible 04:09:41] has written a very perceptive article on when the PLO, already in 1976, came out in open support of a two-state resolution at the Security Council. PLO accepted it. Israel, of course, rejected it. But the resolution didn’t pass because the US and the UK vetoed it. It was both of them.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:10:05)
I think it was nine to five [inaudible 04:10:06].
Mouin Rabbani
(04:10:06)
Ah, okay. Yeah. But fact of the matter is that the PLO came to accept a two-state settlement. Why they did it I think is irrelevant. And subsequently, the PLO acted on the basis of seeking to achieve a two-state settlement. The reason, I think, and I think Norm, you’ve written about this, the reason that Arafat was so insistent on getting minimally acceptable terms for a two-state settlement at Camp David and afterwards was precisely because he knew that once he signed, that was all the Palestinians were going to get. If his intention had been, “I’m not accepting Israel. I simply want to springboard,” he would’ve accepted a Palestinian state in Jericho, but he didn’t. He insisted-
Benny Morris
(04:11:00)
That’s something I’ve never understood. He should have logically accepted the springboard, and then from there, launched his next stage.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:11:07)
No, he understood what you don’t understand.
Benny Morris
(04:11:08)
He should’ve done that.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:11:09)
He understood international law would put a real constraint on him once he accepted it was over.
Benny Morris
(04:11:09)
No, but also, I think, constitutionally, he was incapable of signing.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:11:09)
I don’t know that.
Benny Morris
(04:11:20)
You’re right that he should have-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:11:21)
I’m not his [inaudible 04:11:21].
Benny Morris
(04:11:20)
… accepted it.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:11:21)
But if you’re correct, okay, that he was really out to-
Benny Morris
(04:11:26)
[inaudible 04:11:26].
Mouin Rabbani
(04:11:26)
… eliminate Israel, then he wouldn’t have cared about the borders. He wouldn’t have cared about what the thing said about refugees. He would’ve gotten a sovereign state and used that to achieve that purpose.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:11:35)
The springboard.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:11:37)
But I think it was precisely because he recognized that he was not negotiating for a springboard, he was negotiating permanent status, that he was such a stickler about the details.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:11:48)
Just as a factual matter, he wasn’t such a stickler. When they asked him how many refugees, the numbers at the-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:11:56)
It was the principle rather than the numbers.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:11:57)
It was the principle.
Benny Morris
(04:11:58)
He said they would be pragmatic about it. [inaudible 04:12:00].
Norman Finkelstein
(04:12:00)
Yes. And the numbers that were used at Annapolis were between 100 and 250,000 refugees over 10 years. That was the number. Arafat, when he was asked at Camp David, he kept saying, “I care about the Lebanese… the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon,” which came to about 300,000.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:12:23)
Those were his priority.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:12:24)
Which was a large concession from… whether you accept the number or not, that he wasn’t talking about 6 million. He was talking about between 100 and 250,000 over 10 years. Now, the best offer that came from the Palestinians… Excuse me, the best offer that came from Israel was the Olmert offer.
Lex Fridman
(04:12:44)
Can we just pretend like we didn’t all lay out the exceptionally pessimistic view of a two-state… Hold on a second. Two-state solution? Let’s pretend that in five years, in 10 years, a two-state peace settlement is reached. And as historians, you’ll still be here writing about it 20 years from now. How would it have happened?
Steven Bonnell
(04:13:09)
I think that, historically, I think that the big issue is I think that both sides have had their own internal motivations to fight because they feel like they have something to gain from it. But I think as time has gone on, unfortunately, the record proves that the Palestinian side is delusional. The longer that the conflict endures, the worse position they’ll be in.

(04:13:26)
But for some reason, they’ve never had a leader that convinced them of that as much, that Arafat thought that if he held on, there was always a better deal around the corner, that Abbas is more concerned with trying to maintain any legitimacy amongst Palestinians than actually trying to negotiate anything realistic with Israel, that Palestinians are always incentivized to feel like as long as they keep fighting, either the international community is going to save them with the 5 millionth UN resolution condemning whatever, that another ICJ advisory opinion is finally going to lead to the expulsion of half a million Jews from the West Bank, or that some other international body, the ICJ and the genocide charge, is going to come and save the Palestinians.

(04:14:00)
As long as they, in their mind, feel like somebody is coming to save them, then they feel like they’re going to have the ability to get something better in the future. But the reality is all of the good partners for peace that the Palestinians had have completely and utterly abandoned them; Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf states. Whether you’re talking bilateral peace or the Abraham Accords, most of the Arab leaders, in negotiating peace with Israel, have just not had as much of an interest in maintaining the rights and the representations of what the Palestinian people want.

(04:14:29)
And the only people they have today to draw legitimacy from or to have on their side to argue with them are people that, I guess, write books or tweet or people in the international community that do resolutions or Amnesty International reports. And the reality is, we can scream until we’re blue in the face on these things, none of it has gotten any closer to helping the Palestinians in any sense of the word.

(04:14:48)
The condition has only gotten worse. The settlements only continue to expand. The military operations are only to get more brutal. The blockade is going to continue to have worse effects. As long as we use international law as the basis and there isn’t a strong Sadat-like Palestinian leader that’s willing to come up and confront Israel with the brave, peaceful negotiations to force them to acquiesce, nothing is going to happen.

(04:15:09)
And I think that the issue you come up with is, whether it’s people like Norm that talk about how brave the October 7th attacks were or how much respect they have for those fighters, Israel, in a way… And I think people have said as much about Netanyahu. The right wants violence from the Palestinians because it always gives them a perpetual excuse to further the conflict.

(04:15:27)
“Well, we have to go in on October 7th and we’ve got to remove Hamas. Well, we can’t trust these people in the West. We have to do the night raids because the Second Intifada made us feel like the Palestinian people didn’t want trust with us.”

(04:15:38)
I feel like the biggest thing that would force Israel to change its path would be an actual, a real… not for two weeks, but an actual peaceful Palestinian leader, somebody committed to peace, that is able to apply those standards and hold the entire region of Palestine to those standards. Because I think, over time, the mounting pressure from without the international community and the mounting pressure from within because Israel hosts a lot of its own criticism, if we talk about B’Tselem, we talk about Haaretz, Israel will host a lot of its own criticism.

(04:16:05)
I think that that pressure would force Israel towards an actual peace agreement, but it’s never going to come through violence. Historically, it hasn’t. And in the modern day, violence has just hurt the Palestinians more and more.
Lex Fridman
(04:16:16)
If you paint a picture of the future, now is a good moment for both Palestine and Israel to get new leadership. Netanyahu’s on the way out, Hamas possibly is on the way out. Who should rise to the top such that a peaceful settlement can be reached? And I’d love to [inaudible 04:16:33].
Steven Bonnell
(04:16:33)
The problem is, as Benny said, yeah, it’s difficult because Hamas enjoys so much widespread support amongst the Palestinian people. I think that… Well, I don’t know. There’s opinions on whether democracy or pushing them towards elections was the right or wrong idea. But with an Islamic fundamentalist government for Hamas, I don’t know if a negotiation with Israel ever happens there.

(04:16:51)
And then when the international pressure is always ’67 borders, infinite right of return for refugees, and a total withdrawal of Israel from all these lands to even start negotiations, I just don’t see, realistically, on the Palestinian side, no negotiations are ever going to start in a place that Israel’s willing to accept.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:17:09)
If you want to dismiss international law, that’s fine, but then you have to do it consistently. You can’t set standards for the Palestinians but reject applying those standards to Israel. If we’re going to have the law of the jungle, then we can all be beasts and not only some of us. So it’s either that or you have certain agreed standards that are intended to regulate our conduct, all of our conduct, not just some of us. So that’s a fundamental-
Steven Bonnell
(04:17:46)
[inaudible 04:17:46] I’m saying to abandon?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:17:48)
Well, you’re saying international law and the millionth UN resolution, you’re being very dismissive about all these things.
Steven Bonnell
(04:17:53)
Well, I’m saying [inaudible 04:17:54]-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:17:54)
And that’s fine.
Steven Bonnell
(04:17:54)
I’m not being dismissive.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:17:54)
But then you have to be dismissive across the board.
Steven Bonnell
(04:17:56)
I’m just saying, for instance, 242, that was a Chapter VI resolution. That’s non-binding. But 242 [inaudible 04:18:01]-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:18:00)
It’s binding.
Steven Bonnell
(04:18:01)
It’s absolutely not binding.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:18:01)
It’s binding.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:18:03)
What is binding? Do you know anything about how the UN system works?
Steven Bonnell
(04:18:07)
If you read the language of the resolution, binding is typically if it commits you to upholding a particular international law or if it establishes [inaudible 04:18:13].
Norman Finkelstein
(04:18:12)
What is Chapter VI? You just throw out words. You hear binding, not binding.
Steven Bonnell
(04:18:18)
Does 424 mention a Palestinian state?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:18:20)
Norm-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:18:20)
Of course not.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:18:21)
That’s part of the problem.
Steven Bonnell
(04:18:22)
Yeah, exactly.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:18:22)
That was the reason why the Palestinians didn’t want to recognize 242 because they only referred, at the very end, the refugee problem.
Steven Bonnell
(04:18:31)
Sure, but the PLO recognized 181 and 242 [inaudible 04:18:31].
Mouin Rabbani
(04:18:31)
Yeah, but hold on. Hold on. Every United Nations Security Council resolution, irrespective of under which chapter it was adopted, is, by definition, binding. Binding not only on the members of the Security Council but on every member state of the UN. Read the UN Charter. It’s black and white.
Steven Bonnell
(04:18:51)
Sure. People can look that up [inaudible 04:18:53]-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:18:53)
Yes.
Steven Bonnell
(04:18:54)
… but the language even of 242 is kept intentionally vague such that it doesn’t actually provide, again, the final [inaudible 04:18:59]-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:18:58)
It’s actually not that vague-
Steven Bonnell
(04:18:58)
It’s incredibly vague.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:19:01)
… because the term “land for peace” originates in 242. The idea is-
Steven Bonnell
(04:19:06)
Sure, but the part about territorial acquisition and Israel’s need to give it up was kept vague. That’s why, in ’79, Israel thought that they fulfilled their obligations under 242 [inaudible 04:19:13]-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:19:13)
You asked a separate question.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:19:15)
Allow me points of information. The first principle in UN Resolution 242 is that the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force-
Steven Bonnell
(04:19:25)
Which is meaningless.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:19:27)
It may be meaningless to you, Mr. Bonnell.
Steven Bonnell
(04:19:29)
It was meaningless to everyone in the region.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:19:30)
Okay. Mr. Bonnell, that principle was adopted by the Friendly Nations Resolution, the UN General Assembly in 1970. That resolution was then reiterated in the International Court of Justice ruling, advisory opinion in 2004. That was the basis of the coalition against Iraq when it acquired Kuwait and then declared it a province of Kuwait.
Steven Bonnell
(04:20:03)
Which Arafat supported.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:20:04)
That’s what’s called-
Benny Morris
(04:20:06)
That’s true. Arafat did-
Steven Bonnell
(04:20:06)
Arafat did support it.
Benny Morris
(04:20:07)
Arafat did support it.
Steven Bonnell
(04:20:11)
[inaudible 04:20:11].
Norman Finkelstein
(04:20:10)
It’s not accurate. I’m not going to go there. I’m not going to go there.
Steven Bonnell
(04:20:13)
It’s not accurate that Arafat endorsed-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:20:15)
Okay, I’m not going to go there.
Steven Bonnell
(04:20:16)
Okay. [inaudible 04:20:18].
Norman Finkelstein
(04:20:17)
It’s called, under international law, jus cogens or peremptory norms of international law, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. That is not controversial. It’s not vague. You couldn’t put it more succinctly. You cannot acquire territory by force under international law.
Steven Bonnell
(04:20:39)
On the West Bank before ’67, who owned the Gaza Strip before ’67?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:20:43)
Mr. Bonnell, don’t change the subject. If you don’t know what you’re talking about-
Steven Bonnell
(04:20:50)
It’s not about [inaudible 04:20:50]-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:20:49)
… at least have the humility-
Steven Bonnell
(04:20:55)
How close has 242-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:20:55)
You talk about Chapter VI-
Steven Bonnell
(04:20:55)
How close has 242 gotten-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:20:55)
You don’t know Chapter VI-
Steven Bonnell
(04:20:55)
How close has 242 gotten the Palestinians to peace?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:20:58)
You don’t know Chapter VI from tweet five. You have no idea what you’re talking about. It’s just so embarrassing. At least have some humility. Between us who have read maybe 10,000 books on the topic and you’ve read two Wikipedia entries and you start talking about Chapter VI. Do you know what Chapter VII is?
Steven Bonnell
(04:21:17)
Answer me. Answer the question.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:21:18)
Do you know what Chapter VII is?
Steven Bonnell
(04:21:19)
Norm, answer the question. How close has 242 gotten the Palestinians to a state?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:21:22)
Let me ask you this.
Steven Bonnell
(04:21:23)
How close has the 2004 advisory opinion gotten the West Bank settlement [inaudible 04:21:26]?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:21:26)
What’s your alternative?
Steven Bonnell
(04:21:27)
The alternative is not this, whatever this making money off the conflict is. The actual alternative-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:21:33)
[inaudible 04:21:33] making money-
Steven Bonnell
(04:21:33)
The actual alternative-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:21:34)
Destiny should talk about making money off of idiocy.
Steven Bonnell
(04:21:37)
Yes. Yeah, you’re a media [inaudible 04:21:37] when you go and talk to 50 million different people about your awesome [inaudible 04:21:40].
Benny Morris
(04:21:40)
But he has a point, though.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:21:43)
What point?
Steven Bonnell
(04:21:43)
But the issue is you have to negotiate-
Benny Morris
(04:21:43)
All these resolutions have gotten the Palestinians no closer to a state.
Steven Bonnell
(04:21:46)
Nothing.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:21:48)
Yeah, but hold on. Because they haven’t been enforced because of the US veto.
Benny Morris
(04:21:49)
They’re not going to be enforced.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:21:51)
Wait, wait, wait, wait.
Benny Morris
(04:21:51)
They’ve gotten nowhere-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:21:51)
If I may, if I may-
Steven Bonnell
(04:21:52)
[inaudible 04:21:52].
Norman Finkelstein
(04:21:51)
You know what? You know what? Professor Morris-
Steven Bonnell
(04:21:58)
[inaudible 04:21:58] about the case for genocide.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:21:58)
Professor Morris, because of your logic, and I’m not disputing it, that’s why October 7th happened.
Benny Morris
(04:22:05)
Oh my God.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:22:06)
Because there was no options left for those people. Exactly what Mouin said.
Benny Morris
(04:22:13)
And now what options are left? After October 7th-
Steven Bonnell
(04:22:15)
This has been the Palestinian mentality for 60 years.
Benny Morris
(04:22:21)
… what’s the options left?
Steven Bonnell
(04:22:21)
The only option is conflict.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:22:21)
Listen to this.
Steven Bonnell
(04:22:21)
The only option is combat.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:22:21)
Mr. Bonnell is now an expert on Palestinian mentality.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:22:22)
Hold on. You’re contradicting yourself.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:22:22)
You know as much about Palestinian politics as you know about Chapter V.
Steven Bonnell
(04:22:27)
I only deal with facts. I only deal with facts. Egypt didn’t find it necessary to-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:22:28)
Tell me about Chapter V.
Steven Bonnell
(04:22:30)
Egypt didn’t find it necessary-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:22:33)
Tell me about Chapter V.
Steven Bonnell
(04:22:33)
… to negotiate peace [inaudible 04:22:34] the Palestinians. Jordan didn’t find it necessary to negotiate peace [inaudible 04:22:36] the Palestinians.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:22:36)
Hey, if I may-
Steven Bonnell
(04:22:36)
The Abraham Accords [inaudible 04:22:37] the Palestinians-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:22:38)
Talk faster, faster, faster, faster.
Steven Bonnell
(04:22:38)
… despite all of the international law-
Lex Fridman
(04:22:38)
Everybody, Mouin.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:22:38)
Faster.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:22:42)
You’re contradicting yourself. On the one hand, you’re saying all the Palestinians do is fight and violence and terrorism and all the rest of it, but on the other hand, you’re saying they’re expecting salvation from UN resolutions and international court. Those aren’t violent.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:23:00)
It’s the law.
Steven Bonnell
(04:23:00)
No, but it’s part of maintaining-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:23:00)
It’s the law.
Steven Bonnell
(04:23:01)
It’s the continual putting off of negotiating any solution.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:23:06)
[inaudible 04:23:06].
Mouin Rabbani
(04:23:05)
They’ve negotiated.
Steven Bonnell
(04:23:06)
As in when Arafat takes 10 days to respond-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:23:07)
I think he said-
Steven Bonnell
(04:23:09)
When Arafat takes 10 days to respond and hops on a jet all over the world to go and visit his friends, yes.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:23:09)
I think Mouin said-
Steven Bonnell
(04:23:14)
But it’s for putting the conflict off indefinitely.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:23:15)
… they accepted two states in 1975. Brace yourself.
Benny Morris
(04:23:15)
They didn’t.
Steven Bonnell
(04:23:15)
Why didn’t they accept the Taba Summit then?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:23:18)
Brace yourself. That’s 50 years ago.
Steven Bonnell
(04:23:19)
Why didn’t they accept the Camp David [inaudible 04:23:19]?
Benny Morris
(04:23:19)
This is a legend.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:23:19)
That’s a half-century ago.
Benny Morris
(04:23:19)
No, no, they didn’t accept a two-state solution [inaudible 04:23:26].
Norman Finkelstein
(04:23:28)
He quoted a very good article [inaudible 04:23:28].
Steven Bonnell
(04:23:28)
You can quote Arafat talking about how he’s lying and he’s just going to use… In ’94 and ’95 when he’s making trips around the world, how he just wanted [inaudible 04:23:35] starting ground.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:23:37)
Talk faster. Talk faster.
Steven Bonnell
(04:23:37)
I’m sorry. I can’t talk slow. You can watch [inaudible 04:23:38] and slow it down to 0.5 speed if you don’t understand what I’m saying.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:23:41)
Faster. Faster.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:23:42)
There’s a very lengthy history-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:23:44)
Motor mouth.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:23:44)
… of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. You want to deny that those negotiations took place.
Steven Bonnell
(04:23:49)
Where it feels like there was a good-faith effort-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:23:53)
What it feels like.
Steven Bonnell
(04:23:53)
Where there was a good-faith effort-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:23:53)
Feels like.
Steven Bonnell
(04:23:55)
Where there was a good-faith effort-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:23:56)
We have a written record.
Steven Bonnell
(04:23:57)
With all due respect-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:23:57)
We have a written record, Mr. Bonnell.
Steven Bonnell
(04:23:58)
Mr. Pop History, you can’t even read the written records. I don’t know why you’re referring to them. Okay.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:24:01)
Excuse me? I just said there are 15,000 pages on Annapolis.
Steven Bonnell
(04:24:06)
And I’m sure you cherry-picked your favorite quotes from all of them. Okay.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:24:06)
I don’t cherry-pick.
Steven Bonnell
(04:24:06)
That’s great. That’s great.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:24:08)
Mr. Bonnell, at least I had a quote to cherry-pick.
Steven Bonnell
(04:24:10)
That’s great. [inaudible 04:24:12].
Norman Finkelstein
(04:24:12)
All you have is Wikipedia.
Steven Bonnell
(04:24:15)
I gave you quotes.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:24:16)
All you have is Wikipedia.
Steven Bonnell
(04:24:16)
Do you want quotes? Find me the information that shows the Palestinian cause has been furthered by any international law. You can’t do it.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:24:24)
I think the problem is different. Okay. You want to say the Palestinians were only fighting. And then when I point out they’ve also gone to the court and the UN, you say, “Well, all they do then is these things and they should be negotiating.” And I demonstrate that there was a lengthy record of negotiations. You said, “Yeah, but they didn’t go in good faith.” Again, you’re placing the hamster in the wheel and telling him if he runs fast enough, maybe one day he’ll get out of the cage.
Steven Bonnell
(04:24:53)
What was the best good-faith negotiation on the side of the-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:24:53)
Okay. Please, if I could just finish. I think the fundamental problem here is not what the Palestinians have and haven’t done, and it’s perfectly legitimate to have a discussion about whether they could have been more effective. Of course, they could have been more effective. Everyone could have always been more effective. The fundamental issue here is that Israel has never been prepared to concede the legitimacy of Palestinian national rights in the land of the former British mandate of Palestine.
Steven Bonnell
(04:25:29)
Then how do you explain Taba Summit? How do you explain Camp David?
Benny Morris
(04:25:29)
No, Barack and Olmert did accept the legitimacy-
Steven Bonnell
(04:25:34)
How do you explain Olmert’s offer to Abbas? Yeah.
Benny Morris
(04:25:35)
… of Palestinian demands. But they didn’t want to give the Palestinians all of Palestine, that’s all.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:25:42)
No, all of Palestine? No, no.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:25:44)
You mean all of the occupied territories?
Benny Morris
(04:25:46)
You’re talking about all of Palestine being occupied territory?
Steven Bonnell
(04:25:49)
Wait. What is the occupied territories?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:25:50)
Professor Morris.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:25:50)
The occupied territories-
Steven Bonnell
(04:25:51)
Is that all of Israel?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:25:51)
Professor Morris, could you show me-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:25:52)
The occupied territories are those territories that Israel occupied in June of 1967.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:25:59)
Could you show me-
Benny Morris
(04:25:59)
Palestinians often use that term to define the whole of Palestine, not just the West Bank.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:26:03)
Could you show me, Professor Morris, in all the negotiations, all the negotiations and all the accounts that have been written, can you show me one where the Palestinians in the negotiations, because that’s what we were talking about, wanted all of Israel? The maximum-
Benny Morris
(04:26:27)
They can’t say that because the international community won’t accept it.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:26:27)
Oh, so you know it because you know what-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:26:27)
So they didn’t say it. They didn’t ask for it.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:26:29)
… but you know what’s in their hearts.
Benny Morris
(04:26:30)
No, Hamas did. Hamas always said all of it.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:26:33)
Hamas only negotiated with Israel about prisoner exchanges [inaudible 04:26:36].
Benny Morris
(04:26:36)
No, I know. But they represent-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:26:39)
So we were talking about the negotiations.
Benny Morris
(04:26:39)
… a lot of the Palestinian people, you will agree.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:26:40)
The only place I saw pieces of Israel were the land swaps, and the land swaps accounted for about 2-5% of Israel. Nobody asked for all of Israel. Why do you say things like that?
Steven Bonnell
(04:26:52)
What do you mean? They asked for all of Israel in ’48. They asked for all of Israel in ’67. What do you think those reports were about?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:26:52)
Okay. Mr. Bonnell, you talk so-
Steven Bonnell
(04:26:57)
You’re not going to respond to anything I’m saying because you have no answer.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:27:01)
I’ll respond to you. Okay. Mr. Bonnell, we were talking about the diplomatic negotiations beginning with 2001.
Steven Bonnell
(04:27:10)
Yes, I understand, but you can’t pretend that the first ask for Israel was in diplomacy. It was through war.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:27:16)
Okay. You don’t know what you’re talking about.
Steven Bonnell
(04:27:16)
Is the international law argument ever going to get the Palestinians closer to state? Is the Israeli state ever going to be dismantled? Do you think that’s realistic coming up, ever, in the next 20 years?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:27:26)
Again, I’m posing a question, and the question is, regardless of what’s feasible or realistic today, the question I’m posing is, can you have peace in the Middle East with this militant, irrational, genocidal, apartheid state and power?
Steven Bonnell
(04:27:49)
[inaudible 04:27:49] I don’t think so, no.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:27:50)
Okay. And the question I’m asking is, can you have peace with this regime or does this regime and its institutions need to be dismantled, similar to the examples I gave of Europe and Southern Africa?
Steven Bonnell
(04:28:05)
How do you contend with the fact that most of the surrounding Arab states seem to agree that you can?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:28:09)
Yeah, you’re correct. Several of them, most importantly, Egypt, Jordan, have made their peace with Israel. I should add that Israel’s conduct since then has placed these relations under strain. I had very little… I didn’t take the reports of a Saudi-Israeli rapprochement particularly seriously before October 7th, the reason being that it was really a Saudi-Israeli-US deal, which committed the US to make certain commitments to Saudi Arabia that would probably never get through Congress.
Steven Bonnell
(04:28:48)
Do you not consider the Egypt-Israeli peace deal legitimate then since the United States made a great financial contribution to Egypt?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:28:55)
I don’t think the question is whether that deal is legitimate or not. I think that deal exists. But the point is, the core of this conflict is not between Israel and Egypt. The core of this conflict is between Israel and the Palestinian people.

(04:29:18)
And the reason that Israel agreed to relinquish the occupied Egyptian Sinai and the reason that Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed in 1979 is because Israel, in 1973, recognized that its military superiority was ultimately no match for Egypt’s determination to recover its occupied territories and that there would come a point when Egypt would find a way to extract an unbearable price.
Benny Morris
(04:29:48)
Maybe just Israelis wanted peace.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:29:50)
Well, the Israelis wanted-
Benny Morris
(04:29:51)
Not just because they were afraid of what Egypt might do at some point.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:29:54)
If you’re talking about the average Israeli citizen, I think that’s a fair characterization. If you’re talking about the Israeli leadership, I think they looked at it in more strategic terms of how do you remove-
Benny Morris
(04:29:54)
I think it’s both.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:29:54)
… the most powerful Arab military states from the equation?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:30:06)
Two points. Simple points. What was the terms of that Egypt-Israel peace treaty? International law, Egypt demanded every-
Benny Morris
(04:30:18)
Nobody cared about international law.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:30:20)
Allow me to finish. Every single inch of Egyptian-
Benny Morris
(04:30:30)
Nobody [inaudible 04:30:30] about international law.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:30:30)
Okay.
Benny Morris
(04:30:30)
Begin and Carter and Sadat talk about the realities-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:30:30)
No, Professor-
Benny Morris
(04:30:31)
… of Israel occupying territory and wanting peace.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:30:33)
Professor Morris, I know the record. They demanded, as you know because you’ve written about it, they demanded every square inch, as you know. They demanded the oil fields be dismantled, the airfields be dismantled.
Benny Morris
(04:30:34)
No, not dismantle. They wanted the oil fields.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:30:50)
And they wanted the settlements dismantled.
Benny Morris
(04:30:51)
They wanted the settlements dismantled.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:30:55)
The settlements, the oil fields, and the airfield, they demanded all three back. You can’t have-
Benny Morris
(04:31:01)
What do you mean “back”? The airfields weren’t there when the Egyptians were there.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:31:04)
Okay. That’s incorrect.
Benny Morris
(04:31:04)
What’s incorrect?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:31:06)
You’re incorrect.
Benny Morris
(04:31:07)
The airfields were built after-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:31:08)
They built an airfield. The Israelis built an airfield in the occupied Sinai.
Benny Morris
(04:31:12)
Yes.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:31:12)
And they wanted it back.
Benny Morris
(04:31:14)
They didn’t want it back. It wasn’t theirs.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:31:15)
Okay.
Benny Morris
(04:31:16)
They wanted the territory in which the airfields were built back.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:31:19)
The oil fields, the airfields, the settlements had to be dismantled.
Benny Morris
(04:31:23)
Yes.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:31:24)
Begin said, “I don’t want to be the first prime minister to dismantle a settlement.”
Benny Morris
(04:31:29)
But he did.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:31:29)
But he did. Why? Because of the law.
Benny Morris
(04:31:31)
No.
Steven Bonnell
(04:31:31)
No. It was because of peace… It was normalization-
Benny Morris
(04:31:32)
Nobody cared about the law. The law had nothing to do with anything. It was a negotiation between two states-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:31:32)
Mr. Morris. Mr. Morris.
Benny Morris
(04:31:40)
… each of which wanted certain things.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:31:41)
Palestinians [inaudible 04:31:42]-
Benny Morris
(04:31:42)
The law had nothing to do with anything.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:31:43)
… as they said repeatedly in the negotiations-
Benny Morris
(04:31:48)
You’re not listening. You’re not listening.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:31:48)
I know-
Benny Morris
(04:31:48)
You’re missing the whole point.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:31:49)
I’ve read the negotiations.
Benny Morris
(04:31:49)
The law has nothing to do with anything.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:31:50)
There were two foreign relations of US volumes on it.
Benny Morris
(04:31:53)
Nobody cared about the law.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:31:55)
The Palestinians kept saying, “We want exactly-“
Benny Morris
(04:31:58)
Forget the Palestinians. They weren’t there.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:31:58)
Allow me to finish. The Palestinians kept saying, “We want what Egypt got.”
Norman Finkelstein
(04:32:00)
The Palestinians kept saying, “We want what Egypt got. We want what Egypt got.” Egypt got everything back.
Benny Morris
(04:32:07)
But nothing to do with the law.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:32:07)
Okay.
Benny Morris
(04:32:07)
Nothing to do with the law.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:32:09)
And number two, I’m not saying it’s the whole picture, but as Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan said at the time, he said, “If a car has four wheels and you remove one wheel, the car can’t move.” And for them, removing Egypt from the Arab front would then remove any Arab military threat to Israel.
Benny Morris
(04:32:38)
Yeah, but it’s got nothing to do with the international law.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:32:40)
No, the first part did, and that’s what the Palestinians kept saying-
Benny Morris
(04:32:45)
I don’t know what the first part is.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:32:46)
… “We want what each Egypt got from the settlement.”
Benny Morris
(04:32:48)
Yeah, that’s true, but forget the international law.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:32:50)
By the way-
Benny Morris
(04:32:50)
It had nothing to do with negotiations.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:32:51)
… one last thing on a personal note. The quote about Sharm El Sheikh without peace, that’s the only thing you ever cited from a book of mine.
Benny Morris
(04:33:04)
I’ve cited from your book?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:33:05)
Yes. I was absolutely shocked at your betrayal of your people. That was pure treason.I
Benny Morris
(04:33:14)
I apologize for that. I apologize.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:33:14)
Okay, I accept.

Hope for the future

Lex Fridman
(04:33:18)
All right. Well, let me try once again, for the region and for the entirety of humanity, what gives you hope? We just heard a lot of pessimistic, cynical takes. What gives you hope?
Benny Morris
(04:33:30)
People don’t like war. That’s a good reason, that’s hope. In other words, the fear of war, the disaster of war, should give people an impetus to try and seek peace.
Lex Fridman
(04:33:41)
When you look at people in Gaza and people on the West Bank, people in Israel, fundamentally they hate war?
Benny Morris
(04:33:49)
Yes, I think so.
Lex Fridman
(04:33:51)
What gives you hope?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:33:52)
There is no hope, no. It’s an extreme… Hey, I’m not happy to say that.
Steven Bonnell
(04:33:58)
Of course you are.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:34:02)
It’s a very bleak moment right now.
Benny Morris
(04:34:04)
That I agree with. I agree with that.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:34:07)
Because Israel believes it has to restore what it calls its deterrence capability. I think you’ve written about it actually, I just realized. Israel has to restore its deterrence capability, and after the catastrophe of October 7th, restoring its deterrence capacity means… this part you didn’t write about… the annihilation of Gaza and then moving on to the Hezbollah.

(04:34:34)
So the Israelis are dead set on restoring that deterrence capability. On the Arab side, and I know Mouin and I have disagreed on it, and we’re allowed to disagree, I think the Arab side, the lesson they learned from October 7th is Israelis aren’t as strong as we thought they were.
Benny Morris
(04:34:56)
That would be an unfortunate message if that’s really what the Arabs come to believe.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:35:02)
And they think that there is a military option now. I think that it’s a zero-sum game at this point, and it’s very, very bleak, and I’m not going to lie about that. Now, I will admit my predictive capacities are not perfect-
Benny Morris
(04:35:20)
Are limited.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:35:21)
… are limited, but for the moment it’s a very bleak situation-
Benny Morris
(04:35:25)
That I agree with.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:35:25)
… and I don’t see right now a way out. However, at the very minimum, permanent ceasefire ended in human and illegal blockade of Gaza, and free the hostages.
Benny Morris
(04:35:38)
Why is it illegal? They were shooting rockets at Israel for 20 years. Why is that illegal to blockade Gaza?
Steven Bonnell
(04:35:45)
He thinks they’re bottle rockets, that’s what he calls them [inaudible 04:35:47].
Norman Finkelstein
(04:35:48)
Why is it illegal? I’ll tell you why.
Benny Morris
(04:35:49)
You don’t rocket your neighbor. You rocket your neighbor, expect consequences.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:35:53)
I’ll tell you why.
Benny Morris
(04:35:54)
Expect consequences.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:35:55)
But that works both ways.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:35:55)
Yes.
Benny Morris
(04:35:56)
I know, and I accept that, it works both ways.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:35:58)
Professor Morris. I’ll tell you why. Because every human rights, humanitarian and UN organization in the world-
Benny Morris
(04:35:59)
They’re all irrelevant.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:36:07)
… has said that the blockade-
Benny Morris
(04:36:09)
You keep quoting them. Nobody cares about Amnesty.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:36:12)
… is a form of collective punishment-
Benny Morris
(04:36:14)
Nobody cares about Amnesty.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:36:15)
… which is illegal under international law.
Benny Morris
(04:36:17)
Forget illegal. The word illegal is…
Norman Finkelstein
(04:36:18)
You think a blockade which-
Benny Morris
(04:36:19)
You don’t understand the way the world works. These things are irrelevant.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:36:23)
And you think confining, because that’s the blockade-
Benny Morris
(04:36:27)
Yes, you don’t shoot rockets at your neighbor.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:36:30)
… confining a million children-
Benny Morris
(04:36:32)
That’s the choice of Hamas.
Steven Bonnell
(04:36:32)
Children?
Benny Morris
(04:36:32)
That’s Hamas’ choice.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:36:33)
Confining a million children in what The Economist calls a human rubbish heap-
Benny Morris
(04:36:41)
The Economist supported Israel in this war, and continues to support Israel.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:36:44)
Okay. What International Committee of The Red Cross called a sinking ship, what the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called a toxic slum, you think-
Benny Morris
(04:36:55)
It is a slum, of course it’s a slum, but it’s caused by the Hamas.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:36:58)
… under international law, you think it’s legitimate-
Benny Morris
(04:37:01)
Forget the law.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:37:02)
Hey, I know you want to forget the law.
Benny Morris
(04:37:04)
What about morality? Forget the law, what about morality?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:37:07)
It’s what every Israeli fears the most.
Benny Morris
(04:37:10)
What?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:37:11)
The law.
Benny Morris
(04:37:13)
No, no, no.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:37:13)
As Tzipi Livni said, “I studied international law. I oppose international law.” Of course you don’t want to hear about the law.
Benny Morris
(04:37:22)
That has got nothing to do with anything.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:37:23)
Okay, so here’s the thing. Then don’t complain about October 7th.
Benny Morris
(04:37:23)
Do you hear me complaining? I didn’t complain.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:37:28)
If you want to say forget about the law-
Benny Morris
(04:37:32)
All I said was they acted like barbarians.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:37:34)
… when there is no international humanitarian law, there’s no distinction between civilians and combatants-
Benny Morris
(04:37:41)
There should be, but it’s got nothing to do with the law.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:37:45)
Now you’re doing what Mouin said, you’re becoming very selective about the law. If you want to forget about the law-
Benny Morris
(04:37:51)
People should be [inaudible 04:37:51].
Mouin Rabbani
(04:37:51)
Across the board.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:37:51)
… Hamas had every right to do what it did. It had every right to do what it did according to you, not to me, because you want to forget the law.
Steven Bonnell
(04:37:59)
Do you still support the Houthis shooting random ships?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:38:01)
Absolutely.
Steven Bonnell
(04:38:02)
Okay, that’s a violation of international law, so you play the same game.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:38:05)
Absolutely. And were there are power during World War II who had the courage of the Houthis, were there are power that had that kind of courage-
Steven Bonnell
(04:38:16)
So courageous to be bombing merchant ships while tens of thousands of people die of actual starvation, not the starvation that exists in the Gaza Strip where people before October 7th don’t die of starvation. Not the concentration camp, as they say of the Gaza Strip. The Houthis.
Benny Morris
(04:38:28)
What about starvation in Yemen? Don’t that have something better to do?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:38:28)
That was the Houthis.
Benny Morris
(04:38:30)
Yes, I know. Don’t they have anything better to do?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:38:30)
That was the Houthis, and you know in three years they blew up 180,000 people.
Benny Morris
(04:38:37)
Shouldn’t they be feeding the Yemenis?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:38:38)
You know, 60,000 Yemenis died in starvation?
Benny Morris
(04:38:42)
Why fight the western powers in Israel when you should be taking care of your problems at home, the Houthis.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:38:47)
Often the only allies of the dispossessed are those who experience similar circumstances.
Benny Morris
(04:38:53)
Don’t you think that they should take care of the Yemeni problems?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:38:57)
As I said-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:38:58)
I’m very happy they’re helping out the Palestinians.
Benny Morris
(04:39:02)
It’s at the expense of the Yemenis. They’ll pay for it.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:39:05)
Anybody who comes to the aid of those suffering the genocide-
Benny Morris
(04:39:06)
There’s no genocide.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:39:09)
… half of whom are children… Yeah, according to the most current UN reports, as of today-
Benny Morris
(04:39:15)
There’s no genocide.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:39:15)
… one quarter of the population of Gaza-
Benny Morris
(04:39:18)
Is starving.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:39:19)
That means 500,000 children-
Benny Morris
(04:39:22)
Are starving,
Norman Finkelstein
(04:39:23)
… are on the verge of famine.
Benny Morris
(04:39:25)
They keep saying on the verge of.
Steven Bonnell
(04:39:27)
On the verge of. Didn’t you quote that they said it was unlivable?
Benny Morris
(04:39:29)
I have not seen one Palestinian die of starvation in these last four months. Not one.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:39:34)
There have been documented cases.
Benny Morris
(04:39:38)
They are always on the verge. They’re on the verge.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:39:38)
There have been documented cases.
Benny Morris
(04:39:38)
I haven’t seen any.
Steven Bonnell
(04:39:40)
Yesterday Al Jazeera said six, and the day before that they said two, so those are the two.
Benny Morris
(04:39:44)
That number probably dies in Israel of starvation also.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:39:47)
I don’t think there’s famine in Israel.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:39:49)
You’re so laid back, so blasĆ©.
Benny Morris
(04:39:49)
There isn’t. There isn’t in the Gaza Strip either. It’s something which is produced for the Western-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:39:54)
“I haven’t seen any starving children yet.”
Mouin Rabbani
(04:39:55)
There are infants dying due to a engineered lack of access to food and nutrition.
Benny Morris
(04:40:02)
I don’t think it’s engineered, I think that if the Hamas stopped shooting perhaps, or-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:40:05)
Unfortunately, most-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:40:07)
As I said, engineered.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:40:08)
I think Human Rights Watch called it using starvation as a weapon. That’s called engineering.
Steven Bonnell
(04:40:15)
That’s what they did, but you were pushed on this by Coleman Hughes to bring up an example of why is the Gaza Strip, by what metric are they starving? By what metric is it so behind the rest of the world?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:40:25)
If we’re going to bring up-
Steven Bonnell
(04:40:27)
I want to hear an answer to that, because he didn’t answer it before.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:40:28)
I’m happy to answer it. I just quoted you from the humanitarian organizations. They said one quarter of the population of Gaza is now verging on famine.
Steven Bonnell
(04:40:37)
Before October 7th.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:40:38)
I’m not going before October 7th.
Steven Bonnell
(04:40:40)
But you used that as justification for Hamas fighting. You said the conditions were unlivable, they had to fight.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:40:44)
I said to him-
Steven Bonnell
(04:40:44)
So my question is what made it unlivable prior to October 7th? What are the metrics that you’re using?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:40:49)
There were about five, six or seven reports issued by UNCTAD, issued by the World Bank, issued by the International Monetary Fund, and they all said that’s why.
Steven Bonnell
(04:41:04)
Why? Why did they say that?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:41:05)
That’s why The Economist, not a radical periodical, described Gaza as a human rubbish heap.
Steven Bonnell
(04:41:12)
So tell me by what metrics? If you’re a historian, if you do all this work to get to things, tell me what they said. Don’t just tell me a sentence, tell me by what metric.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:41:12)
Mr. Bonnell.
Steven Bonnell
(04:41:12)
He’s not going to answer again.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:41:23)
I don’t think I’ve avoided any of your questions-
Steven Bonnell
(04:41:25)
Of course you have, you’ve avoided every question.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:41:26)
… except when they breached the threshold of complete imbecility.
Steven Bonnell
(04:41:31)
So you were about to tell me by what metric the Gaza Strip is a humanitarian crisis.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:41:34)
I’m going to answer you. You remember what I said a moment ago, I said to Professor Morris, I defer to expertise? I look at what the organizations say. I look at what the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights said.
Steven Bonnell
(04:41:47)
You’re saying in more words that you don’t know. You don’t know or you don’t care.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:41:48)
And I don’t know.
Steven Bonnell
(04:41:49)
Okay, that’s fine. That’s what I said.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:41:52)
Have you ever investigated how complicated is the metric for hunger, starvation, and famine? It is such a complicated metric they figured out, if you asked me to repeat it now, I couldn’t do it.
Steven Bonnell
(04:42:05)
And yet we have a Human Development Index where we rank countries, yet we can still measure infant mortality-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:42:10)
Okay, you go and call the news programs.
Steven Bonnell
(04:42:12)
… life expectancy, we can measure all of these things.
Lex Fridman
(04:42:14)
Mouin, I’m holding out for you here. You still didn’t answer the hope question. What gives you a source of hope about the region?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:42:22)
Well, first of all, I would agree with Benny Morris and Norman Finkelstein that the current situation is bleak, and I think it would be unreasonable to expect it to not get even bleaker in the coming weeks and months. And we now, this conflict, really, it originated in the late 19th century, it’s been a more or less active conflict since the 1920s, 1930s, and it has produced a tremendous amount of suffering, and regional conflict, and geopolitical complications, and all of that. But what gives me hope is that throughout their entire ordeal, the Palestinian people have never surrendered, and I believe they never will surrender to overwhelming force and violence. They have taken everything that Israel has thrown at them, they have taken everything that the West has thrown at them, they have taken everything that those who are supposed to be their natural allies have on occasion thrown at them.

(04:43:39)
But this is a people that never has and, I believe, never will surrender. At a certain point, I think Israel and its leaders will have to come to the realization that by hook or by crook, these people are going to achieve their inalienable and legitimate national rights, and that is going to be a reality.
Benny Morris
(04:44:12)
Well, what do you mean by that? You mean all of Palestine? Is that what you mean?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:44:18)
No.
Benny Morris
(04:44:19)
From the river to the sea?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:44:20)
Well, ideally, of course, yes. And what I was….
Benny Morris
(04:44:23)
Are those the inalienable rights?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:44:25)
No. What I was saying earlier, and then the discussion got sidetracked, is that I did believe that a two-state settlement, a partition of Palestine along the 1967 boundaries would have been a reasonable solution, because I think it also would have opened pathways to further-
Benny Morris
(04:44:54)
But now you believe what?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:44:55)
… further nonviolent engagement between Israel and the Palestinians that could create other forms of coexistence in a federal, or binational, or other-
Steven Bonnell
(04:45:06)
What do you think about refugees in regards to that? Do you think there has to be a resettlement of the five or six million, whoever wants to lay claim to be [inaudible 04:45:12]?
Benny Morris
(04:45:11)
A return?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:45:13)
I think there has to be an explicit acknowledgement of…
Benny Morris
(04:45:19)
Responsibility?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:45:20)
… of the responsibility-
Benny Morris
(04:45:22)
And the return?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:45:23)
… and of their rights. I think that in the framework of a two-state settlement, I think a formula would need to be found that does not undermine the foundations of a two-state settlement. And I don’t think it would be that difficult, because I suspect that there are probably large numbers of Palestinian refugees who, once their rights are acknowledged, will find it exceptionally distasteful-
Benny Morris
(04:45:59)
To return from [inaudible 04:46:00].
Mouin Rabbani
(04:45:59)
… to have to live among the kind of sentiments that we’ve heard around this table today, to be quite frank. I mean, I was previously unfamiliar with you, and I watched one of your preparation videos. Very disconcerting stuff, I have to say. You were explaining two days ago, in the discussion about apartheid and how absurd it was, that in your view Jim Crow was not apartheid, but Arab states not giving citizenship to Palestinian refugees is apartheid. That’s what I meant with my earlier comments about white supremacy.
Steven Bonnell
(04:46:37)
That’s great, the white supremacy comment. Well, hold on, let me respond. My issue is that I feel like we have jumped on this euphemistic treadmill, and I think that’s part of the reason why this conflict will never get solved, is because on one end you’ve got a people who are now convinced internationally that they’re victims of apartheid, genocide, concentration camp conditions, ethnic cleansing, they’re forced to live in an open air prison, with all of these things that are stacked against them, all of these terms that are highly specific, that refer to very precise things. And then when people like you say that they should-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:47:09)
Well, I would expect nothing less from someone who doesn’t think Jim Crow is apartheid, but who does think that Arab states not giving Palestinians-
Steven Bonnell
(04:47:14)
The problem is you’re morally loading. For you apartheid is when racists do bad things.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:47:18)
No. There’s a definition of apartheid.
Steven Bonnell
(04:47:21)
That’s great.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:47:22)
There is a very clear definition of apartheid.
Steven Bonnell
(04:47:22)
A specific top-down racial domination, enacted through top-down, like federal legislative policies or whatever, means that I don’t know if Jim Crow would have qualified for apartheid. That doesn’t make it any less…
Norman Finkelstein
(04:47:34)
Have you ever heard of Plessy versus Ferguson?
Steven Bonnell
(04:47:35)
Excuse me. Finkelstein, I’m talking right now. Excuse me, excuse me Twinklestein, I’m talking to your friend over here. I don’t know if it would have qualified as the crime of apartheid, just like if Israel were to literally nuke the Gaza Strip and kill two million people, I don’t know if that would qualify for the crime of genocide.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:47:47)
In your eyes probably not.
Steven Bonnell
(04:47:49)
Well, yeah, but because genocide requires a special intent. I think the issue is, instead of… And I think this conversation actually is emblematic of the entire conversation.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:47:57)
Then let me finish answering Benny Morris’s question.
Steven Bonnell
(04:47:59)
Well sure, but you accused me of supporting racism.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:48:03)
Well, you did.
Steven Bonnell
(04:48:03)
I didn’t.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:48:03)
And you are.
Steven Bonnell
(04:48:03)
Do you think I support Jim Crow laws?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:48:06)
Look, when-
Steven Bonnell
(04:48:07)
The fact that you can’t even answer that honestly, right?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:48:09)
It doesn’t matter what-
Steven Bonnell
(04:48:09)
You couldn’t say that 800 civilians were killed by Hamas, you said, “Well, maybe 400 were killed by Israel. I don’t know the number, maybe-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:48:15)
No, I didn’t say that.
Steven Bonnell
(04:48:16)
You said 400.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:48:16)
No, I didn’t say that.
Steven Bonnell
(04:48:17)
You co-signed the opinion.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:48:18)
No, I didn’t.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:48:19)
No, he didn’t. He said the majority [inaudible 04:48:20].
Steven Bonnell
(04:48:20)
Well, wait, how many? I think the word was some, that’s what I heard.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:48:24)
No, I think your memory-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:48:24)
Well, you weren’t listening.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:48:24)
… you memory’s retarded.
Steven Bonnell
(04:48:25)
How many people do you think approximately, if you had to ballpark it, how many do you think were killed by Hamas on October 7th?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:48:30)
I think it’s pretty clear that the majority of civilians that were killed on-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:48:30)
That’s what he said.
Steven Bonnell
(04:48:36)
51%? Or 90%?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:48:38)
Don’t ask me to put a number on something I don’t know.
Steven Bonnell
(04:48:40)
I just want a ballpark. Those are two very different intuition.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:48:42)
First of all, when you say Hamas, do you mean Palestinians, or do you mean Hamas specifically?
Steven Bonnell
(04:48:46)
I mean the invading Palestinian force? I don’t like to say Palestinians, because I don’t think all Palestinian civilians were involved, so I’ll say Hamas, Islamic Jihad, whatever, Al Quds, whatever other-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:48:53)
But that’s how this discussion started. You said Hamas and I began to answer that, and then Benny Morris said, actually he means Hamas in addition to Jihad and the others.
Steven Bonnell
(04:49:03)
So of the invading Palestinian force, how many do you think killed civilians versus the IDF? What do you think the ballpark, the percentage?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:49:10)
Well, the figures we have are that about a third of the casualties on October 7th were military, and about two-thirds were-
Steven Bonnell
(04:49:16)
That’s not what I asked at all.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:49:16)
What’s your question?
Benny Morris
(04:49:17)
He’s asking about the two-thirds.
Steven Bonnell
(04:49:18)
What percentage of civilians do you think were killed by the invading force, a ballpark?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:49:22)
I think a clear majority, but I can’t give you a specific figure.
Steven Bonnell
(04:49:25)
If you thought it was closer to 51% or 99% were killed by-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:49:29)
Why would he know that? How would he know that?
Steven Bonnell
(04:49:30)
Because it’s interesting to actually stake out a position.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:49:33)
Yeah, it’s interesting-
Steven Bonnell
(04:49:34)
If you want to be completely, totally agnostic on it, that’s fine.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:49:36)
Based on complete ignorance, because we don’t know. Professor Morris doesn’t know, Mouin Rabbani doesn’t know.
Steven Bonnell
(04:49:42)
And yet you can speak with absolute certainty that the IDF is targeting and murdering Palestinian children intentionally.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:49:46)
Well, actually-
Steven Bonnell
(04:49:46)
Do you see the double standard?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:49:47)
No, I don’t. You see-
Steven Bonnell
(04:49:48)
I know you don’t. It was a rhetorical question, obviously you don’t.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:49:51)
You know why?
Steven Bonnell
(04:49:52)
Because you’re uneducated on the matter.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:49:54)
I looked at the UN report.
Steven Bonnell
(04:49:55)
Uh-huh. The Goldstone Report?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:49:57)
No. The UN report on the great march of return in 2018, and they said that the snipers were targeting children, medics, journalists, and disabled people.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:50:11)
Just as they are now in this conflict.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:50:13)
Exactly.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:50:15)
More journalists have been killed in the last several months in Gaza, than in any other conflict.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:50:21)
And in all of World War II.
Steven Bonnell
(04:50:21)
Do you acknowledge that Hamas… That’s great, the comparison is fun.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:50:25)
Hamas is not killing journalists in the Gaza strip.
Steven Bonnell
(04:50:27)
Do you agree that they operate in civilian uniforms, that their goal is to induce that confusion, that that’s the way that they conduct themselves militarily?
Mouin Rabbani
(04:50:33)
Let me finish my point. More journalists have been, more UN-
Steven Bonnell
(04:50:37)
I understand, and more children, and the-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:50:38)
He doesn’t want to hear it, it’s so boring.
Steven Bonnell
(04:50:38)
No, because it’s virtue signaling.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:50:38)
Virtue signaling!
Steven Bonnell
(04:50:44)
You don’t have a material, a substantial… It is virtue signaling. Yes, like when you say children, over and over again, that’s virtue signaling.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:50:44)
You know you have this habit of mocking the dead.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:50:46)
But talking about how many Israelis were killed, that’s not virtue signaling, because that’s human life.
Steven Bonnell
(04:50:55)
I don’t care if a hundred are killed or a thousand, I’m curious who you’re assigning blame to.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:50:55)
You just interrogated him, 51%, 90%.
Steven Bonnell
(04:50:55)
The question, yes, that’s not the number, that’s the responsibility, Norman.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:50:59)
And then Mouin mentions that more journalists were killed in Gaza than in all of World War II.
Steven Bonnell
(04:51:13)
That doesn’t further any part of the conversation.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:51:14)
And more medics were killed in Gaza.
Benny Morris
(04:51:16)
No, that’s silly.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:51:17)
And then he says, it’s virtue signaling.
Benny Morris
(04:51:18)
Journalists weren’t in the area.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:51:21)
But when Israelis get killed, that’s serious.
Steven Bonnell
(04:51:25)
I never said that. It’s serious on both sides. I didn’t say, respectfully-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:51:29)
It’s called [inaudible 04:51:29].
Norman Finkelstein
(04:51:29)
No, you called it virtue signaling.
Steven Bonnell
(04:51:29)
No, I’m not virtue signaling, I’m asking a substantive question of who do you assign blame to, or do you play into Norm Finkelstein’s conspiracies that the ambulances should have known immediately who was dead, that the numbers were changed because they were fake.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:51:40)
Mr. Borrell, Mr. Borrell-
Steven Bonnell
(04:51:40)
Or that maybe 51% of the people were killed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, but 29% were killed by IDF helicopters.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:51:48)
You asked me a direct question, and you got a direct answer.
Steven Bonnell
(04:51:51)
I didn’t, I got majority, which could be anything from 51 to 99.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:51:52)
I said a clear majority.
Benny Morris
(04:51:55)
What percent is a clear majority as opposed to a majority?
Steven Bonnell
(04:51:57)
They live in ambiguity.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:51:58)
A clear majority, in my view, is well over 50%. Please don’t ask me to be more precise, because I can’t.
Benny Morris
(04:52:04)
You could say 80, 90, 95%.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:52:06)
If I knew that, I would say it.
Benny Morris
(04:52:08)
I think it’s reasonable. It’s a reasonable supposition.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:52:10)
Perhaps it is, but I…
Norman Finkelstein
(04:52:12)
Mr. Morris, you are not the best person to be asking that question. I read when you described Operation Defensive Shield, and you said a few dozen homes were destroyed.
Benny Morris
(04:52:23)
You’re talking about what happened in a Judean refugee camp.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:52:25)
Yeah. And you said-
Benny Morris
(04:52:26)
No, the Arabs said 500.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:52:26)
You said a few died-
Benny Morris
(04:52:26)
You guys said 500 Palestinians were killed in a Judean-
Mouin Rabbani
(04:52:31)
I never said that.
Benny Morris
(04:52:32)
No, but that was the statement from the PLO, the Palestinian Authority.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:52:36)
You said a few dozen homes-
Benny Morris
(04:52:37)
And that there were massacres there. Yes, a few dozen homes.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:52:40)
Yeah.
Benny Morris
(04:52:41)
That’s right.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:52:42)
Well, it turned 140 buildings were destroyed-
Benny Morris
(04:52:44)
That’s a few dozen.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:52:47)
… 5,000 people were left homeless.
Benny Morris
(04:52:50)
How many people were killed?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:52:51)
5,000.
Benny Morris
(04:52:51)
How many were killed?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:52:51)
You described it… No, I’m talking about homes destroyed. So you are not the best person to be criticizing what Mouin says when he says clear majority, but he can’t say more. You know why he can’t say more?
Benny Morris
(04:53:03)
He doesn’t know.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:53:03)
He doesn’t know.
Benny Morris
(04:53:05)
Yeah, I understand that. I understood that point.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:53:06)
I hope as a historian you understand that.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:53:08)
If I was trying to belittle, I would give you a very different answer. I would just say I don’t know. I do know that some were shot, but-
Benny Morris
(04:53:15)
You know what the right phrase there would be? The overwhelming majority were killed by Arab gunmen, and a very small number were killed by Israelis by accident or whatever.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:53:24)
You’re not speaking as a historian now.
Benny Morris
(04:53:26)
That’s probably true.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:53:28)
I can state with confidence, a clear majority. Overwhelming majority? You may be correct, but I can’t state that with certainty. I think there’s a very easy way to find out is to have an independent-
Benny Morris
(04:53:40)
Forget independent.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:53:41)
Well, of course you forget independent.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:53:41)
I know you want to forget the law-
Benny Morris
(04:53:42)
Well forget, that doesn’t mean anything.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:53:42)
Forget the law-
Benny Morris
(04:53:45)
Independent is the UN High Commission for-
Norman Finkelstein
(04:53:49)
– forget the independent commissioner. No!
Benny Morris
(04:53:50)
… Human Rights, whatever it’s called.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:53:51)
Not necessarily.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:53:51)
Just repeat the numbers.
Benny Morris
(04:53:53)
They’re all from barbaric countries. You know, a Syrian was the head of the UN Commission for Human Rights.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:53:56)
But if it was an Israeli, it would have been okay?
Benny Morris
(04:53:58)
He certainly would have been more honest than a Syrian.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:53:58)
Oh yeah, sure, of course.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:54:00)
Of course. Oh yeah, from your perspective.
Lex Fridman
(04:54:02)
Well, to disagree with Steven, I thought this was extremely valuable, and at times really the view of history, the passion. I’m really grateful that you would spend your really valuable time.

(04:54:20)
One more question, since we have two historians here. Briefly, from a history perspective, what do you hope your legacy is as historians, Benny and Norm, will be of the work that you’ve put out there? Maybe Norm, you can go first, and try to say briefly.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:54:41)
I think there’s a value to preserving the record. I’m not optimistic about where things are going to end up. There was a very nice book written by a woman named Helen Hunt Jackson at the end of the 19th century, describing what was done to the Native Americans. She called it a century of dishonor, and she described in vivid, poignant detail what was done to the Native Americans. Did it save them? No. Did it help them? Probably not. Did it preserve their memory? Yes, and I think there’s a value to that. There was a famous film by Sergei Eisenstein, it was either Battleship Potemkin or Mother, I can’t remember which one. The last scene was the Tsar’s troops mowing down all the Russian people. He pans the scene.
Benny Morris
(04:55:40)
Not all the Russian people, just a few of them.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:55:42)
Well, he pan the massacre.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:55:46)
But he could have killed a lot more.
Norman Finkelstein
(04:55:49)
And the last words of the movie were, “Proletarians,” exclamation point, “Remember,” exclamation point. And I’ve seen it as my life’s work to preserve the memory and to remember. I didn’t expect that anyone would read my book on Gaza. It’s very dense, it gives me even a bit of a headache to read at least one of the chapters.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:56:14)
You wrote a book on Gaza?
Norman Finkelstein
(04:56:17)
But I thought that the memory deserves to be preserved.
Mouin Rabbani
(04:56:21)
Amen.
Benny Morris
(04:56:22)
Well, I would say very briefly, unlike my colleague, I think writing the truth about what happened in history, in various periods of history, if I’ve done a little bit of that, I’m happy.
Lex Fridman
(04:56:36)
Thank you Norm, thank you Benny, thank you Steven, thank you Mouin.

(04:56:41)
Thanks for listening to this conversation with Norman Finkelstein, Benny Morris, Mouin Rabbani, and Steven Bonnell. To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now let me leave you with some words from Lyndon B. Johnson. “Peace is a journey of a thousand miles, and it must be taken one step at a time.” Thank you for listening, and hope to see you next time.

Transcript for Kimbal Musk: The Art of Cooking, Tesla, SpaceX, Zip2, and Family | Lex Fridman Podcast #417

This is a transcript of Lex Fridman Podcast #417 with Kimbal Musk.
The timestamps in the transcript are clickable links that take you directly to that point in
the main video. Please note that the transcript is human generated, and may have errors.
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Table of Contents

Here are the loose “chapters” in the conversation.
Click link to jump approximately to that part in the transcript:

Introduction

Kimbal Musk
(00:00:00)
For me, cooking is an art.
Lex Fridman
(00:00:01)
What’s your favorite ingredient to cook with?
Kimbal Musk
(00:00:03)
There isn’t one. It’s more like when there is one, it really is one. There’s peaches on the cover of this cookbook. Those peaches, those were in August, Colorado peaches. It just doesn’t get any better than that.
Lex Fridman
(00:00:16)
On that day, at that moment, that was best ingredient?
Kimbal Musk
(00:00:17)
That was the best, but that only lasts for a week and then they don’t taste so great, but damn are they so good in that moment and you just can’t stop wanting to use that ingredient.
Lex Fridman
(00:00:33)
The following is a conversation with Kimbal Musk, a long time entrepreneur and chef and author of a new cookbook called The Kitchen Cookbook, Cooking for Your Community. You should check it out. It is in fact the first cookbook I’ve ever owned. I’ve already made stuff from it and it’s delicious. This is the Lex Fridman podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, dear friends, here’s Kimbal Musk.

Growing up in South Africa


(00:01:02)
Growing up in South Africa, you said it was a violent place. What are some formative moments that you remember from that time?
Kimbal Musk
(00:01:09)
South Africa was, so I grew up in apartheid South Africa, but more specifically the fall of apartheid. I was a teenager in the ’80s and our community would, part of our social life frankly, was the anti-apartheid protests and to go be with white people, Black people, kind of mixing it all altogether. The most formative experiences, frankly, how much I appreciate a place like America where we have value for human life. So, that was a country where human life was not valued. It’s a weird thing to come from that to here where we take it so seriously, if someone dies in a war or something like that, and we just didn’t take it seriously.

(00:02:05)
In South Africa, people died, or people were killed. I saw someone killed in front of me. I was getting off a train and it’s a very violent train known for violence. We were stupid kids. We didn’t really listen to our parents. We went on this train and the doors opened and I had people trying to get off the train and in front of me, two Black people, one Black guy just stabbed this knife in the side of this other Black guy’s head and you’re like, “What the fuck?” And you just, I got to get off the train.
Lex Fridman
(00:02:44)
How old were you at this time?
Kimbal Musk
(00:02:45)
Probably 16 or 17. And I got to get off the train and everyone is trying to get me to get off because they’re all behind me. So, I step off and I step into the pool of blood one foot, and then I just walk for about a hundred paces while the stickiness of the blood just kind of for my sneakers just on one foot just leaves a footprint behind me. And you just walk on. You just walk on.
Lex Fridman
(00:03:12)
Did the others walk on as well?
Lex Fridman
(00:03:12)
Go to the concert.
Kimbal Musk
(00:03:13)
Everyone walked on.
Lex Fridman
(00:03:15)
That’s an interesting point you make. Underlying the violence is a kind of philosophy that human life is disposable, the individual life is disposable. I mean, that underlies many ideologies. I grew up in the Soviet Union, the value of human life was lower there than in the United States. The value of the individual in the United States is really high. There’s probably an index you can put together.
Kimbal Musk
(00:03:39)
Yeah, right, exactly.
Lex Fridman
(00:03:41)
Per nation, that’s a really interesting way to put it because violence is much easier on a mass scale. Suffering, causing suffering on a mass scale is much easier when you don’t value the human life.
Kimbal Musk
(00:03:56)
I’ve heard this before, which I think I agree with, is when someone is killed, someone is taken from our lives. The vacuum that it creates, the social vacuum is extraordinarily painful and it truly is true. I mean, if someone in my community passes away, it’s very, very sad for me. And when you go to a place where, or live, grow up in a place where that human life is not valued, there’s something about, there’s a little bit less of the social vacuum created because everyone is kind of expecting everyone to potentially be taken out at any moment. But then there’s also a beauty to it because there’s a much more of a celebratory element.

(00:04:45)
When my cousin, Russ and I, again, we’re stupid kids, we shouldn’t be doing this, but we go into the townships where a lot of the violence would be happening, and we really didn’t see most of the violence there. It was in these more protests and so forth. But there’s a joy that also comes from lower value of human life. There’s a real joy. Everyone was like, well, I mean it’s beautiful. We’d have dinner with Black friends, friends with their family, and we were still pretty young and there was just a real joy to it.
Lex Fridman
(00:05:21)
When you accept mortality, you can really enjoy life.
Kimbal Musk
(00:05:24)
You can really enjoy life. I mean, I think that’s actually quite a nice insight. I’ve never really put it that way, but I think that’s right actually. I think you just chill out a bit, takes things a little less seriously.
Lex Fridman
(00:05:34)
Because life does end for everybody.
Kimbal Musk
(00:05:37)
It does. Right.
Lex Fridman
(00:05:37)
And if you just head on accept that fact, you can just enjoy every single moment and let go of this attachment and just enjoy the moment.
Kimbal Musk
(00:05:47)
I do love that we all live longer and so forth, but we should live longer with the goal of joy and the goal of happiness and peace, not some form of misery that you choose to attach yourself to.
Lex Fridman
(00:06:03)
Maximize joy.
Kimbal Musk
(00:06:04)
Maximize joy. That’s right.
Lex Fridman
(00:06:06)
There’s a story that Walter Isaacson writes about where Elon got beat up pretty bad and you were there, and then you also had to watch your dad yell at Elon for an hour, calling him worthless, all those kinds of things. You said it was the worst memory of your life. What do you make of such cruelty? What do you remember from that time?
Kimbal Musk
(00:06:33)
I mean, it was horrible. I think coming back to the point of low value of human life, they tried to kill him. There was no holding back, so I just watched someone… It wasn’t just one, but there was a main person and then there was a few others that piled in. They tried to kill him in front of me. We were eating sandwiches on a staircase at the school, in outdoor staircase. They were not coming after me and I just had to watch and I couldn’t help. It was one of the saddest, most difficult experiences. It was just awful.
Lex Fridman
(00:07:22)
Just like that, life can end.
Kimbal Musk
(00:07:25)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:07:25)
If could have been you.
Kimbal Musk
(00:07:27)
Yeah. I think I’ve had a near death experience where I almost died. I was in 2010 and I think that… And I broke my neck and I can go into that story in a moment, but this was different. This comes back to the low value of human life part where if someone had killed my brother, if that person had beat him to death, which he was trying to do, life would’ve gone on. That’s like an insane thought in an American, well maybe in some tough neighborhoods, but for the most part, it’s another thing.
Lex Fridman
(00:08:09)
Yeah, the brutality of that, the mundaneness of the brutality.
Kimbal Musk
(00:08:13)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:08:15)
It makes you think of all the places in the world that that’s happening.
Kimbal Musk
(00:08:18)
Exactly. Exactly.
Lex Fridman
(00:08:18)
And all the beautiful people that just disappear.
Kimbal Musk
(00:08:22)
I always say to people who have an opinion about America that this is a really bad country or whatever, and I say, “Look, please go try another country before you say that. Not to say that America can’t get better, but please go try another country,” because not having that perspective or having a perspective that, I don’t know, they’ll catch up on their shoulder about the country that they’re in. Okay, go try another country and then come back and tell me, pick any country. It doesn’t have to be some very violent country. You go pick any country and you just realize that actually the world doesn’t think the same way that America thinks, and you are going to just learn a perspective that I think gives you a better way to critique where we live in America.
Lex Fridman
(00:09:17)
Yeah, it’s humbling. You said that your dad was a roller coaster of affection and then verbal abuse. Walter Isaacson quotes Barack Obama who said, “Someone once said that every man is trying to live up to his father’s expectations or makeup for his father’s mistakes, and I suppose that may explain my particular malady.” Is part of that ring true for you?
Kimbal Musk
(00:09:39)
What I thought you were going to say, thought you were going to end the sentence with live up to my father’s expectations. That’s what most people say. But then you said the second part, which is make up for his mistakes. I think that’s actually, that one rings true for me.

(00:09:57)
He was really [inaudible 00:09:59], but I’m not connected to him, but he taught me, the phrase I used to have was he taught me what not to do, so I still actually learned a lot. What kind of human not to be, what kind of actions not to take. And so that kind of closer to living up to his mistakes. But my father was such a train wreck that it’s not really mistakes. It’s like intentional actions of what not to do. Okay, look, don’t do that.
Lex Fridman
(00:10:34)
But there’s still the trauma of that. It has an effect on the human psychology and can permeate through time. So, it has probably complex indirect effects on who you are, the good and the bad.
Kimbal Musk
(00:10:50)
There’s a critique that my friends give me, which is when they’re talking to me, I kind of just drift away. That just, I’m still looking at them, I’m still nodding, might even respond to them in their conversation, but I’m actually not there. And I’ve realized that actually that grew up because my father would just, verbal abuse is one way to say it. It is abuse, but it’s more just verbal diarrhea for you for hours and constantly saying, “Do you understand?” He wants to make sure that I’m paying attention. So, I trained myself to look like I’m paying attention, but I’m not.
Lex Fridman
(00:11:35)
To disappear to someplace.
Kimbal Musk
(00:11:37)
Disappear to someplace.
Lex Fridman
(00:11:38)
Wherever that is.
Kimbal Musk
(00:11:39)
Yeah, I do that less and less over time, but I-
Lex Fridman
(00:11:43)
That path has been paved somewhere in your mind at childhood, so it could be easy to walk down it. You and Elon were close growing up, you’re still close. What did you learn from each other? How did you compliment each other?
Kimbal Musk
(00:11:58)
Yeah, I think we are a good compliment. I’ll talk for myself first. My strength is definitely on the social side. I love the gathering place and I love putting people together in person and I love to have vibrant debates and conversations. I’ve been doing that forever, including throwing fun parties and stuff where I bring people together and I really want people to have fun, but be vulnerable in not just silly partying, just actually let’s all connect. The definition for me of a good party is people laugh and cry. I want to have people have an emotional connection. I go to Burning Man every year, and that is, there’s no question you will cry at some point during Burning Man.
Lex Fridman
(00:11:58)
No small talk.
Kimbal Musk
(00:12:45)
No small talk. Yeah, exactly. No small talk. You’re totally right on most parties, not parties, but most events you go to are like clubs, these sort of nightclubs. I never go to those. And my joke is why would I want to go to a place where I pay to shout small talk in the dark?
Lex Fridman
(00:13:07)
That’s a good line. That’s what it feels like. The only reason I enjoy those places is the full absurdity of exactly that.
Kimbal Musk
(00:13:14)
Right. It’s totally absurd.
Lex Fridman
(00:13:16)
What are we doing? What is this? What is this life?
Kimbal Musk
(00:13:20)
My compliment for my brother was just bringing joy and social connection and he’s an engineering genius. I’ve worked with him forever and we do compliment each other.

Cooking

Lex Fridman
(00:13:33)
You just came out with a cookbook, by the way. Thank you for giving me my first cookbook. I feel legit.
Kimbal Musk
(00:13:37)
I love that. Your first cookbook.
Lex Fridman
(00:13:41)
I’m going to keep it on the counter and it’s going to give me legitimacy when anyone comes over. Hey, listen, I’m basically a chef now.
Kimbal Musk
(00:13:49)
That’s right. Exactly.
Lex Fridman
(00:13:51)
When did you first fall in love with cooking?
Kimbal Musk
(00:13:54)
I started cooking when I was 11 years old. My mom, she’s wonderful, but she is self-admittedly a bad cook. But at the time it was, and I think anyone with kids goes through this, your kids just want something like spaghetti bolognese or a burger or something. And my mom would do brown bread, plain yogurt, and boiled squash. The absolute most disgusting things that a child could imagine eating. And so I said, “Can I cook?” And she said, “Yeah, if you want to cook, no problem.”

(00:14:32)
So, I went to the grocery store and back in those days, a butcher is separate to the grocery store, and I went to the butcher and I said, “What can I cook?” And he pulled out a chicken and he said, “This is the easiest recipe for you. Just put it on a pan in an oven, a hot oven.” Because back then the ovens weren’t necessarily like 400 degrees or 450 or whatever. “And put it in a hot oven for one hour and enjoy.” That was it. And so I went home and actually I also bought some french fries, I’ll tell you that as well. I’m a kid, of course, I went french fries. So, the roast chicken with french fries and the chicken came out and it was just fantastic.
Lex Fridman
(00:15:16)
It was?
Kimbal Musk
(00:15:16)
Absolutely fantastic.
Lex Fridman
(00:15:18)
That’s incredible, by the way.
Kimbal Musk
(00:15:19)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:15:20)
You didn’t screw it up the first time.
Kimbal Musk
(00:15:21)
First of all, I think that also kicks off the magic. If you screw it up and you’re like, “Oh, maybe this is not for me.” So for me, it really did kick it off.
Lex Fridman
(00:15:30)
You started out on a high note.
Kimbal Musk
(00:15:32)
Right, exactly. But I tell the french fry part, which was a disaster. I cooked the french fries, but I didn’t heat the oil first, so I just put the potatoes in the oil and I waited for to heat up. And I just was throwing up later that night, your body can’t ingest that much because it sucks the oils in. And so that was a disaster. But at the time it tasted good. The real magic, which I also found was wonderful, was when I cooked, my brother, my sister, my mom, all very, very busy, very intense people, would sit down and we would have a meal together.

(00:16:10)
And I was like, “Wow, this is a very powerful thing that I’ve now got.” Where in no other way could I have that connection with my family. I mean, obviously we stay connected, we’re very close, et cetera, but in no other way can we sit down and just talk about things or talk about whatever’s on our mind or just to not even talk, just to be at the table together. And I’ve done that now through my whole life. My kids still for my family, and we will do gratitudes at the beginning of our meal. And it’s just, I think what kept me cooking, what made my love of cooking so great was actually the fact that we would sit down-
Lex Fridman
(00:16:53)
Together.
Kimbal Musk
(00:16:54)
… and be present with each other. And I’m also just horrible with that too, so I also get to be present.
Lex Fridman
(00:17:00)
What is that about food that brings people together and not just together, but really together where you’re paying attention? What is that? Why is it food? What else does that? Sometimes maybe alcohol can do that, which is a kind of food, I guess [inaudible 00:17:18]-
Kimbal Musk
(00:17:18)
Yeah, but I think alcohol is different because you’re usually standing when you’re doing alcohol. You’re socializing, but you’re just going to stay more in the small talk zone. Whereas if you sit down, and I see this in my restaurant, in the kitchen in Boulder where we have every viewpoint or we go to Denver, every viewpoint. In restaurant in Chicago, every viewpoint. And the physical presence of someone being right there is people, they’re just different, absolutely different to what they are online. I think we all know the difference between you send an email to someone and they misunderstand the email and “Oh, if I just had talked to the person, it would’ve been fine.”

(00:18:02)
Well, this is now happening at scale with all of these, what do you, call trolling or whatever. And I’ve sat at the bar and I’ve had a hardcore Trump supporter, and I’m just curious, just like, “Tell me what, I’m not a Trump supporter, but tell me more.” And actually it draws the conversation out because you’re there for an hour or longer, so there’s no rush to get the answer. And I think that’s a big difference. I’ve had one time where just a couple months ago I had someone, I was sitting at the community table, we have a community table in the restaurant, and I didn’t know him too well, but he asked me, did I know that 9-11 was a conspiracy and it didn’t really happen?
Lex Fridman
(00:18:54)
It didn’t happen? Yeah.;
Kimbal Musk
(00:18:56)
And I was like, “Huh.” So, I was at 9-11, [inaudible 00:19:02] I was there physically there. So, it’s like, nope.
Lex Fridman
(00:19:04)
Allegedly.
Kimbal Musk
(00:19:05)
There’s no doubt in my mind. But I didn’t want to interrupt what he had to say. I let him talk for five minutes, six minutes, seven minutes. Again, you’re there for a while, so you’re not in a rush to jump in and argue. And then I shared that I was there, and I think because I had been willing to listen to him, he was willing to listen to me. And I don’t know if he changed his mind. Certainly doesn’t change my mind, but it was actually a pretty cool conversation to get into each other’s mind.
Lex Fridman
(00:19:43)
Well, I think you connect on a different level. Not on the level of the conspiracy, but on the level of basic humanity.
Kimbal Musk
(00:19:51)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(00:19:52)
That’s what you really connect on. And then it almost becomes interesting and fun that you can exchange ideas, even crazy ideas, out there ideas, and kind of play with them. We humans are good at that.
Kimbal Musk
(00:20:04)
Yeah, exactly. I like the term play with them because what you’re not trying to do is shut the conversation down. You’re also not trying to-
Lex Fridman
(00:20:14)
Talk down on me.
Kimbal Musk
(00:20:15)
Yeah, yeah, exactly. This guys is, let me just be nice while I totally disagree with this person. You can do that for a few minutes. You can’t do that for two hours.
Lex Fridman
(00:20:25)
And there’s something about food that completely, I don’t know, it must be evolutionary that it makes us vulnerable in a way that even just standing there for a prolonged period of time doesn’t. There’s something about, you know when the animals gather to the water or whatever, this kind of experience where you’re just like, “All right, let’s just acknowledge together that we need sustenance.”

(00:20:55)
And somehow that kind of grounds us to, we’re just a bunch of descendants of apes here, just kind of grateful to be alive, frankly, and grateful to be consuming this thing which keeps us alive. And in that context, you can talk about all kinds of stuff. You can discuss flat earth and enjoy it.
Kimbal Musk
(00:21:18)
Absolutely. Absolutely. In fact, one of my favorite things to do is you do a Jeffersonian style dinner, let’s say five or six people. Sometimes people will break off into individual conversations. That’s actually when things break down. So that’s when you go back to small talk like, “Oh, I’m stuck next to this guy. I’m just going to do a little small talk.” What you need to do to really create a great conversation is one conversation at the table. And that’s where there’ll be some simple questions that I’ll say. I’ll say, “What’s your middle name?” And you’ll be amazed at the stories you get from that, but it’s about creating vulnerability.

(00:21:56)
So, they’re like, “Oh, no one’s ever asked me that before,” so then they become vulnerable. And then it’s something as simple as, “What’s the most fun thing you’ve done recently and what is the most fun thing you’re looking forward to?” I have gotten into, with those prompts, I’ve gotten into hours long discussions on God. I’ve gotten into hours long discussions on love. I’ve got into hours long discussions on anger. It’s actually amazing when people are just asked a question, ” What’s the most fun thing you’ve done lately?” Well, why would anger come up? Well, actually, they’re in a vulnerable place, so it’ll just kind of come out of them.
Lex Fridman
(00:22:37)
So, you get to see this, you get to see this at the kitchen in you said Boulder, Denver, Chicago?
Kimbal Musk
(00:22:42)
And we’re going to open in Austin.
Lex Fridman
(00:22:43)
In Austin. That’s what I saw. When?
Kimbal Musk
(00:22:45)
In October is the goal.
Lex Fridman
(00:22:47)
In October is the goal. Well, I mean, speaking of characters and human beings, Austin is fascinating. I forget how long ago, a couple months ago, I was just sitting at a bar and the two people were talking and they were talking about Marxism, and it turns out that they’re a narco communists, which is the thing. And I got into this conversation.
Kimbal Musk
(00:23:09)
Communist likes drugs?
Lex Fridman
(00:23:12)
That’s a good question.
Kimbal Musk
(00:23:15)
I think I know some of those.
Lex Fridman
(00:23:18)
Anyway, they were beautiful people. I think they’re local from Austin. I don’t know the depth of their personal experience of the different kinds of communists-like systems, but it was fascinating to listen to and then get to know them and the humanity, the weirdness, like the characters. I love it. One of the reasons I really love Austin, I decided to be here, is just the cliche thing of keep Austin weird. I mean, there’s a lot of weird characters.
Kimbal Musk
(00:23:46)
I love it. I think that I’ve talked to a lot Austinites who’ve been here forever, and I’m like, “Man, you got to hold us accountable. We got to keep this place weird.”
Lex Fridman
(00:23:55)
A hundred percent. Which makes the restaurant seem great because you have all these characters come in. It’s great, so I look forward to that. But you were saying you get to see humans in real life interact. That’s one of the beautiful things over food. In the book you write, Picasso once said, “The meaning of life is to find your gift. The purpose of life is to give it away.” Then you wrote that you believe food is the gift we give ourselves three times a day. Can you explain that? The gift nature of it.
Kimbal Musk
(00:24:26)
Yeah. I think it’s one of my most powerful life lessons is we have to eat. So, it’s not like you have a choice, you have to eat. And so what I choose to do is I choose to make it a gift to myself for each meal. And most of the time, the best gift is with friends, with family. We’ll have to cook some scrambled eggs in the morning with my daughter, or we’ll have dinner with our family. To me, it’s a gift we give ourselves three times a day at least, but for the most part, three times a day, let’s make it a good one.
Lex Fridman
(00:25:00)
What makes it a good one to you? What aspect of what makes it a good one?
Kimbal Musk
(00:25:03)
Well, first definitely eating with people, so that makes it a good one. Eating in a restaurant, it doesn’t have to be my restaurant, where you have the energy of people around you, energy of the town, people you don’t know creates a little bit of a vibe. You mentioned the watering hole analogy that animals sipping at the water, but there’s an energy to that because they’re also looking around going, “Am I just about to be eaten?”

(00:25:35)
So, they’re all in it together, we need to have water. But there’s still a little bit of tension as well in the background. And I think that’s what restaurants do is a very, very subtle version of that. You’re in a room with strangers and you’re a little cluster. Okay, fine, you guys are connected in it, but you’re in a room with strangers, and it’s just something that adds that energy to the meal.
Lex Fridman
(00:25:57)
Yeah. You’re a little bit wondering what does everyone else think about our little cluster?
Kimbal Musk
(00:26:02)
Right. Are we too loud or just people are random, so something random could happen.
Lex Fridman
(00:26:08)
And also depending on your personality, if you’re an extrovert, maybe you want to show off to the other clusters.
Kimbal Musk
(00:26:12)
Exactly. Yeah, absolutely. Totally right. I mean, look at the cowboy hat. I mean, actually, I’ll take my hat off when I want to have a quiet meal and I can leave my hat on when I’m-
Lex Fridman
(00:26:22)
So you’re aware of [inaudible 00:26:23] of the hat.
Kimbal Musk
(00:26:23)
I’m aware of the effect it has. Yeah, absolutely.
Lex Fridman
(00:26:26)
Everyone turns [inaudible 00:26:27].
Kimbal Musk
(00:26:27)
That’s right.
Lex Fridman
(00:26:28)
And then it’s back to the watering hole because when you wear a cowboy hat, you just might actually not-
Kimbal Musk
(00:26:33)
Yeah. I’m like, they’re going to get me first.
Lex Fridman
(00:26:37)
At noon. I love it.
Kimbal Musk
(00:26:39)
I got to tell the story. So, talk to the craziness of being in the restaurant world where you’re sitting at a table and anything can happen in the restaurant. So, this one time, it was like 15 years ago, this guy comes up to us and says, he’d like to propose to his wife, his girlfriend. And so we said, “Okay, cool. We’ve done this before. We’ll make sure it’s-
Kimbal Musk
(00:27:00)
And so we said, okay, cool. We’ve done this before. We’ll make sure it’s all set up, 6:00 PM reservation. So she shows up and we give her a glass of champagne and we obviously didn’t want to spoil the surprise so we just doing everything we can. But then he doesn’t arrive and they’re like, oh man. Now we’re like, don’t leave. Can we get you another glass of champagne? We’re doing everything we can because the guy was obviously earnest earlier, but just as he stuck in traffic or whatever and coming through the back door of the restaurant, which is you’re not allowed to come through the back door of the restaurant, a marching band from the school, the university comes through the restaurant full on brass band and the whole thing and he gets down and he proposes and it’s beautiful, sure, but it’s also like, man, this is chaos. This is insane. And we would never have said yes to this if he’d actually told us what he was going to do.
Lex Fridman
(00:27:56)
Well sometimes in life you have to do it and apologize.
Kimbal Musk
(00:27:59)
You do it and apologize. But that talks to that kind of what’s the crazy thing that could happen in a… It’s subtle, but it’s still there.
Lex Fridman
(00:28:07)
So in 2004 you opened The Kitchen. It’s an American bistro restaurant. What was it like? What’s it like running a restaurant? The good, the bad and the ugly. What’s the easy, what’s the fun and what’s the hard?
Kimbal Musk
(00:28:19)
I think the thing that I absolutely love about running the restaurant, not eating at it but running the restaurant is the tangible reaction from people. And you also kind of know when you screwed it up and you also know when you got it right. It’s kind of a weird way to say this, but even if the customer’s unhappy, you know whether you got it right or wrong. It’s not just about the food you’re making, but it’s about the person’s psychological state. And you’ll do something that you’d know that was not done well. And their psychological state, they’re just in a very happy place and they love it. And you’re like, huh, interesting. That’s not how I would’ve reacted to that dish. And then the other way around you’re like I got that right and that person’s just really unhappy today.
Lex Fridman
(00:29:14)
Yeah. And it’s so hard to read humans because you have to… If you got it right, that can look a million different ways depending on the emotional rollercoaster that humans living through. I’ve been at some very low points and I’ve gone to a restaurant alone and just sitting there and be truly happy with just the zen aspect of it. And it was just a great steak or something like this and maybe two other people around me would look like I’m very unhappy just because I’m within myself.
Kimbal Musk
(00:29:52)
Sure, struggling with your today.
Lex Fridman
(00:29:53)
Yeah. Within myself. But I’m truly happy within that struggle. So yeah, it’s interesting. But you can kind of tell.
Kimbal Musk
(00:29:59)
Yeah, you can tell. And you mentioned being at the bar the most gifted bartenders really understand that. What’s also great about a restaurant it goes beyond the one-time experience that you walk in and you have that experience, is the good bartenders they remember you. Oh, you were in a few months ago and this is kind of your thing. You might need a little time. And other people will come in, they want a conversation or other people come in and they’re going through a divorce and they just want to be sad for a moment. Have a scotch. And it’s like, it’s amazing what you learn in the restaurant world to just be connected to humanity.
Lex Fridman
(00:30:42)
Yeah. What is that about bars? That’s a different experience. You said the table, the communal.
Kimbal Musk
(00:30:48)
The table is when you connect with people, learn about each other. Bars, you can sometimes do that, you can talk left and right, but you have the freedom to always break free. You can say, okay great, I’m going to go back to my meal. It’s a friend you can turn on and off at any time because the bartender knows that. They’re trained. If you want attention, I’m going to give it to you. If you don’t, I’m going to stay away. If you want to be chatty, I’m going to be chatty. If you want to be completely in your head, I’ll leave you in your head.
Lex Fridman
(00:31:18)
But there’s also strangers next to you that you… There’s a feeling with a bar that you’re kind of alone together.
Kimbal Musk
(00:31:26)
Yeah. And you can reach out, you can add some conversation or you can choose not to.
Lex Fridman
(00:31:30)
And you can exit quickly.
Kimbal Musk
(00:31:31)
You can exit. Exactly. It’s a really good exit. So bars are wonderful and I love going to a bar by myself after work. I might have a scotch, might even not even have alcohol, just have something and maybe I’ll have a snack or something before dinner because I’m going to go home and have dinner with the family and that 20 minutes is just an amazing state change from daytime to nighttime. Whereas if I went straight home, I’m still in my head and I’m just trying to get grounded and I’m not as pleasant of a person. So that’s another powerful use of a bar. It’s just like a transition time.
Lex Fridman
(00:32:13)
Well, it would be remiss not to mention the other use of the bar, which is like when you’re going through some shit in life and you just go. I mean that’s the cliche thing, I’ve been somewhere-
Kimbal Musk
(00:32:26)
Drowning your sorrows.
Lex Fridman
(00:32:27)
Exactly.
Kimbal Musk
(00:32:28)
The real thing.
Lex Fridman
(00:32:30)
Exactly. But the bar makes the melancholy somehow rich and beautiful and you feel heard in the silence.
Kimbal Musk
(00:32:40)
Yes. You feel heard. Like I said earlier, people going through a divorce, they don’t know where else to go. These are mostly men. Sometimes women will do it, but mostly men will do this and women have other ways of processing it. But they want a place to be sad and want a place where they could feel comfortable talking about it if… They’re certainly not going to go into too much detail, but they just want to say something and the bartender is there for them.
Lex Fridman
(00:33:10)
Yeah, you don’t know where to go.
Kimbal Musk
(00:33:12)
You don’t know where to go. Exactly.
Lex Fridman
(00:33:14)
And the bar… Yeah, you’re right. For men especially is a place to just go and just, I don’t know. What is that? What is that?
Kimbal Musk
(00:33:23)
I’ll be honest, I still do it myself where if I’m at home and I don’t have a work thing that I got to deal with and I don’t have kids and I don’t have my wife or my family around, I don’t often cook for myself. I actually love going to a bar by myself. I have a glass of red wine and I usually don’t have a starter, appetizer. I just have a main meal and I just take in the energy of the space. It was my restaurant, someone else’s restaurant, I just take in the energy and it’s so much better than being home and turn the TV on. No, no, no. I want to be out in the restaurant. I want to feel the energy of the town. The other thing that restaurants teach me is they’re the front lines of the economy or what’s a better word for it? Front lines of the energy of how things are going.
Lex Fridman
(00:34:24)
Of a people’s in general. It doesn’t necessarily mean this part of town, but it could be the entire society.
Kimbal Musk
(00:34:30)
Yeah, exactly. So you can go into a restaurant and I’ll use a simple example and why is the restaurant empty? Ah, there’s a football game going on and there’s such a large number of people want to watch that game that the restaurant is quiet. Or it might be like another world series or something and you’re like, wow, that’s so interesting. You can actually watch in America, of course, American humanity, you can watch them move in their patterns just by being in the restaurant.
Lex Fridman
(00:34:59)
Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
Kimbal Musk
(00:35:00)
And then another time you might be in a restaurant and he’s just jamming. It’s a Monday night and you’re like, what is the energy that created this on a Monday night and maybe even on a cold February, Monday night, what is it? And sometimes you can’t find out but you can feel it. And it’s my front lines of humanity that I also just really love about the restaurants.
Lex Fridman
(00:35:24)
Yeah, it could be empty, it could be full. Empty bars, there’s a magic to those too.
Kimbal Musk
(00:35:29)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:35:30)
You could still feel that energy. I don’t know.
Kimbal Musk
(00:35:32)
I actually prefer empty bars than full ones.
Lex Fridman
(00:35:34)
It’s just you and the bartender. I mean some of my greatest experiences is just the quiet bar, just me and the bartender and they’re doing their thing and they’ve seen so many… I’ve almost like through osmosis somehow feel the stories that that bartender has seen, has felt, has heard and all that kind of stuff. It’s not to be sort of spiritual about it, but it seems like it’s in the walls or something. Like there’s the history is felt.
Kimbal Musk
(00:36:01)
And then some of these bars are actually very old and it’s wonderful. There are many in Europe like this, but there’s a couple in New York City, a few hundred years old and they’re still operating nonstop for that long and man, you feel it.
Lex Fridman
(00:36:14)
Yeah. Let me ask you some questions about ingredients. What’s your favorite ingredient to cook with?

Ingredients

Kimbal Musk
(00:36:20)
For me, cooking is an art. So it’d be like asking me what’s my favorite paint color to use. It’s not that it isn’t like there isn’t one, it’s more like when there is one, it really is one. There’s peaches on the cover of this cookbook. Those peaches, those were in August, Colorado peaches. It just doesn’t get any better than that.
Lex Fridman
(00:36:44)
On that day, at that moment, that was the best.
Kimbal Musk
(00:36:47)
That was the best, but that only lasts for a week and then they don’t taste so great.
Lex Fridman
(00:36:50)
Yeah.
Kimbal Musk
(00:36:53)
But damn are they so good in that moment and you just can’t stop wanting to use that ingredient.
Lex Fridman
(00:37:00)
They look really good.
Kimbal Musk
(00:37:01)
They are so good.
Lex Fridman
(00:37:02)
What’s your favorite fruit? I love veggies and fruit. What’s your favorite fruit?
Kimbal Musk
(00:37:07)
I love a smoothie bowl, so I do sort of berries, raspberries, but I use fruit more in the form of a smoothie bowl than I eat fruit that often. I like an apple or a banana, but for the most part, I prefer the blended.
Lex Fridman
(00:37:22)
Not me. I love the way you casually said I like an apple.
Kimbal Musk
(00:37:27)
A good apple is pretty great.
Lex Fridman
(00:37:28)
For me it’s a problem, I think. Probably cherries number one. Probably, what are they called? Granny Smith apples number two.
Kimbal Musk
(00:37:37)
Oh, yeah, those are great. But try it when sometime come to Colorado in August and when you try those peaches, it is like it heaven has arrived in your mouth. It is so ridiculously good.
Lex Fridman
(00:37:52)
But just for a week in August.
Kimbal Musk
(00:37:53)
Just for a week. You can’t have it all year long.
Lex Fridman
(00:37:55)
Okay. What about veggies? You wrote that Chef Hugo that you worked with the co-founder of The Kitchen with taught you the power of a good vegetable.
Kimbal Musk
(00:38:05)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:38:05)
What’s the power of good vegetable?
Kimbal Musk
(00:38:07)
So I’ve trained in New York as a French chef, but it wasn’t very much ingredients focused. It wasn’t very much sourcing focused. He came from the River Cafe in London, which was one of the OGs for the farm to table and still going strong today. And he taught me the value of getting to know farmers and getting to know vegetables from that farm versus vegetables from that farm. And they’re actually different. The soil’s a little different. The way they grow it a little different. It’s the opposite of the industrial machine where everything needs to look exactly the same. And sometimes you’ll get carrots that are ugly and deformed, but there’s much sweeter than the carrots you’d get for other purposes.

(00:38:50)
So you’d make a carrot puree out of that and then you’d carrots that are more typical in shape and size, you might roast them for dinner. So it’s the appreciation for vegetables in general. I probably would say carrots is my favorite just because that was an example of one where I’ve really had to learn how to use the different types of carrots that come from all of our farms. And it’s fun. It’s a fun ingredient. If you just went to the whole foods or just went to a grocery store and you just got exactly the same carrot every time, less fun. But go to a farmer’s market and see what you get and you’ll see they’re quite different.
Lex Fridman
(00:39:28)
Yeah, carrot for me is probably number one. I have rigorous detailed rankings for fruit and veggies.
Kimbal Musk
(00:39:35)
That’s amazing.
Lex Fridman
(00:39:35)
But we’ll get into it. No, I’m just kidding. Well, I am the kind of person that would have a spreadsheet for that.
Kimbal Musk
(00:39:40)
That’s great.
Lex Fridman
(00:39:42)
But I’m mostly just making fun of myself. But I do love carrots. I wish they weren’t so full of carbs, but…
Kimbal Musk
(00:39:52)
Yeah, I’m just not anti carbs. I think the-
Lex Fridman
(00:39:55)
Anti carb. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
Kimbal Musk
(00:39:56)
Yeah. I think they play a role. I have a great friend who’s an amazing doctor and he did some tests for me and everything and turns out I have a gluten allergy and I was like, okay. So what that means is I shouldn’t eat gluten. It’s like, yeah. It’s like, okay, but I also have hay fever and that means I should not go out into nature. So I was like, nah, I think I’m going to go out into nature and maybe what I’ll do on bread and pasta is, like the true carbs I’ll just have it when it’s really good because when it’s really good, it’s really good and you don’t want to miss that. Most of the time, okay, find some crummy bread, whatever. I can skip that part, but I find all of these diets that are like, no, none of this will work. Super this, super that. I wonder if they’re just like people are just looking for something to hang on to. But these diets have been around forever and if they work, then we would know that.
Lex Fridman
(00:40:58)
Yeah, I think one of the biggest problems with diets is it adds stress when you do have that perfect bowl of pasta. If you have categorized yourself as a low-carb eating person, you might be very stressed about enjoying this thing when you should just let go.
Kimbal Musk
(00:41:16)
Let go. This is your cheat day or whatever. And I’ve heard that, and actually I have friends who do that their cheat day, and I say to them, I’m only going to hang out with you on your cheat day because that’s when you’re actually fun.
Lex Fridman
(00:41:28)
Yeah. I would say for me there’s things that make me feel really good, but they’re not rules. They’re not… They’re like go-to favorites in terms of diet and so on. For example, I’ve mostly been eating once a day for the longest time, but that’s not a rule. It’s completely flexible and I’ve mostly been eating very low-carb.
Kimbal Musk
(00:41:54)
Yeah, but you must be eating a lot of food in that one meal.
Lex Fridman
(00:41:56)
Yeah, because it’s usually a very sort of meat heavy. It’s not, portions are not that big.
Kimbal Musk
(00:42:03)
Sure, but your body needs food.
Lex Fridman
(00:42:04)
Yeah, body needs food. So you’re talking about like 2000 calories. What you find out is that dinner is the most social time of the day.
Kimbal Musk
(00:42:13)
Yeah. I have kids in the mornings, so if you have kids, it’s for sure a morning experience, but if you don’t, then you’re right.
Lex Fridman
(00:42:18)
Yeah. But like you said, I deviate. I’m more afraid of missing the perfect dessert, the perfect breakfast, the perfect bowl of pasta, pizza, all that kind of stuff. I don’t think of it as a cheat day. I think it’s a-
Kimbal Musk
(00:42:36)
Well, of you only doing one meal a day, you can eat whatever you like.
Lex Fridman
(00:42:39)
But I want to make clear that it’s not one meal a day always, and I’m like this very strict thing. You always have to be open to the experience, to the new experience.
Kimbal Musk
(00:42:50)
I love that. Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:42:51)
Otherwise you do miss out, just like you said, hay fever. I think if you want to be really safe, you should never leave your home.
Kimbal Musk
(00:42:59)
Yes. Right we learned during COVID, if you wrap yourself in cotton wool in your basement-
Lex Fridman
(00:43:03)
Yes.
Kimbal Musk
(00:43:04)
… you’re not going to die from COVID. You might die from a lot of other things, of pure misery.
Lex Fridman
(00:43:10)
Yeah. Well, you might live forever.
Kimbal Musk
(00:43:13)
We don’t know.
Lex Fridman
(00:43:15)
But it certainly doesn’t maximize the joy of whatever makes life worth living, it doesn’t maximize that.
Kimbal Musk
(00:43:22)
Yeah. Exactly.

Anthony Bourdain

Lex Fridman
(00:43:23)
You wrote in the book that Anthony Bourdain was one of your heroes. Can you speak to what inspired you about him?
Kimbal Musk
(00:43:33)
Yeah, he wrote a book called Kitchen Confidential in the nineties. I was in cooking school at the time. It was so… He romanticized the cooking in the restaurant so well. His writing is great. He kind of got me into like, oh, that’s cool, I want to do that. It was cool. So I got into cooking school, got more engaged in it, and I had this FOMO feeling of I wanted to experience what it’s like to be in the back. When you’re in cooking school, you are in the back. It had a restaurant, we would serve people, but it’s not the same thing as actually being in a… A real restaurant it’s like you’re in a submarine with your teammates and you got to win tonight. It’s a real energy. And so that was a big inspiration. I followed him over the… It’s so sad that he chose to end his life, but I also had met with him a few times. Not like one-on-one over dinner or anything, but just met with him and I just felt his love for food and truly just love for food.
Lex Fridman
(00:44:41)
He gave the advice of don’t be afraid, get excited, and cook with love.
Kimbal Musk
(00:44:45)
Yeah. I’ve used that phrase, especially the cook loved one. One of the things about which we talked about this earlier, where you get quick tangible feedback from a customer when you’re in the restaurant. I know when I didn’t put love into that dish. I know when one of my line cooks did not put love into that part of the dish. I know when that expert person did not put love into double checking the dish before putting it on the table. You just know and cook with love is you do it for your family. Oh, actually, especially when you do it for your family. The food doesn’t have to be perfect, but you’re cooking with love.
Lex Fridman
(00:45:27)
That’s why you lost scrambled eggs.
Kimbal Musk
(00:45:29)
I do that, it’s-
Lex Fridman
(00:45:30)
That’s in the book, Kimbal’s scrambled eggs.
Kimbal Musk
(00:45:32)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(00:45:33)
You promised to make me scrambled eggs, I’m going to hold you to it.
Kimbal Musk
(00:45:35)
That’s great.

Cooking school

Lex Fridman
(00:45:38)
A cooking school you mentioned, The French Culinary Institute. I heard it was a bit of a rough experience in parts.
Kimbal Musk
(00:45:46)
I will call it… It’s not a rough experience in that-
Lex Fridman
(00:45:50)
In a beautiful way.
Kimbal Musk
(00:45:51)
Yeah, it’s exactly. It’s not like I’m a victim of it. It’s rough in that they intentionally make it rough. So the school costs the same price as Harvard to go to. You show up, it’s an 18 month program. You are allowed to drop out at any time. You don’t get your money back. 25 people started, six people graduated, and the people who graduated, I graduated, but man, there were times where I’m like, I can’t handle this. I would literally say to my friends, “Oh, I got to go to cooking school. I’m going to go get screamed at for the next six or seven hours.” And I had this little French chef who was my nemesis.
Lex Fridman
(00:46:35)
Does he still live in your head somewhere?
Kimbal Musk
(00:46:40)
He still lives in my head. Exactly. He totally does. He’s like five foot two or something. And I remember him screaming so much at me that… He’s like the short guy. I’m six five. The spittle would land on my face.
Lex Fridman
(00:46:52)
Nice.
Kimbal Musk
(00:46:53)
And I would just have to stand there and take it. It was a very humbling experience. I did learn though that it’s intentionally rough. So it took a little bit of the edge off it. One day when that same chef had come over to me and said, move over a little bit, and I moved over and he took my carrots, whatever, and started just chopping everything, perfectly. And then he said, okay, you can come back. And then he went over to someone else and started screaming at them saying that, look, even Kimbal can do this and you can’t do this. And I was like, this whole thing’s like a psycho game. So it did take the edge off when I realized it was… The guy was intentionally trying to break you down. And they do this apparently in the army. I’ve not been to the army, but they need to break you down. Everything you know is worthless so that then we can teach you and you can come out of it with what actually we want you to know.
Lex Fridman
(00:47:57)
Are there specific technical lessons you remember you learned from that, sort of how to cut carrots or how to approach food, how to prepare food, how to think about food, how to carry yourself in the kitchen?
Kimbal Musk
(00:48:15)
All of those things. I think that one of the most beautiful lessons was actually scrambled eggs. So there’s different layers of chefs. So they’re all master chefs. They’re all very well-known people and everything, but Alain Sailhac was one of the chief main main guys, and he just passed away, master chef, and everything kind of stopped when he would show up in the kitchen and he would teach very few things. And all of the other chefs, the same ones that were screaming at us, just like, it was like the Red Sea parting.

(00:48:48)
They have total respect for this human and he can do whatever he wants. And one of the things he wanted to teach was how do you make an omelet, a French omelet, and it’s really fundamentally the same thing. It’s a soft scrambled eggs that you fold and the love that he put into the time with us. And of course he’s a legend. There were moments like that where I’m like, wow, okay. Also, just like the other chefs, he didn’t have any concern berating anyone. So he berated our master chefs saying, “I don’t trust these people to teach you how to make scrambled eggs, so I’m going to do it instead.”
Lex Fridman
(00:49:31)
Can you speak to that? Because a lot of people here in this would be like scrambled eggs. Why do you need to be a master chef to really make scrambled eggs?
Kimbal Musk
(00:49:39)
Yeah. Well, first of all, for me, and it’s a learning journey forever. So I make scrambled eggs. I must have made it 10,000 times or more, whatever.
Lex Fridman
(00:49:52)
So it’s like Jared dreams of sushi, Kimbal dreams of scrambled eggs.
Kimbal Musk
(00:49:55)
Pretty much.
Lex Fridman
(00:49:56)
Okay.
Kimbal Musk
(00:49:57)
So I will wake up and be held accountable by my kids to make scrambled eggs. So this happens every morning and I know all the steps, muscle memory level kind of steps, how well I know it, and then I’ll cook it. And it’s very meditative for me because you have to focus. So most scrambled eggs, soft scrambled egg recipes are 10, 15 minutes to get them to that perfect softness. And the recipe that I got from Chef Alain was something that you do in 90 seconds, but it requires total focus. If you look up for a second, you’re going to miss the perfect moment where you have to stop and get those eggs out of the pan because the eggs will keep cooking. And so it’s this meditation. And sometimes you hit it perfectly, but most times could have been a little softer, could have been a little firmer, could have been a little bit more salt, could have been a little bit of pepper. And so what’s really fun about the morning is my kids are kind of into it so we critique the eggs every morning.
Lex Fridman
(00:51:19)
Do they have a rating system? We’re back to the spreadsheet.
Kimbal Musk
(00:51:21)
It’s more like, and again, it also comes back to how do people feel. So my kids can be in a bad mood and they can be grumpy.
Lex Fridman
(00:51:27)
Or it’s like a Michelin star system. What?
Kimbal Musk
(00:51:28)
No, no. It’s more like, oh yeah, I like my eggs a little more gooier or yesterday it was this way, but a little bit more salt, a little less salt. Salt is usually the one that is… Because not all salts are equal. So if you are used to working with a certain kind of salt and then you just are forced for some reason to… You ran out of salt so you use some other salt, you actually don’t know how to use it. You really want to have the same salt all the time.
Lex Fridman
(00:51:58)
Yeah. You have a page on salt in the book, which is fascinating.
Kimbal Musk
(00:52:01)
Totally. Salt is you got to get to know your salt, you got to love your salt, and you got to use it over and over and over again. And it will teach you how to use that salt, whereby your own palate will tell you how salty you like things. But if you change it up and you mix up a whole bunch of salts, you’ve now multiplied your learning path. So for me, my favorite salt is kosher salt. And I like to use that all the time. And if I ever change it, I might sprinkle a little bit of Maldon salt, just a crunchy sort of a flaky salt. But it’s more for that when you’re actually eating.
Lex Fridman
(00:52:36)
For the texture.
Kimbal Musk
(00:52:37)
Yeah, it gives you texture as well as salt. Exactly. You wouldn’t use it on scrambled eggs, but if you switch out your salts, it’s a different weapon.
Lex Fridman
(00:52:46)
Yeah. Yeah.
Kimbal Musk
(00:52:47)
You need to learn it.
Lex Fridman
(00:52:50)
I like how usually there’s wine connoisseurs. You’re saying going back to farm to table when you’re talking about carrots, in that same rigor and nuance you have to consider the different farms involved for the carrots, in that same way you have to consider the different salts with like-
Kimbal Musk
(00:53:12)
And also not even all kosher salts are the same. It’s the particular salt that you like, get to know it, get in a relationship with it. It’s like great. You’ll learn so much.
Lex Fridman
(00:53:24)
In terms of the measurement, the proportion, the amount you put of salt you put in, are you doing that exactly, or are you doing it by feel.
Kimbal Musk
(00:53:34)
So it’s by feel, and that’s where you get the relationship. So in fact, in the cookbook, I have QR codes that people can scan because what I struggle with is they don’t teach you technique. They can describe the technique, but they don’t teach the technique because it’s a technique, it’s not a recipe. And so one of the lessons is how do you salt a steak. And the answer is not here’s a teaspoon and you do it this way. The answer is use kosher salts-
Kimbal Musk
(00:54:00)
The answer is use kosher salt so you can see with your eyes, because they’re little flakes, how much salt is on your steak, cook it and then taste it. Do you think you need more or do you need it less? Okay, now next time put a little more on it because you can see it. And it’s about learning the fact that you want to be able to see how much salt is on the steak so that you can then train yourself for the future of how much salt you want on your steak.
Lex Fridman
(00:54:29)
Yeah. But then the steak and the salt kind of dance together. It depends on where the steak came from.
Kimbal Musk
(00:54:34)
That’s true. Or the thickness of the steak, that’ll make a difference. But for the most part, if you’re able to see it versus table salt, for example, just disappears, you just can’t see what you’re putting on your steak. You can’t really learn as a result.
Lex Fridman
(00:54:48)
I think you talk about roast chickens where your love of food began. What about steak?
Kimbal Musk
(00:54:54)
I love a good steak. It’s so great.
Lex Fridman
(00:54:56)
So in the French school, you add sauces and all this kind of stuff, and in Boulder is when you realized there’s a beauty to the basic ingredient.
Kimbal Musk
(00:55:06)
Simplicity, yeah, a good New York strip from a good rancher. There’s a lot of discussion and controversy on how cattle should be raised, and we have a very different approach, which is, we know how our cattle are raised. We go to the farm, we get to know the rancher. And sometimes you do want to have them be finished on, they’ll be grass-fed for the most part, but then there’s some sort of cool recipe of food you’re giving them that will then make them taste better. And sometimes it is actually pretty good to have 100% grass fed. I’ve had some amazing ranchers that show me that the flavor is all there. For the average person that might go to Whole Foods or a grocery store, I think the simplicity of a good steak, it is important to get good sourcing, but also it’s just good.
Lex Fridman
(00:56:07)
What’s your favorite kind of meat? Is it New York Strip? It’s probably New York Strip for me.
Kimbal Musk
(00:56:10)
Yeah. New York Strip. I like the fact that it’s lean, but if you want the fat, you can dive into that little strip of fat or you can leave it alone because you don’t want it that night. It’s also a great steak for adding something, if you want. You could either do a pepper sauce or you could do a lot of ground pepper, which it’s not sauce, but it’s a peppery steak. It’s a really good steak for a canvas for other things.
Lex Fridman
(00:56:41)
But the basic ingredients you’re playing with are salt and pepper?
Kimbal Musk
(00:56:45)
Yeah, pretty much. Actually, I will say there’s another one, garlic. This is my favorite recipe for a steak. You season it, both sides salt and pepper. You saute it in a little olive oil, barely anything, and you’re getting a nice crisp, a golden dark, golden brown on both sides. The other trick with cooking a steak is don’t touch it. You just put one side when you’re ready to turn it, turn it around. Don’t touch it any other time. But at the end, you take a dab of butter and you crush a clove of garlic. You don’t even chop it, you just crush the clove, and you put the two of them in the pan and you just roll the steak around in the garlic butter. I think that’s the one.
Lex Fridman
(00:57:36)
Bold move, bold move. Since you’re in Austin quite a bit opening a restaurant here, what do you think about barbecue? It’s the Texas way.
Kimbal Musk
(00:57:52)
Well, I would say there’s an Austin way.
Lex Fridman
(00:57:53)
There’s an Austin way.
Kimbal Musk
(00:57:55)
And actually even Austin would say, “There’s a suburb of Austin way.” I think that actually the adventure of food is wonderful. I would absolutely say that Austin is one of the great food cities of America, and barbecue is one of its gifts that it gives the city. But you go to one and the other and you’ll have a different approach, and that’s the part I love is where the real celebration of the art is in. So you might go to one, and they have a style that they love and they’ve been doing it for years, and then you’ll go to another and they have a style that they love and they’ve been doing it for years. They’re still barbecue, but they’re actually different. And it’s really beautiful to see that. I think that’s what food culture is. It just builds up over time by people who love this style of cooking.
Lex Fridman
(00:58:49)
Well, I especially love the communal, how they structure restaurants usually. I don’t even want to call it a restaurant because it doesn’t feel like a restaurant. It feels like a tavern of some sort. Terry Black’s was like that.
Kimbal Musk
(00:59:03)
Yeah. They also have paper towels. You can get as messy as you like. And it’s a whole roll of paper towels. They don’t just give you a napkin. They know what you’re getting into.
Lex Fridman
(00:59:11)
There’s just wood everywhere and it has this feel like this place has been around forever. It’s not changing. I know it’s the 21st century with the internet and all this nonsense that you people are building, but really this is all about the same. It’s been the same for generations. We’re doing it the same. That kind of feel, if you want to escape the world in that way and then truly connect with people.
Kimbal Musk
(00:59:34)
One of the other things that’ll happen in a town like Austin is there’ll be a barbecue joint that is just legendary, and then out of that will come someone who wants to go do their own barbecue joint and they’ll take the learning from that barbecue joint, they’ll open up a new one, but it won’t be the same as the other barbecue joint. Part of it says, “Dude, don’t just do the same thing. Do something. What you have to say?” But also part of it is, if you’re in the world of food as an art form and you want to go open up another barbecue joint, you want to prove yourself. “I deserve to have a barbecue joint in this town. I know this is one of the holy grails of barbecue.” And people will follow you like they’re following a musician or they’re following an artist and they are excited to see what your version is and how well you can pull it off. But that’s what I love. That’s what I mean by a city with a food culture. Austin has that.
Lex Fridman
(01:00:34)
There’s also a legend to certain places. Certain places are more than just the food they create. That could be a burden. You have to live up to the legendary nature of the name.
Kimbal Musk
(01:00:47)
Our restaurant in Boulder, The Kitchen, is 20 years old. We’re very well known, very well respected, and we do have to live up to the name. I think that our restaurant lives up to its name in not just the food. It’s like you walk in and you feel the restaurant. And that is also something we’ve just done naturally. The space is 120 year old building. It used to be a brothel. It was a bookstore, a storied history.
Lex Fridman
(01:01:19)
That’s an interesting take.
Kimbal Musk
(01:01:20)
Literally, this was a mining town. So back in the 1800s, this was built late 1800s, brothels were all over. That was a thing. And so there’s an actual tunnel in the basement that goes to the local hotel that would be used for going back and forth between the hotel and the brothel without people knowing. The tunnel is now concreted up, but you can go about 20, 30 feet into the tunnel. You go into the space and it’s actually an old space, so you feel like it’s been there forever.

Life-threatening accident

Lex Fridman
(01:01:58)
In 2010, you had a life-threatening accident that changed the way you see life, the world, also the way you see food and cooking. Can you tell me the story of it?
Kimbal Musk
(01:02:12)
Yeah. So 2010, I was 37. I had opened the restaurant in 2004, and I had loved the restaurant world, loved it, but I didn’t really want to grow a restaurant company. That wasn’t my goal. And so I went back into technology and I had gone from something that I love to something that I like. For me, it was like chewing sawdust every day. I just couldn’t believe that I had changed my life and had gone back into technology. And then now I do, do work in technology and I do love it, but I found a better relationship with it. But I was really unhappy. From the outside, I was a CEO of a hot startup, but from the inside I was just very unhappy. And I was in Jackson Hole and I was doing these very aggressive snowboard runs and I’m at the time a pretty good, aggressive snowboarder. And I remember saying to myself, “Look, I’ve got kids. I need to chill on this.”

(01:03:18)
The next day, it was Valentine’s Day. Tomorrow’s Valentine’s Day. I’m just going to have a nice day with the family and my wife at the time. And we went to a children’s run to do the inner tube run, and the tubes are small, but everyone uses the same tube. So I’m six foot five, my kids are four years old, and everyone uses the same size tube. It should have been a message to me not to get on this thing. But I went and got on it and on the first run, I went down and you’re going super fast, 35 miles an hour, and the tube hit the braking mats and it stopped. The tube just stopped where it was. It just threw me. My head was facing downhill, so that’s created the wrong center of gravity. So instead of braking, it just threw me.

(01:04:08)
I landed on my head. My head went into my chest, compression into my chest, down like that. I ruptured my spine at C6 and C7. And in the blink of a second, I was paralyzed. I was like, “What?” Just impossible to comprehend. And they put this big thing, this halo on my head, and they take me to the hospital, which was more of a medical clinic. And I’m just like, “What is going on here?”
Lex Fridman
(01:04:47)
Do you remember your thoughts from the moment it happened to when you got to the hospital?
Kimbal Musk
(01:04:53)
So this is one of the things that actually the doctor said caused the most damage was I was thrown from the tube, and I heard this big crunch sound in my body and I knew that I was hurt, but I didn’t feel any pain. That’s also, why wouldn’t you feel pain? Because when you’re paralyzed, you don’t feel pain. And I’m face down on the snow and the snow is burning my face because you can’t do that. You need something. And I found a way to turn myself around so that my face wouldn’t be on the ground, but I knew I couldn’t move. And that they said actually caused more damage. Well, obviously, the accident created the opening, but once you move your body, the blood goes into the spinal column at a faster rate. And that is what caused my paralysis. But I remember that and I remember getting into the ambulance.
Lex Fridman
(01:06:00)
Did you think you were going to die in those seconds, minutes?
Kimbal Musk
(01:06:05)
It was a different feeling than death. It was more of a, what is going on here? It was more like, I can’t make sense of what’s going on. There was a moment where I got to the hospital and they did this MRI and the doctor comes up to me and says, “Look, we’ve done this MRI.” Now I’m in the hospital and I’m like, “I can’t move.” But I also don’t feel any pain. So it’s very confusing. Your body looks like you can move it. Look, see how I’m moving my hand? It looks like you can do that and then it just doesn’t move. There’s no feedback loop that it’s not moving. Your brain even thinks it’s moving, but it’s not moving. It’s the worst, most terrifying thing.

(01:07:02)
So the doctor says, “Look, the way you broke your neck, really, at a zero degree angle, that is so rare, but as a result, there is no twisting of the spine. We think that we can get the blood out of your spinal column and you should get some or maybe all of your movement back.” And I was like, “Oh, okay. I think I’m going to be fine. I guess I’m going to be fine.” And then I realized I had tears just streaming down the side of my face and I was like, “Whoa, man. I have no idea what is going on.”
Lex Fridman
(01:07:39)
So this kind of intense state of confusion, I wonder if it’s a weird psychological defense mechanism of taking you away from the obvious possibility of death.
Kimbal Musk
(01:07:52)
For sure, all of the defenses were up. I don’t know else to describe it. But there was denial. There was this curiosity of, why is there no pain? When they did actually repair me and fix me, it was three days later, the pain was indescribable how much pain I was in, but there was no pain for three days.
Lex Fridman
(01:08:24)
The human body is fascinating,
Kimbal Musk
(01:08:26)
Man.
Lex Fridman
(01:08:27)
Wow. So they were able?
Kimbal Musk
(01:08:31)
Yeah, so they did the surgery. But I had this very clear voice in my head that I’ve determined that it’s God, I’m not religious, but I don’t know how else to describe the voice. And this voice was very clear. “You’re going to work with kids and food.” Okay, where did that come from? I’m a tech CEO. I have a restaurant. We were working with some kids in schools with helping at a local nonprofit. And he’s like, “No, you’re just going to work on kids and food.” My good friend Antonio and my brother were in the hospital and I was like, “I’m going to work on kids and food.” They were like, “He’s crazy. He’s lost his mind.” But not that they were arguing, no one was arguing with me, but I was like, “I’m just going to do that. I need to say it out loud.” And I remember resigning from my job as the CEO from the hospital, and that was it.

(01:09:34)
It was just clear. It was a clear voice. It wasn’t for a moment. It wasn’t like a flash of light or anything. It was probably two weeks of clear voice.
Lex Fridman
(01:09:43)
Of clarity.
Kimbal Musk
(01:09:44)
Clarity. Exactly, clarity. No monkey brain, nothing. No monkey brain, just clarity.
Lex Fridman
(01:09:50)
So you’re not a religious person, but you do call it the voice of God. Who is that God, do you think? Who is that? Where did that come from?
Kimbal Musk
(01:10:02)
Well, I’ve done ayahuasca and I’ve spoken to what they call Mother Aya, which is another version of God. It’s a divine presence, I think is a better way to say it. I’ve also had this debate in my head. Maybe it’s just me. I’m talking to me and it’s my peaceful, more kinder, less caught up in the emotion of the day version of me. Maybe it’s me. Okay, maybe it is, but it’s there.
Lex Fridman
(01:10:40)
But who are you? How deep does it go? What does you mean? First of all, the depth of what the human mind even is, is a gigantic mystery, consciousness, all of it. Who are you? So yeah, maybe it is you, but then maybe in order to build you, we need to build the universe. You are actually fundamentally a part of this whole human society, so the pieces of humans that you’ve interacted with are all within you. And then maybe the history of the humans that came before are also in there. And maybe the entirety of life on earth is also in there. And whatever brought life about on earth is in there somewhere. So that’s all you.
Kimbal Musk
(01:11:27)
Yeah, which is really true. It literally is true that we all are, the photons from the sun came in.
Lex Fridman
(01:11:35)
You’re part fish.
Kimbal Musk
(01:11:37)
We all came from all that. One of the things I do is meditate, I’ve been meditating for many, many years, and the way I meditate is I sit and I listen to my thoughts and I simply just do that for 15 to 20 minutes. It just calms the nervous system, and I might breathe and just breathe through because it’s been a stressful day and it’s just a beautiful way I do it around. I remember I said I used to do a [inaudible 01:12:08] at the bar after work. Now I go meditate, for instance.
Lex Fridman
(01:12:12)
Same thing.
Kimbal Musk
(01:12:12)
A little bit better for my health. But meditation I was taught. Sam Harris actually taught me. It was not so much just about watching your thoughts, but realizing that you’re a watcher. You’re actually a watcher. Who is the person watching? That’s you actually. Your thoughts are floating through your mind, but you are the watcher. And I was like, oh, that’s really interesting. Okay, so I’m going to learn that. I’m going to be the watcher. And what I learned was I’m watching these thoughts go by and there’s a consistent other presence. And I’m like, what is that consistent other presence? It’s not a thought. It’s not something I can let it float away, and it doesn’t even want to float away. It’s just a consistent other presence that I can watch and feel.
Lex Fridman
(01:13:18)
So you are the watcher watching the feelings and thoughts, but there’s also other presence next to you almost?
Kimbal Musk
(01:13:24)
Yes. Yeah, that’s how I feel. And it’s a beautiful presence. It’s not a presence that is trying to intervene. It’s not a presence that is trying to tell you what to do. It’s just a beautiful presence.
Lex Fridman
(01:13:37)
And that might be part of the thing you met when you took Ayahuasca.
Kimbal Musk
(01:13:45)
I learned about Mother Ayahuasca where you have this experience of talking to… Actually, I would say the closest thing to breaking my neck, that feeling was ayahuasca.
Lex Fridman
(01:13:53)
Can you go through that experience? Because I’m actually traveling to the Amazon jungle in a month. I’ll probably do ayahuasca for the first time.
Kimbal Musk
(01:14:01)
Okay.
Lex Fridman
(01:14:01)
I need a preview, unofficial instruction manual.
Kimbal Musk
(01:14:04)
Yeah, sure. First of all, I think there are many different ways to do it, and I’ve done many different ways. There’s a very western medicine approach where you have doctors that look after you during the day, put an eye mask on, you’re on a futon, and you really are in a western medicine setting. And it frankly for me has been the most powerful experience. I feel the most comfortable part of western medicine in my upbringing. The other extreme, but they’re in-between would be very probably Peruvian ceremonies, where you’re probably going to go, very much about you do it in a community, you do it with others, and you feel people go through their pain and their processing. So I know the whole gamut, but the thing that I found most powerful about it and profoundly powerful, I would say, first of all, it’s non-recreational. No one should do this for a good time. This is not a good time. This is a very…
Lex Fridman
(01:15:13)
Almost traumatic, but in, again, a beautiful way.
Kimbal Musk
(01:15:16)
I was actually going to say that word, but it’s not traumatic. It’s profound. So it’s more like you really leave who you were before behind, and then you become the person you will be afterwards.
Lex Fridman
(01:15:40)
And that’s never an easy thing.
Kimbal Musk
(01:15:42)
Yes, exactly. And what I recall was arguing with Mother Aya and saying, “No, I’m fine. What are you talking about? Leave me alone.”

Road trip across US

Lex Fridman
(01:15:52)
How did that work out? But before 2010, the accident and the two transformational experiences you had, you were a very successful tech CEO. Maybe go back to the early days with Zip2. In 1994, you and Elon started Zip2. Tell me the story of that.
Kimbal Musk
(01:16:24)
So in ’94, we actually did a road trip around the U.S. to brainstorm about what we wanted to do after college.
Lex Fridman
(01:16:30)
What was the road trip like?
Kimbal Musk
(01:16:32)
That was awesome. So we went from Silicon Valley to Philadelphia. My brother’s old very really cool, it’s one of those very old BMW’s, not ones from the ’60s or ’70s, but the car didn’t work. It would break down all the time, but we had a blast. I remember going through Needles, on the border of California in Arizona, there’s a town called Needles, it’s the hottest place in America, and the engine was not cooling, so we had to put the heat on. So we had the heat blasting to cool the engine, keep the engine cool, and keep the windows down because you can’t stand the heat in the car. But actually the outside heat is hotter than the inside heat, so you’re just in a furnace if you’re driving through.
Lex Fridman
(01:17:19)
Just sweating.
Kimbal Musk
(01:17:20)
This is at night even. I can’t imagine doing that in the day.
Lex Fridman
(01:17:23)
Oh, wow.
Kimbal Musk
(01:17:23)
Yeah, it was wonderful. It took us a few weeks. I think three weeks maybe.
Lex Fridman
(01:17:29)
First time across America?
Kimbal Musk
(01:17:30)
First road trip like that, yeah, for sure. But it was really not a road trip for tourist sites. We went to the weirdest places. And actually, I would say, we didn’t go to them. We broke down in the weirdest places because that’s when we stopped.
Lex Fridman
(01:17:46)
Did you meet any interesting people?
Kimbal Musk
(01:17:49)
I remember we broke down in the Badlands of South Dakota, about an hour from Rapid City. That road is empty, and so we actually slept in the car because there was just no one around. No cell phones in those days. And eventually a trucker picked us up. He was just like, “Man, you guys are the dumbest kids on the planet.” I was 21. He was maybe 22. But he was so nice to us and so kind to us, and found us a mechanic in Rapid City and then found us a tow truck. You find the most wonderful people. When you’re in a place of distress, people do want to take care of other people.
Lex Fridman
(01:18:33)
They help you.
Kimbal Musk
(01:18:33)
Yeah, they want to help.
Lex Fridman
(01:18:34)
And especially when you’re on a road trip, because I’ve taken a road trip across the United States, and there’s a part of people where they really love that. I think part of them wants to do that also, wants to escape whatever the local struggles. Just whatever the mundaneness, the struggles of life are, a road trip is a kind of thing where you’re like, you know what? I’m going to get away from it all and I’m going to experience life in the full epic Jack Kerouac way of seeing America. And the people. Not the tourist sites, just the humans.
Kimbal Musk
(01:19:12)
Yeah, exactly. This was not tourist related. We did, of course, one. We stopped at Mount Rushmore at night, which you can see nothing. We thought that was hilarious. We couldn’t see Mount Rushmore.
Lex Fridman
(01:19:24)
That’s great.
Kimbal Musk
(01:19:27)
It was like, well, we physically were here. We took a photo of us not seeing Mount Rushmore.
Lex Fridman
(01:19:34)
In the darkness. You could just say you went to the Grand Canyon too, just at night. And just visit different places when the car broke down, I love it. So yes, you took the road trip before founding Zip2.
Kimbal Musk
(01:19:45)
Yeah. So I had a experience in college running a house painting business. That, for me, was my first experience with success. It was very, very hard. It was a franchise where they teach students how to paint houses, but I was good at it. I built a team of 30 people after about two years. So I was like, I had a taste of, hey, I’m not unable to do this. In fact, my most vulnerable place I remember as an entrepreneur was I just loved the idea of Wall Street and finance. I was allured by it. This is in the late ’80s. I’m in high school and there was a lot of these books, Liar’s Poker and others that came out and I was like, ah, man, this is awesome. These people must be amazing.

(01:20:33)
So I went to business school and I busted my ass to get a kick-ass summer job, and I got a job in one of the main banks. It was in Toronto, but it was like their version of Wall Street. I was so disappointed with the people that I was around. I was just like, whoa. I totally misunderstood what the banking world is. It was a very large bank. I’m sure if I’d gone to a more aggressive one, maybe I would’ve had a better experience. I say aggressive, meaning someone was paying attention. This was just a…
Kimbal Musk
(01:21:00)
Aggressive meaning someone was paying attention. This was just people showing up and not doing much. Actually, it is funny. This is great. So 1991, ’92, so one of those summers, but the summer job was literally they print out the sales for all the brokerage houses for the whole company. It’s a pile of papers that’s maybe four or five feet tall and you have a pencil and you add things up using your pencil and a calculator. And I had known about Lotus 1-2-3 forever. Excel was coming out and I was like, “Hey, guys, you know that there’s a different way to do this.” And they’re like, “Don’t talk to us. This is just your job. Go do it.”
Lex Fridman
(01:22:02)
Yeah, just use the pencil.
Kimbal Musk
(01:22:03)
So I went to the head of the data… I just asked because in those days you had the manila envelope where you just write the name of the person that you want this to go to and it’ll go to them. It’s like email, I guess, but there’s no filter.
Lex Fridman
(01:22:03)
There’s no spam filter.
Kimbal Musk
(01:22:21)
There’s no spam filter. So I sent a note, I wrote a nice letter to the database administrator who I didn’t really know, and I said, “Would you be open to me saying hi and maybe I can get access to the file rather than print the damn thing out and use a pencil?” And she responded right away and we hit it off. She was great. So she’s like, “Of course you can [inaudible 01:22:43] I can’t believe these guys are doing what they’re doing.” So for the first couple of weeks of the summer, I wrote code in Lotus 1-2-3 that would… This is going to sound crazy, but you type in the date range and you type in the geography and you type in which part of the bank you care about, and it will literally just create a new spreadsheet and it will just, a macro would print it out. It was like a magic trick for these guys.
Lex Fridman
(01:23:17)
Incredible.
Kimbal Musk
(01:23:17)
I know. No, it’s [inaudible 01:23:20] for me, I was like, “Guys, this is so obvious.” So I got all that done and this job was supposed to take three or four months because it’s really, you’re doing this with a pencil and now I’ve created this macro that you could not just do it, you could do it, you could tweak it and say, “Oh, I want this area of the world or this area of or this month or that month compared to that month,” all the normal things you could do with the spreadsheet. And the software was on a floppy disk. And I was like, “Here’s the software and just put it into your computer right now, open 1-2-3 and it just pops up with a little box that type in your dates and the whole little, I coded a little thing like that.”

(01:24:06)
And what I was astounded by was not so much that there was a magic trick, it was the lack of appreciation for innovation. They just looked at it and they were like, “Huh, that’s nice.” And I was like, “We’re going to have someone spend hundreds of hours doing something and now it’s something you can do in a minute.”
Lex Fridman
(01:24:33)
Yeah, if that doesn’t fill you with excitement…
Kimbal Musk
(01:24:35)
Yeah, if that doesn’t move your needle, what the heck? And so I was really disappointed with the banking world. But anyway, that was also fine. That’s…
Lex Fridman
(01:24:44)
Such a good example though. Yeah. And then also see the possibility of where that goes.
Kimbal Musk
(01:24:49)
Then I got back to business school and I canceled all of my business classes I possibly could. But I was actually in business school, so I couldn’t cancel them all. All finance courses, I was like, “I’m done with that industry. I’m not going back.” So the vulnerable part for me was my whole family’s full of entrepreneurs and there was this franchise to do house painting, and I genuinely was afraid that I wouldn’t be good at it. And I was like, “Wow, I really am afraid of failure.” It’s very easy to avoid entrepreneurship, but if your whole family’s entrepreneurs and you go in and you aren’t good, I was really afraid.
Lex Fridman
(01:25:29)
You’re going to have to face that failure every time you meet your family.
Kimbal Musk
(01:25:32)
Yes. And our family are wonderful and everything, but pretty much everyone’s an entrepreneur. And of course not everyone is perfect. Not everyone’s doing it successfully all the time, but when you’re young and you want to prove yourself, it really was putting my heart on my sleeve. I started the business in this part of Toronto and for the first… Paint the houses in the summer, but you do all your sales pre before the summer and all the way until April, I was just not succeeding. And I was like, I’m like, “Oh my God, I’m just going to fail.” And I remember that my whole nervous system was like, “I’m a failure.” And I remember I had this gentle manager who he was like, “You seem like you know what you’re doing. Why are you not making any sales?” So he actually went with me on a few sales calls and he said, “Oh, he was great. You’re doing this wrong, you’re doing that wrong, you’re doing this wrong.”

(01:26:43)
And changed those three things. And it was like a watershed moment just all of a sudden. And I just followed the instructions of what this guy told me. All of a sudden, every single sale I would make, I was like, I can’t believe that it was really my lack of humility to learn from someone else. I was like, “No, I’m going to prove that I can do this without your teachings,” and I was going to fail.
Lex Fridman
(01:27:20)
So to you, that humility is essential for the entrepreneur, especially young.
Kimbal Musk
(01:27:25)
I would say if we have an openness to learning, which does require humility, and you course correct or you help get other people to help you course correct. But it does start with humility because if you try and pretend you have all the answers, you don’t.

Zip2

Lex Fridman
(01:27:45)
So you went from that to founding Zip2. That was an interesting time in the history of tech.
Kimbal Musk
(01:27:50)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:27:50)
But what was it like? You mentioned and the first people to look at a map basically at directions.
Kimbal Musk
(01:28:00)
Yeah. So mapping had been on the internet but vector-based mapping had not. So that’s the ability to zoom in or zoom out, and it’s really data versus an image that comes across. And we went into this company called Navtech, my brother and I, and we just asked for the data and this is Silicon Valley. They wrote us a one page letter that we had to sign and said, “Here’s all of our data that we own it, you don’t own it, but you can use it on the internet and if you ever make any money on it, you have to call us.” That was it. We’re like, “Okay, that sounds great.” And so we put it up on the internet and back in those days, it might take 60 to 120 seconds to actually give you an answer back, but it was amazing. The door to door directions, the ability to take a map and zoom in and zoom out. We use these things 10 times a day now. It was amazing. And we were the first two humans to see it on the internet because this stuff didn’t even exist to the world.

(01:29:01)
Navtech was building it for NeverLost, for Hertz NeverLost, which would come out a few years later. This was not something that people knew existed. This was something we discovered that it existed. Let’s put it on the internet and share it with the world.
Lex Fridman
(01:29:14)
What did the two of you feel like to see that magic? Did you know…
Kimbal Musk
(01:29:17)
It’s amazing. It was like, “What?”
Lex Fridman
(01:29:24)
Did you mean the amazing, just that it’s cool, but also that you could see the future that this could transform…
Kimbal Musk
(01:29:32)
I don’t think people understand before this moment, you could not be told your directions. You just could not. Today, we live in this world where you’re told our directions all the time. Before this moment you could not be told your directions and all of a sudden you could. It wasn’t like a little thing.
Lex Fridman
(01:29:56)
Yeah, there’s a bunch of things that once we have, we take it for granted. And that takes a day for people to transition.
Kimbal Musk
(01:30:05)
Totally.
Lex Fridman
(01:30:05)
It’s like, “Oh, okay, cool.”
Kimbal Musk
(01:30:08)
Yeah. Right. Exactly. Exactly.
Lex Fridman
(01:30:10)
And when you see, maybe when you’re one of the first humans to see that thing, you’re like, “Holy, shit.”
Kimbal Musk
(01:30:15)
Holy shit. This is going to be used by everyone all the time forever.
Lex Fridman
(01:30:20)
So Zip2 was a success.
Kimbal Musk
(01:30:22)
I would say it was a success but it was also a very hard company to build. And I mean it because the internet in those days was a boom time. We were being funded, but you couldn’t make any money. So it was actually really hard, the constant outside criticism that we aren’t for real. This is not going to survive. This is not going to… And it started to feel that way. We’re like, “Wow, man, we are doing something that is great that people are using.” And we were top 100 website. Most of our work was through folks like The New York Times. So we were even much, much busier than that. But there was just no money at it. And even today, go to Google Maps, there’s no money in it. It’s just a local search that is needed for everyone. And so it became an add-on to search. But even remember in those days, you couldn’t make money at search either. No one had figured out AdWords or anything, they didn’t realize how big of a business this was. But we all knew this was a thing and everyone was using it.
Lex Fridman
(01:31:30)
But didn’t quite know how to make money on it.
Kimbal Musk
(01:31:31)
Didn’t make money. When we got acquired, it was a bittersweet moment because Compact that owned AltaVista wanted to merge so that sort of regular search with the best search engine at the time, pre-Google with Zip2, which would be the best local search, and it would be a Yahoo killer. And the Compact just wanted to make money by taking the company public but they wouldn’t give us any stock. They paid us cash return out, actually very well for us, but because the whole internet bubble burst, we didn’t know that at the time. And so it was bittersweet because they essentially wanted our company and we were welcome to stay but you don’t have to. And that feeling, that was a pretty rough feeling. Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:32:19)
But in retrospect, it opened the door to…
Kimbal Musk
(01:32:23)
It set us up for an incredible platform to go do beautiful things.

Tesla

Lex Fridman
(01:32:28)
You’ve invested in X. com that eventually merged with PayPal. That’s a fascinating story there, also fascinating on many levels, including the fact that the current social media company, formerly known as Twitter, is now called X. History has a rhyme to it. It’s kind of all hilarious in a certain kind of way. You invested in and help sell a lot of the initial products for Tesla.
Kimbal Musk
(01:32:59)
Yeah, I still sell on the board of Tesla. Tesla is 20 years now. Isn’t that amazing?
Lex Fridman
(01:33:03)
20 years.
Kimbal Musk
(01:33:03)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:33:04)
From the Roadster, the initial Roadster to…
Kimbal Musk
(01:33:06)
I still have the first business plan. So I didn’t join as a founder, I joined as a founding board member. And so I actually, I didn’t write the business plan. I got to read it and I still have that. I still have it as a part of history.
Lex Fridman
(01:33:20)
Did you see the future at that time, the company that Tesla is today? Could you have possibly, could you and Elon imagine it?
Kimbal Musk
(01:33:27)
No. No, I certainly didn’t. What I saw in it was a real… For me personally, I was really upset that the General Motors had killed their EV car. There’s even a movie called Who Killed the Electric Car? And I knew that the physics of electric is perfectly fine. There’s no reason why you couldn’t use an electric car to drive around. What resonated with me with the business plan was take an electric motor, which is really a high performance motor, and put it in a sports car and sell it at a high price as a way to enter into the market. Whereas what others had been doing, or at least General Motors had done, is you put it into a really crummy car and you sell it as a commuter vehicle that doesn’t really work that well and looks ugly as well. They really did everything you could to make that thing as ugly as Zen. And then I was like, “Okay, I get it. We’re going to take an appropriate technology and put it in an appropriate car so that when you have…”

(01:34:37)
Because electric motors, they have constant torque, incredible power, put it in a car that looks like a sports car. So the idea was to put it in the Lotus release, redesign it a bit. And even at that point I was like, “This is theoretically good, so I’m going to join and help build it.” But I was not convinced that it would work because General Motors had done such a terrible job of making everyone think that these things are terrible. But I was curious. And the time that I fell in love with the company and its mission was I was driving in what’s called a mule where we take a car and we take the engine out and we put in electric drive train and I drove it. Even the dashboards, there’s no dashboard. It’s just you got a steering wheel and it’s just wires and everything around. And I remember there’s a street, we were running the Bay Area called Bing Street, and I was just like… No traffic. So I’m just going to drive this on the floor and see what happens.

(01:35:44)
And it was a feeling I’d never experienced before. Gasoline cars have an inertia to them. So you go… This was being shot out of a cannon. And I was like, “Okay, this is going to be real.”
Lex Fridman
(01:35:58)
It’s a very spaceship-like feeling.
Kimbal Musk
(01:36:00)
Yeah. It’s like, “Whoa.” It’s like the G-force pulls you back.
Lex Fridman
(01:36:05)
Yeah.
Kimbal Musk
(01:36:06)
So I was like, “Okay, this is going to be great. This is going to be an interesting… We are going to create something interesting here.” I think the real transformative thing for Tesla was the Model 3 when we were able to get the price down for the world.
Lex Fridman
(01:36:23)
And that was also one of the most challenging periods…
Kimbal Musk
(01:36:27)
Oh my God.
Lex Fridman
(01:36:27)
… For Tesla for you.
Kimbal Musk
(01:36:29)
We were borderline bankrupt like two or three times that year. And everyone was hating on us about whether we’d get that done. The Model 3 today is incredibly affordable car, like a 300 bucks a month kind of lease and $3,000 down. That’s where you get the scale. That’s where you get people who… And by the way, it’s a great car. It’s even a better Model 3 now than it was five years ago. We don’t function the way car companies function. We function more like how an iPhone company or how Apple works. So our Model 3 today this year is better than last year. It’s like it’s way better and we just keep getting better.
Lex Fridman
(01:37:10)
Yeah, and the software is a fundamental part of the car and the software keeps improving.
Kimbal Musk
(01:37:15)
Exactly. And we upload over the air.
Lex Fridman
(01:37:17)
Which was one of the things that people don’t often acknowledge, it’s over the air updates. It’s like a revolutionary thing. It’s not just the autopilot. To me, it’s like the over the updates, is even bigger thing than on the autopilot, at least in this moment of history because you basically turned a car into the iPhone.
Kimbal Musk
(01:37:36)
Exactly. It’s an iPhone with wheels. But actually talking about autopilot, right after this interview, I’m going to go test out the latest Model 3.
Lex Fridman
(01:37:45)
You’re going to get driven around by a robot.
Kimbal Musk
(01:37:46)
I’m going to get driven around by the car. I’m going to say, “I want to go to this barbecue joint. Take me there and park me there.” And I’m going to see how it is. And this is the latest Model 3 that we have out into production. Anyone can buy it. And it’s super affordable. And it’s like, “Okay. Full stop driving is a journey. It’s not like there’s a destination. It’s a journey forever. So let’s see where we are on the journey today.”
Lex Fridman
(01:38:16)
And there’s been a bit of a push and pull between you and Elon in terms of levels of optimism about deadlines and so on, timelines about when we’ll arrive at the destination. I like that you said it’s a journey. For Elon, there’s a destination, right?
Kimbal Musk
(01:38:30)
Exactly.
Lex Fridman
(01:38:31)
And that destination is tomorrow or yesterday.
Kimbal Musk
(01:38:34)
I think that’s a really good insight. I actually live with this concept of a growth mindset versus a fixed mindset. And it’s a philosophical term where fixed mindset is about the destination and a growth mindset is about learning on the journey. And I think that I’m a happier person because I take that learning on the journey approach, whereas it’s really frustrating if you’re always, it has to be about the destination every time.
Lex Fridman
(01:39:06)
The nice thing about destination, at least from my personal perspective as a programmer engineer, is it puts a little fire under you to get shit done.
Kimbal Musk
(01:39:06)
That’s true.
Lex Fridman
(01:39:16)
If there’s a clear deadline of a destination, you feel the anxiety of it.
Kimbal Musk
(01:39:20)
I would say that I still do that, but I call those forcing functions instead of destinations…
Lex Fridman
(01:39:24)
That’s true.
Kimbal Musk
(01:39:25)
… Because you’re just forcing people to crank on some code or cookbook or whatever because you have a date. And oftentimes there’s reason. It’s 20th anniversary, you wanted to get the cookbook out. We have a reason we didn’t make this up out of thin air. And so yeah, that does push you, but just because we have the cookbook doesn’t mean it’s a destination. It means it was a forcing function to get it out there. Now we’re on the journey.

SpaceX

Lex Fridman
(01:39:53)
Speaking of journeys, I have to ask you about SpaceX. The journey that all of humanity [inaudible 01:40:00]
Kimbal Musk
(01:40:00)
Seriously. Talk about a journey. That is incredible.
Lex Fridman
(01:40:04)
It’s an interesting moment in the history of humanity that perhaps hopefully we’ll become a multi-planetary species. But SpaceX is also a company. You invested in SpaceX, you were side by side with Elon through the highs and the lows, through the lows and the highs. So what were some memorable challenges? What were some low points…
Kimbal Musk
(01:40:30)
Sure.
Lex Fridman
(01:40:30)
… From the history of SpaceX?
Kimbal Musk
(01:40:32)
One of the hardest times in SpaceX was we were in the mid-Pacific in Kwajalein and my brother had sold PayPal. He’d done well financially. But in the rocket world, that money goes away really quickly. And we were in this military base in Kwajalein and I think it was the second rocket that blew up, I’m not sure. But we didn’t have infinite resources. I certainly didn’t have the resources. I’m there to support, brotherly support. So every rocket launch was do or die, and the first one had blown up. And so the second one, I think it was the second one, blew up. And it was so depressing. It was just like, “Ugh.” There’s nowhere to go. There’s no distraction. You’re on this military base. You don’t really socialize. It was just, we were all together. And I had gotten to know… For me, I’m not part of the team, I’m just there for emotional support or whatever, because it’s cool.

(01:41:42)
So I got to know a couple of people locally and got to know this one guy who had a mobile home, best view in the world, but it’s just a mobile home with a patch of grass next to it. And I was just desperate to find food that wasn’t from the cafeteria because this is the worst food you can imagine. And I met him and he showed me this little tiny little grocery store, which had a few things like canned tomatoes. And this is, again, your middle of nowhere. It’s just nothing fresh. And I made this dish that was a version of an Italian version of chili, just baked beans and sweating onions and then tomatoes. And it was a big pot of food. It’s a group of people. We didn’t even have a table. And we just put the big pot in the middle and we had our little paper plates and we took a scoop as we needed it.

(01:42:37)
And it was… Do we need the gathering place of food brings people together in the most difficult times, and it was one of my favorite memories because I was able to bring my gift to this group of incredible people that their hearts were broken. And to sit there and share a meal and feel the life kind come back into us and by the end of the night, we’re actually having a good time.
Lex Fridman
(01:43:04)
What a fascinating contrast of rockets representing the peak accomplishment of human beings as a society and then returning to the thing that is the foundation of human society, which is that communal experience.
Kimbal Musk
(01:43:20)
That communal, vulnerable connection. Like we mentioned vulnerability earlier. The most vulnerable place, actually that’s when you have some of your most beautiful meals.
Lex Fridman
(01:43:28)
Yeah, the descendants of apes gathering around some baked beans after watching a rocket explode.

Hope for the future

Kimbal Musk
(01:43:36)
Right.
Lex Fridman
(01:43:36)
What gives you hope about the future of this whole thing we’ve got going on, humanity?
Kimbal Musk
(01:43:43)
If you look at how things have changed over the past, say, 50 years, you can clearly say, “Oh, wow. Poverty rates have gone down, infant mortality has gone down dramatically. All these things have gone down a lot.” So if you look at it on a daily basis, you can tell that life is very dramatic, whether it’s something’s blowing up on X or from the newspapers or whatever, and you can really get caught up into it. But if you look back over the past few decades, things are getting better. And at the fundamental level, are less people hungry? Are there is war going on? Of course, but are there less wars? Yes. And so I think if we all just step back a little bit, it’s less about hope. It’s more perspective and reflection. And if I do see a problem, like in case of the obesity epidemic, I work really hard to help with that. Our nonprofit’s called Big Green and we work with 150 nonprofits around the country to help Americans grow food again, get connected to their food because I really believe growing food changes your life.

(01:45:08)
And so, “Okay, let’s go do that.” So I’ll help out where I think we really can make a difference. But if you step back a little, things are actually getting better. It’s just a bumpy ride.
Lex Fridman
(01:45:22)
Yeah, and for those of us watching all of this, I think I would love to see more celebrating of the people that are helping, the people that have found their way of helping and just celebrating those people.
Kimbal Musk
(01:45:33)
Yeah. I would also, actually that’s a really nice point. I have learned that you really want to celebrate your successes because even in the greater scheme of things, I’ve learned this in the startup world where you are constantly facing death. Why should you even exist? Do your customers want your product or whatever? And then something will happen where you’re like, “Wow, we really nailed that. That’s really great.” Or we got a product released or got some good kudos from something, right? Everyone, we’re going to go celebrate. And actually everyone’s still like, “No, no, we’ve got all these other problems.” Nope, we’re going to go celebrate and then we’ll go back to the problems. But if you don’t do that, then it starts building on this kind of… You never really get to celebrate.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:17)
Mm-hmm. And be grateful. I think this is a good time to go celebrate the very fact that we’re alive today. We get to live and enjoy this incredible life, the two of us, and have this great conversation, and we’ll get to celebrate over some scrambled eggs.
Kimbal Musk
(01:46:32)
Beautiful.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:32)
I’m going to hold you to it.
Kimbal Musk
(01:46:33)
Beautiful.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:34)
Kimbal, thank you so much for talking today.
Kimbal Musk
(01:46:36)
Thank you for having me.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:37)
Thanks for listening to this conversation with Kimbal Musk. To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now let me leave you some words from Anthony Bourdain. Your body is not a temple, it’s an amusement park. Enjoy the ride. Thank you for listening and hope to see you next time.

Transcript for Yann Lecun: Meta AI, Open Source, Limits of LLMs, AGI & the Future of AI | Lex Fridman Podcast #416

This is a transcript of Lex Fridman Podcast #416 with Yann LeCun.
The timestamps in the transcript are clickable links that take you directly to that point in
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Table of Contents

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Introduction

Yann LeCun
(00:00:00)
I see the danger of this concentration of power through proprietary AI systems as a much bigger danger than everything else. What works against this is people who think that for reasons of security, we should keep AI systems under lock and key because it’s too dangerous to put it in the hands of everybody. That would lead to a very bad future in which all of our information diet is controlled by a small number of companies who proprietary systems.
Lex Fridman
(00:00:32)
I believe that people are fundamentally good, and so if AI, especially open source AI can make them smarter, it just empowers the goodness in humans.
Yann LeCun
(00:00:44)
So I share that feeling. Okay. I think people are fundamentally good and in fact, a lot of doomers are doomers because they don’t think that people are fundamentally good.
Lex Fridman
(00:00:57)
The following is a conversation with Yann LeCun, his third time on this podcast. He is the chief AI scientist at Meta, professor at NYU, Turing Award winner and one of the seminal figures in the history of artificial intelligence. He and Meta AI have been big proponents of open sourcing, AI development and have been walking the walk by open sourcing many of their biggest models, including Llama 2 and eventually Llama 3. Also, Yann has been an outspoken critic of those people in the AI community who warn about the looming danger and existential threat of AGI. He believes the AGI will be created one day, but it will be good. It will not escape human control, nor will it dominate and kill all humans.

Limits of LLMs


(00:01:52)
At this moment of rapid AI development, this happens to be somewhat a controversial position, and so it’s been fun seeing Yann get into a lot of intense and fascinating discussions online as we do in this very conversation. This is the Lex Fridman podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, dear friends, here’s Yann LeCun. You’ve had some strong statements, technical statements about the future of artificial intelligence throughout your career actually, but recently as well, you’ve said that autoregressive LLMs are not the way we’re going to make progress towards superhuman intelligence. These are the large language models like GPT-4, like Llama 2 and 3 soon and so on. How do they work and why are they not going to take us all the way?
Yann LeCun
(00:02:47)
For a number of reasons. The first is that there is a number of characteristics of intelligent behavior. For example, the capacity to understand the world, understand the physical world, the ability to remember and retrieve things, persistent memory, the ability to reason, and the ability to plan. Those are four essential characteristics of intelligent systems or entities, humans, animals. LLMs can do none of those or they can only do them in a very primitive way and they don’t really understand the physical world. They don’t really have persistent memory. They can’t really reason and they certainly can’t plan. And so if you expect the system to become intelligent just without having the possibility of doing those things, you’re making a mistake. That is not to say that autoregressive LLMs are not useful. They’re certainly useful, that they’re not interesting, that we can’t build a whole ecosystem of applications around them. Of course we can, but as a pass towards human-level intelligence, they’re missing essential components.

(00:04:08)
And then there is another tidbit or fact that I think is very interesting. Those LLMs are trained on enormous amounts of texts, basically, the entirety of all publicly available texts on the internet, right? That’s typically on the order of 10 to the 13 tokens. Each token is typically two bytes, so that’s two 10 to the 13 bytes as training data. It would take you or me 170,000 years to just read through this at eight hours a day. So it seems like an enormous amount of knowledge that those systems can accumulate, but then you realize it’s really not that much data. If you talk to developmental psychologists and they tell you a four-year-old has been awake for 16,000 hours in his or her life, and the amount of information that has reached the visual cortex of that child in four years is about 10 to 15 bytes.

(00:05:12)
And you can compute this by estimating that the optical nerve carry about 20 megabytes per second roughly, and so 10 to the 15 bytes for a four-year-old versus two times 10 to the 13 bytes for 170,000 years worth of reading. What that tells you is that through sensory input, we see a lot more information than we do through language, and that despite our intuition, most of what we learn and most of our knowledge is through our observation and interaction with the real world, not through language. Everything that we learn in the first few years of life, and certainly everything that animals learn has nothing to do with language.
Lex Fridman
(00:05:57)
So it would be good to maybe push against some of the intuition behind what you’re saying. So it is true there’s several orders of magnitude more data coming into the human mind much faster, and the human mind is able to learn very quickly from that, filter the data very quickly. Somebody might argue your comparison between sensory data versus language, that language is already very compressed. It already contains a lot more information than the bytes it takes to store them if you compare it to visual data. So there’s a lot of wisdom and language. There’s words, and the way we stitch them together, it already contains a lot of information. So is it possible that language alone already has enough wisdom and knowledge in there to be able to, from that language, construct a world model and understanding of the world, an understanding of the physical world that you’re saying LLMs lack?
Yann LeCun
(00:06:56)
So it’s a big debate among philosophers and also cognitive scientists, like whether intelligence needs to be grounded in reality. I’m clearly in the camp that yes, intelligence cannot appear without some grounding in some reality. It doesn’t need to be physical reality. It could be simulated, but the environment is just much richer than what you can express in language. Language is a very approximate representation or percepts and/or mental models. I mean, there’s a lot of tasks that we accomplish where we manipulate a mental model of the situation at hand, and that has nothing to do with language. Everything that’s physical, mechanical, whatever, when we build something, when we accomplish a task, model task of grabbing something, et cetera, we plan or action sequences, and we do this by essentially imagining the result of the outcome of a sequence of actions that we might imagine and that requires mental models that don’t have much to do with language, and I would argue most of our knowledge is derived from that interaction with the physical world.

(00:08:13)
So a lot of my colleagues who are more interested in things like computer vision are really on that camp that AI needs to be embodied essentially. And then other people coming from the NLP side or maybe some other motivation don’t necessarily agree with that, and philosophers are split as well, and the complexity of the world is hard to imagine. It’s hard to represent all the complexities that we take completely for granted in the real world that we don’t even imagine require intelligence, right?

(00:08:55)
This is the old Moravec paradox, from the pioneer of robotics, hence Moravec, who said, how is it that with computers, it seems to be easy to do high-level complex tasks like playing chess and solving integrals and doing things like that, whereas the thing we take for granted that we do every day, like, I don’t know, learning to drive a car or grabbing an object, we can’t do with computers, and we have LLMs that can pass the bar exam, so they must be smart, but then they can’t learn to drive in 20 hours like any 17-year old, they can’t learn to clear out the dinner table and fill up the dishwasher like any 10-year old can learn in one shot. Why is that? What are we missing? What type of learning or reasoning architecture or whatever are we missing that basically prevent us from having level five sort of in cars and domestic robots?
Lex Fridman
(00:10:00)
Can a large language model construct a world model that does know how to drive and does know how to fill a dishwasher, but just doesn’t know how to deal with visual data at this time, so it can operate in a space of concepts?
Yann LeCun
(00:10:17)
So yeah, that’s what a lot of people are working on. So the short answer is no, and the more complex answer is you can use all kinds of tricks to get an LLM to basically digest visual representations of images or video or audio for that matter. And a classical way of doing this is you train a vision system in some way, and we have a number of ways to train vision systems either supervised, semi-supervised, self-supervised, all kinds of different ways, that will turn any image into a high-level representation. Basically a list of tokens that are really similar to the kind of tokens that typical LLM takes as an input.

(00:11:10)
And then you just feed that to the LLM in addition to the text, and you just expect the LLM, during training, to be able to use those representations to help make decisions. I mean, there’s been work along those lines for quite a long time and now, you see those systems. I mean there are LLMs that have some vision extension, but they’re basically hacks in the sense that those things are not trained to really understand the world. They’re not trained with video, for example. They don’t really understand intuitive physics, at least not at the moment.
Lex Fridman
(00:11:51)
So you don’t think there’s something special to you about intuitive physics, about sort of common sense reasoning about the physical space, about physical reality. That to you is a giant leap that LLMs are just not able to do?
Yann LeCun
(00:12:02)
We’re not going to be able to do this with the type of LLMs that we are working with today, and there’s a number of reasons for this, but the main reason is the way LLMs are trained is that you take a piece of text, you remove some of the words in that text, you mask them, you replace them by blank markers, and you train a genetic neural net to predict the words that are missing. And if you build this neural net in a particular way so that it can only look at words that are to the left or the one it’s trying to predict, then what you have is a system that basically is trying to predict the next word in a text. So then you can feed it a text, a prompt, and you can ask it to predict the next word. It can never predict the next word exactly.

(00:12:48)
So what it’s going to do is produce a probability distribution of all the possible words in a dictionary. In fact, it doesn’t predict words. It predicts tokens that are kind of subword units, and so it’s easy to handle the uncertainty in the prediction there because there is only a finite number of possible words in the dictionary, and you can just compute a distribution over them. Then what the system does is that it picks a word from that distribution. Of course, there’s a higher chance of picking words that have a higher probability within that distribution. So you sample from that distribution to actually produce a word, and then you shift that word into the input, and so that allows the system not to predict the second word, and once you do this, you shift it into the input, et cetera.

Bilingualism and thinking


(00:13:35)
That’s called autoregressive prediction, which is why those LLMs should be called autoregressive LLMs, but we just call them LLMs, and there is a difference between this kind of process and a process by which before producing a word… When you and I talk, you and I are bilingual, we think about what we’re going to say, and it’s relatively independent of the language in which we’re going to say. When we talk about, I don’t know, let’s say a mathematical concept or something, the kind of thinking that we’re doing and the answer that we’re planning to produce is not linked to whether we’re going to see it in French or Russian or English.
Lex Fridman
(00:14:19)
Chomsky just rolled his eyes, but I understand, so you’re saying that there’s a bigger abstraction that goes before language and maps onto language?
Yann LeCun
(00:14:30)
Right. It’s certainly true for a lot of thinking that we do.
Lex Fridman
(00:14:33)
Is that obvious that we don’t… You’re saying your thinking is same in French as it is in English?
Yann LeCun
(00:14:40)
Yeah, pretty much.
Lex Fridman
(00:14:42)
Pretty much or how flexible are you if there’s a probability distribution?
Yann LeCun
(00:14:49)
Well, it depends what kind of thinking, right? If it’s producing puns, I get much better in French than English about that, or much worse.
Lex Fridman
(00:14:58)
Is there an abstract representation of puns? Is your humor an abstract… When you tweet and your tweets are sometimes a little bit spicy, is there an abstract representation in your brain of a tweet before it maps onto English?
Yann LeCun
(00:15:11)
There is an abstract representation of imagining the reaction of a reader to that text.
Lex Fridman
(00:15:18)
Or you start with laughter and then figure out how to make that happen?
Yann LeCun
(00:15:23)
Or figure out like a reaction you want to cause and then figure out how to say it so that it causes that reaction. But that’s really close to language. But think about a mathematical concept or imagining something you want to build out of wood or something like this. The kind of thinking you’re doing has absolutely nothing to do with language really. It’s not like you have necessarily an internal monologue in any particular language. You are imagining mental models of the thing. I mean, if I ask you to imagine what this water bottle will look like if I rotate it 90 degrees, that has nothing to do with language. And so clearly, there is a more abstract level of representation in which we do most of our thinking, and we plan what we’re going to say if the output is uttered words as opposed to an output being muscle actions, we plan our answer before we produce it.

(00:16:29)
LLMs don’t do that. They just produce one word after the other instinctively if you want. It’s a bit like the subconscious actions where you’re distracted, you’re doing something, you’re completely concentrated, and someone comes to you and asks you a question and you kind of answer the question. You don’t have time to think about the answer, but the answer is easy. So you don’t need to pay attention. You sort of respond automatically. That’s kind of what an LLM does. It doesn’t think about its answer really. It retrieves it because it’s accumulated a lot of knowledge. So it can retrieve some things, but it’s going to just spit out one token after the other without planning the answer.
Lex Fridman
(00:17:13)
But you’re making it sound just one token after the other. One token at a time generation is bound to be simplistic, but if the world model is sufficiently sophisticated that one token at a time, the most likely thing it generates is a sequence of tokens is going to be a deeply profound thing.
Yann LeCun
(00:17:39)
But then that assumes that those systems actually possess an eternal world model.

Video prediction

Lex Fridman
(00:17:44)
So really goes to the… I think the fundamental question is can you build a really complete world model, not complete, but one that has a deep understanding of the world?
Yann LeCun
(00:17:58)
Yeah. So can you build this first of all by prediction, and the answer is probably yes. Can you build it by predicting words? And the answer is most probably no, because language is very poor in terms of weak or low bandwidth if you want, there’s just not enough information there. So building world models means observing the world and understanding why the world is evolving the way it is, and then the extra component of a world model is something that can predict how the world is going to evolve as a consequence of an action you might take.

(00:18:45)
So one model really is here is my idea of the state of the world at time, T, here is an action I might take. What is the predicted state of the world at time, T+1? Now that state of the world does not need to represent everything about the world, it just needs to represent enough that’s relevant for this planning of the action, but not necessarily all the details. Now, here is the problem. You’re not going to be able to do this with generative models. So a generative model has trained on video, and we’ve tried to do this for 10 years, you take a video, show a system, a piece of video, and then ask you to predict the reminder of the video, basically predict what’s going to happen.
Lex Fridman
(00:19:27)
One frame at a time, do the same thing as the autoregressive LLMs do, but for video.
Yann LeCun
(00:19:34)
Right. Either one frame at a time-
Lex Fridman
(00:19:34)
LVMs.
Yann LeCun
(00:19:36)
… or a group of frames at a time. But yeah, a large video model if you want. The idea of doing this has been floating around for a long time and at FAIR, some of our colleagues and I have been trying to do this for about 10 years, and you can’t really do the same trick as with LLMs because LLMs, as I said, you can’t predict exactly which word is going to follow a sequence of words, but you can predict the distribution of words. Now, if you go to video, what you would have to do is predict the distribution of all possible frames in a video, and we don’t really know how to do that properly.

(00:20:20)
We do not know how to represent distributions over high-dimensional, continuous spaces in ways that are useful. And there lies the main issue, and the reason we can do this is because the world is incredibly more complicated and richer in terms of information than text. Text is discrete, video is high-dimensional and continuous. A lot of details in this. So if I take a video of this room and the video is a camera panning around, there is no way I can predict everything that’s going to be in the room as I pan around. The system cannot predict what’s going to be in the room as the camera is panning. Maybe it’s going to predict this is a room where there’s a light and there is a wall and things like that. It can’t predict what the painting of the wall looks like or what the texture of the couch looks like. Certainly not the texture of the carpet. So there’s no way I can predict all those details.

(00:21:19)
So one way to possibly handle this, which we’ve been working for a long time, is to have a model that has what’s called a latent variable. And the latent variable is fed to a neural net, and it’s supposed to represent all the information about the world that you don’t perceive yet, and that you need to augment the system for the prediction to do a good job at predicting pixels, including the fine texture of the carpet and the couch and the painting on the wall.

(00:21:57)
That has been a complete failure essentially. And we’ve tried lots of things. We tried just straight neural nets, we tried GANs, we tried VAEs, all kinds of regularized auto encoders. We tried many things. We also tried those kinds of methods to learn good representations of images or video that could then be used as input to, for example, an image classification system. That also has basically failed. All the systems that attempt to predict missing parts of an image or video from a corrupted version of it, basically, so take an image or a video, corrupt it or transform it in some way, and then try to reconstruct the complete video or image from the corrupted version, and then hope that internally, the system will develop good representations of images that you can use for object recognition, segmentation, whatever it is. That has been essentially a complete failure and it works really well for text. That’s the principle that is used for LLMs, right?
Lex Fridman
(00:23:07)
So where’s the failure exactly? Is it that it’s very difficult to form a good representation of an image, like a good embedding of all the important information in the image? Is it in terms of the consistency of image to image, to image to image that forms the video? If we do a highlight reel of all the ways you failed, what’s that look like?
Yann LeCun
(00:23:30)
Okay, so the reason this doesn’t work is first of all, I have to tell you exactly what doesn’t work because there is something else that does work. So the thing that does not work is training the system to learn representations of images by training it to reconstruct a good image from a corrupted version of it, okay? That’s what doesn’t work. And we have a whole slew of techniques for this that are variant of denoising autoencoders, something called MAE developed by some of my colleagues at FAIR, masked autoencoder. So it’s basically like the LLMs or things like this where you train the system by corrupting texts except you corrupt images, you remove patches from it, and you train a gigantic neural network reconstruct. The features you get are not good, and you know they’re not good because if you now train the same architecture, but you train it to supervise with label data, with textual descriptions of images, et cetera, you do get good representations and the performance on recognition tasks is much better than if you do this self-supervised retraining.
Lex Fridman
(00:24:42)
The architecture is good?
Yann LeCun
(00:24:44)
The architecture is good, the architecture of the encoder is good, but the fact that you train the system to reconstruct images does not lead it to produce to long, good generic features of images.
Lex Fridman
(00:24:56)
When you train in a self-supervised way?
Yann LeCun
(00:24:58)
Self-supervised by reconstruction.
Lex Fridman
(00:25:00)
Yeah, by reconstruction.
Yann LeCun
(00:25:01)
Okay, so what’s the alternative? The alternative is joint embedding.

JEPA (Joint-Embedding Predictive Architecture)

Lex Fridman
(00:25:07)
What is joint embedding? What are these architectures that you’re so excited about?
Yann LeCun
(00:25:11)
Okay, so now instead of training a system to encode the image and then training it to reconstruct the full image from a corrupted version, you take the full image, you take the corrupted or transformed version, you run them both through encoders, which in general, are identical, but not necessarily. And then you train a predictor on top of those encoders to predict the representation of the full input from the representation of the corrupted one. So joint embedding, because you’re taking the full input and the corrupted version or transformed version, run them both through encoders, you get a joint embedding, and then you’re saying, can I predict the representation of the full one from the representation of the corrupted one?

(00:26:06)
And I call this a JEPA, so that means joint embedding predictive architecture because this joint embedding and there is this predictor that predicts the representation of the good guy from the bad guy. And the big question is how do you train something like this? And until five years ago or six years ago, we didn’t have particularly good answers for how you train those things except for one, called contrastive learning, where the idea of contrastive learning is you take a pair of images that are, again, an image and a corrupted version or degraded version somehow or transformed version of the original one, and you train the predicted representation to be the same as that. If you only do this, this system collapses. It basically completely ignores the input and produces representations that are constant. So the contrastive methods avoid this, and those things have been around since the early ’90s, I had a paper on this in 1993, is you also show pairs of images that you know are different, and then you push away the representations from each other. So you say, not only do representations of things that we know are the same should be the same or should be similar, but representation of things that we know are different should be different. And that prevents the collapse, but it has some limitation. And there’s a whole bunch of techniques that have appeared over the last six, seven years that can revive this type of method, some of them from FAIR, some of them from Google and other places, but there are limitations to those contrastive methods.

(00:27:47)
What has changed in the last three, four years is now we have methods that are non-contrastive. So they don’t require those negative contrastive samples of images that we know are different. You turn them on you with images that are different versions or different views of the same thing, and you rely on some other tricks to prevent the system from collapsing. And we have half a dozen different methods for this now.

JEPA vs LLMs

Lex Fridman
(00:28:16)
So what is the fundamental difference between joint embedding architectures and LLMs? Can JEPA take us to AGI? Whether we should say that you don’t like the term AGI, and we’ll probably argue I think every single time I’ve talked to you, we’ve argued about the G in AGI.
Yann LeCun
(00:28:36)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(00:28:38)
I get it. I get it. Well, we’ll probably continue to argue about it. It’s great. You like AMI because you like French and ami is friend in French, and AMI stands for advanced machine intelligence. But either way, can JEPA take us to that towards that advanced machine intelligence?
Yann LeCun
(00:29:02)
Well, so it’s a first step. Okay, so first of all, what’s the difference with generative architectures like LLMs? So LLMs or vision systems that are trained by reconstruction generate the inputs. They generate the original input that is non-corrupted, non-transformed, so you have to predict all the pixels, and there is a huge amount of resources spent in the system to actually predict all those pixels, all the details. In a JEPA, you’re not trying to predict all the pixels, you’re only trying to predict an abstract representation of the inputs. And that’s much easier in many ways. So what the JEPA system, when it’s being trained, is trying to do is extract as much information as possible from the input, but yet only extract information that is relatively easily predictable. So there’s a lot of things in the world that we cannot predict. For example, if you have a self-driving car driving down the street or road, there may be trees around the road and it could be a windy day. So the leaves on the tree are kind moving in kind semi-chaotic, random ways that you can’t predict and you don’t care, you don’t want to predict. So what you want is your encoder to basically eliminate all those details. It’ll tell you there’s moving leaves, but it’s not going to give the details of exactly what’s going on. And so when you do the prediction in representation space, you’re not going to have to predict every single pixel of every leaf. And that not only is a lot simpler, but also, it allows the system to essentially learn an abstract representation of the world where what can be modeled and predicted is preserved and the rest is viewed as noise and eliminated by the encoder.

(00:30:59)
So it lifts the level of abstraction of the representation. If you think about this, this is something we do absolutely all the time. Whenever we describe a phenomenon, we describe it at a particular level of abstraction. We don’t always describe every natural phenomenon in terms of quantum field theory. That would be impossible. So we have multiple levels of abstraction to describe what happens in the world, starting from quantum field theory, to atomic theory and molecules and chemistry, materials and all the way up to concrete objects in the real world and things like that. So we can’t just only model everything at the lowest level. And that’s what the idea of JEPA is really about, learn abstract representation in a self-supervised manner, and you can do it hierarchically as well. So that, I think, is an essential component of an intelligent system. And in language, we can get away without doing this because language is already to some level abstract and already has eliminated a lot of information that is not predictable. And so we can get away without doing the joint embedding, without lifting the abstraction level and by directly predicting words.
Lex Fridman
(00:32:16)
So joint embedding, it’s still generative, but it’s generative in this abstract representation space?
Yann LeCun
(00:32:23)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:32:23)
And you’re saying language, we were lazy with language because we already got the abstract representation for free, and now we have to zoom out, actually think about generally intelligent systems. We have to deal with a full mess of physical reality, of reality. And you do have to do this step of jumping from the full, rich, detailed reality to a abstract representation of that reality based on what you can then reason and all that kind of stuff.
Yann LeCun
(00:32:57)
Right. And the thing is those self-supervised algorithm that learn by prediction, even in representation space, they learn more concept if the input data you feed them is more redundant. The more redundancy there is in the data, the more they’re able to capture some internal structure of it. And so there is way more redundancy in the structure in perceptual inputs, sensory input like vision than there is in text, which is not nearly as redundant. This is back to the question you were asking a few minutes ago. Language might represent more information really, because it’s already compressed. You’re right about that, but that means it’s also less redundant, and so self-supervision, you will not work as well.
Lex Fridman
(00:33:43)
Is it possible to join the self-supervised training on visual data and self-supervised training on language data? There is a huge amount of knowledge, even though you talk down about those 10 to the 13 tokens. Those 10 to the 13 tokens represent the entirety-
Lex Fridman
(00:34:00)
Those 10 to the 13 tokens represent the entirety, a large fraction of what us humans have figured out, both the shit-talk on Reddit and the contents of all the books and the articles and the full spectrum of human intellectual creation. So is it possible to join those two together?
Yann LeCun
(00:34:22)
Well, eventually, yes. But I think if we do this too early, we run the risk of being tempted to cheat. And in fact, that’s what people are doing at the moment with vision-language model. We’re basically cheating. We’re using language as a crutch to help the deficiencies of our vision systems to learn good representations from images and video.

(00:34:46)
And the problem with this is that we might improve our language models by feeding them images, but we’re not going to get to the level of even the intelligence or level of understanding of the world of a cat or a dog, which doesn’t have language. They don’t have language and they understand the world much better than any LLM. They can plan really complex actions and imagine the result of a bunch of actions. How do we get machines to learn that before we combine that with language? Obviously if we combine this with language, this is going to be a winner, but before that, we have to focus on how do we get systems to learn how the world works?
Lex Fridman
(00:35:33)
So this joint-embedding predictive architecture, for you, that’s going to be able to learn something like common sense, something like what a cat uses to predict how to mess with its owner most optimally by knocking over a thing.
Yann LeCun
(00:35:50)
That’s the hope. In fact, the techniques we’re using are non-contrastive. So not only is the architecture non-generative, the learning procedures we are using are non-contrastive. We have two sets of techniques. One set is based on distillation, and there’s a number of methods that use this principle, one by DeepMind called BYOL, a couple by FAIR, one called vcREG and another one called I-JEPA. And vcREG, I should say, is not a distillation method actually, but I-JEPA and BYOL certainly are. And there’s another one also called DINO or DINO also produced from at FAIR. And the idea of those things is that you take the full input, let’s say an image, you run it through an encoder, produces a representation, and then you corrupt that input or transform it, run it through essentially what amounts to the same encoder with some minor differences and then train a predictor.

(00:36:50)
Sometimes a predictor is very simple, sometimes it doesn’t exist, but train a predictor to predict a representation of the first uncorrupted input from the corrupted input. But you only train the second branch. You only train the part of the network that is fed with the corrupted input. The other network, you don’t train. But since they share the same weight, when you modify the first one, it also modifies the second one. And with various tricks, you can prevent the system from collapsing with the collapse of the type I was explaining before, where the system basically ignores the input. So that works very well. The two techniques we developed at FAIR, DINO and I-JEPA work really well for that.

DINO and I-JEPA

Lex Fridman
(00:37:39)
So what kind of data are we talking about here?
Yann LeCun
(00:37:41)
So there’s several scenario, one scenario is you take an image, you corrupt it by changing the cropping, for example, changing the size a little bit, maybe changing the orientation, blurring it, changing the colors, doing all kinds of horrible things to it.
Lex Fridman
(00:38:00)
But basic horrible things?
Yann LeCun
(00:38:01)
Basic horrible things that sort of degrade the quality a little bit and change the framing, crop the image. And in some cases, in the case of I-JEPA, you don’t need to do any of this, you just mask some parts of it. You just basically remove some regions, like a big block essentially, and then run through the encoders and train the entire system, encoder and predictor, to predict the representation of the good one from the representation of the corrupted one.

V-JEPA


(00:38:33)
So that’s the I-JEPA. It doesn’t need to know that it’s an image for example, because the only thing it needs to know is how to do this masking. Whereas with DINO, you need to know it’s an image because you need to do things like geometry transformation and blurring and things like that, that are really image specific. A more recent version of this that we have is called V-JEPA. So it’s basically the same idea as I-JEPA except it’s applied to video. So now you take a whole video and you mask a whole chunk of it. And what we mask is actually kind of a temporal tube, so a whole segment of each frame in the video over the entire video.
Lex Fridman
(00:39:10)
And that tube was statically positioned throughout the frames, just literally it’s a straight tube.
Yann LeCun
(00:39:16)
The tube, yeah, typically is 16 frames or something, and we mask the same region over the entire 16 frames. It’s a different one for every video obviously. And then again, train that system so as to predict the representation of the full video from the partially masked video. And that works really well. It’s the first system that we have that learns good representations of video so that when you feed those representations to a supervised classifier head, it can tell you what action is taking place in the video with pretty good accuracy. So that’s the first time we get something of that quality.
Lex Fridman
(00:39:56)
That’s a good test that a good representation is formed. That means there’s something to this.
Yann LeCun
(00:40:00)
Yeah. We also preliminary result that seem to indicate that the representation allow our system to tell whether the video is physically possible or completely impossible, because some object disappeared or an object suddenly jumped from one location to another or changed shape or something.
Lex Fridman
(00:40:21)
So it’s able to capture some physics based constraints about the reality represented in the video, about the appearance and the disappearance of objects.
Yann LeCun
(00:40:33)
Yeah, that’s really new.
Lex Fridman
(00:40:35)
Okay, but can this actually get us to this kind of world model that understands enough about the world to be able to drive a car?
Yann LeCun
(00:40:49)
Possibly, this is going to take a while before we get to that point. And there are systems already robotic systems, that are based on this idea. And what you need for this is a slightly modified version of this, where imagine that you have a complete video and what you’re doing to this video is that you are either translating it in time towards the future. So you only see the beginning of the video, but you don’t see the latter part of it that is in the original one, or you just mask the second half of the video, for example. And then you train a JEPA system or the type I described, to predict the representation of the full video from the shifted one. But you also feed the predictor with an action. For example, the wheel is turned 10 degrees to the right or something, right?

(00:41:45)
So if it’s a dash cam in a car and you know the angle of the wheel, you should be able to predict to some extent what’s going to happen to what you see. You’re not going to be able to predict all the details of objects that appear in the view obviously, but at a abstract representation level, you can probably predict what’s going to happen. So now what you have is a internal model that says, “Here is my idea of the state of the world at time T. Here is an action I’m taking. Here is a prediction of the state of the world at time T plus one, T plus delta T, T plus two seconds,” whatever it is. If you have a model of this type, you can use it for planning. So now you can do what LMS cannot do, which is planning what you’re going to do. So as you arrive at a particular outcome or satisfy a particular objective.

(00:42:40)
So you can have a number of objectives. I can predict that if I have an object like this and I open my hand, it’s going to fall. And if I push it with a particular force on the table, it’s going to move. If I push the table itself, it’s probably not going to move with the same force. So we have this internal model of the world in our mind, which allows us to plan sequences of actions to arrive at a particular goal. And so now if you have this world model, we can imagine a sequence of actions, predict what the outcome of the sequence of action is going to be, measure to what extent the final state satisfies a particular objective, like moving the bottle to the left of the table and then plan a sequence of actions that will minimize this objective, at runtime.

(00:43:41)
We’re not talking about learning, we’re talking about inference time, so this is planning, really. And in optimal control, this is a very classical thing. It’s called model predictive control. You have a model of the system you want to control that can predict the sequence of states corresponding to a sequence of commands. And you’re planning a sequence of commands so that according to your role model, the end state of the system will satisfy an objectives that you fix. This is the way rocket trajectories have been planned since computers have been around, so since the early ’60s essentially.

Hierarchical planning

Lex Fridman
(00:44:20)
So yes, for a model predictive control, but you also often talk about hierarchical planning. Can hierarchical planning emerge from this somehow?
Yann LeCun
(00:44:28)
Well, so no, you will have to build a specific architecture to allow for hierarchical planning. So hierarchical planning is absolutely necessary if you want to plan complex actions. If I want to go from, let’s say from New York to Paris, it’s the example I use all the time, and I’m sitting in my office at NYU, my objective that I need to minimize is my distance to Paris. At a high level, a very abstract representation of my location, I would have to decompose this into two sub goals. First one is go to the airport, second one is catch a plane to Paris. Okay, so my sub goal is now going to the airport. My objective function is my distance to the airport. How do I go to the airport where I have to go in the street and hail a taxi, which you can do in New York.

(00:45:21)
Okay, now I have another sub goal go down on the street. Well that means going to the elevator, going down the elevator, walk out the street. How do I go to the elevator? I have to stand up from my chair, open the door in my office, go to the elevator, push the button. How do I get up for my chair? You can imagine going down, all the way down, to basically what amounts to millisecond by millisecond muscle control. And obviously you’re not going plan your entire trip from New York to Paris in terms of millisecond by millisecond muscle control. First, that would be incredibly expensive, but it will also be completely impossible because you don’t know all the conditions of what’s going to happen, how long it’s going to take to catch a taxi or to go to the airport with traffic. I mean, you would have to know exactly the condition of everything to be able to do this planning and you don’t have the information. So you have to do this hierarchical planning so that you can start acting and then sort of replanning as you go. And nobody really knows how to do this in AI. Nobody knows how to train a system to learn the appropriate multiple levels of representation so that hierarchical planning works.
Lex Fridman
(00:46:41)
Does something like that already emerge? So can you use an LLM, state-of-the-art LLM, to get you from New York to Paris by doing exactly the kind of detailed set of questions that you just did, which is, can you give me a list of 10 steps I need to do, to get from New York to Paris? And then for each of those steps, can you give me a list of 10 steps, how I make that step happen? And for each of those steps, can you give me a list of 10 steps to make each one of those, until you’re moving your individual muscles, maybe not, whatever you can actually act upon using your own mind.
Yann LeCun
(00:47:21)
Right. So there’s a lot of questions that are also implied by this, right? So the first thing is LLMs will be able to answer some of those questions down to some level of abstraction, under the condition that they’ve been trained with similar scenarios in their training set.
Lex Fridman
(00:47:37)
They would be able to answer all of those questions, but some of them may be hallucinated meaning non-factual.
Yann LeCun
(00:47:44)
Yeah, true. I mean they’ll probably produce some answer except they’re not going to be able to really produce millisecond by millisecond muscle control of how you stand up from your chair. But down to some level of abstraction where you can describe things by words, they might be able to give you a plan, but only under the condition that they’ve been trained to produce those kinds of plans. They’re not going to be able to plan for situations where that they never encountered before. They basically are going to have to regurgitate the template that they’ve been trained on.
Lex Fridman
(00:48:14)
Just for the example of New York to Paris, is it going to start getting into trouble? Which layer of abstraction do you think you’ll start? I can imagine almost every single part of that, an LLM would be able to answer somewhat accurately, especially when you’re talking about New York and Paris, major cities.
Yann LeCun
(00:48:31)
I mean certainly LLM would be able to solve that problem if you fine tune it for it. And so I can’t say that an LLM cannot do this, it can do this if you train it for it, there’s no question down to a certain level where things can be formulated in terms of words. But if you want to go down to how you climb down the stairs or just stand up from your chair in terms of words, you can’t do it. That’s one of the reasons you need experience of the physical world, which is much higher bandwidth than what you can express in words, in human language.
Lex Fridman
(00:49:11)
So everything we’ve been talking about on the joint embedding space, is it possible that that’s what we need for the interaction with physical reality on the robotics front, and then just the LLMs are the thing that sits on top of it for the bigger reasoning, about the fact that I need to book a plane ticket and I need to know how to go to the websites and so on.
Yann LeCun
(00:49:33)
Sure. And a lot of plans that people know about that are relatively high level are actually learned. Most people don’t invent the plans by themselves. We have some ability to do this of course, obviously, but most plans that people use are plans that have been trained on, they’ve seen other people use those plans or they’ve been told how to do things, right? That you can’t invent how you take a person who’s never heard of airplanes and tell them how do you go from New York to Paris? And they’re probably not going to be able to deconstruct the whole plan unless they’ve seen examples of that before. So certainly LLMs are going to be able to do this, but then how you link this from the low level of actions, that needs to be done with things like JEPA that basically lift the abstraction level of the representation without attempting to reconstruct the detail of the situation, that’s why we need JEPAs for.

Autoregressive LLMs

Lex Fridman
(00:50:40)
I would love to sort of linger on your skepticism around auto regressive LLMs. So one way I would like to test that skepticism is everything you say makes a lot of sense, but if I apply everything you said today and in general to I don’t know, 10 years ago, maybe a little bit less, no, let’s say three years ago, I wouldn’t be able to predict the success of LLMs. So does it make sense to you that autoregressive LLMs are able to be so damn good?
Yann LeCun
(00:51:20)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(00:51:21)
Can you explain your intuition? Because if I were to take your wisdom and intuition at face value, I would say there’s no way autoregressive LLMs, one token at a time, would be able to do the kind of things they’re doing.
Yann LeCun
(00:51:36)
No, there’s one thing that autoregressive LLMs or that LLMs in general, not just the autoregressive one, but including the bird style bidirectional ones, are exploiting and its self supervised running, and I’ve been a very, very strong advocate of self supervised running for many years. So those things are a incredibly impressive demonstration that self supervised running actually works. The idea that started, it didn’t start with BERT, but it was really kind of good demonstration with this.

(00:52:09)
So the idea that you take a piece of text, you corrupt it, and then you train some gigantic neural net to reconstruct the parts that are missing. That has produced an enormous amount of benefits. It allowed us to create systems that understand language, systems that can translate hundreds of languages in any direction, systems that are multilingual, so it’s a single system that can be trained to understand hundreds of languages and translate in any direction, and produce summaries and then answer questions and produce text.

(00:52:51)
And then there’s a special case of it, which is the auto regressive trick where you constrain the system to not elaborate a representation of the text from looking at the entire text, but only predicting a word from the words that are come before. And you do this by constraining the architecture of the network, and that’s what you can build an auto aggressive LLM from.

(00:53:15)
So there was a surprise many years ago with what’s called decoder only LLM. So since systems of this type that are just trying to produce words from the previous one and the fact that when you scale them up, they tend to really understand more about language. When you train them on lots of data, you make them really big. That was a surprise and that surprise occurred quite a while back, with work from Google, Meta, OpenAI, et cetera, going back to the GPT kind of work, general pre-trained transformers.
Lex Fridman
(00:53:56)
You mean like GPT2? There’s a certain place where you start to realize scaling might actually keep giving us an emergent benefit.
Yann LeCun
(00:54:06)
Yeah, I mean there were work from various places, but if you want to place it in the GPT timeline, that would be around GPT2, yeah.
Lex Fridman
(00:54:19)
Well, because you said it so charismatic and you said so many words, but self supervised learning, yes. But again, the same intuition you’re applying to saying that auto aggressive LLMs cannot have a deep understanding of the world. If we just apply that, same intuition, does it make sense to you that they’re able to form enough of a representation in the world to be damn convincing, essentially passing the original touring test with flying colors?
Yann LeCun
(00:54:50)
Well, we’re fooled by their fluency, right? We just assume that if a system is fluent in manipulating language, then it has all the characteristics of human intelligence, but that impression is false. We’re really fooled by it.
Lex Fridman
(00:55:06)
What do you think Alan Turing would say, without understanding anything, just hanging out with it?
Yann LeCun
(00:55:11)
Alan Turing would decide that a Turing test is a really bad test, okay? This is what the AI community has decided many years ago that the Turing test was a really bad test of intelligence.
Lex Fridman
(00:55:22)
What would Hans Marvek say about the larger language models?
Yann LeCun
(00:55:26)
Hans Marvek would say that Marvek Paradox still applies. Okay, we can pass-
Lex Fridman
(00:55:32)
You don’t think he would be really impressed?
Yann LeCun
(00:55:34)
No, of course everybody would be impressed. But it’s not a question of being impressed or not, it’s the question of knowing what the limit of those systems can do. Again, they are impressive. They can do a lot of useful things. There’s a whole industry that is being built around them. They’re going to make progress, but there is a lot of things they cannot do, and we have to realize what they cannot do and then figure out how we get there. And I’m seeing this from basically 10 years of research on the idea of self supervised running, actually that’s going back more than 10 years, but the idea of self supervised running. So basically capturing the internal structure of a piece of a set of inputs without training the system for any particular task, to learning representations.

(00:56:26)
The conference I co-founded 14 years ago is called International Conference on Learning Representations. That’s the entire issue that deep learning is dealing with, and it’s been my obsession for almost 40 years now. So learning representation is really the thing. For the longest time, we could only do this with supervised learning, and then we started working on what we used to call unsupervised learning and revived the idea of unsupervised running in the early 2000s with your [inaudible 00:56:58] and Jeff Hinton. Then discovered that supervised running actually works pretty well if you can collect enough data. And so the whole idea of unsupervised, self supervised running kind of took a backseat for a bit, and then I tried to revive it in a big way starting in 2014, basically when we started FAIR and really pushing for finding new methods to do self supervised running both for text and for images and for video and audio.

(00:57:29)
And some of that work has been incredibly successful. I mean, the reason why we have multilingual translation system, things to do, content moderation on Meta, for example, on Facebook, that are multilingual, that understand whether a piece of text is hate speech not or something, is due to that progress using self supervised running for NLP, combining this with transformer architectures and blah, blah, blah.

(00:57:53)
But that’s the big success of self supervised running. We had similar success in speech recognition, a system called WAVE2VEC, which is also a joint embedding architecture, by the way, trained with contrastive running. And that system also can produce speech recognition systems that are multilingual with mostly unlabeled data and only need a few minutes of labeled data to actually do speech recognition, that’s amazing. We have systems now based on those combination of ideas that can do real time translation of hundreds of languages into each other, speech to speech.
Lex Fridman
(00:58:28)
Speech to speech, even including, which is fascinating, languages that don’t have written forms.
Yann LeCun
(00:58:34)
That’s right.
Lex Fridman
(00:58:34)
Just spoken only.
Yann LeCun
(00:58:35)
That’s right. We don’t go through text, it goes directly from speech to speech using an internal representation of speech units that are discrete, but it’s called Textless NLP. We used to call it this way. But yeah, so I mean incredible success there. And then for 10 years, we tried to apply this idea to learning representations of images by training a system to predict videos, learning intuitive physics by training a system to predict what’s going to happen in the video.

(00:59:02)
And tried and tried and failed and failed, with generative models, with models that predict pixels. We could not get them to learn good representations of images. We could not get them to learn good representations of videos. And we tried many times, we published lots of papers on it, where they kind of sort of work, but not really great. They started working, we abandoned this idea of predicting every pixel and basically just doing the joint embedding and predicting and representation space, that works. So there’s ample evidence that we’re not going to be able to learn good representations of the real world using generative model. So I’m telling people, everybody’s talking about generative AI. If you’re really interested in human level AI, abandon the idea of generative AI.
Lex Fridman
(00:59:51)
Okay, but you really think it’s possible to get far with the joint embedding representation. So there’s common sense reasoning, and then there’s high level reasoning. I feel like those are two… The kind of reasoning that LLMs are able to do, okay, let me not use the word reasoning, but the kind of stuff that LLMs are able to do, seems fundamentally different than the common sense reasoning we use to navigate the world. It seems like we’re going to need both. Would you be able to get, with the joint embedding, which is JEPA type of approach, looking at video, would you be able to learn, let’s see, well, how to get from New York to Paris or how to understand the state of politics in the world today. These are things where various humans generate a lot of language and opinions on, in the space of language, but don’t visually represent that in any clearly compressible way.
Yann LeCun
(01:00:56)
Right. Well, there’s a lot of situations that might be difficult to, for a purely language based system to know. Okay, you can probably learn from reading texts, the entirety of the publicly available texts in the world that I cannot get from New York to Paris by snapping my fingers. That’s not going to work, right?
Lex Fridman
(01:01:16)
Yes.
Yann LeCun
(01:01:18)
But there’s probably more complex scenarios of this type, which an LLM may never have encountered and may not be able to determine whether it’s possible or not. So that link from the low level to the high level, the thing is that the high level that language expresses is based on the common experience of the low level, which LLMs currently do not have. When we talk to each other, we know we have a common experience of the world. A lot of it is similar, and LLMs don’t have that.
Lex Fridman
(01:01:59)
But see, it’s present. You and I have a common experience of the world in terms of the physics of how gravity works and stuff like this, and that common knowledge of the world, I feel like is there, in the language. We don’t explicitly express it, but if you have a huge amount of text, you’re going to get this stuff that’s between the lines. In order to form a consistent world model, you’re going to have to understand how gravity works, even if you don’t have an explicit explanation of gravity. So even though in the case of gravity, there is explicit explanations of gravity in Wikipedia. But the stuff that we think of as common sense reasoning, I feel like to generate language correctly, you’re going to have to figure that out. Now, you could say as you have, there’s not enough text… Sorry, okay, so you don’t think so?
Yann LeCun
(01:02:57)
No, I agree with what you just said, which is that to be able to do high level common sense, to have high level common sense, you need to have the low level common sense to build on top of.
Lex Fridman
(01:03:09)
But that’s not there.
Yann LeCun
(01:03:10)
And that’s not there in the LLMs. LLMs are purely trained from text. So then the other statement you made, I would not agree with, the fact that implicit in all languages in the world is the underlying reality, is a lot of underlying reality, which is not expressed in language.
Lex Fridman
(01:03:26)
Is that obvious to you?
Yann LeCun
(01:03:28)
Yeah, totally.
Lex Fridman
(01:03:30)
So all the conversations we had… Okay, there’s the dark web, meaning whatever, the private conversations like DMs and stuff like this, which is much, much larger probably than what’s available, what LLMs are trained on.
Yann LeCun
(01:03:46)
You don’t need to communicate the stuff that is common, right?
Lex Fridman
(01:03:50)
But the humor, all of it, no, you do, you don’t need to, but it comes through. If I accidentally knock this over, you’ll probably make fun of me in the content of the you making fun of me will be explanation of the fact that cups fall, and then gravity works in this way. And then you’ll have some very vague information about what kind of things explode when they hit the ground. And then maybe you’ll make a joke about entropy or something like this, then we’ll never be able to reconstruct this again. You’ll make a little joke like this and there’ll be a trillion of other jokes. And from the jokes, you can piece together the fact that gravity works and mugs can break and all this kind of stuff. You don’t need to see, it’ll be very inefficient. It’s easier to knock the thing over, but I feel like it would be there if you have enough of that data.
Yann LeCun
(01:04:46)
I just think that most of the information of this type that we have accumulated when we were babies, it’s just not present in text, in any description, essentially.
Lex Fridman
(01:04:59)
And the sensory data is a much richer source for getting that kind of understanding.
Yann LeCun
(01:05:04)
I mean, there’s 16,000 hours of wake time of a 4-year-old and tend to do 15 bites going through vision, just vision, there is a similar bandwidth of touch and a little less through audio. And then text, language doesn’t come in until a year in life. And by the time you are nine years old, you’ve learned about gravity, you know about inertia, you know about gravity, the stability, you know about the distinction between animate and inanimate objects. You know by 18 months, you know about why people want to do things and you help them if they can’t. I mean, there’s a lot of things that you learn mostly by observation, really not even through interaction. In the first few months of life, babies don’t really have any influence on the world, they can only observe. And you accumulate a gigantic amount of knowledge just from that. So that’s what we’re missing from current AI systems.

AI hallucination

Lex Fridman
(01:06:06)
I think in one of your slides, you have this nice plot that is one of the ways you show that LLMs are limited. I wonder if you could talk about hallucinations from your perspectives, the why hallucinations happen from large language models and to what degree is that a fundamental flaw of large language models?
Yann LeCun
(01:06:29)
Right, so because of the autoregressive prediction, every time an produces a token or a word, there is some level of probability for that word to take you out of the set of reasonable answers. And if you assume, which is a very strong assumption, that the probability of such error is that those errors are independent across a sequence of tokens being produced. What that means is that every time you produce a token, the probability that you stay within the set of correct answer decreases and it decreases exponentially.
Lex Fridman
(01:07:08)
So there’s a strong, like you said, assumption there that if there’s a non-zero probability of making a mistake, which there appears to be, then there’s going to be a kind of drift.
Yann LeCun
(01:07:18)
Yeah, and that drift is exponential. It’s like errors accumulate. So the probability that an answer would be nonsensical increases exponentially with the number of tokens.
Lex Fridman
(01:07:31)
Is that obvious to you, by the way? Well, mathematically speaking maybe, but isn’t there a kind of gravitational pull towards the truth? Because on average, hopefully, the truth is well represented in the training set?
Yann LeCun
(01:07:48)
No, it’s basically a struggle against the curse of dimensionality. So the way you can correct for this is that you fine tune the system by having it produce answers for all kinds of questions that people might come up with.
Yann LeCun
(01:08:00)
Having it produce answers for all kinds of questions that people might come up with. And people are people, so a lot of the questions that they have are very similar to each other, so you can probably cover 80% or whatever of questions that people will ask by collecting data and then you fine tune the system to produce good answers for all of those things, and it’s probably going to be able to learn that because it’s got a lot of capacity to learn. But then there is the enormous set of prompts that you have not covered during training, and that set is enormous, like within the set of all possible prompts, the proportion of prompts that have been used for training is absolutely tiny, it’s a tiny, tiny, tiny subset of all possible prompts.

(01:08:54)
And so the system will behave properly on the prompts that has been either trained, pre-trained, or fine-tuned, but then there is an entire space of things that it cannot possibly have been trained on because the number is gigantic. So whatever training the system has been subject to produce appropriate answers, you can break it by finding out a prompt that will be outside of the set of prompts that’s been trained on, or things that are similar, and then it will just spew complete nonsense.
Lex Fridman
(01:09:30)
When you say prompt, do you mean that exact prompt or do you mean a prompt that’s in many parts, very different than? Is it that easy to ask a question or to say a thing that hasn’t been said before on the internet?
Yann LeCun
(01:09:46)
People have come up with things where you put essentially a random sequence of characters in the prompt and that’s enough to throw the system into a mode where it is going to answer something completely different than it would have answered without this. So that’s a way to jailbreak the system, basically go outside of its conditioning.
Lex Fridman
(01:10:09)
That’s a very clear demonstration of it, but of course, that goes outside of what is designed to do, right? If you actually stitch together reasonably grammatical sentences, is it that easy to break it?
Yann LeCun
(01:10:26)
Yeah, some people have done things like, you write a sentence in English or you ask a question in English and it produces a perfectly fine answer and then you just substitute a few words by the same word in another language and all of a sudden the answer is complete nonsense.
Lex Fridman
(01:10:45)
What I’m saying is, which fraction of prompts that humans are likely to generate are going to break the system?
Yann LeCun
(01:10:55)
The problem is that there is a long tail, this is an issue that a lot of people have realized in social networks and stuff like that, which is there’s a very, very long tail of things that people will ask and you can fine tune the system for the 80% or whatever of the things that most people will ask. And then this long tail is so large that you’re not going to be able to fine tune the system for all the conditions. And in the end, the system ends up being a giant lookup table essentially, which is not really what you want, you want systems that can reason, certainly that can plan.

Reasoning in AI


(01:11:31)
The type of reasoning that takes place in LLM is very, very primitive, and the reason you can tell is primitive is because the amount of computation that is spent per token produced is constant. So if you ask a question and that question has an answer in a given number of token, the amount of computation devoted to computing that answer can be exactly estimated. It’s the size of the prediction network with its 36 layers or 92 layers or whatever it is multiply by number of tokens, that’s it. And so essentially, it doesn’t matter if the question being asked is simple to answer, complicated to answer, impossible to answer because it’s a decidable or something, the amount of computation the system will be able to devote to the answer is constant or is proportional to number of token produced in the answer. This is not the way we work, the way we reason is that when we’re faced with a complex problem or a complex question, we spend more time trying to solve it and answer it because it’s more difficult.
Lex Fridman
(01:12:43)
There’s a prediction element, there’s an iterative element where you’re adjusting your understanding of a thing by going over and over and over, there’s a hierarchical elements on. Does this mean it’s a fundamental flaw of LLMs or does it mean that-
Yann LeCun
(01:13:00)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:13:00)
… There’s more part to that question, now you’re just behaving like an LLM, immediately answering. No, that it’s just the low level world model on top of which we can then build some of these kinds of mechanisms, like you said, persistent long-term memory or reasoning, so on. But we need that world model that comes from language. Maybe it is not so difficult to build this kind of reasoning system on top of a well constructed world model.
Yann LeCun
(01:13:37)
Whether it’s difficult or not, the near future will say because a lot of people are working on reasoning and planning abilities for dialogue systems. Even if we restrict ourselves to language, just having the ability to plan your answer before you answer in terms that are not necessarily linked with the language you’re going to use to produce the answer, so this idea of this mental model that allows you to plan what you’re going to say before you say it, that is very important. I think there’s going to be a lot of systems over the next few years that are going to have this capability, but the blueprint of those systems will be extremely different from auto aggressive LLMs.

(01:14:26)
It’s the same difference as the difference between what psychologists call system one and system two in humans, so system one is the type of task that you can accomplish without deliberately consciously think about how you do them, you just do them, you’ve done them enough that you can just do it subconsciously without thinking about them. If you’re an experienced driver, you can drive without really thinking about it and you can talk to someone at the same time or listen to the radio. If you are a very experienced chess player, you can play against a non- experienced chess player without really thinking either, you just recognize the pattern and you play. That’s system one, so all the things that you do instinctively without really having to deliberately plan and think about it.

(01:15:13)
And then there is all the tasks where you need to plan, so if you are a not too experienced chess player or you are experienced where you play against another experienced chess player, you think about all kinds of options, you think about it for a while and you are much better if you have time to think about it than you are if you play blitz with limited time. So this type of deliberate planning, which uses your internal world model, that’s system two, this is what LMS currently cannot do. How do we get them to do this? How do we build a system that can do this kind of planning or reasoning that devotes more resources to complex problems than to simple problems? And it’s not going to be a regressive prediction of tokens, it’s going to be more something akin to inference of little variables in what used to be called probabilistic models or graphical models and things of that type.

(01:16:17)
Basically, the principle is like this, the prompt is like observed variables, and what the model does, is that basically, it can measure to what extent an answer is a good answer for a prompt. So think of it as some gigantic neural net, but it’s got only one output, and that output is a scaler number, which is, let’s say, zero, if the answer is a good answer for the question and a large number, if the answer is not a good answer for the question. Imagine you had this model, if you had such a model, you could use it to produce good answers, the way you would do is, produce the prompt and then search through the space of possible answers for one that minimizes that number, that’s called an energy based model.
Lex Fridman
(01:17:11)
But that energy based model would need the model constructed by the LLM?
Yann LeCun
(01:17:18)
Well, so really what you need to do would be to not search over possible strings of text that minimize that energy. But what you would do, we do this in abstract representation space, so in the space of abstract thoughts, you would elaborate a thought using this process of minimizing the output of your model, which is just a scaler, it’s an optimization process. So now the way the system produces its sensor is through optimization by minimizing an objective function basically. And we’re talking about inference, we’re not talking about training, the system has been trained already.

(01:18:01)
Now we have an abstract representation of the thought of the answer, representation of the answer, we feed that to basically an autoregressive decoder, which can be very simple, that turns this into a text that expresses this thought. So that, in my opinion, is the blueprint of future data systems, they will think about their answer, plan their answer by optimization before turning it into text, and that is turning complete.
Lex Fridman
(01:18:31)
Can you explain exactly what the optimization problem there is? What’s the objective function? Just linger on it, you briefly described it, but over what space are you optimizing?
Yann LeCun
(01:18:43)
The space of representations.
Lex Fridman
(01:18:45)
It goes abstract representation?
Yann LeCun
(01:18:48)
You have an abstract representation inside the system, you have a prompt, the prompt goes through an encoder, produces a representation, perhaps goes through a predictor that predicts a representation of the proper answer. But that representation may not be a good answer because there might be some complicated reasoning you need to do, so then you have another process that takes the representation of the answers and modifies it so as to minimize a cost function that measures to what extent the answer is a good answer for the question. Now we ignore the issue for a moment of how you train that system to measure whether an answer is a good answer for a fraction.
Lex Fridman
(01:19:36)
Sure. Suppose such a system could be created, but what’s this search like process?
Yann LeCun
(01:19:42)
It’s an optimization process. You can do this if the entire system is differentiable, that scaler output is the result of running the representation of the answers to some neural net. Then by gradient descent, by back propagating gradients, you can figure out how to modify the representation of the answers so as to minimize that.
Lex Fridman
(01:20:05)
That’s still a gradient based?
Yann LeCun
(01:20:06)
It’s gradient based inference. So now you have a representation of the answer in abstract space, now you can turn it into text. And the cool thing about this is that the representation now can be optimized through gradient descent, but also is independent of the language in which you’re going to express the answer.
Lex Fridman
(01:20:27)
Right. So you’re operating in the subtract representation. This goes back to the joint embedding, that it’s better to work in the space of, I don’t know, or to romanticize the notion like space of concepts versus the space of concrete sensory information.
Yann LeCun
(01:20:45)
Right.
Lex Fridman
(01:20:48)
But can this do something like reasoning, which is what we’re talking about?
Yann LeCun
(01:20:51)
Well, not really, only in a very simple way. Basically, you can think of those things as doing the optimization I was talking about, except they optimize in the discrete space, which is the space of possible sequences of tokens. And they do this optimization in a horribly inefficient way, which is generate a lot of hypothesis and then select the best ones. And that’s incredibly wasteful in terms of competition because you basically have to run your LLM for every possible generative sequence and it’s incredibly wasteful. So it’s much better to do an optimization in continuous space where you can do gradient and descent as opposed to generate tons of things and then select the best, you just iteratively refine your answer to go towards the best, that’s much more efficient. But you can only do this in continuous spaces with differentiable functions.
Lex Fridman
(01:21:48)
You’re talking about the ability to think deeply or to reason deeply, how do you know what is an answer that’s better or worse based on deep reasoning?
Yann LeCun
(01:22:05)
Then we are asking the question of, conceptually, how do you train an energy based model? Energy based model is a function with a scaler output, just a number, you give it two inputs, X and Y, and it tells you whether Y is compatible with X or not. X, you observe, let’s say it’s a prompt, an image, a video, whatever, and Y is a proposal for an answer, a continuation of video, whatever and it tells you whether Y is compatible with X. And the way it tells you that Y is compatible with X is that the output of that function would be zero if Y is compatible with X and would be a positive number, non-zero, if Y is not compatible with X.

(01:22:47)
How do you train a system like this at a completely general level, is you show it pairs of X and Ys that are compatible, a question and the corresponding answer, and you train the parameters of the big neural net inside to produce zero. Now that doesn’t completely work because the system might decide, well, I’m just going to say zero for everything, so now you have to have a process to make sure that for a wrong Y, the energy would be larger than zero. And there you have two options, one is contrastive method, so contrastive method is, you show an X and a bad Y and you tell the system, well, give a high energy to this, push up the energy, change the weights in the neural net that confuse the energy so that it goes up. So that’s contrasting methods.

(01:23:37)
The problem with this is, if the space of Y is large, the number of such contrasting samples are going to have to show is gigantic. But people do this, they do this when you train a system with RLHF, basically what you’re training is what’s called a reward model, which is basically an objective function that tells you whether an answer is good or bad, and that’s basically exactly what this is. So we already do this to some extent, we’re just not using it for inference, we’re just using it for training.

(01:24:14)
There is another set of methods which are non-contrastive, and I prefer those, and those non-contrastive methods basically say, the energy function needs to have low energy on pairs of XYs that are compatible that come from your training set. How do you make sure that the energy is going to be higher everywhere else? And the way you do this is by having a regularizer, a criterion, a term in your cost function that basically minimizes the volume of space that can take low energy. And the precise way to do this is all kinds of different specific ways to do this depending on the architecture, but that’s the basic principle. So that if you push down the energy function for particular regions in the XY space, it will automatically go up in other places because there’s only a limited volume of space that can take low energy by the construction of the system or by the regularizing function.
Lex Fridman
(01:25:16)
We’ve been talking very generally, but what is a good X and a good Y? What is a good representation of X and Y? Because we’ve been talking about language and if you just take language directly that presumably is not good, so there has to be some kind of abstract representation of ideas.
Yann LeCun
(01:25:37)
You can do this with language directly by just, X is a text and Y is a continuation of that text.
Lex Fridman
(01:25:43)
Yes.
Yann LeCun
(01:25:45)
Or X is a question, Y is the answer.
Lex Fridman
(01:25:48)
But you’re saying that’s not going to take it, that’s going to do what LLMs are doing.
Yann LeCun
(01:25:52)
Well, no, it depends on how the internal structure of the system is built. If the internal structure of the system is built in such a way that inside of the system there is a latent variable, let’s call it Z, that you can manipulate so as to minimize the output energy, then that Z can be viewed as a representation of a good answer that you can translate into a Y that is a good answer.
Lex Fridman
(01:26:19)
This system could be trained in a very similar way?
Yann LeCun
(01:26:24)
Very similar way, but you have to have this way preventing collapse of ensuring that there is high energy for things you don’t train it on. And currently, it’s very implicit in LLM, it’s done in a way that people don’t realize it’s being done, but it is being done. It is due to the fact that when you give a high probability to a word, automatically, you give low probability to other words because you only have a finite amount of probability to go around right there to sum to one. So when you minimize the cross entropy or whatever, when you train your LLM to predict the next word, you are increasing the probability your system will give to the correct word, but you’re also decreasing the probability it will give to the incorrect words.

(01:27:12)
Now, indirectly, that gives a high probability to sequences of words that are good and low probability to sequences of words that are bad, but it’s very indirect. And it’s not obvious why this actually works at all because you’re not doing it on the joint probability of all the symbols in a sequence, you factorize that probability in terms of conditional probabilities over successive tokens.
Lex Fridman
(01:27:41)
How do you do this for visual data?
Yann LeCun
(01:27:44)
We’ve been doing this with I-JEPA architectures, basically-
Lex Fridman
(01:27:46)
The joint embedding.
Yann LeCun
(01:27:47)
… I-JEPA. So there the compatibility between two things is, here’s an image or a video, here is a corrupted, shifted or transformed version of that image or video or masked. And then the energy of the system is the prediction error of the predicted representation of the good thing versus the actual representation of the good thing. So you run the corrupted image to the system, predict the representation of the good input uncorrupted, and then compute the prediction error, that’s the energy of the system. So this system will tell you if this is a good image and this is a corrupted version, it will give you zero energy if those two things, effectively, one of them is a corrupted version of the other, it gives you a high energy if the two images are completely different.
Lex Fridman
(01:28:46)
And hopefully that whole process gives you a really nice compressed representation of a visual reality?
Yann LeCun
(01:28:54)
And we know it does because then we use those representations as input to a classification system or something and that it works.

Reinforcement learning

Lex Fridman
(01:29:00)
And then that classification system works really nicely, okay. Well, so to summarize, you recommend in a spicy way that only Yann LeCun can, you recommend that we abandon generative models in favor of joint embedding architectures?
Yann LeCun
(01:29:15)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(01:29:15)
Abandon autoregressive generation.
Yann LeCun
(01:29:17)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(01:29:19)
This feels like court testimony, abandon probabilistic models in favor of energy based models as we talked about, abandon contrastive methods in favor of regularized methods. And let me ask you about this, you’ve been for a while, a critic of reinforcement learning.
Yann LeCun
(01:29:36)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(01:29:38)
The last recommendation is that we abandon RL in favor of model predictive control, as you were talking about, and only use RL when planning doesn’t yield the predicted outcome, and we use RL in that case to adjust the world model or the critic.
Yann LeCun
(01:29:55)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(01:29:57)
You’ve mentioned RLHF, reinforcement learning with human feedback, why do you still hate reinforcement learning?
Yann LeCun
(01:30:05)
I don’t hate reinforcement learning, and I think-
Lex Fridman
(01:30:07)
It’s all love, yes.
Yann LeCun
(01:30:08)
… I think it should not be abandoned completely, but I think it’s use should be minimized because it’s incredibly inefficient in terms of samples. And so the proper way to train a system is to first have it learn good representations of the world and world models from mostly observation, maybe a little bit of interactions.
Lex Fridman
(01:30:31)
And then steered based on that, if the representation is good, then the adjustments should be minimal.
Yann LeCun
(01:30:36)
Yeah. Now there’s two things, if you’ve learned a world model, you can use the world model to plan a sequence of actions to arrive at a particular objective, you don’t need RL unless the way you measure whether you succeed might be in exact. Your idea of whether you are going to fall from your bike might be wrong, or whether the person you’re fighting with MMA who’s going to do something and they do something else. So there’s two ways you can be wrong, either your objective function does not reflect the actual objective function you want to optimize or your world model is inaccurate, so the prediction you were making about what was going to happen in the world is inaccurate.

(01:31:25)
If you want to adjust your world model while you are operating in the world or your objective function, that is basically in the realm of RL, this is what RL deals with to some extent, so adjust your word model. And the way to adjust your word model even in advance is to explore parts of the space where you know that your world model is inaccurate, that’s called curiosity basically, or play. When you play, you explore parts of the space that you don’t want to do for real because it might be dangerous, but you can adjust your world model without killing yourself basically. So that’s what you want to use RL for, when it comes time to learning a particular task, you already have all the good representations, you already have your world model, but you need to adjust it for the situation at hand, that’s when you use RL.
Lex Fridman
(01:32:26)
Why do you think RLHF works so well? This enforcement learning with human feedback, why did it have such a transformational effect on large language models than before?
Yann LeCun
(01:32:38)
What’s had the transformational effect is human feedback, there is many ways to use it, and some of it is just purely supervised, actually, it’s not really reinforcement learning.
Lex Fridman
(01:32:49)
It’s the HF?
Yann LeCun
(01:32:50)
It’s the HF, and then there is various ways to use human feedback. So you can ask humans to rate multiple answers that are produced by world model, and then what you do is you train an objective function to predict that rating, and then you can use that objective function to predict whether an answer is good and you can back propagate gradient to this to fine tune your system so that it only produces highly rated answers. That’s one way, so in RL, that means training what’s called a reward model, so something that basically is a small neural net that estimates to what extent an answer is good.

(01:33:35)
It’s very similar to the objective I was talking about earlier for planning, except now it’s not used for planning, it’s used for fine-tuning your system. I think it would be much more efficient to use it for planning, but currently, it’s used to fine tune the parameters of the system. There’s several ways to do this, some of them are supervised, you just ask a human person like, what is a good answer for this? Then you just type the answer. There’s lots of ways that those systems are being adjusted.

Woke AI

Lex Fridman
(01:34:10)
Now, a lot of people have been very critical of the recently released Google’s Gemini 1.5 for essentially, in my words, I could say super woke in the negative connotation of that word. There is some almost hilariously absurd things that it does, like it modifies history like generating images of a black George Washington, or perhaps more seriously something that you commented on Twitter, which is refusing to comment on or generate images or even descriptions of Tiananmen Square or The Tank Man, one of the most legendary protest images in history. Of course, these images are highly censored by the Chinese government and therefore, everybody started asking questions of what is the process of designing these LLMs? What is the role of censorship and all that kind of stuff? So you commented on Twitter saying that open source is the answer.
Yann LeCun
(01:35:24)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:35:25)
Essentially, so can you explain?
Yann LeCun
(01:35:29)
I actually made that comment on just about every social network I can, and I’ve made that point multiple times in various forums. Here’s my point of view on this, people can complain that AI systems are biased and they generally are biased by the distribution of the training data that they’ve been trained on that reflects biases in society, and that is potentially offensive to some people or potentially not. And some techniques to de-bias then become offensive to some people because of historical incorrectness and things like that.

(01:36:23)
And so you can ask two questions, the first question is, is it possible to produce an AI system that is not biased? And the answer is, absolutely not. And it’s not because of technological challenges, although they are technological challenges to that, it’s because bias is in the eye of the beholder. Different people may have different ideas about what constitutes bias for a lot of things, there are facts that are indisputable, but there are a lot of opinions or things that can be expressed in different ways. And so you cannot have an unbiased system, that’s just an impossibility.

(01:37:08)
And so what’s the answer to this? And the answer is the same answer that we found in liberal democracy about the press, the press needs to be free and diverse. We have free speech for a good reason, is because we don’t want all of our information to come from a unique source because that’s opposite to the whole idea of democracy and progressive ideas and even science. In science, people have to argue for different opinions and science makes progress when people disagree and they come up with an answer and consensus forms, and it’s true in all democracies around the world.

(01:37:58)
There is a future which is already happening where every single one of our interaction with the digital world will be mediated by AI systems, AI assistance. We’re going to have smart glasses, you can already buy them from Meta, the Ray-Ban Meta where you can talk to them and they are connected with an LLM and you can get answers on any question you have. Or you can be looking at a monument and there is a camera in the glasses you can ask it like, what can you tell me about this building or this monument? You can be looking at a menu in a foreign language, and I think we will translate it for you, or we can do real time translation if we speak different languages. So a lot of our interactions with the digital world are going to be mediated by those systems in the near future.

(01:38:53)
Increasingly, the search engines that we’re going to use are not going to be search engines, they’re going to be dialogue systems that we just ask a question and it will answer and then point you to perhaps appropriate reference for it. But here is the thing, we cannot afford those systems to come from a handful of companies on the west coast of the US because those systems will constitute the repository of all human knowledge, and we cannot have that be controlled by a small number of people. It has to be diverse for the same reason the press has to be diverse, so how do we get a diverse set of AI assistance? It’s very expensive and difficult to train a base model, a base LLM at the moment, in the future it might be something different, but at the moment, that’s an LLM. So only a few companies can do this properly.

(01:39:50)
And if some of those top systems are open source, anybody can use them, anybody can fine tune them. If we put in place some systems that allows any group of people, whether they are individual citizens, groups of citizens, government organizations, NGOs, companies, whatever, to take those open source AI systems and fine tune them for their own purpose on their own data, then we’re going to have a very large diversity of different AI systems that are specialized for all of those things.

(01:40:35)
I tell you, I talked to the French government quite a bit, and the French government will not accept that the digital diet of all their citizens be controlled by three companies on the west coast of the US. That’s just not acceptable, it’s a danger to democracy regardless of how well-intentioned those companies are, and it’s also a danger to local culture, to values, to language. I was talking with the founder of Infosys in India, he’s funding a project to fine tune Llama 2, the open source model produced by Meta, so that Llama 2 two speaks all 22 official languages in India, it is very important for people in India. I was talking to a former colleague of mine, Moustapha Cisse, who used to be a scientist at Fair and then moved back to Africa, created a research lab for Google in Africa and now has a new startup Co-Kera.

(01:41:37)
And what he’s trying to do, is basically have LLM that speak the local languages in Senegal so that people can have access to medical information because they don’t have access to doctors, it’s a very small number of doctors per capita in Senegal. You can’t have any of this unless you have open source platforms, so with open source platforms, you can have AI systems that are not only diverse in terms of political opinions or things of that-
Yann LeCun
(01:42:00)
… AI systems that are not only diverse in terms of political opinions or things of that type, but in terms of language, culture, value systems, political opinions, technical abilities in various domains, and you can have an industry, an ecosystem of companies that fine tune those open source systems for vertical applications in industry. I don’t know, a publisher has thousands of books and they want to build a system that allows a customer to just ask a question about the content of any of their books, you need to train on their proprietary data. You have a company, we have one within Meta, it’s called Metamate, and it’s basically an LLM that can answer any question about internal stuff about the company, very useful.

(01:42:53)
A lot of companies want this. A lot of companies want this not just for their employees, but also for their customers, to take care of their customers. So the only way you’re going to have an AI industry, the only way you’re going to have AI systems that are not uniquely biased is if you have open source platforms on top of which any group can build specialized systems. So the direction of inevitable direction of history is that the vast majority of AI systems will be built on top of open source platforms.
Lex Fridman
(01:43:28)
So that’s a beautiful vision. So meaning a company like Meta or Google or so on should take only minimal fine-tuning steps after building the foundation pre-trained model as few steps as possible.

Open source

Yann LeCun
(01:43:47)
Basically.
Lex Fridman
(01:43:49)
Can Meta afford to do that?
Yann LeCun
(01:43:51)
No.
Lex Fridman
(01:43:51)
So I don’t know if you know this, but companies are supposed to make money somehow and open source is giving away… I don’t know. Mark made a video, Mark Zuckerberg, very sexy video talking about 350,000 Nvidia H100s.
Yann LeCun
(01:44:12)
Yeah, [inaudible 01:44:12]
Lex Fridman
(01:44:13)
The math of that is just for the GPUs, that’s 100 billion plus the infrastructure for training everything. So I’m no business guy, but how do you make money on that? So the division you paint is a really powerful one, but how is it possible to make money?
Yann LeCun
(01:44:32)
Okay, so you have several business models, right?
Lex Fridman
(01:44:36)
Mm-hmm.
Yann LeCun
(01:44:36)
The business model that Meta is built around is you offer a service and the financing of that service is either through ads or through business customers. So for example, if you have an LLM that can help a mom-and-pop pizza place by talking to the customers through WhatsApp, and so the customers can just order a pizza and the system will just ask them, “What topping do you want or what size, blah, blah, blah.” The business will pay for that, okay? That’s a model. Otherwise, if it’s a system that is on the more classical services, it can be ad supported or there’s several models. But the point is, if you have a big enough potential customer base and you need to build that system anyway for them, it doesn’t hurt you to actually distribute it to the open source.
Lex Fridman
(01:45:43)
Again, I’m no business guy, but if you release the open source model, then other people can do the same kind of task and compete on it, basically provide fine-tuned models for businesses.
Yann LeCun
(01:45:57)
Sure.
Lex Fridman
(01:45:59)
By the way, I’m a huge fan of all this, but is the bet that Meta is making, it’s like, “We’ll do a better job of it?”
Yann LeCun
(01:46:05)
Well, no. The bet is more, “We already have a huge user base and customer base-
Lex Fridman
(01:46:13)
Ah, right.
Yann LeCun
(01:46:14)
… so it’s going to be useful to them. Whatever we offer them is going to be useful and there is a way to derive revenue from this.
Lex Fridman
(01:46:21)
Sure.
Yann LeCun
(01:46:22)
It doesn’t hurt that we provide that system or the base model, the foundation model in open source for others to build applications on top of it too. If those applications turn out to be useful for our customers, we can just buy it from them. It could be that they will improve the platform. In fact, we see this already. There is literally millions of downloads of LLaMA 2 and thousands of people who have provided ideas about how to make it better. So this clearly accelerates progress to make the system available to a wide community of people, and there’s literally thousands of businesses who are building applications with it. So Meta’s ability to derive revenue from this technology is not impaired by the distribution of base models in open source.

AI and ideology

Lex Fridman
(01:47:26)
The fundamental criticism that Gemini is getting is that as you point out on the West Coast, just to clarify, we’re currently on the East Coast where I would suppose Meta AI headquarters would be. So there are strong words about the West Coast, but I guess the issue that happens is I think it’s fair to say that most tech people have a political affiliation with the left wing. They lean left. So the problem that people are criticizing Gemini with is that there’s in that de-biasing process that you mentioned, that their ideological lean becomes obvious. Is this something that could be escaped? You’re saying open source is the only way.
Yann LeCun
(01:48:17)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(01:48:17)
Have you witnessed this kind of ideological lean that makes engineering difficult?
Yann LeCun
(01:48:22)
No, I don’t think the issue has to do with the political leaning of the people designing those systems. It has to do with the acceptability or political leanings of their customer base or audience. So a big company cannot afford to offend too many people, so they’re going to make sure that whatever product they put out is safe, whatever that means. It’s very possible to overdo it, and it’s impossible to do it properly for everyone. You’re not going to satisfy everyone. So that’s what I said before, you cannot have a system that is perceived as unbiased by everyone. It’s going to be you push it in one way, one set of people are going to see it as biased, and then you push it the other way and another set of people is going to see it as biased. Then in addition to this, there’s the issue of if you push the system perhaps a little too far in one direction, it’s going to be non-factual. You’re going to have Black Nazi soldiers in uniform.
Lex Fridman
(01:49:31)
Yeah, we so we should mention image generation of Black Nazi soldiers, which is not factually accurate.
Yann LeCun
(01:49:38)
Right, and can be offensive for some people as well. So it’s going to be impossible to produce systems that are unbiased for everyone. So the only solution that I see is diversity.
Lex Fridman
(01:49:53)
Diversity in the full meaning of that word, diversity of in every possible way.

Marc Andreesen

Yann LeCun
(01:49:57)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(01:49:59)
Marc Andreessen just tweeted today. Let me do a TL;DR. The conclusion is only startups and open source can avoid the issue that he’s highlighting with big tech. He’s asking, “Can Big Tech actually field generative AI products?” (1) Ever-escalating demands from internal activists, employee mobs, crazed executives, broken boards, pressure groups, extremist regulators, government agencies, the press, in quotes, “experts” and everything corrupting the output. (2) Constant risk of generating a bad answer or drawing a bad picture or rendering a bad video who knows what is going to say or do at any moment. (3) Legal exposure, product liability, slander, election law, many other things and so on, anything that makes Congress mad. (4) Continuous attempts to tighten grip on acceptable output, degrade the model, how good it actually is, in terms of usable and pleasant to use and effective and all that kind of stuff. (5) Publicity of bad text, images, video actual puts those examples into the training data for the next version and so on. So he just highlights how difficult this is from all kinds of people being unhappy. He said you can’t create a system that makes everybody happy.
Yann LeCun
(01:51:24)
Yes.
Lex Fridman
(01:51:25)
So if you’re going to do the fine-tuning yourself and keep it close source, essentially, the problem there is then trying to minimize the number of people who are going to be unhappy.
Yann LeCun
(01:51:36)
Yep.
Lex Fridman
(01:51:38)
You’re saying that almost impossible to do, and there are better ways to do open source
Yann LeCun
(01:51:45)
Basically. Yeah. Mark is right about a number of things that you list that indeed scare large companies. Certainly, congressional investigations is one of them, legal liability, making things that get people to hurt themselves or hurt others. Big companies are really careful about not producing things of this type because they don’t want to hurt anyone, first of all, and then second, they want to preserve their business. So it’s essentially impossible for systems like this that can inevitably formulate political opinions, and opinions about various things that may be political or not, but that people may disagree about, about moral issues and questions about religion and things like that or cultural issues that people from different communities would disagree with in the first place. So there’s only a relatively small number of things that people will agree on are basic principles, but beyond that, if you want those systems to be useful, they will necessarily have to offend a number of people inevitably.
Lex Fridman
(01:53:09)
So open source is just better and then you get-
Yann LeCun
(01:53:11)
Diversity is better, right?
Lex Fridman
(01:53:13)
And open source enables diversity.
Yann LeCun
(01:53:15)
That’s right. Open source enables diversity.
Lex Fridman
(01:53:18)
This can be a fascinating world where if it’s true that the open source world, if Meta leads the way and creates this open source foundation model world, governments will have a fine- tuned model and then potentially, people that vote left and right will have their own model and preference to be able to choose and it will potentially divide us even more. But that’s on us humans. We get to figure out basically the technology enables humans to human more effectively, and all the difficult ethical questions that humans raise will just leave it up to us to figure that out.
Yann LeCun
(01:54:02)
Yeah, there are some limits. The same way there are limits to free speech. There has to be some limit to the kind of stuff that those systems might be authorized to produce, some guardrails. So that’s one thing I’d be interested in, which is in the type of architecture that we were discussing before where the output of the system is a result of an inference to satisfy an objective, that objective can include guardrails, and we can put guardrails in open source systems. If we eventually have systems that are built with this blueprint, we can put guardrails in those systems that guarantee that there is a minimum set of guardrails that make the system non-dangerous and non-toxic, et cetera, basic things that everybody would agree on. Then the fine-tuning that people will add or the additional guardrails that people will add will cater to their community, whatever it is.
Lex Fridman
(01:55:06)
The fine-tuning will be more about the gray areas of what is hate speech, what is dangerous and all that kind of stuff, but it’s the-
Yann LeCun
(01:55:12)
Or different value systems.
Lex Fridman
(01:55:13)
Still value systems. But still even with the objectives of how to build a bioweapon, for example, I think something you’ve commented on, or at least there’s a paper where a collection of researchers is trying to understand the social impacts of these LLMs. I guess one threshold that’s nice is, does the LLM make it any easier than a search would, like a Google search would?
Yann LeCun
(01:55:39)
Right. So the increasing number of studies on this seems to point to the fact that it doesn’t help. So having an LLM doesn’t help you design or build a bioweapon or a chemical weapon if you already have access to a search engine and their library. So the increased information you get or the ease with which you get it doesn’t really help you. That’s the first thing. The second thing is, it’s one thing to have a list of instructions of how to make a chemical weapon, for example, a bioweapon. It’s another thing to actually build it, and it’s much harder than you might think, and then LLM will not help you with that.

(01:56:25)
In fact, nobody in the world, not even countries used bioweapons because most of the time they have no idea how to protect their own populations against it. So it’s too dangerous, actually, to ever use, and it’s, in fact, banned by international treaties. Chemical weapons is different. It’s also banned by treaties, but it’s the same problem. It’s difficult to use in situations that doesn’t turn against the perpetrators, but we could ask Elon Musk. I can give you a very precise list of instructions of how you build a rocket engine. Even if you have a team of 50 engineers that are really experienced building it, you’re still going to have to blow up a dozen of them before you get one that works. It’s the same with chemical weapons or bioweapons or things like this, it requires expertise in the real world that the LLM is not going to help you with.
Lex Fridman
(01:57:25)
It requires even the common sense expertise that we’ve been talking about, which is how to take language-based instructions and materialize them in the physical world requires a lot of knowledge that’s not in the instructions.
Yann LeCun
(01:57:41)
Yeah, exactly. A lot of biologists have posted on this actually, in response to those things saying, “Do you realize how hard it is to actually do the lab work?” Like, “No, this is not trivial.”

Llama 3

Lex Fridman
(01:57:51)
Yeah, and Hans Moravec comes to light once again. Just to linger on LLaMA, Marc announced that LLaMA 3 is coming out eventually. I don’t think there’s a release date, but what are you most excited about? First of all, LLaMA 2 that’s already out there and maybe the future a LLaMA 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, just the future of the open source under Meta?
Yann LeCun
(01:58:17)
Well, a number of things. So there’s going to be various versions of LLaMA that are improvements of previous LLaMAs, bigger, better, multimodal, things like that. Then in future generations, systems that are capable of planning that really understand how the world works, maybe are trained from video, so they have some world model maybe capable of the type of reasoning and planning I was talking about earlier. How long is that going to take? When is the research that is going in that direction going to feed into the product line if you want of LLaMA? I don’t know. I can’t tell you. There’s a few breakthroughs that we have to basically go through before we can get there, but you’ll be able to monitor our progress because we publish our research. So last week we published the V-JEPA work, which is a first step towards training systems for video.

(01:59:16)
Then the next step is going to be world models based on this type of idea training from video. There’s similar work at DeepMind also and taking place people, and also at UC Berkeley on world models and video. A lot of people are working on this. I think a lot of good ideas are appearing. My bet is that those systems are going to be JEPA light, they’re not going to be generative models, and we’ll see what the future will tell. There’s really good work, a gentleman called Danijar Hafner who is now DeepMind, who’s worked on models of this type that learn representations and then use them for planning or learning tasks by reinforcement training and a lot of work at Berkeley by Pieter Abbeel, Sergey Levine, a bunch of other people of that type I’m collaborating with actually in the context of some grants with my NYU hat.

(02:00:20)
Then collaboration is also through Meta ’cause the lab at Berkeley is associated with Meta in some way, so with fair. So I think it is very exciting. I haven’t been that excited about the direction of machine learning and AI since 10 years ago when Fairway was started. Before that, 30 years ago, we were working, oh, sorry, 35 on combination nets and the early days of neural nets. So I’m super excited because I see a path towards potentially human-level intelligence with systems that can understand the world, remember, plan, reason. There is some set of ideas to make progress there that might have a chance of working, and I’m really excited about this. What I like is that somewhat we get on to a good direction and perhaps succeed before my brain turns to a white sauce or before I need to retire.
Lex Fridman
(02:01:28)
Yeah. Yeah. Is it beautiful to you just the amount of GPUs involved, the whole training process on this much compute, just zooming out, just looking at earth and humans together have built these computing devices and are able to train this one brain, then we then open source, like giving birth to this open source brain trained on this gigantic compute system, there’s just the details of how to train on that, how to build the infrastructure and the hardware, the cooling, all of this kind of stuff, or are you just still that most of your excitement is in the theory aspect of it, meaning the software?
Yann LeCun
(02:02:19)
I used to be a hardware guy many years ago.
Lex Fridman
(02:02:21)
Yes. Yes, that’s right.
Yann LeCun
(02:02:22)
Decades ago.
Lex Fridman
(02:02:23)
Hardware has improved a little bit. Changed-
Yann LeCun
(02:02:26)
A little bit.
Lex Fridman
(02:02:27)
… a little bit, yeah.
Yann LeCun
(02:02:28)
Certainly, scale is necessary but not sufficient.
Lex Fridman
(02:02:32)
Absolutely.
Yann LeCun
(02:02:32)
So we certainly need competition. We’re still far in terms of compute power from what we would need to match the compute power of the human brain. This may occur in the next couple of decades, but we’re still some ways away. Certainly, in terms of power efficiency, we’re really far, so there’s a lot of progress to make in hardware. Right now, a lot of the progress is, there’s a bit coming from silicon technology, but a lot of it coming from architectural innovation and quite a bit coming from more efficient ways of implementing the architectures that have become popular, basically combination of transformers and com nets, and so there’s still some ways to go until we are going to saturate. We’re going to have to come up with new principles, new fabrication technology, new basic components perhaps based on different principles and classical digital [inaudible 02:03:41]
Lex Fridman
(02:03:42)
Interesting. So you think in order to build AMI, we potentially might need some hardware innovation too.
Yann LeCun
(02:03:52)
Well, if we want to make it ubiquitous, yeah, certainly, ’cause we’re going to have to reduce the power consumption. A GPU today is half a kilowatt to a kilowatt. Human brain is about 25 watts, and a GPU is way below the power of the human brain. You need something like 100,000 or a million to match it, so we are off by a huge factor here.

AGI

Lex Fridman
(02:04:21)
You often say that a GI is not coming soon, meaning not this year, not the next few years, potentially farther away. What’s your basic intuition behind that?
Yann LeCun
(02:04:35)
So first of all, it’s not going to be an event. The idea somehow, which is popularized by science fiction and Hollywood, that somehow somebody is going to discover the secret to AGI or human-level AI or AMI, whatever you want to call it, and then turn on a machine and then we have AGI, that’s just not going to happen. It’s not going to be an event. It’s going to be gradual progress. Are we going to have systems that can learn from video how the world works and learn good representations? Yeah. Before we get them to the scale and performance that we observe in humans it’s going to take quite a while. It’s not going to happen in one day. Are we going to get systems that can have large amount of associated memory so they can remember stuff? Yeah, but same, it’s not going to happen tomorrow. There is some basic techniques that need to be developed. We have a lot of them, but to get this to work together with a full system is another story.

(02:05:37)
Are we going to have systems that can reason and plan perhaps along the lines of objective-driven AI architectures that I described before? Yeah, but before we get this to work properly, it’s going to take a while. Before we get all those things to work together, and then on top of this, have systems that can learn hierarchical planning, hierarchical representations, systems that can be configured for a lot of different situation at hand, the way the human brain can, all of this is going to take at least a decade and probably much more because there are a lot of problems that we’re not seeing right now that we have not encountered, so we don’t know if there is an easy solution within this framework. So it’s not just around the corner. I’ve been hearing people for the last 12, 15 years claiming that AGI is just around the corner and being systematically wrong. I knew they were wrong when they were saying it. I called their bullshit.
Lex Fridman
(02:06:38)
First of all, from the birth of the term artificial intelligence, there has been a eternal optimism that’s perhaps unlike other technologies. Is it a Moravec’s paradox, the explanation for why people are so optimistic about AGI?
Yann LeCun
(02:06:57)
Don’t think it’s just Moravec’s paradox. Moravec’s paradox is a consequence of realizing that the world is not as easy as we think. So first of all, intelligence is not a linear thing that you can measure with a scale or with a single number. Can you say that humans are smarter than orangutans? In some ways, yes, but in some ways, orangutans are smarter than humans in a lot of domains that allows them to survive in the forest, for example.
Lex Fridman
(02:07:26)
So IQ is a very limited measure of intelligence. Human intelligence is bigger than what IQ, for example, measures.
Yann LeCun
(02:07:33)
Well, IQ can measure approximately something for humans, but because humans come in relatively uniform form, right?
Lex Fridman
(02:07:49)
Yeah.
Yann LeCun
(02:07:50)
But it only measures one type of ability that maybe relevant for some tasks but not others. But then if you were talking about other intelligent entities for which the basic things that are easy to them is very different, then it doesn’t mean anything. So intelligence is a collection of skills and an ability to acquire new skills efficiently. The collection of skills that a particular intelligent entity possess or is capable of learning quickly is different from the collection of skills of another one. Because it’s a multidimensional thing, the set of skills is a high dimensional space, you can’t measure, you cannot compare two things as to whether one is more intelligent than the other. It’s multidimensional.

AI doomers

Lex Fridman
(02:08:48)
So you push back against what are called AI doomers a lot. Can you explain their perspective and why you think they’re wrong?
Yann LeCun
(02:08:59)
Okay, so AI doomers imagine all kinds of catastrophe scenarios of how AI could escape or control and basically kill us all, and that relies on a whole bunch of assumptions that are mostly false. So the first assumption is that the emergence of super intelligence is going to be an event, that at some point we’re going to figure out the secret and we’ll turn on a machine that is super intelligent, and because we’d never done it before, it’s going to take over the world and kill us all. That is false. It’s not going to be an event. We’re going to have systems that are as smart as a cat, have all the characteristics of human-level intelligence, but their level of intelligence would be like a cat or a parrot maybe or something. Then we’re going to work our way up to make those things more intelligent. As we make them more intelligent, we’re also going to put some guardrails in them and learn how to put some guardrails so they behave properly.

(02:10:03)
It’s not going to be one effort, that it’s going to be lots of different people doing this, and some of them are going to succeed at making intelligent systems that are controllable and safe and have the right guardrails. If some other goes rogue, then we can use the good ones to go against the rogue ones. So it’s going to be my smart AI police against your rogue AI. So it’s not going to be like we’re going to be exposed to a single rogue AI that’s going to kill us all. That’s just not happening. Now, there is another fallacy, which is the fact that because the system is intelligent, it necessarily wants to take over. There is several arguments that make people scared of this, which I think are completely false as well.

(02:10:48)
So one of them is in nature, it seems to be that the more intelligent species otherwise end up dominating the other and even distinguishing the others sometimes by design, sometimes just by mistake. So there is thinking by which you say, “Well, if AI systems are more intelligent than us, surely they’re going to eliminate us, if not by design, simply because they don’t care about us,” and that’s just preposterous for a number of reasons. First reason is they’re not going to be a species. They’re not going to be a species that competes with us. They’re not going to have the desire to dominate because the desire to dominate is something that has to be hardwired into an intelligent system. It is hardwired in humans. It is hardwired in baboons, in chimpanzees, in wolves, not in orangutans. The species in which this desire to dominate or submit or attain status in other ways is specific to social species. Non-social species like orangutans don’t have it, and they are as smart as we are, almost, right?
Lex Fridman
(02:12:09)
To you, there’s not significant incentive for humans to encode that into the AI systems, and to the degree they do, there’ll be other AIs that punish them for it, I’ll compete them over it.
Yann LeCun
(02:12:23)
Well, there’s all kinds of incentive to make AI systems submissive to humans.
Lex Fridman
(02:12:26)
Right.
Yann LeCun
(02:12:27)
Right? This is the way we’re going to build them. So then people say, “Oh, but look at LLMs. LLMs are not controllable,” and they’re right. LLMs are not controllable. But objectively-driven AI, so systems that derive their answers by optimization of an objective means they have to optimize this objective, and that objective can include guardrails. One guardrail is, obey humans. Another guardrail is, don’t obey humans if it’s hurting other humans within limits.
Lex Fridman
(02:12:57)
Right. I’ve heard that before somewhere, I don’t remember-
Yann LeCun
(02:12:59)
Yes, maybe in a book.
Lex Fridman
(02:13:01)
Yeah, but speaking of that book, could there be unintended consequences also from all of this?
Yann LeCun
(02:13:09)
No, of course. So this is not a simple problem. Designing those guardrails so that the system behaves properly is not going to be a simple issue for which there is a silver bullet for which you have a mathematical proof that the system can be safe. It’s going to be a very progressive, iterative design system where we put those guardrails in such a way that the system behave properly. Sometimes they’re going to do something that was unexpected because the guardrail wasn’t right and we’re dd correct them so that they do it right. The idea somehow that we can’t get it slightly wrong because if we get it slightly wrong, we’ll die is ridiculous. We are just going to go progressively. It is just going to be, the analogy I’ve used many times is turbojet design. How did we figure out how to make turbojet so unbelievably reliable?

(02:14:07)
Those are incredibly complex pieces of hardware that run at really high temperatures for 20 hours at a time sometimes, and we can fly halfway around the world on a two-engine jetliner at near the speed of sound. Like how incredible is this? It’s just unbelievable. Did we do this because we invented a general principle of how to make turbojets safe? No, it took decades to fine tune the design of those systems so that they were safe. Is there a separate group within General Electric or Snecma or whatever that is specialized in turbojet safety? No. The design is all about safety, because a better turbojet is also a safer turbojet, so a more reliable one. It’s the same for AI. Do you need specific provisions to make AI safe? No, you need to make better AI systems, and they will be safe because they are designed to be more useful and more controllable.
Lex Fridman
(02:15:16)
So let’s imagine a system, AI system that’s able to be incredibly convincing and can convince you of anything. I can at least imagine such a system, and I can see such a system be weapon like because it can control people’s minds. We’re pretty gullible. We want to believe a thing, and you can have an AI system that controls it and you could see governments using that as a weapon. So do you think if you imagine such a system, there’s any parallel to something like nuclear weapons?
Yann LeCun
(02:15:53)
No.
Lex Fridman
(02:15:56)
Why is that technology different? So you’re saying there’s going to be gradual development?
Yann LeCun
(02:16:01)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(02:16:03)
It might be-
Lex Fridman
(02:16:00)
Gradual development is going to be, it might be rapid, but there’ll be iterative and then we’ll be able to respond and so on.
Yann LeCun
(02:16:09)
So that AI system designed by Vladimir Putin or whatever, or his minions is going to be talking to, trying to talk to every American to convince them to vote for-
Lex Fridman
(02:16:25)
Whoever.
Yann LeCun
(02:16:25)
… Whoever pleases Putin.
Lex Fridman
(02:16:28)
Sure.
Yann LeCun
(02:16:30)
Or whatever, or rile people up against each other as they’ve been trying to do. They’re not going to be talking to you, they’re going to be talking to your AI assistant, which is going to be as smart as theirs. Because as I said, in the future, every single one of your interaction with the digital world will be mediated by your AI assistant. So the first thing you’re going to ask, is this a scam? Is this thing telling me the truth? It’s not even going to be able to get to you because it’s only going to talk to your AI system or your AI system. It’s going to be like a spam filter. You’re not even seeing the email, the spam email. It’s automatically put in a folder that you never see. It’s going to be the same thing. That AI system that tries to convince you of something is going to be talking to AI assistant, which is going to be at least as smart as it, and it’s going to say, “This is spam.” It’s not even going to bring it to your attention.
Lex Fridman
(02:17:32)
So to you, it’s very difficult for any one AI system to take such a big leap ahead to where it can convince even the other AI systems. There’s always going to be this kind of race where nobody’s way ahead.
Yann LeCun
(02:17:46)
That’s the history of the world. History of the world is whenever there is a progress someplace, there is a countermeasure and it’s a cat and mouse game.
Lex Fridman
(02:17:58)
Mostly yes, but this is why nuclear weapons are so interesting because that was such a powerful weapon that it mattered who got it first. That you could imagine Hitler, Stalin, Mao getting the weapon first, and that having a different kind of impact on the world than the United States getting the weapon first. But to you, nuclear weapons, you don’t imagine a breakthrough discovery and then Manhattan Project-like effort for AI?
Yann LeCun
(02:18:35)
No. No, as I said, it’s not going to be an event. It’s going to be continuous progress. And whenever one breakthrough occurs, it’s going to be widely disseminated really quickly.
Lex Fridman
(02:18:48)
Yeah.
Yann LeCun
(02:18:48)
Probably first within industry. This is not a domain where government or military organizations are particularly innovative and they’re in fact way behind. And so this is going to come from industry and this kind of information disseminates extremely quickly. We’ve seen this over the last few years where you have a new … Even take AlphaGo, this was reproduced within three months even without particularly detailed information, right?
Lex Fridman
(02:19:18)
Yeah. This is an industry that’s not good at secrecy. But people [inaudible 02:19:22]-
Yann LeCun
(02:19:21)
No. But even if there is, just the fact that you know that something is possible makes you realize that it’s worth investing the time to actually do it. You may be the second person to do it, but you’ll do it. And same for all the innovations of self supervision in transformers, decoder only architectures, LLMS. Those things, you don’t need to know exactly the details of how they work to know that it’s possible because it’s deployed and then it’s getting reproduced. And then people who work for those companies move. They go from one company to another and the information disseminates. What makes the success of the US tech industry and Silicon Valley in particular is exactly that, is because the information circulates really, really quickly and disseminates very quickly. And so the whole region is ahead because of that circulation of information.
Lex Fridman
(02:20:24)
Maybe just to linger on the psychology of AI doomers, you give, in the classic Yann LeCun way, a pretty good example of just when a new technology comes to be, you say engineer says, “I invented this new thing. I call it a ball pen.” And then the Twitter sphere responds, “OMG people could write horrible things with it, like misinformation, propaganda, hate speech. Ban it now.” Then writing doomers come in, akin to the AI doomers, “Imagine if everyone can get a ball pen. This could destroy society. There should be a law against using ball pen to write hate speech, regulate ball pens now.” And then the pencil industry mogul says, “Yeah, ball pens are very dangerous. Unlike pencil writing, which is erasable, ball pen writing stays forever. Government should require a license for a pen manufacturer.” This does seem to be part of human psychology when it comes up against new technology. What deep insights can you speak to about this?
Yann LeCun
(02:21:37)
Well, there is a natural fear of new technology and the impact it can have in society. And people have instinctive reaction to the world they know being threatened by major transformations that are either cultural phenomena or technological revolutions. And they fear for their culture, they fear for their job, they fear for the future of their children and their way of life. So any change is feared. And you see this along history, any technological revolution or cultural phenomenon was always accompanied by groups or reaction in the media that basically attributed all the current problems of society to that particular change. Electricity was going to kill everyone at some point. The train was going to be a horrible thing because you can’t breathe past 50 kilometers an hour. And so there’s a wonderful website called the Pessimist Archive.
Lex Fridman
(02:22:56)
It’s great.
Yann LeCun
(02:22:57)
Which has all those newspaper clips of all the horrible things people imagine would arrive because of either a technological innovation or a cultural phenomenon, just wonderful examples of jazz or comic books being blamed for unemployment or young people not wanting to work anymore and things like that. And that has existed for centuries and it’s knee-jerk reactions. The question is do we embrace change or do we resist it? And what are the real dangers as opposed to the imagined ones?
Lex Fridman
(02:23:51)
So people worry about, I think one thing they worry about with big tech, something we’ve been talking about over and over, but I think worth mentioning again, they worry about how powerful AI will be and they worry about it being in the hands of one centralized power of just a handful of central control. And so that’s the skepticism with big tech you make, these companies can make a huge amount of money and control this technology, and by so doing take advantage, abuse the little guy in society.
Yann LeCun
(02:24:29)
Well, that’s exactly why we need open source platforms.
Lex Fridman
(02:24:31)
Yeah, I just wanted to nail the point home more and more.
Yann LeCun
(02:24:37)
Yes.

Joscha Bach

Lex Fridman
(02:24:38)
So let me ask you on your, like I said, you do get a little bit flavorful on the internet. Joscha Bach tweeted something that you LOL’d at in reference to HAL 9,000. Quote, “I appreciate your argument and I fully understand your frustration, but whether the pod bay doors should be opened or closed is a complex and nuanced issue.” So you’re at the head of Meta AI. This is something that really worries me, that our AI overlords will speak down to us with corporate speak of this nature, and you resist that with your way of being. Is this something you can just comment on, working at a big company, how you can avoid the over fearing, I suppose, through caution create harm?
Yann LeCun
(02:25:41)
Yeah. Again, I think the answer to this is open source platforms and then enabling a widely diverse set of people to build AI assistance that represent the diversity of cultures, opinions, languages, and value systems across the world so that you’re not bound to just be brainwashed by a particular way of thinking because of a single AI entity. So, I think it’s a really, really important question for society. And the problem I’m seeing is that, which is why I’ve been so vocal and sometimes a little sardonic about it-
Lex Fridman
(02:26:25)
Never stop. Never stop, Yann. We love it.
Yann LeCun
(02:26:29)
… is because I see the danger of this concentration of power through proprietary AI systems as a much bigger danger than everything else. That if we really want diversity of opinion AI systems, that in the future where we’ll all be interacting through AI systems, we need those to be diverse for the preservation of diversity of ideas and creed and political opinions and whatever, and the preservation of democracy. And what works against this is people who think that for reasons of security, we should keep the AI systems under lock and key because it’s too dangerous to put it in the hands of everybody, because it could be used by terrorists or something. That would lead to potentially a very bad future in which all of our information diet is controlled by a small number of companies through proprietary systems.
Lex Fridman
(02:27:42)
So you trust humans with this technology to build systems that are on the whole good for humanity.
Yann LeCun
(02:27:53)
Isn’t that what democracy and free speech is all about?
Lex Fridman
(02:27:56)
I think so.
Yann LeCun
(02:27:57)
Do you trust institutions to do the right thing?
Lex Fridman
(02:27:59)
Sure.
Yann LeCun
(02:28:00)
Do you trust people to do the right thing? And yeah, there’s bad people who are going to do bad things, but they’re not going to have superior technology to the good people. So then it’s going to be my good AI against your bad AI, right? There’s the examples that we were just talking about of maybe some rogue country will build some AI system that’s going to try to convince everybody to go into a civil war or something or elect a favorable ruler, but then they will have to go past our AI systems.
Lex Fridman
(02:28:35)
Right. An AI system with a strong Russian accent will be trying to convince our-
Yann LeCun
(02:28:40)
And doesn’t put any articles in their sentences.

Humanoid robots

Lex Fridman
(02:28:45)
Well, it’ll be at the very least, absurdly comedic. Okay. So since we talked about the physical reality, I’d love to ask your vision of the future with robots in this physical reality. So many of the kinds of intelligence that you’ve been speaking about would empower robots to be more effective collaborators with us humans. So since Tesla’s Optimus team has been showing us some progress on humanoid robots, I think it really reinvigorated the whole industry that I think Boston Dynamics has been leading for a very, very long time. So now there’s all kinds of companies Figure AI, obviously Boston Dynamics.
Yann LeCun
(02:29:30)
Unitree.
Lex Fridman
(02:29:30)
Unitree, but there’s a lot of them.
Yann LeCun
(02:29:33)
There’s a few of them.
Lex Fridman
(02:29:33)
It’s great. It’s great. I love it. So do you think there’ll be millions of humanoid robots walking around soon?
Yann LeCun
(02:29:44)
Not soon, but it’s going to happen. The next decade I think is going to be really interesting in robots, the emergence of the robotics industry has been in the waiting for 10, 20 years without really emerging other than for pre-program behavior and stuff like that. And the main issue is, again, the Moravec paradox, how do we get those systems to understand how the world works and plan actions? And so we can do it for really specialized tasks. And the way Boston Dynamics goes about it is basically with a lot of handcrafted dynamical models and careful planning in advance, which is very classical robotics with a lot of innovation, a little bit of perception, but it’s still not, they can’t build a domestic robot.

(02:30:41)
We’re still some distance away from completely autonomous level five driving, and we’re certainly very far away from having level five autonomous driving by a system that can train itself by driving 20 hours like any 17-year-old. So until we have, again, world models, systems that can train themselves to understand how the world works, we’re not going to have significant progress in robotics. So a lot of the people working on robotic hardware at the moment are betting or banking on the fact that AI is going to make sufficient progress towards that,
Lex Fridman
(02:31:28)
And they’re hoping to discover a product in it too. Because before you have a really strong world model, there’ll be an almost strong world model and people are trying to find a product in a clumsy robot, I suppose, not a perfectly efficient robot. So there’s the factory setting where humanoid robots can help automate some aspects of the factory. I think that’s a crazy difficult task because of all the safety required and all this kind of stuff. I think in the home is more interesting, but then you start to think, I think you mentioned loading the dishwasher, right?
Yann LeCun
(02:32:03)
Yeah.
Lex Fridman
(02:32:04)
I suppose that’s one of the main problems you’re working on.
Yann LeCun
(02:32:07)
There’s cleaning up, cleaning the house, clearing up the table after a meal.
Lex Fridman
(02:32:17)
Sure.
Yann LeCun
(02:32:18)
Washing the dishes, all those tasks, cooking. All the tasks that in principle could be automated but are actually incredibly sophisticated, really complicated.
Lex Fridman
(02:32:28)
But even just basic navigation around a space full of uncertainty.
Yann LeCun
(02:32:32)
That works. You can do this now, navigation is fine.
Lex Fridman
(02:32:37)
Well, navigation in a way that’s compelling to us humans is a different thing.
Yann LeCun
(02:32:42)
Yeah, it’s not going to be necessarily … We have demos actually, because there is a so-called embodied AI group at fair, and they’ve been not building their own robots, but using commercial robots. And you can tell the robot dog go to the fridge and they can actually open the fridge and they can probably pick up a can in the fridge and stuff like that and bring it to you. So it can navigate, it can grab objects as long as it’s been trained to recognize them, which vision systems work pretty well nowadays, but it’s not like a completely general robot that would be sophisticated enough to do things like clearing up the dinner table.
Lex Fridman
(02:33:31)
To me, that’s an exciting future of getting humanoid robots, robots in general in the home more and more, because it gets humans to really directly interact with AI systems in the physical space. And in so doing it allows us to philosophically, psychologically explore our relationships with robots. Going to be really, really, really interesting. So I hope you make progress on the whole JEPA thing soon.
Yann LeCun
(02:33:54)
Well, I hope things can work as planned. Again, we’ve been working on this idea of self supervised running from video for 10 years, and only made significant progress in the last two or three.
Lex Fridman
(02:34:11)
And actually you’ve mentioned that there’s a lot of interesting breakage that can happen without having access to a lot of compute. So if you’re interested in doing a PhD in this kind of stuff, there’s a lot of possibilities still to do innovative work. So what advice would you give to an undergrad that’s looking to go to grad school and do a PhD?
Yann LeCun
(02:34:33)
Basically, I’ve listed them already, this idea of how do you train a world model by observation? And you don’t have to train necessarily on gigantic data sets. It could turn out to be necessary, to actually train on large data sets, to have emergent properties like we have with other lamps. But I think there is a lot of good ideas that can be done without necessarily scaling up than there is how do you do planning with a learn world model? If the world the system evolves in is not the physical world, but is the world of let’s say the internet or some sort of world where an action consists in doing a search in a search engine or interrogating a database or running a simulation or calling a calculator or solving a differential equation, how do you get a system to actually plan a sequence of actions to give the solution to a problem?

(02:35:29)
And so the question of planning is not just a question of planning physical actions. It could be planning actions to use tools for a dialogue system or for any kind of intelligence system. And there’s some work on this, but not a huge amount. Some work at fair, one called Toolformer, which was a couple years ago and some more recent work on planning, but I don’t think we have a good solution for any of that. Then there is the question of hierarchical planning. So the example I mentioned of planning a trip from New York to Paris, that’s hierarchical, but almost every action that we take involves hierarchical planning in some sense, and we really have absolutely no idea how to do this.

(02:36:20)
There’s zero demonstration of hierarchical planning in AI where the various levels of representations that are necessary have been learned. We can do two level hierarchical planning when we designed the two levels. So for example, you have a dog-like robot, you want it to go from the living room to the kitchen. You can plan a path that avoids the obstacle, and then you can send this to a lower level planner that figures out how to move the legs to follow that trajectories. So that works, but that two level planning is designed by hand.

(02:37:05)
We specify what the proper levels of abstraction, the representation at each level of abstraction have to be. How do you learn this? How do you learn that hierarchical representation of action plans? With [inaudible 02:37:21] and deep learning, we can train the system to learn hierarchical representations of percepts. What is the equivalent when what you’re trying to represent are action plans?
Lex Fridman
(02:37:30)
For action plans, yeah. So you want basically a robot dog or humanoid robot that turns on and travels from New York to Paris all by itself.
Yann LeCun
(02:37:41)
For example.
Lex Fridman
(02:37:43)
It might have some trouble at the TSA.
Yann LeCun
(02:37:47)
No, but even doing something fairly simple like a household task, like cooking or something.

Hope for the future

Lex Fridman
(02:37:53)
Yeah, there’s a lot involved. It’s a super complex task and once again, we take it for granted. What hope do you have for the future of humanity? We’re talking about so many exciting technologies, so many exciting possibilities. What gives you hope when you look out over the next 10, 20, 50, a hundred years? If you look at social media, there’s wars going on, there’s division, there’s hatred, all this kind of stuff that’s also part of humanity. But amidst all that, what gives you hope?
Yann LeCun
(02:38:29)
I love that question. We can make humanity smarter with AI. AI basically will amplify human intelligence. It’s as if every one of us will have a staff of smart AI assistants. They might be smarter than us. They’ll do our bidding, perhaps execute a task in ways that are much better than we could do ourselves, because they’d be smarter than us. And so it’s like everyone would be the boss of a staff of super smart virtual people. So we shouldn’t feel threatened by this any more than we should feel threatened by being the manager of a group of people, some of whom are more intelligent than us. I certainly have a lot of experience with this, of having people working with me who are smarter than me.

(02:39:35)
That’s actually a wonderful thing. So having machines that are smarter than us, that assist us in all of our tasks, our daily lives, whether it’s professional or personal, I think would be an absolutely wonderful thing. Because intelligence is the commodity that is most in demand. That’s really what I mean. All the mistakes that humanity makes is because of lack of intelligence really, or lack of knowledge, which is related. So making people smarter, we just can only be better. For the same reason that public education is a good thing and books are a good thing, and the internet is also a good thing, intrinsically and even social networks are a good thing if you run them properly.

(02:40:21)
It’s difficult, but you can. Because it helps the communication of information and knowledge and the transmission of knowledge. So AI is going to make humanity smarter. And the analogy I’ve been using is the fact that perhaps an equivalent event in the history of humanity to what might be provided by generalization of AI assistant is the invention of the printing press. It made everybody smarter, the fact that people could have access to books. Books were a lot cheaper than they were before, and so a lot more people had an incentive to learn to read, which wasn’t the case before.

(02:41:14)
And people became smarter. It enabled the enlightenment. There wouldn’t be an enlightenment without the printing press. It enabled philosophy, rationalism, escape from religious doctrine, democracy, science. And certainly without this, there wouldn’t have been the American Revolution or the French Revolution. And so we would still be under a feudal regimes perhaps. And so it completely transformed the world because people became smarter and learned about things. Now, it also created 200 years of essentially religious conflicts in Europe because the first thing that people read was the Bible and realized that perhaps there was a different interpretation of the Bible than what the priests were telling them. And so that created the Protestant movement and created the rift. And in fact, the Catholic Church didn’t like the idea of the printing press, but they had no choice. And so it had some bad effects and some good effects.

(02:42:32)
I don’t think anyone today would say that the invention of the printing press had a overall negative effect despite the fact that it created 200 years of religious conflicts in Europe. Now, compare this, and I thought I was very proud of myself to come up with this analogy, but realized someone else came with the same idea before me, compare this with what happened in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire banned the printing press for 200 years, and he didn’t ban it for all languages, only for Arabic. You could actually print books in Latin or Hebrew or whatever in the Ottoman Empire, just not in Arabic.

(02:43:20)
And I thought it was because the rulers just wanted to preserve the control over the population and the religious dogma and everything. But after talking with the UAE Minister of AI, Omar Al Olama, he told me no, there was another reason. And the other reason was that it was to preserve the corporation of calligraphers. There’s an art form, which is writing those beautiful Arabic poems or whatever, religious text in this thing. And it was a very powerful corporation of scribes basically that run a big chunk of the empire, and we couldn’t put them out of business. So they banned the printing press in part to protect that business.

(02:44:21)
Now, what’s the analogy for AI today? Who are we protecting by banning AI? Who are the people who are asking that AI be regulated to protect their jobs? And of course, it’s a real question of what is going to be the effect of a technological transformation like AI on the job market and the labor market? And there are economists who are much more expert at this than I am, but when I talk to them, they tell us we’re not going to run out of the job. This is not going to cause mass unemployment. This is just going to be gradual shift of different professions.

(02:45:02)
The professions that are going to be hot 10 or 15 years from now, we have no idea today what they’re going to be. The same way, if you go back 20 years in the past, who could have thought 20 years ago that the hottest job, even five, 10 years ago, was mobile app developer? Smartphones weren’t invented.
Lex Fridman
(02:45:23)
Most of the jobs of the future might be in the Metaverse.
Yann LeCun
(02:45:27)
Well, it could be, yeah.
Lex Fridman
(02:45:29)
But the point is you can’t possibly predict. But you’re right. You made a lot of strong points. And I believe that people are fundamentally good. And so if AI, especially open source AI, can make them smarter, it just empowers the goodness in humans.
Yann LeCun
(02:45:48)
So I share that feeling, I think people are fundamentally good. And in fact, a lot of doomers are doomers because they don’t think that people are fundamentally good, and they either don’t trust people or they don’t trust the institution to do the right thing so that people behave properly.
Lex Fridman
(02:46:10)
Well, I think both you and I believe in humanity, and I think I speak for a lot of people in saying thank you for pushing the open source movement, pushing to making both research and AI open source, making it available to people, and also the models themselves, making it open source. So thank you for that. And thank you for speaking your mind in such colorful and beautiful ways on the internet. I hope you never stop. You’re one of the most fun people I know and get to be a fan of. So Yann, thank you for speaking to me once again, and thank you for being you.
Yann LeCun
(02:46:44)
Thank you, Lex.
Lex Fridman
(02:46:45)
Thanks for listening to this conversation with Yann LeCun. To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, let me leave you with some words from Arthur C. Clarke. The only way to discover the limits of the possible is to go beyond them, into the impossible. Thank you for listening and hope to see you next time.

Transcript for Serhii Plokhy: History of Ukraine, Russia, Soviet Union, KGB, Nazis & War | Lex Fridman Podcast #415

This is a transcript of Lex Fridman Podcast #415 with Serhii Plokhy.
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Table of Contents

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Introduction

Serhii Plokhy
(00:00:00)
What happened during World War II? Was that once the Germans started to run out of manpower, they created foreign legion groups. But because those people were not Aryans, they couldn’t be trusted. So they were put under the command of Heinrich Himmler and the commando SS, and became known as SS Waffen units, and one of such units was created in Ukraine.
Lex Fridman
(00:00:33)
The following is a conversation with Serhii Plokhy, a historian at Harvard University and the director of the Ukrainian Research Institute, also at Harvard. As a historian, he specializes in the history of Eastern Europe with an emphasis on Ukraine. He wrote a lot of great books on Ukraine and Russia, the Soviet Union, on Slavic peoples in general across centuries, on Chernobyl and nuclear disasters, and on the current war in Ukraine, a book titled The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History.

(00:01:09)
This is the Lex Fridman podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, dear friends, here’s Serhii Plokhy. What are the major explanations for the collapse of the Soviet Union? Maybe ones you agree with and ones you disagree with.

Collapse of the Soviet Union

Serhii Plokhy
(00:01:25)
Very often people confuse three different processes that were taking place in the late ’80s and early ’90s, and the one was the collapse of communism as ideology. Another was the end of the Cold War. And the third one was the end of the Soviet Union.

(00:01:47)
All of this processes were interrelated, interconnected, but when people provide ideology as the explanation for all of these processes, that’s where I disagree, because ideological collapse happened on the territory of the Soviet Union in general. The Soviet Union lost the Cold War, whether we’re talking about Moscow, Leningrad, or St. Petersburg now, or Vladivostok. But the fall of the Soviet Union is about a story in which Vladivostok and St. Petersburg ended up in one country, and Kyiv, Minsk and Dushanbe ended in different countries.

(00:02:28)
The theories and explanations about how did that happen, for me, this really very helpful theories for understanding the Soviet collapse. So the mobilization from below the collapse of the center, against the background of economic collapse, against the background of ideological implosion, that’s how I look at the fall of the Soviet Union and that’s how I look at the theories that explain that collapse.
Lex Fridman
(00:03:03)
So it’s a story of geography, ideology, economics. Which are the most important to understand of what made the collapse of the Soviet Union happen?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:03:14)
The Soviet collapse was unique, but not more unique than collapse of any other empire. What we really witnessed, or the world witnessed back in 1991, and we continue to witness today with the Russian aggression against Ukraine, is a collapse of one of the largest world empires.

(00:03:36)
We talked about the Soviet Union, and now talk about Russia, as possessing plus-minus 1/6th of the surface of the Earth. You don’t get in possession of 1/6th of the earth by being a nation state. You get that sort of size as an empire. And the Soviet collapse is continuation of the disintegration of the Russian Empire that started back in 1917, that was arrested for some period of time by the Bolsheviks, by the Communist ideology, which was internationalist ideology. And then came back in full force in the late ’80s and early ’90s.

(00:04:19)
So the most important story for me, this is the story of the continuing collapse of the Russian Empire and the rise of not just local nationalism, but also rise of Russian nationalism that turned out to be as a destructive force for the imperial or multi-ethnic, multinational state, as was Ukrainian nationalism or Georgian or Estonian for that matter.
Lex Fridman
(00:04:49)
You said a lot of interesting stuff there. In 1917, Bolsheviks, internationalists, how that plays with the idea of Russian Empire and so on. But first, let me ask about US influence on this. One of the ideas is that through the Cold War, that mechanism, US had major interest to weaken the Soviet Union, and therefore the collapse could be attributed to pressure and manipulation from the United States. Is there truth to that?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:05:18)
The pressure from the United States, this is part of the Cold War. And Cold War, part of that story, but it doesn’t explain the Soviet collapse. And the reason is quite simple. The United States of America didn’t want the Soviet Union to collapse and disintegrate. They didn’t want that at the start of the Cold War in 1948. We now have the strategic documents. They were concerned about that, they didn’t want to do that. And certainly they didn’t want to do that in the year 1991. As late as August of 1991, the month of the coup in Moscow, President Bush, George H.W. Bush, travels from Moscow to Kyiv and gives famous or infamous speech called Chicken Kiev speech, basically warning Ukrainians against going for independence.

(00:06:16)
The Soviet collapse was a huge headache for the administration in the White House for a number of reasons. They liked to work with Gorbachev. The Soviet Union was emerging as a junior partner of the United States on the international arena. Collapse was destroying all of that. And on the top of that, there was a question of the nuclear weapons, unaccounted nuclear weapons. So the United States was doing everything humanly possible to keep the Soviet Union together in one piece until really late November of 1991, when it became clear that it was a lost cause and they had to say goodbye to Gorbachev and to the project that he introduced.

(00:07:05)
A few months later, or a year later, there was a presidential campaign and Bush was running for the second term and was looking for achievements. And there were many achievements. I basically treat him with great respect, but destruction of the Soviet Union was not one of those achievements. He was on the other side of that divide. But the politics, the political campaign, of course, have their own rules. And they produce, give birth to mythology, which we still, at least in this country, we live until now, until today.
Lex Fridman
(00:07:44)
Gorbachev is an interesting figure in all of this. Is there a possible history where the Soviet Union did not collapse and some of the ideas that Gorbachev had for the future of the Soviet Union came to life?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:07:58)
Of course, history, on the one hand, there is a statement, it doesn’t allow for what-ifs. On the other hand, in my opinion, history is full of what-if. That’s what history is about, and certainly the Russian areas, how the Soviet Union would continue, would continue beyond, let’s say, Gorbachev’s tenure. And the argument has been made that the reforms that he introduced, that they were mismanaged and they could be managed differently, or there could be no reforms and there could be continuing stagnation. So that is all possible.

(00:08:36)
What I think would happen one way or another is the Soviet collapse in a different form, on somebody else’s watch at some later period in time. Because we’re dealing with not just processes that we’re happening in the Soviet Union, we’re dealing with global processes. And the 20th century turned out to be the century of the disintegration of the empires.

(00:09:03)
You look at the globe, at the map of the world in 1914, and you compare it to the map at the end of the 20th century in 1991, 1992, and suddenly you realize that there are many candidates for being the most important event, the most important process in the 20th century. But the biggest global thing that happened was redrawing the map of the world and producing dozens, if not hundreds, of new states. That’s the outcome of the different processes of the 20th century. Look, Yugoslavia is falling apart around the same time. Czechoslovakia goes through what can be called a civilized divorce, a very, very rare occurrence in the fall of multinational states.

(00:09:55)
So yeah, the writing was on the wall, whether it would happen under Gorbachev or later, whether it would happen as the result of reforms, or as the result of no reforms. But I think that sooner later that would happen.
Lex Fridman
(00:10:11)
Yeah, it’s very possible hundreds of years from now, the way the 20th century is written about, as the century defined by the collapse of empires. You call the Soviet Union “the last empire.” The book is called The Last Empire. So is there something fundamental about the way the world is that means it’s not conducive to the formation of empires?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:10:35)
The meaning that I was putting in the term the Soviet Union as the last empire was that the Soviet collapse was the collapse of the last major European empires, traditional empires, that was there in the 18th century, 19th century, and through most of the 20th century. The Austria-Hungary died in the midst of World War I. The Ottoman Empire disintegrated. The Brits were gone and left India. And the successor to the Russian Empire called the Soviet Union was still hanging on there.

(00:11:15)
And then came 1991. And what we see even with today’s Russia, is it’s a very different sort of policies. The Russia or Russian leadership tried to learn a lesson from 1991, so there is no national republics in the Russian Federation that would have more rights than the Russian administrative units. The structure is different, the nationality policies are different, the level of Russification is much higher. So it is in many ways already a post-imperial formation.
Lex Fridman
(00:11:59)
And you’re right about that moment in 1991, the role that Ukraine played in that, seems to be a very critical role. You can describe just that, what role Ukraine played in the collapse of the Soviet Union?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:12:15)
History is many things, but it started in a very simple way of making notes on the yearly basis, what happened this year and that. So it’s about chronology. Chronology in the history of the collapse of the Soviet Union is very important. You have Ukrainian referendum on December 1st, 1991, and you have dissolution of the Soviet Union by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus one week later. And the question is why.

(00:12:46)
Ukrainian referendum is the answer, but Ukrainians didn’t answer their referendum question of whether they want the Soviet Union to be dissolved or not. They answered very limited in terms of … It’s been a question whether you support the decision of [foreign language 00:13:06], your parliament, for Ukraine to go independent. And the rest was not on the ballot. So why then, one week later, the Soviet Union is gone? And President Yeltsin explained to President Bush around that time the reason why Ukraine was so important. He said that, “Well, if Ukraine is gone, Russia is not interested in this Soviet project because Russia would be outnumbered and outvoted by the Muslim republics.” So there was a cultural element.

(00:13:42)
But there was also another one. Ukraine happened to be the second-largest Soviet republic in then post-Soviet state, in terms of population, in terms of the economy, economic potential, and so on and so forth. And as Yeltsin suggested close culturally, linguistically and otherwise to Russia. So with the second-largest republic gone, Russia didn’t think that it was in Russia’s interest to continue with the Soviet Union. And around that time Yegor Gaidar, who was the chief economic advisor of Yeltsin, was telling him, “Well, we just don’t have money anymore to support other republics. We have to focus on Russia. We have to use oil and gas money within the Russian Federation.” So the state was bankrupt. Imperial projects, at least in the context of the late 20th century, they costed money. It wasn’t a money-making machine as it was back in the 18th and 19th century. And the combination of all this factors led to the processes in which Ukraine’s decision to go independent spelled the end to the Soviet Union. And if today anybody wants to restore, not the Soviet Union, but some form of Russian control over the post-Soviet space, Ukraine is as important today as it was back in December of 1991.
Lex Fridman
(00:15:14)
Let me ask you about Vladimir Putin’s statement that the collapse of the Soviet Union is one of the great tragedies of history. To what degree does he have a point? To what degree is he wrong?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:15:29)
His formulation was that this is the greatest geopolitical catastrophe or tragedy of the 20th century. And I specifically went and looked at the text and put it in specific time when it was happening. And it was interesting that the statement was made a few weeks before the May 9 parade and celebrations of the victory, a key part of the mythology of the current Russian state. So why say things about the Soviet collapse being the largest geopolitical strategy, and not in that particular context, the Second World War?

(00:16:14)
My explanation at least is that the World War II, the price was enormous, but the Soviet Union emerged as a great victor and captured half of Europe. 1991, in terms of the lives lost at that point, the price was actually very, very low. But for Putin, what was important that the state was lost, and he in particular was concerned about the division of the Russian people, which he understood back then like he understands now in very, very broad terms.

(00:16:54)
So for him, the biggest tragedy is not the loss of life, the biggest tragedy is the loss of the great power status or the unity of those whom he considered to be Russian nations. So at least this is my reading, this is my understanding of what is there, what is on the paper, and what is between the lines.
Lex Fridman
(00:17:17)
So both the unity of the, quote, Russian Empire and the status of the superpower?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:17:25)
That’s how I read it.

Origins of Russia and Ukraine

Lex Fridman
(00:17:27)
You wrote a book, The Origins of the Slavic Nations. So let’s go back into history. What is the origin of Slavic nations?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:17:37)
We can look at that from different perspectives, and we are now making major breakthroughs in answering this question with the very interesting, innovative linguistic analysis, the study of DNA. So that’s really the new frontier. We are getting into a pre-historical period where there is no historical sources.

(00:18:02)
And from what we can understand today, and that can of course change tomorrow with all these breakthroughs in sciences, is that the Slavs came into existence somewhere in the area of Pripyat Marshes, the northwestern part of Ukraine, southwestern part of Belarus, eastern part of Poland. And that is considered to be historical homeland of Slavs. And then they spread, and they spread all the way to the Adriatic. So we have Kurds, we have Russians spreading all the way to the Pacific. We have Ukrainians, we have Belarusians, Poles. Once we had Czechoslovaks, now we have Czechs and Slovaks. That’s the story of starting with the 8th and 9th century, even a little bit early, we can already follow that story with the help of the written sources, mostly from Byzantine, then later from Western Europe.

(00:19:07)
But what I was trying to do, not being a scientist, not being an expert in linguistics, or not being an expert in DNA analysis, I was trying to see what was happening in the minds of those peoples, and their elites in particular. Whom we call today not Slavs, but Eastern Slavs, which means Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. How they imagined themselves, how they imagined their world. And eventually I look at the so-called nation-building projects.

(00:19:41)
So trying to answer the question of how we arrived to the situation in which we are today, where there are not just three East Slavic nations, but there are also three East Slavic states, Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian. This is the focus of my book. And admittedly, in that particular book, I end on the 18th century before the era of nationalism. But then there are other books like Lost Kingdom, where I bring the story all the way up to today.
Lex Fridman
(00:20:15)
What aspects of the 8th and 9th century the East Slavic states permeates to today that we should understand?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:20:25)
Well, the most important one is that the existence of the state of Kievan Rus, back during the medieval period, created the foundations for historical mythology, common historical mythology. And there are just wars and battles over who has the right or more right for Kievan Rus.

(00:20:48)
The legal code that was created at that time existed for a long period of time. The acceptance of Christianity from Byzantium, that became a big issue that separated then Eastern Slavs from their Western neighbors, including Czechs and Poles, but united in that way to, let’s say, Bulgarians or Serbs. And the beginning of the written literature, beginning in Kyiv. So all of that is considered to be part of heritage, all of that is being contested. And this debates that were academic for a long period of time, what we see now tragically are being continued on the battlefield.
Lex Fridman
(00:21:38)
What is Kyiv? What is Rus that you mentioned? What’s the importance of these? You mentioned them as the defining places and terms, labels, at the beginning of all of this, so what is Kyiv?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:21:54)
Kyiv became a capital or the outpost of the Vikings who were trying to establish control over the trade route between what is today’s western Russia and Belarus and northern Ukraine, so the forest areas. And the biggest and the richest market in the world that existed at that time, which was in Constantinople, in Byzantium.

(00:22:27)
The idea was to get whatever goods you can get in that part of Eastern Europe, and most of those goods were slaves, local population. Put them on the ships in Kyiv, because Kyiv was on the border with the steppe zones. Steppe zones were controlled by other groups, Scythians, Sarmations, Polovtsians, Pechenegs, and so on, and you name it. And then staying on the river, being protected from attacks of the nomads to come to the Black Sea and sell these products in Constantinople. That was the idea, that was the model.

(00:23:11)
Vikings tried to practice that sort of business model also in other parts of Europe, and like in other parts of Europe, they turned out to be by default creators of new politics, of new states. And that was the story of the first Kievan dynasty, and Kyiv as the capital of that huge empire that was going from the Baltics to today, central Ukraine, and then was trying to get through the southern Ukraine to the Black Sea, that was a major, major European state kingdom, if you want to call it, of medieval Europe. Creating a lot of tradition in terms of dynasty, in terms of language, in terms of religion, in terms of, again, historical mythology. So Kyiv is central for the nation-building myth of a number of groups in the region.
Lex Fridman
(00:24:20)
In one perspective and narrative, Kyiv is at the center of this Russian Empire. At which point does Moscow come to prominence as the center of the Russian Empire?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:24:36)
Well, the Russian Empire is a term and really creation of the 18th century. What we have for the Kievan, we call it Kievan Rus, again, this is a term of the 19th century, they call themselves Rus.
Lex Fridman
(00:24:49)
Rus.
Serhii Plokhy
(00:24:51)
And there was metropolitanate of Rus and there was Rus principalities. So very important to keep in mind that Rus is not Russia because that was a self-name for all multiple groups on that territory. And Moscow doesn’t exist at the time when Kyiv emerges as the capital. The first reference to Moscow comes from the 12th century when it was founded by one of the Kievan princes.

(00:25:25)
And Moscow comes to prominence really in a very different context and with a very different empire running the show in the region. The story of Moscow and the rise of Moscow, this is the story of the Mongol rule over former Rus lands and former Rus territories. The part of the former Rus eventually overthrows the Mongol control with the help of the small group of people called Lithuanians, which had a young state and young dynasty, and united this lands, which were mostly in today’s terms Ukrainian and Belorussian. So they separate early. And what is today’s Russia, mostly western Russia, central Russia, stays under the Mongol control up until late 15th century.

(00:26:22)
And that was the story when Moscow rises as the new capital of that realm, replacing the city of Vladimir as that capital. For those who ever went to Russia, they familiar with, of course, Vladimir as the place of the oldest architectural monuments, the so-called the Golden Ring of Russia, and so on and so forth. Vladimir is central, and there were so many architectural monuments there because before there was Moscow, there was Vladimir. Eventually in this struggle over control of the territory, struggle for favors from the Mongols and the Tatar Horde, Moscow emerges as the center of that particular realm under Mongols.

(00:27:15)
After the Mongol rule is removed, Moscow embarks on the project that historians, Russian historians of the 19th century, called the “gathering of the Russian lands.” Using Russian now for Rus and trying to bring back the lands of former Kievan Rus, but also the lands of the former Mongol Empire. The Russians get to the Pacific before they get to Kyiv historically, and really the, quote, unquote, “gathering of the,” quote, unquote, “Russian lands.” As only in 1945, when the Soviet Union bullies the Czechoslovak government into turning what is today’s Transcarpathian Ukraine to the Soviet Union. It is included in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

(00:28:17)
So that’s the moment when that destiny, the way how it was imagined by the 19th century Russian historian, was eventually fulfilled. Moscow was in control of all these lands.
Lex Fridman
(00:28:30)
To what degree are the Slavic people one people, and this is the theme that will continue throughout, I think, versus a collection of multiple peoples? Whether we’re talking about the Kievan Rus or we’re talking about the 19th century Russian Empire conception.
Serhii Plokhy
(00:28:49)
Well, a number of ways to look at that. One, the most obvious, the most clear, is language. And there is no question that Poles speak a separate language than the Slavs. And there is no question for anyone going to Ukraine and here in Ukrainian, realizing that this is not Russian. The level of comprehension can be different, you can understand certain words and you don’t understand others. And the same would be with Polish, and the same would be with Czech.

(00:29:27)
So there is this linguistic history that is in common, but languages very clearly indicate that you’re dealing with different peoples. We know that language is not everything. Americans speak a particular way of English, Australians speak a particular variant of English. But for reasons of geography, history, we pretty much believe that despite linguistic unity, these are different nations and different peoples. And there are some parts of political tradition more in common, others are quite different.

(00:30:12)
So the same when it comes to language, the same when it comes to political tradition, to the loyalty to the political institution, applies to Slavic nations. Again, there is nothing particularly unique about the Slavs in that regard.

Ukrainian nationalism

Lex Fridman
(00:30:30)
You wrote the book, The Cossack Myth: History and Nationhood in the Age of Empires. It tells the story of an anonymous manuscript called The History of the Rus. It started being circulated in the 1820s. I would love it if you can tell the story of this. This is supposedly one of the most impactful texts in history, modern history. So what’s the importance of this text? What did it contain? How did it define the future of the region?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:30:56)
In the first decades of the 19th century, after Napoleonic Wars, a mysterious text emerged that was attributed to an Orthodox archbishop that was long dead, which was claiming that the Cossacks of Ukraine were in fact the original Rus people, and that they had the right for particular place, for central place, in the Russian Empire. And it tells the history of the Cossacks. It’s the era of romanticism, full of all sorts of drama, there are heroes, there are villains.

(00:31:41)
And the text captivates the attention of some key figures in the Russian intellectual elite in St. Petersburg, people like Kondraty Ryleyev, who was executed for his participation in 1825 uprising. Writes poetry on the basis of this text. Pushkin pays attention to it as well. And then comes along the key figure in Ukrainian national revival, of the 19th century Ukrainian national project, Taras Shevchenko, and reads it as well, and they all read it very differently. Eventually, by the beginning of the mid 20th century, some of the Russian, mostly nationalist writers, call this text the Quran of Ukrainian nationalism.

(00:32:47)
So what is there? The story, it’s very important in a sense that what the authors, and that’s what I claim in the book, what the authors of the text were trying to say, they were trying to say that the Cossack elite should have the same rights as the Russian nobility. And brings the long historical records to prove how cold the Cossacks were over the period of time.

(00:33:17)
But at the beginning of the 19th century, they put this claim already, they use new arguments, and these arguments are about nation and nationalism. And they’re saying that the Cossacks are a separate nation, and that’s a big, big, big claim. The Russian Empire, and this is a very, very good argument in historiography, that Russian Empire grew and acquired this 1/6th of the Earth by using one very specific way of integrating those lands. It integrated the elites. It was making deals with the elites. Whether their elites were Muslim or their elites were Roman Catholic, as the case with the Poles, they would be-
Serhii Plokhy
(00:34:00)
… were Roman Catholic, as the case with the Poles. The elites would be integrated, and the empire was based on the state loyalty and the state integration. But once you bring in the factor of nation and nationalism and language, then, once in a sudden, the whole model of the integration of the elites, irrespective of their language, religion, and culture, starts falling apart. And the Poles were the first who really produced this sort of a challenge to the Russian Empire, by two uprisings in the 19th century. And Ukrainians then followed in their footsteps.

(00:34:51)
So, the importance of the tax is that it was making claim on the part of a particular estate, the Cossack Officer Class, which was that empire could survive. But it turned it, given the conditions of the time, into the claim for the special role of Cossacks as a nation, creating that this is a separate nation, Russian nation. And that is the challenge of nationalism that no empire really survived, and the Russian Empire was not an exception. So, there’s a turning point when the discourse switches from loyalty based on the integration of the elites to the loyalty based on attachment to your nation, to your language, and to your culture, and to your history.
Lex Fridman
(00:35:42)
So that was like the initial spark, the flame, that led to nationalist movements.
Serhii Plokhy
(00:35:50)
That was the beginning and the beginning that was building a bridge between the existence of the Cossack state in the 17th and 18th century that was used as a foundation for the Cossack mythology, Ukrainian national mythology, went into the Ukrainian National Anthem, and the new age and the new stage where the Cossacks were not there anymore, whether they were professors, intellectuals, students, members of the national and organizations. And it started, of course, with romantic poetry, it was started with collected folklore, and then, later goes to the political stage, and eventually the stage of mass politics.
Lex Fridman
(00:36:33)
So to you, even throughout the 20th century under Stalin, there was always a force within Ukraine that wants it to be independent.
Serhii Plokhy
(00:36:43)
There were five attempts for Ukraine to declare its independence and to maintain it in the 20th century. Only one succeeded in 1991, but there were four different attempts at times before. And you see the Ukrainian national identity manifest in itself in two different ways, in the form of national communism after the Bolshevik victory in the Bolshevik-controlled Ukraine, and in the form of radical nationalism in the parts of Ukraine that were controlled by Poland and Romania, and part of that was also controlled by Czechoslovakia and later Hungary. So, in those parts outside of the Soviet Union, the form of the national mobilization, the key form of national mobilization, became radical nationalism. In Soviet Ukraine, it was national communism that came back in the 1960s and 1970s. And then, in the 1991, the majority of the members of the Ukrainian Parliament, who voted for independence, were members of the Communist Party. So that spirit on certain level never died.

Stepan Bandera

Lex Fridman
(00:38:08)
So, there’s national communism and radical nationalism. Well, let me ask you about the radical nationalism, because that is a topic that comes up in the discussion of the war in Ukraine today. Can you tell me about Stepan Bandera? Who was he, this controversial far-right Ukrainian revolutionary?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:38:31)
The [inaudible 00:38:32] lists two Stepan Banderas. One is the real person and another is mythology that really comes with this name. And the real person was a young student, nationalistically oriented student, in the late 1920s and early 1930s in the part of Ukraine that was controlled by Poland, who belonged to the generation who regretted that they were not born in time for the big struggles of the World War I and Revolution at that time. They believed that their fathers lost opportunity for Ukraine to become independent and that a new ideology was needed, and that ideology was radical nationalism, and new tactics were needed.

(00:39:25)
So, Bandera becomes the leader of the organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Ukraine at the young age and organizes a number of assassinations of the Polish officials or members of the Ukrainian community who this young people, in their 17, 18, 19, considered to be collaborators. He is arrested, put on trial, and that’s where the myth of Bandera starts to emerge, because he uses the trial to make statements about the Ukrainian nationalism, radical nationalism, and its goals, and suddenly, becomes a hero among the Ukrainian youth at that time. He is sentenced for execution for death. So, when he delivers his speech, he knows that he probably would die soon, and then it was, the sentence was commuted to life in prison.

(00:40:37)
Then World War II happens. The Polish state collapses under the pressure coming, of course, from Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Bandera walks away and presides over the act of the split of the organization of Ukrainian Nationalists into two groups. The most radical one used called Revolutionary, they call themselves Revolutionary, is led by Bandera. They worked together with the Nazi Germany at that time, with the hope that Nazi Germany would deliver them independent Ukraine.

(00:41:17)
First days of the German attack, Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, the units formed on the basis of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists marching to the city of Lviv and declare Ukrainian independence. That was not sanctioned by the German authorities. That was not in German plans. So, they arrest Bandera, members of his family, his brothers, members of the leaders, leaders of the organization. So, his two brothers go to Auschwitz, die there. He was sent to Sachsenhausen for the most duration of the war, until 1944, refusing to revoke declaration of Ukrainian independence, which, again, contributes further to his mythology.

(00:42:11)
After the war, he never comes back to Ukraine. He lives in exile in Munich. So, between 1930 and his death in 1959, he spent in Ukraine maybe up to two years, maybe a little bit more, but most of the time was either in the Polish prison, or in the German concentration camp, or in exile.

(00:42:39)
But the myth of Bandera lived. And all the members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and then the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, that fought against the Soviets all the way into the early 1950s, they were called Banderites. They were called Banderites by the Soviet authorities. They were known also in that way to the local population. So, there was a faraway leader that barely was there on the spot, but whose name was attached to this movement for, really, liberation of Ukraine at that time. Again, the battle that failed.
Lex Fridman
(00:43:18)
The fact that he collaborated with the Nazis sticks. From one perspective, he’s considered by many to be a hero of Ukraine for fighting for the independence of Ukraine. From another perspective, coupled with the fact that there’s this radical, revolutionary extremist flavor to the way he sees the world, that label just stays that he’s a fascist, he’s a Nazi. To what degree is this true? To what degree is it not?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:43:51)
This label is certainly promoted, first, by the Soviet propaganda, and then by Russian propaganda. It works very nicely. If you focus on the years of collaboration, those were the same years when Joseph Stalin collaborated with Hitler, right? So, we have the same reason to call Stalin Nazi collaborator as we have the reason to call Bandera Nazi collaborator. We look at the situation in the Pacific, in Indonesia, in other places, the leaders who worked together with Japanese, with the idea of promoting independence of their countries after the Japanese collapse, become leaders of the empire. So, the difference with Bandera is that he never becomes the leader, the leader of empire, and immunity that comes with that position certainly doesn’t apply to him.

(00:44:53)
But there are other parts of his life which certainly put this whole thing in question. The fate of his family, his own time in the German concentration camp, certainly don’t fit the propaganda one-sided image of Bandera.

(00:45:13)
In terms of him being a hero, that’s a very, very interesting question, because he is perceived in Ukraine today, not by all, and probably not by the majority, but by many people in Ukraine, as a symbol of fighting against the Soviet Union and, by extension, against Russia and Russian occupation. So, his popularity grew after February 24, 2022 as a symbol of that resistance. Again, we are talking here about myth and mythology, because Bandera was not leading the fight against the Soviet occupation in Ukraine because, at that time, he was just simply not in Ukraine. He was in Germany. And you can imagine that geography mattered at that time much more than it matters today.
Lex Fridman
(00:46:08)
There’s a million questions to ask here. I think it’s an important topic, because it is at the center of the claimed reason that the war continues in Ukraine. So, I would like to explore that from different angles. But just to clarify, was there a moment where Bandera chose Nazi Germany over the Red Army when the war already began? So, in the list of allegiances, is Ukraine’s independence more important than fighting Nazi Germany, essentially?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:46:43)
The Ukrainian independence was their goal, and they were there to work with anybody who would support and, in one way, or at least allow the Ukrainian independence. So, there is no question that they are just classic nationalists. So, the goal is, nationalism is the principle according to which the, or at least one definition is, according to which the cultural boundaries coincide with political boundaries. So, their goal was to create political boundaries that would coincide with the geographic boundaries in the conditions of the World War II, and certainly making deals with whoever would either support, as I said, or tolerate that project of theirs.
Lex Fridman
(00:47:39)
So, I would love to find the line between nationalism, even extreme nationalism, and fascism and Nazism. So, for Bandera, the myth, the Bandera the person, let’s look at some of the ideology of Nazism. To which degree did he hate Jews? Was he anti-Semitic?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:48:01)
We know that, basically, in his circle, there were people who were anti-Semites in a sense that, okay, we have the texts, right? We know that. We don’t have that information about, or that sort of text, or that sort of evidence with regard to Bandera himself.

(00:48:24)
In terms of fascism, there is very clear and there is research done that, in particularly, Italian fascism had influence on the thinking of people in that organization, including people at the top. But it is also very important to keep in mind that they call themselves nationalist and revolutionaries. And despite the fact that in 1939 and 1940 and 1941, it was very beneficial for them to declare themselves to be Ukrainian fascists and establish this bond, not just with Italy, but with Nazi Germany. They refused to do that. And then, they used to recall their independence. So, influences, yes, but clearly, it’s a different type of political project.
Lex Fridman
(00:49:30)
So, let me fast-forward into the future and see to which degree the myth permeates. Does Ukraine have a neo-Nazi problem?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:49:38)
My understanding is there are Nazis in Ukraine and there are supporters of white supremacy theories, but also my understanding is that they are extremely marginal and they are more marginal than the same sort of groups are in Central Europe, maybe in the U.S. as well. And for me, the question is not whether the Ukraine has it, but why even in the conditions of the war, the radical nationalism and extremism and white supremacist is such a marginal force, when in the countries that are not at the war, you look at France, you look at, again, it’s not exactly Nazis, but really right radical right is becoming so important.

(00:50:50)
Why Ukraine in the conditions of the war is the country that manages relations between different ethnic groups and languages in the way that strengthens political nation? So, for me, as a scholar and a researcher, what I see is that, in Ukraine, the influence of the far right in different variations is much lower than it is among some of Ukraine’s neighbors and in Europe in general. And the question is why. I don’t know. I have guesses. I don’t know answer. But that’s the question that I think is interesting to answer, how Ukraine ended up to be the only country in the world, outside of Israel, who has a Jewish president who is, my at least understanding, is the most popular president in history, in terms of how his popularity goes after the election. So, this really, from my point of view, interesting questions, and again, we can certainly debate that.
Lex Fridman
(00:52:00)
So, just for context, the most popular far right party, 1-0.15% of the vote in 2019. This is before the war. So that’s where things stood. It’s unclear where they stand now. It’d be an interesting question whether it escalated and how much. What you’re saying is that war in general can serve as a catalyst for expansion of extremist groups, of extremist nationalistic groups especially, like the far right. And it’s interesting to see to what degree they have or have not risen to power in the shadows.
Serhii Plokhy
(00:52:39)
So, no nationalist or nationalistic party actually crossed the barrier to get into the Parliament.
Lex Fridman
(00:52:45)
Yeah.
Serhii Plokhy
(00:52:45)
So, Ukraine is the country where there is no right or far right in the Parliament. We can’t say that about Germany, we can’t say that about France, so that’s just one more way to stress this unique place of Ukraine in that sense. And the year 2019 is the year already of the war. The war started in 2014 with the annexation of the Crimean. The front line was near Donbas. All these groups were fighting there. So, Ukraine, maybe not to a degree that it is now, was already on the war footing, and yet the right party couldn’t get more than 2%. So, that’s the question that I have in mind.

(00:53:31)
And yes, the war, historically, of course, puts forward and makes, from the more nationalist views and forces, turned them from marginal forces into more central ones. We talked about Bandera and we talked about Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. They were the most marginal group in the political spectrum in Ukraine in the 1930s that one can only imagine. But World War II comes, and they become the most central group, because they also were, from the start go, they had the organization, the violence was basically one of their means, they knew how to fight. So, historically, wars indeed produced those results, so we are looking at Ukraine. We’re trying to see what is happening there.
Lex Fridman
(00:54:25)
So, Vladimir Putin in his interview with Tucker Carlson, but many times before, said that the current goal for the war in Ukraine is denazification, that the purpose of the war is denazification. Can you explain this concept of denazification as Putin sees it?
Serhii Plokhy
(00:54:45)
Denazification is the trop that is accepted quite well by the former Soviet population and Russian population in particular. The most powerful Soviet mythology that then was basically passed as part of heritage to the Russian Federation was World War II, was fighting against fascism. So, once you use terms “fascism,” and “Nazi,” and “denazification,” suddenly people, not just start listening, they just stop analyzing. And as a propaganda tool, this is, of course, very powerful tool. In terms of to what degree this is the real goal or not, we discussed the importance of the far right in Europe and in Ukraine. So, if that’s the real goal of the war probably, the war would have to start not against Ukraine, but probably against France or some other country, if you take this at face value.
Lex Fridman
(00:55:48)
Well, there is something really interesting here, as you mentioned, because I’ve spoken to a lot of people in Russia, and you said analysis stops. In the West, people look at the word “denazification” and look at the things we’ve just discussed and almost think this is absurd. But when you talk to people in Russia, maybe it’s deep in there somewhere, the history of World War II still reverberates through maybe the fears, maybe the pride, whatever the deep emotional history is there, it seems that the goal of denazification appears to be reasonable for people in Russia. They don’t seem to see the absurdity or the complexity or even the need for analysis, I guess, in this kind of word of denazification.
Serhii Plokhy
(00:56:47)
I would say this is broader. This is broader. The war that started under the banner that Russians and Ukrainians were one and the same people and produces that sort of casualty, really goes against also any sort of logical thinking. But Russia is a place where the free press doesn’t exist already for a long period of time. Russia is the place where there is an echo chamber, to a degree.

(00:57:22)
And as war started first in 2014, and then all out war in 2022, I came across a lot of people on the personal level, but also in the media reporting, that they really can’t find common language with their close relatives in Russia, people who visited Ukraine who know that it’s not taken over by nationalists and is not taken over by Nazis, but the media around them, the neighbors around them, the people at their work, basically, say one and the same thing. And we, as humans, in general, whatever our background, we are very, very, our mind is really, it’s relatively easy to manipulate it, and to a degree that even family connections and even family ties don’t sometimes help to maintain that ability to think and to analyze on your own to look at the facts.
Lex Fridman
(00:58:30)
So, Putin has alluded to the Yaroslav Hunka incident in the Canadian Parliament September 2023. This man is a veteran of World War II on the Ukrainian side, and he got two standing ovations in the Canadian Parliament, but they later found out that he was part of the SS. So, can you explain on this, what are your thoughts on this? This had a very big effect on the narrative, I guess, propagated throughout the region.
Serhii Plokhy
(00:59:04)
Yes. What happened during World War II was that once the Germans started to run out of manpower, they created foreign legion groups. But because those people were not Aryans, they were created for fighting on the battleground. Because they were not Aryans, they couldn’t be trusted. So, they were put under the command of Henry Himmler, under command of SS, and became known as SS Waffen units. And one of such units was created in Ukraine, with great difficulties, because Nazis didn’t consider Slavs to be generally worthy of even that sort of foreign legion formations. But they made an exception, because those people were coming from Galicia, which was part of Austria-Hungary, which means part of Austria, which means somehow were open to the benevolent influence of the Germanic race, and called the Division Galizien, or Galicia. Part of Ukrainian youth joined the division.

(01:00:29)
One of the explanations was that they were looking at the experience of World War I, and seeing that the units, the Ukrainian units, in the Austrian army then played a very important role in the fight for independence. So that is one of the explanations. You can’t just use one explanation to describe motivations of everyone and every single person who was joined in there. So, they were sent to the front. They were defeated within a few short days by the Red Army, and then were retreating through Slovakia, where they were used to fight with the partisan movement there, and eventually surrendered to the British. So, that’s the story. You can personally maybe understand what the good motivations were of this person or that person, but that is one of the best, one of the very tragic and unfortunate pages in Ukrainian history. You can’t justify that as a phenomenon.

(01:01:43)
So, from that point of view, the celebration of that experience, as opposed to looking at that, okay, that happened, and we wish that those young men who were idealistic or joined the Division for idealistic purposes had better understanding of things or made other choices, but you can’t certainly celebrate that. And once that happened, that, of course, became a big propaganda, a propaganda item, in the current war. We’re talking about 10,000-20,000 people in the Division, and we’re talking about 2-3 million Ukrainians fighting in the Red Army. And again, it’s not like Red Army is completely blameless in the way how it behaved in Prussia, in Germany, and so on and so forth. But it’s basically, it’s, again, we’re going back to the story of Bandera. So, there is a period of collaboration, and that’s what propaganda tries to define him by, or there is a Division Galizien by 20,000 people, and somehow it makes irrelevant the experience of 2-3 million people.
Lex Fridman
(01:03:01)
I mean, just to clarify, I think there is just a blunder on the Canadian Parliament side, the Canadian side, of not doing research of, maybe correct me if I’m wrong, but from my understanding, they were just doing stupid shallow political stuff. Let’s applaud, when Zelenskyy shows up, let’s have a Ukrainian veteran, let’s applaud a veteran of World War II, and then all of a sudden, you realize, well, there’s actually complexities to wars. We can talk about, for example, a lot of dark aspects on all sides of World War II, the mass rape at the end of World War II by the Red Army, when they [inaudible 01:03:40] Germany. There’s a lot of really dark complexity in it on all sides.

(01:03:44)
So, that could be an opportunity to explore the dark complexity that some of the Ukrainians were in the SS, or Bandera, the complexities there, but I think they were doing not a complex thing. They were doing a very shallow applaud. And we should applaud veterans, of course, but in that case, they were doing it for show, for Zelenskyy and so on. So, we should clarify that the applause wasn’t knowing, it wasn’t for the SS. It was for Ukrainian, it was for World War II veterans, but the propaganda, or at least an interpretation from the Russian side, from whatever side, is that they were applauding the full person standing before them, which wasn’t just a Ukrainian veteran, but Ukrainian veteran that fought for the SS.
Serhii Plokhy
(01:04:36)
I don’t have any particular insights, but I would be very much surprised if even one person in the Parliament, I mean, the members of the Parliament actually knew the whole story. I would be very surprised.
Lex Fridman
(01:04:50)
Yeah. The whole story of this person, and frankly, the whole story of Ukraine and Russia in World War II, period.
Serhii Plokhy
(01:04:58)
Yes, yes.
Lex Fridman
(01:05:00)
Nevertheless, it had a lot of power and really reverberated in support of the narrative that there is a neo-Nazi, a Nazi problem in Ukraine.
Serhii Plokhy
(01:05:09)
This is the narrative that is out there, and it’s especially powerful in Russia. It’s especially powerful in Russia given that there are, really, that the atmosphere that is created, really, is not conducive to any independent analysis.
Lex Fridman
(01:05:32)
Well, I wonder what is the most effective way to respond to that particular claim, because there could be a discussion about nationalism, and extreme nationalism, and the fight for independence, and whether it isn’t, like Putin wrote, “one people,” but the question of, are there Nazis in Ukraine, seems to be a question that could be analyzed rigorously with data.
Serhii Plokhy
(01:06:03)
That is being done on the academic level. But in terms of the public response and public discourse, the only response that I see is not to focus on the questions raised and put by the propaganda, because you’ve already become victim of that propaganda by definition, but talk about that much broadly and talk about different aspects of, if it is World War II, about different aspects of World War II, if it’s about issue of the far right in Ukraine, let’s talk about U.S., let’s talk about Russia, let’s talk about France, let’s compare. That’s the only way how you deal with propaganda, because propaganda is not necessarily something that is an outright lie. It can be just one factor that’s taken out of the context and is blown out of proportion. And that is good enough.

KGB

Lex Fridman
(01:07:09)
And the way to defend against that is to bring in the context. Let us move gracefully throughout, back and forth through history, back to Bandera. You wrote a book on the KGB spy Bohdan Stashynsky. Can you tell his story?
Serhii Plokhy
(01:07:27)
This is a story of the history of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, and Bandera as well, already after the end of the Second World War.
Lex Fridman
(01:07:37)
Mm-hmm.
Serhii Plokhy
(01:07:38)
Because what you got after the Second World War, so imagine May of 1945, the Red Banner is all over Riksdag, the Red Army is in control of half of Europe, but the units of the Red Army are still fighting the war, and not just behind the Soviet lines, but within the borders of the Soviet Union.
Serhii Plokhy
(01:08:00)
… behind the Soviet lines, but within the borders of the Soviet Union. And this war continues all the way into the early 1950s, almost up to Stalin’s death.

(01:08:13)
The war is conducted by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which have a Ukrainian insurgent army, and the government tries to crush that resistance. So, what it does is basically recruits local people to spy on the partisans on the underground, and Bohdan Stashynsky is one of those people. His family is supporting the resistance. They provide food. His sister is engaged with one of the local commanders of this underground unit, and they know everything about Stashynsky’s family and they know everything about him because he is also collecting funds for the underground. They have a conversation with him saying that, “Okay, that’s what we got, and you and your family can go to prison, or you help us a little bit. We’re interested in the fiance of your sister, and we want to get him.” Stashynsky says yes. Once they round up the fiance, he basically betrayed a member or almost member of his family, he is done. He can’t go back to his village, he can’t go back to his study. He was studying in [inaudible 01:09:39] at that time. As I write in my book, the secret police becomes his family.

(01:09:46)
And he is sent to Kyiv. He is trained for two years, sent to East Germany, into Berlin and becomes an assassin. So, they sent him across the border to Western Germany, to Munich. It was the headquarter of different organizations, anti-Soviet organizations, Ukrainian and Russian and Georgian and so on and so forth. And he kills two leaders of the organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, one editor of the newspaper, and eventually he kills Bandera. He does that with the new weapon, a spray pistol, that eventually makes it into the bond novel, The Man with the Golden Gun. And that whole episode is a little bit reshaped, but it’s not in the film, but it is in the novel itself.

(01:10:51)
And then later has a change of mind under the influence of his German fiance and then wife. They decide to escape to the West. And while they’re doing that, they discover that their apartment was bugged and probably the KGB knows all of that. A long story short, his son dies in Berlin. KGB doesn’t allow him to go there, but his wife has a nervous breakdown so they allow him to go there to just calm her so that there would be no scandal. And two of them, one day before their son’s burial, because after that they would be sent to Moscow. They jumped the ship and go to West Berlin, two hours before the Berlin Wall was being built.

(01:11:55)
So, if they would stay for the funeral, probably the KGB would not let them go. But also if they would stay, the border would be there. And he goes to the American intelligence and says, “Okay, that’s who I am and that’s what I did.” And they look at him and they say, “We don’t trust you. We don’t know who you are. You have documents in five names. You say you killed Bandera. Well, we have a different information. He was poisoned and probably by someone in his close circle. A spray pistol, did you read too much Ian Fleming? Where does this come from?”

(01:12:43)
He insists, they said, “Okay, you insist. If you committed all those crimes, they giving you to the German police, and German police will be investigating you.” And then the trial comes, and if he says, if he takes back his testimony, the whole case against him collapses. He can go free. He knows that if he goes free, he is a target of his colleagues from the same department. So, his task at the trial is to prove that he’s guilty, that he did that.

(01:13:20)
And then he disappears and nobody knows where he goes. And there are all sorts of cover stories. And I was lucky to interview a commander, former chief of the South African Police, who confirmed to me that Stashynsky was in South Africa.
Lex Fridman
(01:13:41)
He fled.
Serhii Plokhy
(01:13:41)
The West German intelligence thought that it was too dangerous for him to stay in Germany. They sent him under a different name to South Africa. So, that’s the story of Stashynsky himself. But going back to Bandera, of course, the fact that he confessed and it became known that KGB assassinated Bandera, that added to the image and to general mythology about Bandera.
Lex Fridman
(01:14:12)
What a fascinating story of a village boy becoming an assassin who killed one of the most influential revolutionaries of the region in the 20th century. Just zooming out broadly on the KGB, how powerful was the KGB? What role did it play in this whole story of the Soviet Union?
Serhii Plokhy
(01:14:34)
It depends on the period. At the time that we just described, late ’50s and early ’60s, they were not powerful at all. And the reasons for that was that people like Khrushchev were really concerned about the secret police becoming too powerful. It became too powerful in their mind under Stalin, under Beria. And it was concern about Beria’s power as a secret police chief that led to the coup against Beria, and Khrushchev come into power, and Beria was arrested and executed. And what Khrushchev was trying to do after that was trying to put… Since ’54, the name was already KGB, KGB under his control. So, he was appointing the former [inaudible 01:15:33] leaders as the heads of the KGB, so the people who really owned everything to him, that sort of position. And the heads of the KGB were not members of Politburo.

(01:15:49)
It changed in the ’70s with Andropov where KGB started to play, again, very important role in the Soviet history. And let’s say decisions on Afghanistan and the Soviet troops marching into Afghanistan were made by the, apart from Brezhnev, by the trio of the people who would be called today [foreign language 01:16:15] maybe or not all of them were [foreign language 01:16:17] but one of course was Andropov, the head of the KGB. Another was the Minister of Defense, and then there was secretary in charge of the military industrial complex, Ministry of Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(01:16:29)
But the head of the KGB became really not just the member of Politbruo, but the member of that inner circle. And then the fact that on Andropov succeeds Brezhnev is also a manifestation of the power that KGB acquired really after Khrushchev in the 1970s, and then going into the 1980s.
Lex Fridman
(01:16:53)
Who was more powerful, the KGB or the CIA during the Soviet Union?
Serhii Plokhy
(01:16:58)
The CIA, it’s the organization that is charged with the information gathering and all sorts of operations, including assassinations in the ’50s and ’60s abroad. The KGB was the organization that really had both the surveillance over the population within the Soviet Union and also the operations abroad. And its members, its leaders were members of the inner circle for making decisions. Again, from what I understand about the way how politics and decision work and decisions are made in the United States, the CIA, the chief of the CIA is not one of the decision-making group that providing information. Yeah, so I would say it’s not day and night, but their power, political influence, political significance, very different.
Lex Fridman
(01:18:04)
Is it understood how big the KGB was? How widespread it was, given its secretive and distributed nature.
Serhii Plokhy
(01:18:13)
Certain things we know, others we don’t, because the Stasi archives are open and most of the KGB, especially in Moscow, they’re not. But we know that the KGB combined not only the internal sort of secret police functions at home and counter intelligence branch and intelligence branch abroad, but also the border troops for example.

(01:18:44)
So, really institutionally it was a huge, huge mammoth. And another thing that we know we can sort of extrapolate from what we know from the Stasi archives, that the surveillance at home, the surveillance was really massive. The guess is the Soviets were not as effective and as meticulous and as scrupulous and as methodical as probably as Germans were. But that gives you a basic idea of how penetrated the entire society was.
Lex Fridman
(01:19:21)
What do you think is important to understand about the KGB, if we want to also understand Vladimir Putin? Since he was a KGB foreign intelligence officer for 16 years.
Serhii Plokhy
(01:19:33)
From my research, including on Stashynsky, what I understand is that in KGB, and it was a powerful organization, again, less powerful in ’50s and ’60s, but still very powerful organization. There was on the one hand the understanding of the situation in the country and abroad that probably other organizations didn’t have. They had also first pick in terms of the select and cadres. The work in the KGB was well paid and considered to be very prestigious. So, that was part to a degree of the Soviet elite in terms of whom they recruited. And they had a resentment over the party leadership that didn’t allow them to do James Bond kind of things that they would want to do because there were political risks.

(01:20:31)
After this scandal with Stashynsky, at least on many levels, the KGB stopped the practice of the assassinations, political assassinations abroad because it was considered politically to be extremely, extremely dangerous. The person who was in charge of the KGB at the time of Bandera assassination, Shelepin, was one of the candidates to replace Khrushchev and Brezhnev used against him that scandal abroad eventually to remove him from Politburo.

(01:21:07)
So, the KGB was really looking at the party leadership as to a degree, an effective corrupt and who was on their way. And from what I understand, that’s exactly the attitudes that people like Putin and people of his circle brought to power in Kremlin. So, the methods that KGB use they can use now, and there is no party or no other institution actually stopping them from doing that. And they think about, my understanding, the operations abroad about foreign policy in general in terms of the KGB mindset of planning operations and executing particular operations and so on and so forth. I think a lot of culture that came into existence in the Soviet KGB now became part of the culture of the Russian establishment.

War in Ukraine

Lex Fridman
(01:22:12)
You wrote the book, the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Return of History, that gives the full context leading up to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February, 2022. Can you take me through the key moments in history that led up to this war? So, we’ll mention the collapse of the Soviet Union. We could probably go much farther back, but the collapse of the Soviet Union mentioned 2014. Maybe you can highlight key moments that led up to 2022.
Serhii Plokhy
(01:22:54)
The key moments would be first, the year 2004, known for Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and then the year 2013, known as the Revolution of Dignity. Both were the revolts against the something that by significant part of Ukrainian population was considered to be completely, completely unacceptable actions on the part of the government and people in the government at that time. The Orange Revolution of 2004 was a protest against falsified presidential elections and rejection of a candidate that was supported by Russia, publicly supported by Russia. I remember being in Moscow at that time and couldn’t believe my eyes went, in the center of Russia, I saw a billboard with Yanukovych. The trick was that there were a lot of Ukrainians in Russia and in Moscow in particular, and they had the right to vote. And it led to the election as Ukrainian president, Viktor Yushchenko, who put on the agenda the issue of Ukraine’s membership in NATO. So, it was very clear pro-Western orientation. And the second case was the Revolution of Dignity 2013, with some of the same characters including Yanukovych, who at that time was already president of Ukraine. And there the question was of the government promising the people for one year at least to sign an association agreement with European Union, and then turning over almost overnight and saying that they were not going to do that.

(01:24:54)
And that’s how things started. But then when they became really massive and why something that was called Euro Revolution became Revolution of Dignity was when the government police beat up students in downtown Kyiv, who judging by the reports were basically already almost ready to disperse, almost ready to go home. And that’s when roughly half of Kyiv showed up on the streets. That sort of the police behavior, that sort of was absolutely unacceptable in Ukraine. The stealing elections and falsification of elections wasn’t unacceptable.

(01:25:45)
That’s where around that time and around 2004, the president of Ukraine at that time, Leonid Kuchma, writes a book called Ukraine is Not Russia. And apparently the term comes from his discussion with Putin, when Putin was suggesting to him quite strongly to use force against people [inaudible 01:26:11] on the square in Kyiv. And Kuchma allegedly said to him, “You don’t understand. Ukraine is not Russia. You can’t do things like that. You get pushed back.” And that’s, this two events, 2004 and then 2013 became really crucial point in terms of the Ukraine direction, the survival of Ukrainian democracy, which is one of very few countries in the post Soviet space where democracy survived the original flirt between the government leaders and democracy of the 1990s.

(01:26:54)
It was the old Soviet story in Russia. Everywhere else there was high democratic expectations, but they came pretty much to an end by the end of the decade. Ukraine preserved the democracy and the orientation of Ukraine toward integration in some form into Western and European structures, that Ukrainian democracy plus Western orientation was something. And in Russia, we see the strengthening of the autocratic regime under Putin, that if you look deeper, this are the processes that put the two countries on the collision course.
Lex Fridman
(01:27:40)
So, there’s a division, a push and pull inside Ukraine on identity, on whether they’re part of Russia or part of Europe. And you highlighted two moments in Ukrainian history that there’s a big flare up where the statement was first Ukraine is not Russia, and essentially Ukraine is part of Europe, but there’s other moments. What were the defining moments that began an actual war in the [inaudible 01:28:11]?
Serhii Plokhy
(01:28:11)
The war started in February of 2014, was the Russian takeover of Crimea by military force. The so-called Green Man. And the big question is why, and it’s very important to go back to the year 2013 and the start of the protests and the story of the Ukraine signing association agreement with European Union. So, from what we understand today, the Ukrainian government under President Yanukovych, did this suicidal sharp turn after one year of promising association agreement saying that, “Okay, we changed our mind under pressure from Moscow.” And Moscow applied that pressure for one reason, at least in my opinion.

(01:29:09)
The Ukraine signing association agreement with European Union would mean that Ukraine would not be able to sign association agreement with any Eurasian union in any shape or form, that was at that time in the process of making. And for Vladimir Putin, that was the beginning of his, or part of his third term, one of his agenda items for the third term was really consolidation of the post-Soviet space and Eurasian space and not membership in NATO, not membership in European Union. But association agreement with European Union meant that that post-Soviet space would have to exist under Moscow’s control, but without Ukraine, the second-largest post-Soviet republic. The republic on whose vote depended the continuing existence of the Soviet Union and whose vote ended in many ways the existence of the Soviet Union.

(01:30:17)
So, that is broadly background, but also there are of course personalities. There are also their beliefs, their readings of history, and all of that became part of the story. But if you look at that geopolitically, the association agreement is put in Ukraine outside of the Russian sphere of influence. And the response was an attempt to topple the government in Kyiv that clearly was going to sign that agreement, to take over Crimea and to help to deal with a lot of issues within Russia itself and boost the popularity of the president.

(01:31:12)
And it certainly, certainly worked in that way as well. Once Ukraine, still after Crimea, continued on its path, then the next step started the so-called hybrid warfare in Donbas. But again, unlike Crimea, from what I understand, Russia was not really looking forward to taking possession of Donbas. Donbas was viewed as the way how to influence Ukraine to stop it from a drift toward the West.
Lex Fridman
(01:31:49)
Maybe you can tell me about the region of Donbas.
Serhii Plokhy
(01:31:52)
I mentioned that nationalism and principle of nationalism is the principle of making the political borders to coincide with ethnic and cultural borders. And that’s how the maps of many East European countries had been drawn in the 19th and 20th century. On that principle, Donbas, where the majority constituted by the beginning of the 20th century were Ukrainians, was considered to be Ukrainian and was claimed in the middle of this revolution and revolutionary wars and civil wars by Ukrainian government.

(01:32:36)
But Donbas became a site, one of the key sites in the Russian Empire of early industrialization, with its mining industry, with mythological industry. So, what that meant was that people from other parts of, not Ukraine, but other parts of the Russian Empire, congregated there. That’s where jobs were. That’s how Khrushchev and his family came to Donbas. The family of Brezhnev overshoot a little bit. They got to the industrial enterprises in the city of [inaudible 01:33:13] the place, the city that was called [inaudible 01:33:16].

(01:33:15)
So, those were Russian peasants moving into the area in looking for their job. The population became quite mixed. Ukrainians still constituted the majority of the population, but not necessarily in the towns and in the cities. And culturally, the place was becoming more and more Russian as the result of that moment. Apart from the Crimea, Donbas was the part of Ukraine where the ethnic Russians were the biggest group. They were not the majority, but they were very, very big and significant group. For example, in the city of Mariupol, that was all but destroyed in the course of the last two years, the ethnic Russians constituted over 40% of the population, right? So, that’s not exactly part of Donbas, but that gives you general idea.

(01:34:22)
Now, the story of Donbas and what happened now is multidimensional, and this ethnic composition is just one part of the story. Another very important part of the story is economy, and Donbas is a classical rust belt. And we know what happens with the cities that were part of the first or second wave of industrialization in the United States and globally, we know about social problems that exist in those places. So, Donbas is probably the most dramatic and tragic case of implosion of the rust belt. With the mines not anymore producing the sort of the… And at the acceptable price. The coal that they used to produce, is people losing jobs with the politicians looking for subsidies as opposed to trying very unpopular, unpopular measures of doing something and bring your money and your investment into the region. All of that become part of the story that made it easy for Russia, for the Russian Federation, to destabilize the situation. We have interviews with Mr. Girkin who is saying that he was the first who pulled the trigger and fired the shot in that war. He became the Minister of Defense in the Donetsk people’s republic. You look at the Prime Minister, he is another person with Moscow residency permit. So, you see key figures in those positions at the start and the beginning, not being Russians from Ukraine, but being Russians from Russia and Russians from Moscow closely connected to the government structure and intelligence structure and so on. So, that is the start in the beginning, but the way how it exploded, the way it did was also a combination of the economic and ethno-cultural and linguistic factors.
Lex Fridman
(01:36:43)
For Putin, the war on Donbas and even in 2022 is a defensive war against what the Ukrainian government is doing against ethnically Russian people in Donbas. Is that fair to say how he describes it?
Serhii Plokhy
(01:36:59)
What we see, this is certainly the argument. This is certainly the argument and pretext because what we see there is that there would be no, and there was no independent mobilization in Crimea either, in Crimea or in Donbas, without Russian presence. Without Russian occupation de facto of the Crimea, there would be no… And there was no before, at least in the previous five to six years, any mass mobilizations of Russians. There was none of such mobilizations in Donbas before Girkin and other people with parts of military units showed up there. So, it is an excuse. You’ve been to Ukraine.
Lex Fridman
(01:37:57)
Mm-hmm.
Serhii Plokhy
(01:37:58)
You know that Russian language is not persecuted in Ukraine. And if you’ve not been to Donbas or to the Crimea, it would be difficult to find one single Ukrainian school. Not that they didn’t exist at all, but it would take quite an effort for you to find it, or sometimes even to hear Ukrainian language outside of the institutions or the farmer’s market. That’s the reality. That’s the reality that is clear, that is visible. So, imagine under those conditions and context that someone is persecuting ethnic Russians or Russian speakers. One, to believe in something like that, one important precondition is never to step your foot in Ukraine.
Lex Fridman
(01:38:57)
I should mention, maybe this is a good moment to mention, when I traveled to Ukraine, this is after the start of the war, you mentioned farmer’s market, which is funny. Basically every single person I talked to, including the leadership, we spoke in Russian. For many of them, Russian is the more comfortable language even.

(01:39:21)
And the people who spoke Ukrainian are more on the western side of Ukraine and young people that are kind of wanting to show that in an activist way that they want to fight for the independence of their country. So, I take your point. I wonder if you want to comment about language and maybe about the future of language in Ukraine. Is the future of language going to stabilize on Ukrainian or is it going to return to its traditional base of Russian language?
Serhii Plokhy
(01:39:59)
Very roughly, before the start of the war in 2014, we can talk about parity between Russian and Ukrainian and also with, as you said, clearly Ukraine being a dominant language in the West and Russian being a dominant language on the streets, certainly in the East of the country. And then in between of that to pause a number of these transitional areas. And Ukraine, in my experience, and I visited a lot of countries, not all of them, and probably maybe I will be still surprised, but in my experience, this is the only truly bilingual country that I ever visited. I lived in Canada for a long period of time. There is Quebec and the rest.

(01:40:54)
And in Ukraine, you can talk in either Russian or Ukrainian in any part of the country and you would be understood and you would be responded in a different language with the expectation that you would understand. And if you don’t understand, that means you don’t come from Ukraine. That’s the reality. The war and loss of the Crimea and partial loss of Donbas, its major industrial areas, really shifted the balance toward mostly Ukrainian-speaking regions. And also what you see, and you clearly pointed to that, starting with 2014, even a little bit earlier, the younger generation chooses Ukrainian as a marker of its identity. And that started in 2014, but we have a dramatic, dramatic shift after 2022. And on the-
Serhii Plokhy
(01:42:00)
… 2022. And on the anecdotal level I can tell you that I speak to people who be in Chernihiv at the time, this is east of Crimea, at the time of the Russian aggression, and bombardment and so on and so forth, who had passive knowledge of Ukrainian but spoke all their life Russian. And they would speak Ukrainian to me, and when I say, “Okay, why you doing that? We know each other for decades and you used Russian.” And he said, “Well, I don’t want to have anything in common with people who did that to us.” So there is a big, big push of course with this current war. Now the question is whether this change is something that will stay or not. What is the future? Linguistic practices are very, very conservative ones. And we at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute have a project called MAPA Digital Atlas of Ukraine.

(01:43:05)
And we were documenting and mapping different data in time. And what we noticed a spike in the people’s self-reporting of use of Ukrainian in 2014 and 2015 at the time of the start of the war when the threat was the most clear one. This is self-reporting, that doesn’t mean that people exactly do what they believe that that’s what they’re supposed to do, and then return back to where it was by the year 2016 and 2017. So this dynamic can repeat itself, but given how long the war is going on, how big the impact, how big the stress is, and that the wave of the future is probably associated with younger people who are switching to Ukrainian. So my bet would be on Ukrainian language rising in prominence.
Lex Fridman
(01:44:11)
So as we get closer to February of 2022, there’s a few other key moments. Maybe let’s talk about in July 2021, Putin publishing an essay titled On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. Can you describe the ideas expressed in this essay?
Serhii Plokhy
(01:44:34)
The idea is very conveniently presented already in the first paragraph, in the first sentences really of the article, where Putin says that, “For a long time I was saying that Russians and Ukrainians were one and the same people, and here is the proof.” He develops his historical argumentation apparently with the help of a lot of people around him. And he started to talk about Russians and Ukrainians being one and the same people, one year before the start of the war in 2014. So in 2013, he was together with Patriarch Kirill on visit to Kiev. And there was a conference specifically organized for him in the Kievan Caves Monastery, and that’s where he stated that. The fact that he was with Patriarch Kirill is very important factor for understanding where the idea is coming from.

(01:45:40)
This is the idea that was dominant in the Russian Empire of the 19s and the beginning of the 20th century, that Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians are really, great Russians, little Russians, and white Russians, and that they constitute one people. Yes, there are some dialectical differences. Yes, Ukrainians sing well, yes, they dance funny, but overall that doesn’t matter.

(01:46:15)
And that idea actually was really destroyed, mostly destroyed by the revolution of 1917. Because it wasn’t just social revolution that’s how it’s understood in the US and good part of the world, it was also national revolution, it was an empire, it was a revolution in the Russian Empire. And to bring this pieces of empire back within the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks had to make concessions. And one of those concessions was recognition of the existence of Ukrainians as a separate nation, Belorussians as a separate nations, Russians as a separate nations. Endowing them with their own territorial with borders, with institutions and so on and so forth.

(01:47:09)
But there was one institution that was not reformed, that institution was called the Russian Orthodox Church. Because one of the ways that Bolsheviks dealt with it, they couldn’t eradicate religion completely. But they arrested the development of the religion, and thinking, and theology on the level as it existed before the revolution of 1917. So the Russian Orthodox Church of 1917 continued to be the Russian Orthodox Church in 1991 and in 2013. Continuing the same imperial mantra of the existence of one big Russian nation, one unified people. And when you see the formation of the ideas about nations, about foreign policy in the Russian Empire after 1991, they’re going back to the pre-Bolshevik times.

(01:48:17)
Ukrainians do that as well. Estonians do that as well. The difference is that when Ukrainians go back, they go back to the pre-1917, they had their intellectual fathers and writings of basically liberal nationalism. Or sometimes they go to the radical nationalism of Bandera, which would be not pre-1917, but pre-1945. When the Russians go to pre-Bolshevik past, looking for the ideas, looking for inspiration, looking for the narratives, what they find there is empire, what they find there are imperial projects. And that’s certainly the story of Putin’s claim, that’s the story of the argument. And to conclude the argument that he lays out there, historical argument, comes also almost directly from the narratives of the late 19s and the beginning of the 20th century. So it’s not only the argument is coming from that era, but also the argumentation is coming from that era as well.
Lex Fridman
(01:49:24)
But those arguments are all in the flavor of empire.
Serhii Plokhy
(01:49:29)
It’s empire on the one hand, but also there is imperial understanding of what Russian nation is, that doesn’t allow for independence of its little Russian and white Russian branches, alleged branches. So what you see is the concept of the big Russian nation that’s late 19s beginning 20th century. Empire sees the writing on the wall that nationalism is on the rise, and it tries to survive by mobilizing the nationalism of the largest group in the empire, she happens to be Russian. Stalin is a big promoter of some form of Russian nationalism, especially during the war and after war. And he started his career as a very promising Georgian writer, writing in Georgian. So he’s not doing that for some personal affinity or cultural intellectual roots within Russian nation or Russian people. He is doing that for the sake of the success of his Soviet and communist project. And he has to get the largest ethnic group on board, which are Russians. But Stalin and Putin have different understanding who Russians are. Stalin already accepted Ukrainians and Belarusians, their existence Putin goes back to pre-Stalin and pre-Lenin times.
Lex Fridman
(01:51:05)
So if we step back from the historical context of this and maybe the geopolitical purpose of writing such an essay, and forget about the essay altogether. I have family in Ukraine and Russia. I know a lot of people in Ukraine and Russia. Forget the war, forget all of this, they all sound the same. If I go to France, they sound different than in Ukraine and Russia. If you lay out the cultural map of the world, there’s just a different beat, and music, and flavor to a people. What I’m trying to say is there seems to be a closeness between the cultures of Ukraine and Russia. How do we describe that? Do we acknowledge that and how does that add tension with the national independence?
Serhii Plokhy
(01:52:07)
First of all, especially when it comes to Eastern Ukraine or to big cities, many people in Ukraine spoke Russian. Generally, it’s the same language. On the top of that we started our discussion with talking about the Slavs, so both Ukrainian and Russian language are Slavic languages, so there is proximity there as well.

(01:52:33)
On the top of that, there is a history of existence in the Soviet Union, and before that in one empire for a long period of time. So you see a lot of before the war, a lot of Ukrainian singers and entertainers performing in Russia and vice versa. And biography of President Zelensky certainly fits that particular model as well, that all talks about similarities. But this similarities also very often obscure things that became so important in the course of this war. And I already mentioned the book titled by President Kuchma of Ukraine, Ukraine is Not Russia. So that’s the argument, despite the fact that you think that we are the same, we behave differently. And it turned out that they behave differently. You have Bolotnaya in Moscow and police violence, and that’s the end of it. You have the Maidan in Ukraine and you have police violence, and that’s the beginning, that’s not the end. History really matters in the way why sometimes people speaking the same language with different accents behave very differently.

(01:54:02)
Russia and Russian identity was formed around the state, and has difficulty imagining itself outside of the state, and that state happened to be imperial for most of Russian history. Ukrainian project came into existence in revolt against the state. Ukraine came into existence out of the parts of different empires, which means they left different cultural impact on them. And for Ukrainians to stay together, autocratic regime so far didn’t work. It’s like the colonies of the United States. You have to find common language, you have to talk to each other. And that became part of the Ukrainian political DNA. And that became a huge factor in the war.

(01:54:54)
And very few people in Ukraine believed what Vladimir Putin was saying that Russians and Ukrainians were one and the same people, but the majority believed that they’re certainly close culturally and historically nations. And from that point of view the bombardment of the Ukrainian cities became such a shock to the Ukrainians. Because deep down they maybe looked at Syria, they looked at Chechnya, and were explaining that through the fact that there was basically such a big cultural gap and difference between Russians and those countries and those nations. But my understanding at least, most of them had difficulty imagining the war of that proportion and that ferocity, and bring that war crimes and on that level.
Lex Fridman
(01:55:55)
It’s interesting you say that in the DNA of Ukraine versus Russia. So maybe Russia is more conducive to authoritarian regimes, and Ukraine is more conducive to defining itself by rebelling against authoritarian regimes.
Serhii Plokhy
(01:56:18)
By rebellion, absolutely, and that was the story pretty much before 1991. So what you see since 1991 and what you see today is I would say new factor, certainly in Ukrainian modern history. Because Ukrainians traditionally were very successful rebels. The largest peasant army in the Civil War in the Russian Empire was the Makhno army in Southern Ukraine. And one revolt, Cossack revolts and other revolts, one after another. But Ukrainians had historically difficulty actually maintaining the freedom that they acquired, had difficulty associating themselves with the state. And what we see, especially in the last two years, it’s a quite phenomenal development in Ukraine when Ukrainians associate themselves with the state. Where Ukrainians see a state not just as a foreigner, as historically it was in Ukrainian history.

(01:57:26)
Not just someone who came to take, but the state that is continuation of them, that helps to provide security for them. That the Ukrainian armed forces even before the start of this war had the highest support and popularity in Ukraine. The state today functions unbelievably effectively under attacks and missile attacks, and against city government and local government. And we are witnessing when it comes to Ukraine, we’re witnessing a very important historical development where Ukrainians found their state for the first time through most of their history, and try to make a transition from successful rebels to successful managers and state builders.

NATO and Russia

Lex Fridman
(01:58:27)
I talked to John Mearsheimer recently, there’s a lot of people that believe NATO had a big contribution to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. So what role did NATO play in this full history from Bucharest in 2008 to today?
Serhii Plokhy
(01:58:49)
NATO was a big part certainly of the Russian justification for the war, that was the theme that was up there in the months leading to the aggression. The truth is that, and Vladimir Putin went on records saying that, that the Western leaders were telling him again and again that there is no chance for Ukraine to become member of NATO anytime soon. Russia was very effective back in the year two ’08 in stopping Ukraine and Georgia on the path of joining NATO. There was a Bucharest Summit at which the US president at that time, George W. Bush was pushing for the membership. And Putin convinced leaders of France and Germany to block that membership. And after that membership for Ukraine and for Georgia was really removed from the realistic agenda for NATO. And that’s what the leaders of the western world in the month leading into the February 2022 aggression were trying to convey to Vladimir Putin.

(02:00:19)
What he wanted there was an ultimatum that really was there not to start negotiations, but really to stop negotiations. He demanded the withdrawal of NATO to the borders of the 1997, if I’m not mistaken. So completely something that neither leaders would accept, nor the country’s members of NATO would accept. But for me, it’s very clear that that was an excuse, that that was a justification.

(02:00:50)
And what happened later in the year 2022 and 2023 certainly confirms me in that belief. Finland joined NATO and Sweden is on the way to joining NATO. So Finland joining NATO, increased border between Russia and NATO, twofold, and probably more than that. So if NATO is the real concern, it would be probably not completely unreasonable to expect that if not every single soldier, but at least half of the Russian army fighting in Ukraine would be moved to protect the new border with NATO in Finland.

(02:01:38)
So I have no doubt that no one in Kremlin either in the past or today looks favorably or is excited about NATO moving, or the countries of Eastern Europe journey NATO. But I have very difficult time imagining that that was the primary cause of the war. And what we see also we talked about Tucker’s interview, he was surprised, but he believed that Putin was completely honest when the first 25 minutes of interview he was talking about relations between Russia and Ukraine, was talking about history. And that was also the main focus of his essay. Essay was not on NATO and Russia, his essay was on Russia and Ukraine. So that is where the real causes are. The broader context is the fall of empire and process of disintegration of empire, not the story of NATO.
Lex Fridman
(02:02:45)
What was to clarify the reason Putin, Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:02:53)
The immediate goal in 2014 when the war started was to stop the drift of Ukraine toward the west and outside of the Russian sphere of influence. The invasion of 2022 perceived the same goals, keeping Ukraine in the Russian sphere of influence. Once we have the resistance, quite effective resistance on the part of Ukraine, the Rammstein and coalition, international coalition in support of Ukraine. Then we see the realization of plan B, where parts of Ukrainian territory are being annexed and included in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. So the two scenarios don’t exclude each other, but if scenario number one doesn’t work, then scenario number two goes into play.
Lex Fridman
(02:03:57)
In the Gates of Kiev chapter, you write about Volodymyr Zelensky in the early days of the war. What are most important moments to you about this time? The first hours and days of the invasion.
Serhii Plokhy
(02:04:13)
The first hours and the first days were the most difficult, psychologically. The rest of the world really didn’t expect Kiev to last for more than few days. Didn’t expect Ukraine to last for more than few weeks. And all the data suggested that that’s what would happen. Ukraine would collapse, would be taken over. Putin called his war a special military operation, which suggests your also expectations about the scope, expectations about the time. So semi-military, semi police operation. So every reasonable person in the world believed that that would happen. And it’s the heroism of “unreasonable” people like Zelensky, like the commander of Ukrainian Armed forces, Zoluzhny, like mayors of the cities, Klitschko and others. I’m just naming names that are familiar to almost all of us now. But there are thousands of those people, unreasonable people who decided that it was unreasonable to attack their country.

(02:05:28)
And that was the most difficult times and days. And speaking about Zelensky, every I understand reasonable leader in the West was trying to convince him to leave Ukraine and to set a government in exile in Poland or in London. And it was reasonable to accept one of his predecessors Mr. Yanukovych fled Kiev. A few months before that in Afghanistan, the president of Afghanistan fled Afghanistan. That was a reasonable thing to expect, and he turned out to be very, very unreasonable in that sense. That comes with the guts, his guts and guts people around him and Ukrainians in general.
Lex Fridman
(02:06:24)
Why do you think he stayed in Kiev, this former comedian who played a president on TV, when Kiev is being invaded by the second most powerful military in the world?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:06:38)
Because I think he believes in things. One of those things was that if he a president and he is in the presidential office, he is there to play his role to the end. And another thing, my personal, again, I never met Volodymyr Zelensky. My personal understanding of him is that he has talent that helped him in his career before the presidency and then helps now. He feels the audience, and then channels the attitude of the audience and amplifies it. And I think that another reason why he didn’t leave Kiev was that he felt the audience, the audience in that particular context for the Ukrainians.
Lex Fridman
(02:07:41)
So he had a sense that the Ukrainians would unify. Because he was quite if you look at the polls before the war, quite unpopular. And there was still divisions and factions, and the government is divided, there’s the East and the West and all this stuff. You think he had a sense that this could unite people.
Serhii Plokhy
(02:08:03)
The East and the West was not already such an issue after Crimea and part of Donbas being gone. So Ukraine was much more united than it was before. He brought to power his before that really non-existent party of regions on his personal popularity. But the important thing is that he created a majority in the parliament, which really reflected the unity that existed among Ukrainians that was not there before. He won with 73% of the population of those who took part in the elections, his predecessor Petro Poroshenko also carried 90% of the precincts. And the same happened with Zelensky. So the country unified after 2014, to a degree it was impossible to imagine before. And Zelensky felt that Zelensky knew that, and that’s where the talent of politician really matters. That’s something that you can see beyond just data, and you can feel that apparently Yeltsin had that ability.

Peace talks

Lex Fridman
(02:09:31)
Why did the peace talks fail? There was a lot of peace talks.
Serhii Plokhy
(02:09:36)
The main reason is that the conditions that Russia was trying to impose on Ukraine were basically unacceptable for Ukraine. Because one of the conditions apart from this strange thing called Denazification, was of course de facto loss of the territory. And for the future, really staying outside either of NATO or any Western support, which was very clear. You can buy a couple of weeks, you can buy a couple of months, but in the conditions like that Russia will come back tomorrow and will take over everything.

(02:10:19)
And once Ukrainians realize that they can win on the battlefield, once the Russians were defeated and withdrew from Kiev, the opportunity emerged to get out of the negotiations, which was very clear were leading, if not today then tomorrow to the complete destruction of Ukraine. And then of course, once the territory started to be liberated, things like butcher and massacres of the civilian population came to the fore, which made also very difficult, if not impossible to conduct negotiations from this moral and emotional point of view.
Lex Fridman
(02:11:05)
What about the claims that Boris Johnson, the West compromised the ability of these peace talks to be successful, basically manipulated the talks?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:11:17)
I asked people who accompanied Boris Johnson to Kiev that question, the answer was no. And I believe this answer, and I’ll tell you why. Because it is very difficult for me to imagine President Zelensky to take orders from anybody in the world. Either whether it is Johnson or Joe Biden or anybody else, and basically doing things that Zelensky believes are not in his interest or in the interest of his country. I just can’t imagine that anybody in the world telling Zelensky what to do, and Zelensky actually following it against his own wishes and desires. At least if that is possible, what is in the public’s sphere doesn’t allow us to suggest that it is.
Lex Fridman
(02:12:23)
That said, Zelensky is a smart man and he knows that the war can only continue with the West’s support.
Serhii Plokhy
(02:12:32)
That is a different supposition to know that it can continue with the West’s support. But if talking about withdrawing from the negotiations, that’s not about the continuation of the war, that you don’t need Western support.
Lex Fridman
(02:12:49)
Well, what I mean is if he started to sense that the West will support no matter what, then maybe the space of decisions you’re making is different.
Serhii Plokhy
(02:12:59)
We can interpret that that way. But Boris Johnson represented at that point Britain, not the United States. And really what the war showed, and it was clear already at that time that what was needed was massive support from the West as a whole. And the promise of that support came only after the West realized that Ukraine can win, and came only in late April is the Rammstein, so at least a few weeks later. So I don’t know how much Boris Johnson could promise, he probably could promise to try to help and try to convince and try to work on that. If Zelensky acted on that promise he certainly was taking a risk. But the key issue, again, I’m going back where I started, it’s principle unacceptance for Ukraine the conditions that were offered. And Ukraine was the moment they saw the possibility that they could fight back with Johnson’s support, without Johnson’s support they took the chance.
Lex Fridman
(02:14:18)
So what are the ways this war can end, do you think? What are the different possible trajectories, whether it’s peace talks? What does winning look like for you this side? What is the role of US? What trajectories do you see that are possible?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:14:33)
It’s a question on the one level very easy to answer, on the other very difficult. The level on which it is very easy, it’s a broad historical perspective. If you really believe, and I believe in that, that this is the war of the Soviet succession, that this is the war of the disintegration of empire. We know how the story ends, and they end with disintegration of empire. They end with the rise of the new states and appearance of the new colored spots on the map. That’s the story that started with the American Revolution, so that’s long-term perspective. The difficult part is of course what will happen tomorrow. The difficult part is what they will be in two days or even in two years. In very broad terms, the war can end in one of three scenarios.

(02:15:36)
The victory of one side, the victory of another side, and a sort of stalemate and compromise, especially when it comes to the territories. This war is already approaching the end of the second year. I follow the news and look analysis. I don’t remember one single piece suggesting that the next year will bring peace or will bring-
Serhii Plokhy
(02:16:00)
Suggesting that the next year will bring peace for sure, and we are in a situation where both sides still believe that they can achieve something or improve their position on the battlefield. Certainly that was the expectations of Ukrainian side back in the summer and early fall of 2023, and from what I understand now, this is certainly the expectations of the Russian side today. This is the largest war in Europe since World War II, the largest war in the world since Korean War. And we know that the Korean war ended in this division of Korea, but the negotiations were going on for more than two years. While those negotiations were going on, both sides were trying to improve their position there. And until there was a political change, death of Stalin, rival of Eisenhower in the United States, and the realization that the chances of succeeding on the battlefield are huge, the peace talks didn’t come. So at this point, all three scenarios are possible. I don’t really discount any of them. It’s early to say what will happen.
Lex Fridman
(02:17:34)
So without any political change, let’s try to imagine what are the possibilities that the war ends this year? Is it possible that it can end with compromise basically at the place it started?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:17:49)
Meaning back to the borders of 2022.
Lex Fridman
(02:17:52)
Yeah. Back to the borders of ’22, with some security guarantees that aren’t really guarantees, but are hopeful guarantees.
Serhii Plokhy
(02:18:01)
No, it’s not just virtual impossibility, it is impossible without political change in Moscow. The reason is that back in the fall of 2022, Vladimir Putin included five of Ukrainian regions, oblasts, even those that he didn’t control or didn’t control fully into the Russian constitution, which basically in simple language is that the hands are tied up not only for Putin himself, but also for his possible successors. So that means that no return to the borders of 2022 without political change in Moscow are possible. A few days after that decision in Moscow, Zelensky issued a decree saying that no negotiations with Russia. What that really meant in plain language is that basically, we’re not prepared to negotiate a stable agreement with five oblasts, not just the next, but also included into the Russian constitution. So that’s where we are, so that scenario, again, everything is possible of course, but it’s highly, highly unlikely.
Lex Fridman
(02:19:22)
So the Russian constitution is a thing that makes this all very difficult.
Serhii Plokhy
(02:19:27)
Yes, and not only as a negotiation tactic for Putin or whoever would negotiate on the Russian side, but also as a legal issue.
Lex Fridman
(02:19:37)
So the practical aspect of it even is difficult.
Serhii Plokhy
(02:19:40)
Yes. You really have to change the Constitution before the peace agreement takes hold or immediately after that. And with the Minsk agreements, that was one of things that Russia wanted from Ukraine, change of the Constitution, and it turned out to be rarely impossible. So that’s one of the backstories of the Minsk and collapse of the Minsk agreements.
Lex Fridman
(02:20:05)
Is there something like Minsk agreements that are possible now, maybe this is a legal question, but to override the Constitution to sort of shake everything up? So see the constitutional amendment as just a negotiation tactic to come to the table to something like Minsk agreement?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:20:25)
Given how fast those amendments to the Constitution were adopted, that suggests that really, executive power in Russia has enormous power over the legislative branch. So it’s again difficult to imagine, but technically this is possible, again, but possible if there is a political change in Moscow.
Lex Fridman
(02:20:50)
I don’t understand why assuming political change in Moscow is not possible this year, so I’m trying to see if there’s a way to end this war this year. Right?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:20:59)
There is a possibility of armistice, right? But armistice more like any armistice, along the lines of the current front lines. But withdrawal of the Russian troops to the borders of 2022 at this point, whether it’s reasonable or unreasonable, can be achieved all only as the result of the defeat of the Russian army like it happened near Kiev. Is it possible? Possible. Is it likely, especially given what is happening with the Western support, military support for Ukraine? Probably not.
Lex Fridman
(02:21:36)
But if Putin, the executive branch has a lot of power, why can’t the United States president, the Russian president, the Ukrainian president come to the table and drop something like Minsk agreements, and then rapid constitutional changes made and you go back to the borders of before 2022? Through agreements, through compromise, impossible for you?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:22:03)
Certainly not this year. I look at this year as the time when at least one side, Russian side, will try to get as much as it can through military means.
Lex Fridman
(02:22:17)
But that’s been happening last year too. There’s been a counteroffensive, there’s attempts.
Serhii Plokhy
(02:22:22)
It doesn’t mean that new year somehow is supposed to bring new tactics. The last year was pretty much a lot of fighting, a lot of suffering, very little movement of the front line. The biggest change of the last year was Ukraine victory on the Black Sea, where they pushed the Russian Navy into the western part of the pond and restored the grain corridor and export from Odessa, apparently up to 75% of what it used to be before the war. So that’s the only major change but again, the price is enormous in terms of wealth, especially in terms of lives.

Ukrainian Army head Valerii Zaluzhnyi

Lex Fridman
(02:23:18)
So thinking about what 2024 brings, Zelensky just fired Ukraine’s head of the army, a man you’ve mentioned, General Valery Zaluzhny. What do you make of this development?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:23:32)
This is a very, very dangerous moment in the war. The reason for that is that Zaluzhny is someone who is very popular with the army and we people in general. So if you look at that through American prism, that would be something analogous to President Truman firing General MacArthur, given that stakes for U.S at that time were very high, but probably not as high as they’re for Ukraine today. In both cases, what is at stake is certainly the idea that the political leadership and military leadership have to be on the same page.

(02:24:22)
And the question is whether on the part of Zelensky, this is just the change of the leadership or this is also the change of his approach to the war, and that can mean many things. One, can mean him taking more active part in planning operations. It can mean also possible change of the tactic in the war, given that counteroffensive didn’t work out. We don’t know yet. I don’t know whether President Zelensky at this point knows exactly what will come next, but this is the time when the change of the leadership in the country and in the army that is at war, it’s one of the most trying, most dangerous moments.
Lex Fridman
(02:25:14)
So the thing that President Zelensky expressed is that this is going to be a change of tactics, making the approach more technologically advanced, those kind of things. But as you said, I believe he is less popular than the chief of the army, Zaluzhny, 80% to 60% depending on the polls. Do you think it’s possible that Zelensky’s days are numbered as the president and that somebody like Zaluzhny comes to power?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:25:51)
What we know is that in this war, Ukrainian people really united around their president and the armed forces were always, even before the start of the war, more popular than was the presidential office., so the change that happened in that realm was not so dramatic. And from what I can see from social media in Ukraine, there is a lot of unhappiness, a lot of questions, but there is also realization, and very strong realization, that the country has to stay united. And certainly the behavior of Zaluzhny himself is there basically not suggesting any sort of a Prigozhin type of scenario. That gives me some hope, actually a lot of hope.

(02:26:54)
And in terms of whether Zelensky’s days are numbered or not, I don’t think they’re numbered, but if Ukraine stays a democracy, and I believe it’ll stay, what comes to my mind is the story of Churchill, the story of de Gaulle. In Poland, the story of Pilsudski. So once the war is over, really the electorate in the Democratic elections, they want to change the political leadership, they want to move forward. But Pilsudski came back to power, and de Gaulle came back to power, and Churchill came back to power. So no, whatever happens in the short run or medium term run, I think that Zelensky’s days in politics are not numbered.
Lex Fridman
(02:27:52)
So what to you is interesting? For example, if I get a chance to interview Zelensky, what to you is interesting about the person that would be good to ask about, to explore about, the state of his mind, his thinking, his view of the world as it stands today?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:28:07)
Next month we’re supposed to take place Ukrainian elections. They’re not taking place because the majority of Ukrainians don’t think this is the right thing to do, to change the president, to have the elections, to have a political struggle in the middle of the war. So Zelensky refused to call those elections, despite the fact that he is and continues to be the most popular politician in Ukraine. So it would be to his benefit, but that’s clearly not what the Ukrainians want. But the question of continuing as the president beyond five years also one way or another would raise questions about the legitimacy, and certainly Russia will be playing this card like there is no tomorrow. What I would be interested in asking Zelensky about, whether he sees that his second term, which comes on those conditions, would suggest a different attitude toward the opposition. Maybe some form of the coalition government, like it was the case in Britain with Churchill, under different circumstances of course, or this is basically, in his opinion, something that would be destructive and something that would really be an impediment for the issue, for the question of unity and war effort. And I would ask this question not to basically suggest that that’s the way to go, but I would be very much interested to hear what is his thinking about that is.

Power and War

Lex Fridman
(02:29:54)
Do you think there’s a degree during wartime that the power that comes with being a war president can corrupt the person, sort of push you away from the democratic mindset towards an authoritarian one?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:30:13)
I think that there is a possibility of that, right? In the conditions of any emergency, a war, in the case of the Soviet Union, there was a Chernobyl disaster and so on and so forth, you make decisions much faster. You create this vertical and then it’s very easy to get really used to that way dealing with the conditions of emergency. And in continuing emergency or with no emergency, they’re continuing the emergency mode. I think again, that would be a very, very natural thing for any human being to do to make it easier. Should I do that easier and in more effective way, or should I do the right way? That’s the challenge. Sometimes it’s difficult to answer this question.
Lex Fridman
(02:31:17)
Let me stay in power for just a little longer to do it the efficient way, and then time flies away and all of a sudden you’re going for the third term and the fourth term.
Serhii Plokhy
(02:31:28)
And suddenly it’s easy to realize that actually, you can’t control in any other way. Whatever skills you had or people around that can help, is that already gone?
Lex Fridman
(02:31:40)
Exactly. The people that surround you are not providing the kind of critical feedback necessary for democratic system. One of the things that Tucker said after his interview with Putin, he was just in his hotel just chatting on video, and he said that he felt like Putin was not very good at explaining himself, like a coherent, whole narrative of why the invasion happened or just this big picture. And he said that’s not because he doesn’t have one, but it’s been a long time since he’s had somebody around him where he has to explain himself to so he’s out of practice, which is very interesting. It’s a very interesting point. And that’s what war and being in power for a prolonged period of time can do. So on that topic, if you had a chance to talk to Putin, what kind of questions would you ask him? What would you like to find out about the man as he stands today?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:32:46)
As a historian, I have a lot of questions, and I have questions about when the decision was made to attack Ukraine and what went into this decision because we’re thinking about that, we’re trying to solve. As a historian, I have this big question. I have question about the Crimea when those decisions were made. So that sort of questions that interest me, but the rest either I think that I understand what is going on with him or I don’t expect the answer that can help. For example, a good question, whether you regret or not the start of the war in ’22, given the enormous, enormous casualties on both sides. But you can’t expect from a politician an honest answer to this question. Right? So there are questions to which I know he can’t answer honestly, and then there are other questions to which I think already provided all answers that he could. So what for me is of interest are basically questions for a historian about the timing and the logic of particular decisions.
Lex Fridman
(02:34:04)
Well, I do wonder how different what he says publicly is from what he thinks privately, so a question about when the decision to invade Ukraine happens is a very good question to give insight to the difference between how he thinks about the world privately versus what he says publicly. And same about empire is if you ask Putin, he will say he has no interest in empire and he finds the notion silly, but at the same time, perhaps privately there’s a sense in which he does seek the reunification of the Russian Empire.
Serhii Plokhy
(02:34:52)
Not in the form of the Russian Empire, not in the form of the Soviet Union, but certainly in some form of the Russian control. For me at least, it’s quite clear, otherwise there would be no busts to the Russian emperors and Catherine and Peter and others.
Lex Fridman
(02:35:18)
You wrote in your book titled The Frontline: Essays on Ukraine’s Past and Present about the Russian question, I guess articulated by Solzhenitsyn first in 1994. Solzhenitsyn of course is the year of The Gulag Archipelago, he’s half Ukrainian. What is the Russian question?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:35:42)
Solzhenitsyn clearly identifies himself as a Russian, and his opposition to the communist regime was a position of a Russianist. So his argument was that communism was bad for Russia, and for him Russian question is about the ethnic Russians, but also he was thinking about Russians in Putin’s terms, how Putin thinks. In Solzhenitsyn’s terms about Ukrainians and Belorussians constituting part of that. So the Russian question is the biggest tragedy of the 20th century, the the loss of the statehood and division of the Russians between different states. This is the Solzhenitsyn Russian question, and his original idea and plan was presented in the essay that he published in 1990, which was called How We Should Restructure Russia.

(02:36:52)
And restructure Russia meant getting rid of the Baltics, Central Asia Caucasus and have Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians, including those who live in northern Kazakhstan to create one nation state. So he was a Russian nationalist, but he was thinking about Russian nation state as the state of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians. And once the Soviet Union collapsed and his idea was not implemented in the 1990s, he formulated plan B, taking over by Russia of Donbas, Crimea, and southern Ukraine, the areas that now are included in the Russian constitution. So in historical terms and intellectual terms, what is happening today in the war between Russia and Ukraine is the vision on one level or another level that was formulated by the noble laureate Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, half Russian, half Ukrainian.
Lex Fridman
(02:38:04)
If there is such a thing, what would you say is the Ukrainian question as we stand today?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:38:10)
The Ukrainian question is very simple. Now it’s not anymore acquisition of the nation state, but actually a sovereign state. But it’s maintenance, so the Ukrainian question is like dozens of other questions in the 20th and 21st century, the rise of the new state. And that’s what is the Ukrainian question, whether Ukraine will continue to its existence as a nation, as an independent state, because that existence has been questioned by stating that Russians and Ukrainians so on are the same people, which de facto is saying your guy is Russian and also trying to destroy the state.
Lex Fridman
(02:38:58)
Is it possible that if the war in Ukraine continues for many more years, that the next leader that follows Zelensky would take Ukraine away from a democratic western style nation towards a more authoritarian one, maybe even with a far right influence, this kind of direction because of the influence of war?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:39:25)
Everything is possible and the longer the war continues, the more likely a scenario like that becomes. But realization of that scenario would go against the grain of largest part of Ukrainian history. Where Ukraine really emerged as a pluralistic state on which the elements of democracy were built in the last 30 years would go against the grain of the Ukrainian society where, as one author formulated in the 1990s, he wrote a book, Ukrainian Nationalism: A Minority Faith, where the nationalist was a minority faith. And radical nationalism continues to be or at least continued to be in 2019 a minority faith during the last elections. So possible, but unlikely given the historical realities of the last 30+ years.

Holodomor

Lex Fridman
(02:40:28)
I could talk to you for many more hours on Chernobyl alone, since you’ve written a book on Chernobyl and nuclear disaster. There’s just a million possible conversations here, but let me just jump around history a little bit. Back before World War II, my grandmother lived through Holodomor and World War II, Nazi-occupied Ukraine. Holodomor, what do you learn let’s say about human nature and about governments and nations from the fact that Holodomor happened? And maybe you could say what it is and why it happened?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:41:11)
Holodomor is a massive famine in Ukraine between the years 1932 and 1934, and it happened as the result of forceful collectivization of the agriculture, and a tamp on the part of Stalin also really roll Ukraine into the Soviet Union with basically no potential opposition from Ukraine, now national communists. So two things came together in December of 1932 when in the same decree, Stalin and Molotov signed a decree on the acquisition of the grain, which led eventually to the mass starvation, and on the banning of Ukrainian language publications and education in other Soviet republics outside of Ukraine, and introducing limitations on the so-called Ukrainianization policies, so the use of Ukrainian language in Ukraine itself. And the numbers are debated. The numbers that most of the scholars work today are 4 million, but again, there are larger numbers as well that circulate.

(02:42:39)
The famine of ’32-’33 was not exclusive Ukrainian phenomenon, but most of Ukraine in the Soviet Union died in Ukraine. And Ukraine was the only place where the policy on collecting grain were coming together with the policy of the cleansing of the political leadership, sending people from Moscow to recover the leadership and attack on Ukrainian culture. So in terms of what I learn about human nature, it’s more me learning about the ideologies of the 20th century because it’s not the only famine in the communist lands. The famine in China, which was in terms of the numbers, much more devastating than that. It’s in a different category and for a good reason, but you have Holocaust. What unites these things is the time. This is 20th century.

(02:43:49)
What unites them are the dominance in the societies that are doing that, really ideologies that not just devalued human life, but considered that actually the way forward is by destroying large group of populations defined ethnically, religiously, socially, or otherwise, which tells about the time, but tells also about humanity because for centuries before that human life was valued. There were enemies, but the idea was that human life can put and at the end of the day, they can be slaves. You can use them for productive force. Countries in the 18th century with southern Ukraine, they were looking for settlers, for people to bring and live on land. You move into the 20th century and there is mass destruction of the population in the name of ideologies, which basically are by definition destroy human lives.

(02:44:57)
And that’s what’s really so shocking and striking because that break with not just with issues of morale, not just with issues of humanity, with any common sense, what is happening. And I’m absolutely convinced that we didn’t learn the lesson. I’m absolutely convinced that we didn’t learn the lesson. With turning our page on fascism communism, we somehow decided that we are free of that. That at least in those terms, history came to and end. That what is ahead is the future and nothing of that sort. What happened would take place to a degree that people would get in trouble for comparing any statements or events that happening today with the communism or fascism. And so I feel responsibility of myself and as a historian in particular for not doing a better job about telling people that, “Well, we are who we are and we have as humans our dark side and we have to be very careful.”
Lex Fridman
(02:46:25)
So there is a human capacity to be captured by an idea, an ideology that claims to bring up a better world as the Nazis did, as Soviet Union did. And on the path of doing that, devaluing human life, that we will bring a better world. And if millions of people have to be tortured on the way to that, all right, but at least we have a better world and human beings are able to if not accept it, look the other way.
Serhii Plokhy
(02:47:01)
Yes. And in the name of a particular nation or race, like it was the Third Reich or in the name of the humanity of the future. So not just devalue human life, destroy human life.

Chernobyl

Lex Fridman
(02:47:17)
Is there something fundamental about communism and centralized planning that’s part of the problem here? Maybe this also connects to the story of Chernobyl, where the Chernobyl disaster is not just a story of failure of a nuclear power plant, but it’s an entire institution of the scientific and nuclear institution, but the entirety of the government.
Serhii Plokhy
(02:47:42)
There is, and there is a number of factors of political and social character that produced Chernobyl. One of them is generally the atmosphere of secrecy in the Soviet Union in the conditions of the Cold War. Chernobyl reactor was a dual purpose reactor. It could boil water today and produce enriched uranium tomorrow, so it was top secret and if there were problems with that reactor, those problems were kept secret even at people who operated the reactor. That’s what happened in Chernobyl. Another big, big part of the story, which is specifically Soviet, that’s the nature of the managerial culture and administrative culture in which people had no right to make their own decisions in their place, in their position.

(02:48:48)
A few years before that, Three Mile Island happened, which was a big, big nuclear disaster, but in terms of consequences, nothing like Chernobyl. And there in the context of the American legal culture and managerial culture, people who were operators, who were in managerial positions, that was their responsibility to take decisions. President Carter came there, but he was not calling shots on none of those issues. What you see with Chernobyl, and people who saw HBO series know that very well, the moment the high official arrives, everyone actually falls in line, it’s the official who calls the shot. And to move population from the city of Pripyat, you needed the okay coming from Moscow from the very top. So that is Soviet story, and then there is a global story of cutting corners to meet either deadlines like it was with that test that they were running at that time, or to meet production quotas. This is not just socialist thing, you can-
Serhii Plokhy
(02:50:00)
… quotas, this is not just socialist thing. You can replace production quotas with profit and you get the same story. So some parts in that story are generally reflective of today’s world in general. Others are very specific, very specific for Soviet Union, for Soviet experience. And then the biggest, probably, Soviet part of that story is that on the one hand, the government in Moscow and Kiev, they mobilize all resources to deal with that, but they keep information about what is happening and the radiation clouds secret from the rest of the population, something that completely would be impossible and was impossible in the US, in UK where other accidents happened.

(02:50:58)
And then guess what? A few years later, the Soviet Union collapses very much also thanks to the mobilization of people over the issue of Chernobyl and nuclear energy. People writing about that subject call it eco-nationalism, ecological nationalism, which comes at least in part from withholding information from people. And in Ukraine, mobilization didn’t start over the issues that led to independence, didn’t start over the issue of language or didn’t start over the issue of national autonomy. It started under the slogans, “Tell us the truth about Chernobyl. We want to know whether we live in contaminated areas or not.”

(02:51:50)
And that was a very, very strong factor that crossed, not just ethnic religious linguistic lines, lines between members of the party and not members of the party of the topĀ§ leadership and not in military and civilian because it turned out that the party card didn’t protect you from being affected by radiation. So the all national mobilization happens. The first mass manifestations are about Chernobyl, not about anything else.
Lex Fridman
(02:52:24)
That’s fascinating. For people who might not know, Chernobyl is located in Ukraine. It’s a fascinating view that Chernobyl might be one of the critical threshold catalysts for the collapse of the Soviet Union. That’s very interesting. Just as a small aside, I guess this is a good moment to give some love to the HBO series. Even though it’s British accents and so on, it made me realize that some of these stories in Eastern Europe could be told very effectively through film, through series. It’s so incredibly well done. And maybe I can ask you. Historically speaking, were you impressed?
Serhii Plokhy
(02:53:09)
I was. I was and I think that the mini-series are very truthful on a number of levels and very untruthful on some others. And they got very well the macro and micro levels. So the macro level is the issue of the big truth and the story there is very much built around the theme that I just discussed now. It’s about the cost of lies and the Soviet Union lying to the people. And that’s what the film explores. So that, I call it a big truth about Chernobyl. And they got a lot of minor things really, really very well. Like the curtains on the windows, like how the houses looked from inside and outside. I didn’t see any post-Soviet film or any western film that would be so good at capturing those everyday details.

(02:54:23)
But then there is a huge gray area in between big truth and small truths of recreating the environment. And that’s how you get from one to another. And then you see the KGB officers coming and taking someone out of the meeting and arresting, which was not necessary. You see the Soviet boss threatening someone to throw the person from the helicopter. So you get these Hollywood sort of things despite the fact that it’s HBO series. And they’re the best really as a film in the fourth episode where they completely decided just to hell with the reality and let’s make a film.

(02:55:10)
So they bring Legasov, one of the key characters, to the court meetings. They bring Soviet party boss, Shcherbina, he wasn’t there. They created drama there. So they got the main thing, the big truth right, and that’s why I like this production.
Lex Fridman
(02:55:35)
Sometimes to show what something felt like you have to go bigger than it actually was. If you… I don’t know. If you experience heartbreak and you see a film about it, you want there to be explosions.
Serhii Plokhy
(02:55:53)
You want to see this in images. Visible, right? But the question again, I just mentioned KGB marching in and some party leader giving a speech, they were not giving that speech, but the sense was there and it was in the air and I, as people of my generation who were there, knew that and recognized that. But for new generation, whether they are in Ukraine and Russia, in US, in Britain, in Zimbabwe, anywhere, you have do these little untruths and introduce them. And I had a very interesting on-air conversation with the author of the script, Mazin, and I asked him the question of the film declared really the importance of the truth, but how do you square that with the need in the film, to really put it mildly, to go beyond the measures of truth, whatever understanding of that term is?
Lex Fridman
(02:57:12)
Well, I suppose it is a bit terrifying that some of the most dramatic moments in history are probably quite mundane. The decisions to begin wars, invasions, they’re probably something like a Zoom meeting on a random Tuesday in today’s workplace. So it’s not like there’s dramatic music playing. These are just human decisions and they command armies and they command destruction. I personally, because of that, believe in the power of individuals to be able to stop wars, not just start wars, individual leaders.

Nuclear power


(02:57:51)
So let me just ask about nuclear safety because there’s an interesting point you make. You wrote in the book in Atoms and Ashes: A Global History of Nuclear Disasters, so technically nuclear energy is extremely safe. If there’s a number of people died per energy generated, it’s much safer than coal oil, for example, as far as I understand. But the case you also make is you write, quote, “Many of the political, economic, social and cultural factors that led to the accidents of the past are still with us today, making the nuclear industry vulnerable to repeating old mistakes in new and unexpected ways and any new accidents are certain to create new anti-nuclear mobilization.”

(02:58:35)
And then you continue with, “This makes the nuclear industry not only risky to operate, but also impossible to count on as a long-term solution to an overwhelming problem.” Can you explain that perspective? It’s an interesting one, speaking to the psychology when an accident does happen, it has a dramatic effect. And also speaking to the fact that accidents can happen, not because of the safety of the nuclear power plant, but of the underlying structure of government that oversees it.
Serhii Plokhy
(02:59:14)
Yes, I wrote a book on Chernobyl and then I tried to understand Chernobyl better by placing it in the context of other disasters. As a historian I was looking at the political factors and social factors and cultural factors, not the physics or engineering part of the story. And the factors that are still with us are, like it was the case in Chernobyl, the authoritarian regimes and high centralization of the decision-making and desire to cut corners and also the issues associated with secrecy.

(02:59:57)
So that is with us, if you look at where the future of the nuclear industry is now at this point, it’s the regimes and powers in the Middle East, that’s a big new frontier. The countries that are not particularly known for the history of democratic existence. Where we also have the situation that we had at Three Mile Island that we had at Chernobyl, this is the first generation nuclear engineers. So people who are, where the country doesn’t have a lot of experience and generations after generations working in that particular industry where it’s all new. That is certainly additional risk.

(03:00:53)
And what we got now with this current war is something that… Not that people completely didn’t expect, but didn’t happen in the past. You see the war come into the nuclear sites, Chernobyl was taken over by the Russian army or National Guard rather, on the first day of the invasion. Then there was Zaporizhzhia, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe where the battle was waged on the territory of the nuclear power plant. The missiles being fired, buildings catching fire, and the situation that brought the Fukushima disaster was there at Zaporizhzhia more than once, and Fukushima came because the reactors were shut down as they are at Zaporizhzhia, but they still needed electricity to bring water and to them down.

(03:01:52)
And in Fukushima case, it was the tsunami that cut off the supply of electricity. In the case of Zaporizhzhia, there was the warfare that was happening in the area around Zaporizhzhia that did the same effect. So we have 440 reactors in the world today, plus minus. None of them was designed to withstand the direct missile attack or to function in the conditions of the warfare. Operators they’re human, then they make mistakes like they did it Three Mile Island or Chernobyl. But think also if the war is happening around them, if they’re not sure what is happening with their families, if they don’t know whether next missile, whether will hit the control room or not, that multiplies also.

(03:02:46)
So we are in a situation where we are not done yet with the nuclear accidents. It’s not like we don’t pay attention or we don’t learn. Smart people work on that and after every accident, try to figure the way how not to step into the same trap. But next accident would actually expose new vulnerability. You deal with Chernobyl and then tsunami comes. You deal with tsunami and then war comes. And we really in that sense, we have sometimes wild imagination, but sometimes it’s difficult to imagine what can happen next. So we are not done. There will be nuclear accidents unfortunately in the future.

(03:03:41)
And that makes nuclear energy so problematic when you count on it to fight climate change. I’ll explain why. You gave the figures how many people die from burning coal, from how many people die from radiation. And it’s a good argument. Some people would question them because it’s also the issue of not just dying, but impact of radiation on cancer, on our health, which is not completely understood yet. So still there is a lot of question marks, but let’s assume what you’re saying, that’s the figures. That’s how it is. But we as people, for whatever reason are not afraid of coal, but we’re very much afraid of radiation. It’s invisible, it’s everywhere and you can’t see it.

(03:04:43)
And then you start having issues and then you have problems during the COVID, the governments closed the borders, maybe a good idea, maybe not so good ideas, isolation. So that was the way governments started to fight for access, to fight, to Moderna, to Sputnik, to whatever it’s, to vaccine. So now back to the radiation. What is happening once Chernobyl happens? That’s the highest point in the development of nuclear industry so far in terms of how many new reactors were commissioned or the licenses were issued.

(03:05:35)
The next reactor after Three Mile Island in the US go ahead was given, it seems to me 10 years ago or something like that, the Fukushima happens, the reaction is in China to that as well. They’re very much concerned. So there is a saying in the field, “Anywhere is Chernobyl everywhere.” After Fukushima, Germany decides to go nuclear-free and gets there at the expense of burning coal. So that’s how we react. And each major accident, that means global freeze on the nuclear reactor production for at least another 10 years. So that’s what I mean that nuclear industry is politic, not just in terms of technology and not just in terms of radiation, impact on health, but also politically a very, very unreliable option.
Lex Fridman
(03:06:38)
And to you, you suspect that’s an irreparable aspect of human nature in the human mind that there are certain things that just create a kind of panic, invisible threats of this kind. Whether it’s a virus or radiation. There’s something about the mind, if I get a stomach ache in the United States after Fukushima, I kind of think it’s probably radiation, this kind of irrational type of thinking. And that’s not possible to repair?
Serhii Plokhy
(03:07:10)
I think we can be trained. We can be trained.
Lex Fridman
(03:07:15)
Pretty smart, aren’t we? Education.
Serhii Plokhy
(03:07:16)
But generally, we are afraid of things that we see, but even more, we’re afraid of things that we don’t see and radiation is one of those.

Future of the world

Lex Fridman
(03:07:28)
Let’s zoom out on the world. We talked about the war in Ukraine. How does the war in Ukraine change the world order? Let me just look at everything that’s going on. Zoom out a bit. China, the Israel-Gaza war, the Middle East, India. What is interesting to you, important to think about, in the coming years and decades?
Serhii Plokhy
(03:07:57)
As a historian, and I’m trained that way, I have a feeling of deja vu. I see the Cold War is coming back in many of its features. And the war started, and we discussed that, in 2014, at least in my interpretation, with Russia trying to really reestablish its control over the post-Soviet space and Ukraine was crucial for that project. The more global Russian vision since 1990s was that they didn’t like the American monopolar world. They knew and realized that they couldn’t go back to the bipolar world of the Cold War era. So the vision was multipolar world. Again, it wasn’t just academic exercise, it was a political exercise in which Russia would be one of the poles on par with China, on par with European Union, on par with the United States. That’s very broadly speaking the context in which the war starts in 2014.

(03:09:21)
Where we are now? Well, we are now in Russia certainly trying to regain its military strength, but no one actually believes that Russia is the superpower it was imagined before 2022. We see certainly Russia finding the way to deal with the sanctions, but we don’t see certainly Russia as an economic power with any sort of a future. So it is not an implosion of the Russian military economic and political power, but it’s significantly… actually it’s diminished. So today, very difficult to imagine Russia emerging as another pole of the multipolar world. Not impossible, but the war certainly made that very problematic and much more difficult.

(03:10:26)
On the other hand, what the war did, it basically awakened the old West. United States and Western Europe transatlantic alliance. On the top of that, there are East European countries that are even much, even much stronger proponents of assistance for Ukraine than is Germany or the United States of America. So it is the replay of the Cold War story, the Return of the West, one of the chapters in my book, the Russo-Ukrainian War is called that way. We also can see the elements of the rebuilding of the Beijing-Moscow alliance of the 1950s, which was a very important part of the Cold War. It was extremely important part of the Korean War that in many ways launched also the Cold War globally.

(03:11:25)
So I see a lot of parallels of going back to the time of the Cold War and the bipolar world that emerges, it’s not anymore the world focused on Washington and Moscow. It’s more like world focused on Washington and Beijing. And then there are countries in between. There are countries in between that join one bloc or another bloc that is emerging that is not fully formed. This, in my opinion, makes the task of us historians to really go back to the Cold War and look through new perspective on the history of that conflict because there is a lot of things that we can learn.
Lex Fridman
(03:12:14)
So in some ways, history does repeat itself here. So now it’s a cold war with China and the United States. What’s a hopeful trajectory for the 21st century for the rest of it?
Serhii Plokhy
(03:12:28)
The hopeful trajectory is really trying to be as wise and as lucky as our predecessors during the Cold War War were. Because the dominant discourse so far about the Cold War was what a horrible thing that Cold War was. What did we do wrong? How did we end up in the Cold War? And I think especially today, this is a wrong question to ask. The right question to ask is how did it happen? What did we do so right that for now more than 70 years, we don’t have a world war? How come that after World War I, World War II came within 20 years? What helped us to keep the world on the brink, but still away from the global war for such a long period of time? How to keep the Cold War cold. That’s the biggest lesson that the history of the Cold War can give us. And I don’t think we ask the question quite often enough, ask the question that way. And if you don’t ask right questions, we don’t get right answers.
Lex Fridman
(03:13:53)
Yeah, you’ve written a book, a great book on the Cuban Missile crisis. We came very close, not to just another world war, but to a nuclear war and the destruction of human civilization as we know it. So I guess it’s a good question to ask, what did we do so right? And maybe one of the answers could be that we just got lucky. And the question is how do we keep getting lucky?
Serhii Plokhy
(03:14:32)
Luck is clearly, clearly one of the factors in Cuban Missile crisis because what happened there, and there is one of the lessons, is that eventually, the commanders at the top, they believe that they have all the cards, they negotiate with each other. They try to see who blinks first in the game of nuclear brinkmanship. The trick is that they don’t control fully people on the ground. The most dangerous moment, or one of the most dangerous moment of the Cuban Missile crisis was the Soviet missile shooting down the American airplane, killing the pilot, an act of war. So technically we’re already in the war. And the order to shoot the missile was given with Moscow having no clue what was going on the ground. Moscow never gave approval for that.

(03:15:40)
And again, I described that in book many times about Kennedy bringing back his wisdom from World War II years. There always will be SOB who didn’t get the order or missed things that was happening on the American side as well. So people who believe that they’re in control really are not in control, and that can escalate whether they very often against their wishes. So that is one lesson, but going back to what we’re still here and why the world didn’t end up in 1962 is that the leadership, and I come to the issue that you strongly believe in that people, personalities matter, leaders matter. They were very different. Age, education, political careers, understanding what politics are and so on and so forth.
Lex Fridman
(03:16:45)
You mean Khrushchev?
Serhii Plokhy
(03:16:47)
Khrushchev and Kennedy. Yes, but they had one thing in common, that in one way they belong to the same generation. That was generation of the Bikini Atoll, that was the generation of the hydrogen bomb. The bomb that unlike the atomic bomb, they knew could destroy the world. And they were scared. They were scared of the nuclear weapons and they tried to do whatever they could pushing against their advisors or trying to deal with their anxieties. The first is true for Kennedy, later maybe for Khrushchev to make sure that the war between the United States and the Soviet Union doesn’t start because they knew that that war would be a nuclear war.

(03:17:50)
So we have a very, very paradoxical sort of situation. The crisis occurred because of the nuclear weapons, because Khrushchev put them on Cuba, but the crisis was resolved and we didn’t end in the third World War because of the nuclear weapons, because people, leaders were afraid of them. And that’s where I want to put emphasis. It’s not that the nuclear weapons created crisis or solved the crisis, it’s basically our perception of them. And we are now in the age after the Cold War era, with the new generation of voters, with the new generation of politicians. We don’t belong to the generation of bikini atoll. You maybe know what bikini is, but we think that this is something-
Lex Fridman
(03:18:42)
It’s a different thing. Yeah.
Serhii Plokhy
(03:18:42)
… That this is something else. And it’s very important.
Lex Fridman
(03:18:46)
It’s so fascinating how that fades into memory, that the power and the respect and fear of the power of nuclear weapons just fades into memory. And then we may very well make the same mistakes again.
Serhii Plokhy
(03:18:59)
Yes, we can.
Lex Fridman
(03:19:01)
Another leader said that, I believe, but about a totally different topic. Well, like you said, I’m also glad that we’re here as a civilization, that we’re still seem to be going on. There’s several billion of us. And I’m also glad that the two of us are here. I’ve read a lot of your books. I’ve been recommending it. Please keep writing. Thank you for talking today. This was an honor.
Serhii Plokhy
(03:19:24)
Thank you very much, Lex. It was a pleasure.
Lex Fridman
(03:19:27)
Thanks for listening to this conversation with Serhii Plokhy. To support this podcast. Please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, let me leave you with some words from Ernest Hemingway. “Never think that war, no matter how necessary nor how justified is not a crime.” Thank you for listening and hope to see you next time.